Freiberg, Peck & Kang, LLP (Yilo J. Kang of counsel), for appellant. Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Edward H. King, J.), entered June 4, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint only to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse hearing.

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Edward H. King, J.) entered June 4, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint only to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse hearing.

No appeal lies as of right from an order setting a matter down for a traverse hearing (see CCA 1702 [a] [2]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Omezie, 54 Misc 3d 136[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50110[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]; Wheeler v McCreight, 34 Misc 3d 144[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50143[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Citibank, N.A. v S & J Inzlicht, Inc., 8 Misc 3d 134[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51174[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]; see also Frost v Halvorsen, 100 AD2d 608 [1984]), and we decline to grant leave to appeal therefrom.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

Freiberg, Peck & Kang, LLP (Yilo J. Kang of counsel), for appellant. Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Edward H. King, J.), entered June 4, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint only to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse hearing.

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Edward H. King, J.) entered June 4, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint only to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse hearing.

For the reasons stated in Shamrock Med., P.C., as Assignee of Rexford Bishop v Personal Serv. Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2025 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2024-858 K C], decided herewith), the appeal is dismissed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

Freiberg, Peck & Kang, LLP (Yilo J. Kang of counsel), for appellant. Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Edward H. King, J.), entered June 4, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint only to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse hearing.

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Edward H. King, J.) entered June 4, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint only to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse hearing.

For the reasons stated in Shamrock Med., P.C., as Assignee of Rexford Bishop v Personal Serv. Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2025 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2024-858 K C], decided herewith), the appeal is dismissed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

Roman Kravchenko (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant. Bruno, Gerbino. Soriano & Aitken, LLP (Vince Gerbino and Alfred Polidore of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Robert E. Pipia, J.), dated July 31, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the branch of petitioner’s motion seeking an award of attorney’s fees.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, the branch of petitioner’s motion seeking an award of attorney’s fees is granted and the matter is remitted to the District Court to determine the amount of attorney’s fees to which petitioner is entitled, in accordance with this decision and order.

After the provider’s claims for assigned first-party no-fault benefits were denied, the parties proceeded to arbitration and the no-fault arbitrator made an award in favor of the provider, which award was upheld by a master arbitrator. As the insurer did not timely satisfy the award (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [e] [4]), the provider commenced this proceeding to confirm the master arbitration award (see CPLR 7510). The provider moved to confirm the master arbitrator’s award and, insofar as is relevant here, for an award of attorney’s fees. Shortly thereafter, the insurer paid petitioner the amount of the master arbitration award. By order dated July 31, 2024, the District Court (Robert E. Pipia, J.) granted the branch of the motion seeking to confirm the master arbitration award but denied the branch of the motion seeking attorney’s fees, finding that, notwithstanding 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4), the provider was not entitled to an award of additional attorney’s fees because “the instant proceeding is a special proceeding that was commenced for the sole purpose of confirming a master arbitration award. It was not commenced to resolve a dispute de novo, nor was it brought to appeal the underlying master arbitration award.”

“The attorney’s fee for services rendered . . . in a court appeal from a master arbitration [*2]award and any further appeals, shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]). “The term ‘court appeal’ applies to a proceeding taken pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award” (Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v TC Acupuncture P.C., 179 AD3d 414, 414 [2020]; see Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017]). As the Court of Appeals has stated with regard to the No-Fault Law (see Insurance Law article 51), “[t]o implement [the] legislative aim of curtailing delay and reducing expense in the adjustment of motor vehicle accident claims, the regulations are written to encourage prompt payment of claims, to discourage investigation by insurers, and to penalize delays” (Dermatossian v New York City Tr. Auth., 67 NY2d 219, 225 [1986] [emphasis added] [citation omitted]). Consequently, where, as here, the insurer failed to timely (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [e] [4]) pay the amounts set forth in the master arbitration award and the provider commenced a proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7510 to confirm the master arbitration award so that it could be reduced to a judgment, the provider is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees, fixed by the court, for the District Court proceeding as well as for fees incurred on this appeal (see 11 NYCRR § 65-4.10 [j] [4]; Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v TC Acupuncture P.C., 179 AD3d 414; Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 170 AD3d 1168, 1169 [2019]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703; Matter of Metro Pain Specialist, P.C., v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 66 Misc 3d 135[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50014[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2020]). In view of the foregoing, the matter is remitted to the District Court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to which the provider is entitled.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, the branch of petitioner’s motion seeking an award of attorney’s fees is granted and the matter is remitted to the District Court to determine the amount of attorney’s fees to which petitioner is entitled, in accordance with this decision and order

GARGUILO, P.J., DRISCOLL and GOLDBERG-VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

Gary Tsirelman, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Robyn M. Brilliant (Robyn M. Brilliant of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), dated February 1, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that, on the court’s own motion, the notice of appeal from a “judgment” purportedly entered February 1, 2024 is deemed a notice of appeal from the order dated February 1, 2024 (see CPLR 5520 [c]); and it is further,

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) dated February 1, 2024 granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the vehicle insured by defendant (the insured vehicle), was not involved in the accident.

In support of its motion, defendant relied on the truth of statements made in a police report regarding the accident. While the police report was certified, the statements within the report attributed to the driver of an unrelated vehicle, a witness and plaintiff’s assignor were inadmissible hearsay, as no exception to the hearsay rule was established for the statements (see Yassin v Blackman, 188 AD3d 62, 66 [2020]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 38 Misc 3d 128[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52388[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]). The statement in a purported transcript of a call with the owner of the insured vehicle, which defendant offered for its truth, was also inadmissible hearsay. In any event, defendant’s own papers demonstrated that there are conflicting accounts as to how the alleged accident occurred and whether the insured vehicle was involved. Thus, defendant’s motion failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that there are no material issues of fact to be determined.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

MUNDY, J.P., TOUSSAINT and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

Martyn, Smith, Murray & Yong (Thomas M. Martyn of counsel), for appellant. Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ira R. Greenberg, J.), dated April 12, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment of that court entered September 14, 2023.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action in 2000 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. The parties agreed to settle the matter, and plaintiff’s counsel tendered to defendant’s counsel a letter dated March 30, 2006, to which a general release and a stipulation of discontinuance were appended. After plaintiff applied to the clerk for the entry of a judgment pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e) in June 2023, predicated upon the alleged failure of defendant to make prompt payment (see CPLR 5003-a [a]), a judgment was entered against defendant on September 14, 2023.

In October 2023, defendant moved to, among other things, vacate the judgment. One of defendant’s arguments in support of its motion was that plaintiff failed to satisfy its CPLR 5003-a (a) obligations before entering judgment. Plaintiff opposed the motion, to which defendant replied. As limited by its brief, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Ira R. Greenberg, J.) dated April 12, 2024 as denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the judgment.

“The purpose of CPLR 5003-a is to encourage the prompt payment of damages in settled actions” (Pitt v New York City Hous. Auth., 106 AD3d 797, 797-798 [2013]). CPLR 5003-a (a) requires a settling defendant to “pay all sums due to any settling plaintiff within twenty-one days of tender, by the settling plaintiff to the settling defendant, of a duly executed release and a stipulation discontinuing action executed on behalf of the settling plaintiff” (see Orthotics & [*2]Professional Supply, Ltd. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 77 Misc 3d 130[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 51221[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). In the context of CPLR 5003-a (a), “tender . . . shall mean either to personally deliver or to mail, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested” (CPLR 5003-a [g]; see J.D.T. v Chaimowitz, 218 AD3d 821, 823 [2023]; DJS Med. Supplies, Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 143[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52456[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). “If the settling defendant fails to pay the sum due under the settlement agreement within 21 days of tender of [a duly executed release and a stipulation discontinuing action executed on behalf of the settling plaintiff], the statute authorizes the plaintiff to enter, without further notice, a judgment in the amount of the settlement, which is to include interest, costs, and disbursements” (Klee v Americas Best Bottling Co., Inc., 76 AD3d 544, 545 [2010]; see CPLR 5003-a [e]).

While defendant contends that the judgment was improperly entered because plaintiff failed prove on its application to the clerk for the entry of a judgment pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e) that it tendered to defendant the executed release and stipulation of discontinuance by personal delivery or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested (see CPLR 5003-a [a], [g]), it was defendant’s burden on its motion to vacate the judgment to show plaintiff’s noncompliance with CPLR 5003-a (see Medtech Med. Supply, Inc. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 74 Misc 3d 137[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50304[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). However, defendant submitted no evidence to show that plaintiff failed to tender the requisite documents to defendant in accordance with CPLR 5003-a.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

MUNDY, J.P., BUGGS and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), entered July 16, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) entered July 16, 2024 as granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification. While plaintiff does not argue that its cross-motion should have been granted, on appeal, plaintiff argues that the order, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed and the matter remitted to the Civil Court for consideration of what plaintiff denominated as an amended cross-motion, which the court declined to consider, rejecting that submission as an improper surreply. In the alternative, plaintiff argues that defendant’s motion should have been denied.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, it was not improper for defendant to seek, during the claim verification stage, information—such as management agreements, W-2 forms, business-related bank records and lease agreements—for the purpose of determining whether plaintiff was ineligible to collect no-fault benefits due to a failure to meet licensing requirements (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.16 [a] [1]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313 [2005]; Burke Physical Therapy, P.C., v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 85 Misc 3d 130[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50196[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]).

Plaintiff also argues that the instant action cannot be maintained, as collateral estoppel effect should be given to an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, in a declaratory judgment action brought by defendant herein in that court, denying defendant’s motion for [*2]summary judgment (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Burke Physical Therapy, P.C., 2022 NY Slip Op 30580[U] [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2022]). However, this court has previously held that the denial of that motion by the Supreme Court “has no preclusive effect . . . as it was not a final determination on the merits” (Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 Misc 3d 41, 45 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]). Thus, we need not address plaintiff’s contention that the Civil Court erred in declining, on procedural grounds, to consider plaintiff’s subsequent submission of that Supreme Court decision and order in support of plaintiff’s “amended” cross-motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

MUNDY, J.P., BUGGS and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.