Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lenox Hill Hosp. (NSUH) (2026 NY Slip Op 01052)
| Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lenox Hill Hosp. (NSUH) |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 01052 |
| Decided on February 25, 2026 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. |
LARA J. GENOVESI, J.P.
PAUL WOOTEN
LOURDES M. VENTURA
DONNA-MARIE E. GOLIA, JJ.
2024-04107
(Index No. 535871/22)
v
Lenox Hill Hospital (NSUH), etc., appellant.
Roman Kravchenko, Melville, NY (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant.
Short & Bill, P.C., New York, NY (Seok Ho [Richard] Kang of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award, Lenox Hill Hospital (NSUH) appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Heela D. Capell, J.), dated February 15, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the motion of Lenox Hill Hospital (NSUH) which were to compel the petitioner to comply with an information subpoena, to impose a $50 fine upon the petitioner, and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees, and granted that branch of the petitioner’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena.
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the motion of Lenox Hill Hospital (NSUH) which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the petitioner, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
In 2022, the petitioner, American Transit Insurance Company (hereinafter American Transit), commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award entered in favor of Lenox Hill Hospital (NSUH) (hereinafter Lenox Hill). Lenox Hill cross-petitioned, inter alia, to confirm the master arbitration award. In a judgment dated May 24, 2023, the Supreme Court, among other things, confirmed the master arbitration award and awarded Lenox Hill attorneys’ fees in the sum of $500. In August and September 2023, American Transit paid the sums owed to Lenox Hill, except for postjudgment interest in the sum of $192.
Lenox Hill served American Transit with an information subpoena. Thereafter, Lenox Hill moved, inter alia, to compel American Transit to comply with the information subpoena, to impose a $50 fine upon American Transit, and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees. American Transit cross-moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. In an order dated February 15, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied those branches of Lenox Hill’s motion and granted that branch of American Transit’s cross-motion. Lenox Hill appeals.
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting that branch of American Transit’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. “An application to quash a subpoena should be granted only where the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious . . . or where the information sought is utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry” (Matter of Kapon v Koch, 23 NY3d 32, 38 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v Abrams, 71 NY2d 327, 331-332; 8206 N. Blvd, LLC v Ai Qiu Qu, 232 AD3d 833, 834). Here, American Transit established that the requested information in the information subpoena was irrelevant and that Lenox Hill served the information subpoena to harass American Transit.
However, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of Lenox Hill’s motion which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees. The general rule is that in proceedings involving arbitration, as in other litigation, attorneys’ fees are not recoverable unless provided for by agreement or statute (see Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705; Myron Assoc. v Obstfeld, 224 AD2d 504). “Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations” (Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 705 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 15). As Lenox Hill sought payment of postjudgment interest in the sum of $192 that was overdue, Lenox Hill was entitled to an award of additional attorneys’ fees for the services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue postjudgment interest. However, Lenox Hill was not entitled to an award of additional attorneys’ fees for the remainder of the services performed by its attorneys in connection with preparing and serving the information subpoena and prosecuting this appeal, which were not part of a legitimate attempt to collect payment of an overdue claim or portion of a claim.
Accordingly, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of the additional attorneys’ fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) to which Lenox Hill is entitled.
Lenox Hill’s remaining contentions are without merit.
GENOVESI, J.P., WOOTEN, VENTURA and GOLIA, JJ., concur.
Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court
Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v MTS Acupuncture, P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 01053)
| Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v MTS Acupuncture, P.C. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 01053 |
| Decided on February 25, 2026 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. |
LARA J. GENOVESI, J.P.
PAUL WOOTEN
LOURDES M. VENTURA
DONNA-MARIE E. GOLIA, JJ.
2024-06668
(Index No. 536898/22)
v
MTS Acupuncture, P.C., etc., appellant.
Roman Kravchenko, Melville, NY (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant.
Larkin Farrell, LLC, New York, NY (William Larkin and Melissa A. Marano of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to confirm a master arbitration award, MTS Acupuncture, P.C., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ingrid Joseph, J.), dated July 3, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the petitioner’s motion which was to direct the entry of a satisfaction of judgment, denied, as academic, those branches of the motion of MTS Acupuncture, P.C., which were to compel the petitioner to comply with an information subpoena, to impose a $50 fine against the petitioner, and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees, and denied, as academic, that branch of the petitioner’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena.
ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order as denied, as academic, that branch of the petitioner’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena is dismissed, as MTS Acupuncture, P.C., is not aggrieved by that portion of the order (see CPLR 5511; Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144, 156-157); and it is further,
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying, as academic, that branch of the motion of MTS Acupuncture, P.C., which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion on the merits; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,
ORDERED that with one bill of costs is awarded to the petitioner.
In 2022, the petitioner, American Transit Insurance Company (hereinafter American Transit), commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award entered in favor of MTS Acupuncture, P.C. (hereinafter MTS), for no-fault benefits. MTS cross-petitioned, inter alia, to confirm the master arbitration award. In a judgment dated March 21, 2023, the Supreme Court, among other things, confirmed the master arbitration award and awarded MTS attorneys’ fees. In April and May 2023, American Transit paid the sums owed.
Thereafter, MTS served American Transit with an information subpoena. MTS moved, inter alia, to compel American Transit to comply with the information subpoena, to impose a $50 fine against American Transit, and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees. American Transit cross-moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. American Transit also moved, inter alia, to direct the entry of a satisfaction of judgment. In an order dated July 3, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of American Transit’s motion which was to direct the entry of a satisfaction of judgment, denied, as academic, those branches of MTS’s motion which were to compel American Transit to comply with the information subpoena, to impose a $50 fine against American Transit, and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees, and denied, as academic, that branch of American Transit’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. MTS appeals.
The Supreme Court properly determined that American Transit issued payments satisfying the judgment and directed the entry of a satisfaction of judgment pursuant to CPLR 5021(a)(2) (see Breck Contr. Corp. v Vecchione, 73 Misc 2d 1002, 1004 [Suffolk Dist Ct, 2d Dist]). Since the judgment was satisfied, MTS was not entitled to any additional discovery (see CPLR 5223). Moreover, the court properly denied, as academic, those branches of MTS’s motion which were to compel American Transit to comply with the information subpoena and to impose a $50 fine against American Transit.
However, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of MTS’s motion which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees on the merits, not as academic. The general rule is that in proceedings involving arbitration, as in other litigation, attorneys’ fees are not recoverable unless provided for by agreement or statute (see Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705; Myron Assoc. v Obstfeld, 224 AD2d 504). “Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations” (Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 705 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 15). MTS was not entitled to an award of additional attorneys’ fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for its postjudgment motion practice, as no claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits was overdue.
MTS’s remaining contentions are without merit.
GENOVESI, J.P., WOOTEN, VENTURA and GOLIA, JJ., concur.
Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court
Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C. (2026 NY Slip Op 01054)
| Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 01054 |
| Decided on February 25, 2026 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. |
LARA J. GENOVESI, J.P.
PAUL WOOTEN
LOURDES M. VENTURA
DONNA-MARIE E. GOLIA, JJ.
2024-02481
2024-04108
(Index No. 502863/22)
v
YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C., etc., appellant.
Roman Kravchenko, Melville, NY (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant.
Short & Billy, P.C., New York, NY (Seok Ho [Richard] Kang of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award, YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C., appeals from two orders of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rupert V. Barry, J.), both dated November 1, 2023. The first order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the motion of YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C., which was to compel the petitioner to comply with an information subpoena and granted that branch of the petitioner’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. The second order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the petitioner’s motion which was to direct the entry of a satisfaction of judgment and denied the cross-motion of YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C., pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees.
ORDERED that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
In 2022, the petitioner, American Transit Insurance Company (hereinafter American Transit), commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award entered in favor of YSC Trinity Acupuncture, P.C. (hereinafter YSC), on YSC’s claim for no-fault benefits. YSC cross-petitioned, inter alia, to confirm the master arbitration award. A proposed judgment was prepared, among other things, awarding YSC attorneys’ fees, plus additional attorneys’ fees “in the sum of 20% of the sum of principal and interest.” In July 2022, American Transit paid YSC the sums owed. In a judgment dated November 22, 2022, the Supreme Court, inter alia, confirmed the master arbitration award and awarded YSC attorneys’ fees in the sum of $1,000, plus additional attorneys’ fees in the sum of 20% of the sum of principal and interest.
YSC served American Transit with an information subpoena. Thereafter, YSC moved, among other things, to compel American Transit to comply with the information subpoena. American Transit cross-moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. American Transit also moved, among other things, to direct the entry of a satisfaction of judgment. YSC cross-moved pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees. In an order dated November 1, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that [*2]branch of YSC’s motion which was to compel American Transit to comply with the information subpoena and granted that branch of American Transit’s cross-motion which was to quash the information subpoena. In a second order dated November 1, 2023, the court, among other things, granted that branch of American Transit’s motion which was to direct the entry of a satisfaction of judgment and denied YSC’s cross-motion pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees. YSC appeals from both orders.
The Supreme Court properly determined that American Transit issued payments satisfying the judgment and directed the entry of a satisfaction of judgment pursuant to CPLR 5021(a)(2) (see Breck Contr. Corp. v Vecchione, 73 Misc 2d 1002, 1004 [Suffolk Dist Ct, 2d Dist]). Since the judgment was satisfied, YSC was not entitled to any additional discovery (see CPLR 5223).
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting that branch of American Transit’s cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash the information subpoena. “An application to quash a subpoena should be granted only where the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious . . . or where the information sought is utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry” (Matter of Kapon v Koch, 23 NY3d 32, 38 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v Abrams, 71 NY2d 327, 331-332; 8206 N. Blvd, LLC v Ai Qiu Qu, 232 AD3d 833, 834). Here, American Transit established that the judgment had been satisfied and, as such, there was no reason for postjudgment discovery in an effort to collect the judgment. Moreover, the requested information in the information subpoena was irrelevant, and the information subpoena was served to harass American Transit.
The Supreme Court properly denied YSC’s cross-motion pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorneys’ fees. The general rule is that in proceedings involving arbitration, as in other litigation, attorneys’ fees are not recoverable unless provided for by agreement or statute (see Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705; Myron Assoc. v Obstfeld, 224 AD2d 504). “Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney’s reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations” (Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 705 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 AD3d 1, 15). YSC was not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees for its postjudgment motion practice, as no claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits was overdue.
YSC’s remaining contentions are without merit.
GENOVESI, J.P., WOOTEN, VENTURA and GOLIA, JJ., concur.
Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court
Reported in New York Official Reports at Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Atlantic Med. Care, P.C. (2025 NY Slip Op 07297)
| Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Atlantic Med. Care, P.C. |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 07297 |
| Decided on December 24, 2025 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. |
ANGELA G. IANNACCI, J.P.
PAUL WOOTEN
BARRY E. WARHIT
DONNA-MARIE E. GOLIA, JJ.
2023-06054
(Index No. 527962/22)
v
Atlantic Medical Care, P.C., etc., appellant.
Gary Tsirelman, P.C., Brooklyn, NY, for appellant.
Larkin Farrell, LLC, New York, NY (William R. Larkin III of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate an award of a master arbitrator dated June 27, 2022, in which Atlantic Medical Care, P.C., as assignee of Destiny Dixon, cross-petitioned to confirm the award of the master arbitrator and for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, Atlantic Medical Care, P.C., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Carl J. Landicino, J.), dated April 20, 2023. The order granted the petition to the extent of remanding the matter to arbitration for further proceedings as set forth therein, and, in effect, denied the cross-petition.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied, the cross-petition is granted, the award of the master arbitrator is confirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees to be awarded to the appellant.
Atlantic Medical Care, P.C. (hereinafter the provider), is the assignee of a claim for no-fault benefits for treatment it rendered to Destiny Dixon after Dixon was involved in a car accident. After the petitioner, American Transit Insurance Company (hereinafter the insurer), denied the claim, the provider submitted the claim to arbitration. In an award dated April 18, 2022 (hereinafter the April 2022 award), the arbitrator awarded the provider the full amount of its claim. The insurer appealed, and in an award of a master arbitrator dated June 27, 2022 (hereinafter the master arbitrator’s award), the master arbitrator confirmed the award.
The insurer commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the master arbitrator’s award. The provider cross-petitioned to confirm the master arbitrator’s award and for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees. In an order dated April 20, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition to the extent of remanding the matter to arbitration for the consideration of the effect of certain executive orders issued in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic and, in effect, denied the cross-petition. The provider appeals.
“[A]n arbitrator’s rulings, unlike a trial court’s, are largely unreviewable” (Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d 530, 534). “A court reviewing the award [*2]of a master arbitrator is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR article 75″ (Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d 800, 802; see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10[h]). Significantly, a master arbitrator’s determination is not subject to vacatur by the courts on the basis of an error of law, including, “‘the incorrect application of a rule of substantive law,'” unless the master arbitrator’s determination is irrational (Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d at 802, quoting Matter of Smith [Firemen’s Ins. Co.], 55 NY2d 224, 232; see Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d at 534).
Here, regardless of any errors of law the arbitrator and master arbitrator made regarding burdens of proof, the master arbitrator’s determination to affirm the April 2022 award to the provider was rationally based on the conclusion that Dixon’s minor delay in providing the insurer with notice of the accident was reasonably justified because she was a passenger in the vehicle involved in the accident and, thus, was not making a claim to her own insurance company (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5[l]). Because the master arbitrator’s affirmance of the April 2022 award had a rational basis, and “‘[i]t is not for the court to decide whether the master arbitrator erred in applying the applicable law,'” the petition to vacate the master arbitrator’s award should have been denied and the master arbitrator’s award confirmed (Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Westchester Med. Group, M.D., 125 AD3d 649, 650 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d at 535; see Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d at 802; Matter of Singh v Allstate Ins. Co., 137 AD3d 1046, 1047; Matter of Travelers Indem. Co. v United Diagnostic Imaging, P.C., 70 AD3d 1043, 1043-1044).
Further, the provider is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10[j][4]; Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 170 AD3d 1168; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705). Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees to be awarded to the provider (see Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 170 AD3d 1168; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d at 705).
In light of our determination, we need not reach the parties’ remaining contentions.
IANNACCI, J.P., WOOTEN, WARHIT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.
Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court
Reported in New York Official Reports at Balanced Channels Acupuncture, P.C. v USAA Cas. Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51972(U))
[*1]| Balanced Channels Acupuncture, P.C. v USAA Cas. Ins. Co. |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 51972(U) |
| Decided on December 5, 2025 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on December 5, 2025
PRESENT: : CHEREÉ A. BUGGS, J.P., LISA S. OTTLEY, JOANNE D. QUIÑONES, JJ
2024-638 RI C
against
USAA Casualty Insurance Company, Respondent.
Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin (Aneshia Chintamani of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), dated June 6, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant had not issued an insurance policy covering plaintiff’s assignor and, thus, plaintiff’s assignor was not an eligible injured person entitled to receive no-fault benefits. By order dated June 6, 2024, the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) granted defendant’s motion.
As plaintiff properly contends on appeal, defendant failed to establish its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint as the affidavit submitted by a claims adjuster from “USAA General Indemnity Company” was insufficient to establish, prima facie, defendant’s lack of coverage defense. Here, the claims adjuster did not establish that she was employed by defendant or how defendant and her employer were related to each other. Moreover, she failed to establish that she had personal knowledge of defendant’s standard practices and procedures for maintaining or searching for information related to policyholders and current or past policies. Indeed, the claims adjuster failed to set forth that a search of defendant’s records or databases was ever conducted for the instant case. Rather, she merely stated in her affidavit that “USAA General Indemnity Company” did not insure plaintiff’s assignor, his vehicle, nor anyone that resided with plaintiff’s assignor. This statement was insufficient, and, as a result, defendant failed to satisfy its prima facie burden entitling it to summary judgment dismissing the complaint (cf. Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Am. Tr. Ins. Co., 44 Misc 3d 136[A], 2014 NY Slip Op [*2]51240[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]; Great Health Care Chiropractic, P.C. v Omni Indem. Co., 40 Misc 3d 139[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51450[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]; Astoria Quality Med. Supply v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 138[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50743[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). Consequently, defendant’s motion should have been denied regardless of the sufficiency of plaintiff’s opposition papers (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).
Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
BUGGS, J.P., OTTLEY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.
ENTER:Jennifer Chan
Acting Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 5, 2025
Reported in New York Official Reports at LV Med. Diagnostic Servs., P.C. v Safe Auto Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51974(U))
[*1]| LV Med. Diagnostic Servs., P.C. v Safe Auto Ins. Co. |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 51974(U) |
| Decided on December 5, 2025 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on December 5, 2025
PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, JOANNE D. QUIÑONES, JJ
2024-893 K C
against
Safe Auto Insurance Company, Appellant.
Alahverdian Van Leuvan, P.C. (Gerard R. Van Leuvan of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Lola Waterman, J.), entered May 21, 2024. The order denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. In support of its motion, defendant argued that the Civil Court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over it because it is an Ohio company which is not authorized to do business in New York, and that it has not filed a statement with the Superintendent of Insurance agreeing that its automobile insurance policies will be deemed to satisfy the requirements of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law; that the $5,000 limit of the insurance policy had been exhausted prior to plaintiff’s claims; and that it was not properly served with the summons and complaint. By order entered May 21, 2024, the Civil Court (Lola Waterman, J.) solely addressed, and denied, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction (see CPLR 3211 [a] [8]). The court found that defendant “failed to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form.” Specifically, the affidavit by defendant’s director of claims, which was signed and notarized in Ohio, lacked a certificate of conformity, and the insurance policy’s declaration page was not certified and lacked any foundation. The order concluded by noting that “issues of material fact exist as to whether defendant does not do business in the State of New York,” and that “This case shall proceed on to trial on the issue of personal jurisdiction.” On appeal, defendant contends that the Civil Court should have granted the branch of its motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
In addition to its determination that there were various deficiencies in defendant’s [*2]submissions which required its motion to be denied, the court found that sufficient issues of fact existed “as to whether defendant does not do business in the State of New York” and, therefore, held that the issue of personal jurisdiction would be determined at trial. We find that this determination by the Civil Court was proper under the circumstances of this case.
Defendant’s remaining contentions either lack merit or are unpreserved for appellate review.
Accordingly, the order is affirmed.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.
ENTER:Jennifer Chan
Acting Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 5, 2025
Reported in New York Official Reports at Prompt Med. Group, Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51977(U))
[*1]| Prompt Med. Group, Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 51977(U) |
| Decided on December 5, 2025 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on December 5, 2025
PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, JOANNE D. QUIÑONES, JJ
2024-1129 RI C
against
Foremost Signature Insurance Company, Respondent.
Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Rothenberg & Romanek, for respondent (no brief filed).
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), entered October 22, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) entered October 22, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was no insurance coverage for the vehicle allegedly involved in a November 4, 2022 accident, as the insurance policy had been cancelled on October 24, 2022.
Upon a review of the record, we find that the papers defendant submitted in support of the branch of its motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint failed to demonstrate by admissible proof, as a matter of law, that defendant provided the insured with proper notice of cancellation in accordance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313 (1) (a) (see Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, PLLC v Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Misc 3d 132[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51006[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). In addition, we note that defendant, in any event, has not demonstrated that the alleged cancellation of the policy was effective with respect to plaintiff’s assignor, who was not the named insured or a member of the insured’s household (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313 [2] [a]; [3]; Matter of Progressive Classic Ins. Co. v Kitchen, 46 AD3d 333 [2007]; Matter of Progressive Northeastern Ins. Co. v Barnes, 30 AD3d 523 [2006]; Pravel, Inc. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 67 Misc 3d 132[A], [*2]2020 NY Slip Op 50457[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]; Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 54 Misc 3d 46 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]; Advanced Med. Care, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50130[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2016]; GL Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 48 Misc 3d 141[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51239[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). Consequently, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been denied.
Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Acting Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 5, 2025
Reported in New York Official Reports at Medical Supply of NY Servs., Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51978(U))
[*1]| Medical Supply of NY Servs., Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 51978(U) |
| Decided on December 5, 2025 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on December 5, 2025
PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, JOANNE D. QUIÑONES, JJ
2024-1132 RI C
against
Foremost Signature Insurance Company, Respondent.
Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Rothenberg & Romanek (Kenneth F. Popper of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), entered October 22, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) entered October 22, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was no insurance coverage for the vehicle allegedly involved in a November 4, 2022 accident, as the insurance policy had been cancelled on October 24, 2022.
For the reasons stated in Prompt Med. Group, Inc., as Assignee of Philippe F. Polidor v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2024-1129 RI C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Acting Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 5, 2025
Reported in New York Official Reports at Prompt Med. Group, Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51979(U))
[*1]| Prompt Med. Group, Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 51979(U) |
| Decided on December 5, 2025 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on December 5, 2025
PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, JOANNE D. QUIÑONES, JJ
2024-1133 RI C
against
Foremost Signature Insurance Company, Respondent.
Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Rothenberg & Romanek, for respondent (no brief filed).
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), entered October 22, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) entered October 22, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was no insurance coverage for the vehicle allegedly involved in a November 4, 2022 accident, as the insurance policy had been cancelled on October 24, 2022.
For the reasons stated in Prompt Med. Group, Inc., as Assignee of Philippe F. Polidor v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2024-1129 RI C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Acting Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 5, 2025
Reported in New York Official Reports at Medical Supply of NY Servs., Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 51980(U))
[*1]| Medical Supply of NY Servs., Inc. v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 51980(U) |
| Decided on December 5, 2025 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| As corrected in part through December 17, 2025; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on December 5, 2025
PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, JOANNE D. QUIÑONES, JJ
2024-1134 RI C
against
Foremost Signature Insurance Company, Respondent.
Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Rothenberg & Romanek (Kenneth F. Popper of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), entered October 22, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) entered October 22, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was no insurance coverage for the vehicle allegedly involved in a November 4, 2022 accident, as the insurance policy had been cancelled on October 24, 2022.
For the reasons stated in Prompt Med. Group, Inc., as Assignee of Philippe F. Polidor v Foremost Signature Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2024-1129 RI C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Jennifer Chan
Acting Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 5, 2025