Civil Court, Kings County

046215/02

Loren Baily-Schiffman, J.

This is an action to recover benefits pursuant to the no-fault provisions of Insurance Law §5106 and regulations promulgated thereunder, 11 NYCRR §65-1.1 and for attorneys fees pursuant to 65 NYCRR §65.17 (b)(6)(v). Plaintiff provider, as assignee of Kate Boglio, Julia DeJesus, Lillia Galicia, Fred Korets, Bertha Louis, Nelson Neton, Mozeik Perkins, Shawn Perkins, Maxim Savelyev, and Alexander Yakhshibekov moves this Court for summary judgment. Plaintiff asserts that it is entitled to judgment as defendant has not paid or denied the subject claims within thirty (30) days of receipt and where denials have been made, has not asserted a basis for the denial that is cognizable under the No-Fault Law. Defendant opposes the motion for summary judgment on the following bases: that the motion is premature in that the Court has not yet ruled on defendant’s motion to extend their time to comply with this Court’s [*2]prior discovery Order; the claims concerning Fred Korets, Maxim Savelyn and Alexander Yakhshibekov have been paid; plaintiff lacks standing to recover for its services billed from July 7, 2000 to July 6, 2001 as Michael M. Katz was suspended from practicing medicine during this time; plaintiff lacks standing to recover for its services because it is in violation of Article 15 BCL; a question of fraud exists as to allegedly negligent or fraudulent services provided by plaintiffs, and; plaintiff has failed to establish its prima facie case because the assignments of benefits submitted as part of the claims are not authenticated.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must make out a prima facie case of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, offering sufficient evidence to establish the absence of any material issues of fact. Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 (1986). After making out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to present sufficient evidence to show that there are material issues of fact in controversy which require a trial. Id. In a claim for no-fault benefits by a provider, the Plaintiff’s prima facie case is established by “the submission of a complete proof of claim and the amount of the loss. (See Insurance Law §5106[a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; Amaze Med. Supply Inc. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51701{App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists])”. Ocean Diagnostic Imaging PC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, NYLJ, Sept 24, 2004, p. 28, col. 5 (App Term 2d & 11th Jud Dists, 2004).

Pursuant to the Insurance Law and regulation, an insurer must either pay or deny a claim for no-fault benefits within thirty (30) days of receipt. The thirty (30) day period may be extended by an insurer’s request for verification of the claim within ten (10) business days for claims covered by the regulations in effect prior to April 5, 2002 and fifteen (15) business days for claims covered by the regulations that came into effect on April 5, 2002. 11 NYCRR 65.15 (e)(old regs); 11 NYCRR 65-3.5(b)(new regs). If any insurer fails to timely deny a claim, the insurer is precluded from raising any defenses to the claim other than lack of coverage and fraud by the assignor. Presbyterian Hosp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 278 (1997); Presbyterian Hosp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 233 AD2d 433 (2d Dept, 1996); Central Hospital v. Chubb, 90 NY2d 195 (1997); Mt. Sinai v. Triboro Coach, 263 AD2d 11 (2d Dept 1999). An insurer’s failure to raise objections within the ten (10) or fifteen (15) day verification period constitutes a waiver of any defenses based thereon. Id.

Plaintiff asserts that it submitted the following proofs of claim for the aforementioned assignors:

AssignorDate of Date Claim Date of Reason for

ServiceReceivedDenialDenial

[*3]Boglio9/8/002/14/017/27/01Investigation Pending

DeJesus2/10/003/23/004/13/00Investigation Pending

Galicia2/10/003/21/004/26/00Investigation Pending

Korets2/2/00unknownNo denial received

Louis9/14/9910/28/9911/2/99Investigation Pending

9/21/9910/28/9911/2/99Investigation Pending

Neton2/10/004/3/005/2/00Investigation Pending

M.Perkins8/11/004/10/016/6/01Investigation Pending

8/18/004/10/016/6/01Investigation Pending

9/6/004/10/016/6/01Investigation Pending

S. Perkins4/30/997/25/9911/19/99Investigation Pending

5/11/997/25/9911/19/99Investigation Pending

5/28/998/3/9911/19/99Investigation Pending

Savelyn2/1/00unknownNo denial received

Yakhshibekov10/3/005/14/015/21/01Investigation Pending

10/26/005/14/015/21/01Investigation Pending

A.Claims Previously Paid

Defendant asserts that the claim for services provided to Fred Korets was settled and payment made. In support its assertion of payment, defendant submits a copy of a cancelled check in the amount of $1488.40, dated April 22, 2003, payable to plaintiff. The check indicates the name of the claimant as Fred Korets and the claim number listed on the check is the same as on the claim form annexed to plaintiff’s motion. The amount of the check is in excess of the amount of the claim listed on the claim form. However, Plaintiff’s reply papers do not in any way challenge defendant’s assertion that this claim was paid. Accordingly, the Court rules that defendant has submitted sufficient support for its assertion that the claim for services provided to Fred Korets has been paid.

Defendant asserts that the claims for services provided to Maxim Savelyn and Alexander Yakhshibekov also have been paid. In support of this assertion, defendant submits copies of cancelled checks issued to plaintiff which have the name of the claimant and the claim number that corresponds to the information provided by plaintiff in its papers. The Court notes that as to the claim for services provided to Maxim Savelyn, the amount of the check and the claim number are the same as for the claim concerning Fred Korets. The Court also notes that the amount of the check issued for services provided to Alexander Yakhshibekov is in excess of the amount of the claim. Plaintiff’s reply does not challenge defendant’s assertion that the claims for services provided to Maxim Savelyn and Alexander Yakhshibekov have been paid. Accordingly, the Court rules that defendant has submitted sufficient support for its assertion that the claims for services provided to Maxim Savelyn and Alexander Yakhshibekov have been paid.

B.Timeliness of the Denials [*4]

The Affirmation of Gilbert Lee, Esq., defendant’s counsel, acknowledges that “defendant issued untimely and/or defective denials with respect to seven of the ten claims identified in Plaintiff’s suit”. Lee Affirmation at ¶7. Neither Mr. Lee nor the Affidavits of Sandra DiSanto or Dietra Tripp in opposition to plaintiff’s motion indicates which claims they admit to having untimely denied, however reference to the above chart of claims leads the Court to the conclusion that the denials of claims concerning services provided to the following assignors were beyond the 30 day period provided for in 11 NYCRR §65.15: Boglio, Galicia, M. Perkins and S. Perkins.

Defendant takes the position that despite the untimeliness of its denials, it should not be precluded from raising its defenses to these claims because its defense is based on a lack of coverage. Defendant cites Central General Hospital v. Chubb Group of Ins. Companies, 90 NY2d 195 (1997) and Metro Medical Diagnostics, PC v. Eagle Insurance Co., 293 AD2d 751, (2 Dept.,2002) for this proposition. Each of these cases is improperly cited for the position that fraud by a provider is a “coverage” defense which can be asserted more than thirty (30) days after a claim is received.

While the Second Department in Central General Hospital, supra, does state that a “coverage” defense may be asserted beyond the thirty (30) day period, it clearly states that claims of fraud by the provider such as excessive billing are not “coverage” defenses. Id at 199. Similarly, Metro Medical, supra is inapplicable to the case at bar because it concerns an allegedly staged accident and not the allegation of fraud by a provider. More recently, Courts have clarified the differences between these two types of fraud allegations as they apply to the timeliness of denials and preclusion of defenses.

In Melbourne Medical, PC v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 4 Misc 3d 92 (App. Term 2nd & 11th Jud. Dists., 2004) the Appellate Term stated the following:

With regard to the fraud allegation, raised for the first time in defendant’s motion for summary judgment, defendant did not specify whether the fraudulent conduct was a staged automobile incident or the provider’s unilateral scheme to obtain no-fault benefits for unnecessary or excessive medical treatment. If the latter is the case, the purported defense is precluded by defendant’s untimely claim denial (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of NY v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d at 285). If the former is the case, the defense survives preclusion (Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751, 752 [2002]) and would, if substantiated, constitute a complete defense to the action (Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Shaulskaya, 302 AD2d 522 [2003]).

4 Misc 3d 92 at 94. This decision clearly differentiates between fraud by an assignor which implicates the coverage issues that would permit an insurer to submit its denial beyond the thirty [*5](30) day period without waiving its defenses, from fraud by the provider which must be asserted in a timely denial in order to avoid being precluded from asserting the defense.

This issue was determined with even more clarity in PSG Psychological, PC v. State Farm Ins. Co., 6 Misc 2d 1002(A); 2004 NY Slip Op. 51701 (Civ. Ct. Kings Co., 2004). There the Court stated that

[t]he fraud which defendant is claiming as a defense to payment of this claim is fraud by the plaintiff medical provider. Although an untimely denial permits a defendant to assert a defense of fraud by the assignor, a claim of fraud by the assignee must be asserted in a timely denial (Melbourne Medical, PC v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 4 Misc 2d 92 [2d Dept 2004]).

See also Careplus Medical Supply Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., NYLJ 10/13/04, p. 21, col. 1 (Civ. Ct. Kings Co., 2004). Clearly, the law in this Department is that a defense of fraud by the provider does not go to the issue of coverage and, therefore, must be asserted in a timely denial.

C.Propriety of Denial Based On “Pending Investigation”

Each of the claims for which a denial was submitted was denied on the basis of a pending investigation. Plaintiff asserts that the “no-fault regulations” prohibit such a denial but does not cite the Court to any specific regulation. There is case law in the 2nd and 11th Judicial District which supports plaintiff’s view that a denial based on a pending investigation is ineffective.

In AB Medical Services v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 2005 NY Slip Op 25032 (App Term 2nd & 11th Jud. Dists, 2005) the Appellate Term held that a delay letter does not extend the insurer’s time to pay or deny a claim. Similarly, the same Appellate Term held in Melbourne Medical v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, that an insurer may not rely on a letter informing a claimant that the claim is delayed pending an investigation to effect an extension of time to pay or deny the claim, even if that letter is denominated a verification request. Id at 94. In Sehgal v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 1999 WL 1074313 (App Term, 2d & 11th Jud. Dists, 1999) the Court held that an insurer’s submission of a claim to peer review is not a request for verification and does not extend the insurer’s time to pay or deny the claim.

Other Courts are in accord with the Appellate Term, 2nd & 11th Judicial Districts. The Appellate Division, Third Department in LaHendro v. Travelers Ins. Co., 220 AD2d 971 (3d Dept 1995) held that an insurer could not extend the time to pay or deny a claim until it received a report from Health Cost Containment Associates. The statutory thirty (30) day period began to run when the insurer received the claim and responses to requests for verification, if any.

District Court, Nassau County, in Atlantis Medical, PC v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 NY Slip Op 40043 (Dist Ct, Nassau Co, 2002) held, relying on LaHendro, supra and Sehgal, supra that once the insurer has received from claimant all of the information necessary to verify the [*6]claim, “any time spent analyzing the claim is on the insurer’s dime” Atlantis Medical, supra..

In the case at bar, each of the claims that defendant denied was denied on the basis that there was a pending investigation. There is no distinction between the above cited cases concerning delays of the determination of claims based upon a continuing investigation and a denial of the claim based on a pending investigation. The conclusion is the same: an insurer may not delay or deny a claim based upon its desire to further investigate the claim, except in compliance with the regulatory verification procedures. LaHendro v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra; AB Medical Services v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., supra; Melbourne Medical v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., supra; Sehgal v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, supra; Atlantis Medical, PC v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., supra.

D.Authentication of Assignment of Benefits;

Invalid Verification of Treatment Forms

Defendant argues in its Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s motion that plaintiff has failed to establish its prima facie case because it has failed to authenticate the various assignment of benefits forms and, therefore, has no standing to bring the instant action. Defendant also argues that the verification of treatment forms are unsigned. This issue has long been resolved in this Judicial District. A Plaintiff’s prima facie case is established by “the submission of a complete proof of claim and the amount of the loss. (See Insurance Law §5106[a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; Amaze Med. Supply Inc. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51701[U]{App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists])”. Ocean Diagnostic Imaging PC A/A/O Jean Baptists Turenne, Johnson Turenne, v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, NYLJ, Sept 24, 2004, p. 28, col. 5 (App Term 2d & 11th Jud Dists, 2004). The defense of invalid assignment must be raised in a timely denial or it is waived. Presbyterian Hosp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra.;Presbyterian Hosp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., supra; Quality Medical Healthcare, PC v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., 2002 NY Slip Op 50098 (App Term 1st Dept, 2002); Inwood Hill Medical OC v. Allstate Ins.Co., NYLJ, Aug. 23, 2004, p. 19, col. 1 (Civ. Ct. Queens Co., 2004).

Here, each claim that was denied was denied because of a pending investigation. As defendant has failed to deny any of the claims on the basis that the authentication is invalid, this defense is waived. Similarly, as defendant has failed to deny any of the claims on the basis that the verification of treatment form is invalid, defendant has waived this defense. Id.

E.Question of Fact as to Whether the Services Billed for Were Provided

Defendant argues in its Memorandum of Law that there is a question of fact as to whether the services billed for and raised in this action were provided. The factual basis for this argument is the suspension of Michael M. Katz’s and Valentino J. Bianchini’s medical licenses. There is no indication in the defendant’s papers that these doctors were the only doctors providing services at plaintiff’s office. Moreover, defendant does not allege that Dr. Bianchini’s license was suspended during a time when services were provided to the assignors in this action. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish that there is a question of fact sufficient to defeat plaintiff’s motion for [*7]summary judgment as to whether the billed for services were provided.

F.Plaintiff’s Standing to Bring This Action

Defendant argues that plaintiff does not have standing to bring the instant action because Michael M. Katz, the owner of plaintiff corporation, was suspended from practicing medicine from July 7, 2000 to July 6, 2001, surrendered his license on or about November 18, 2003 and the subsequent owner, Valentino J. Bianchini, surrendered his license to practice medicine on or about November 21, 2002. Essentially, defendant is making two arguments: 1) that plaintiff may not be compensated for services provided by an unlicensed medical professional and 2) that a professional corporation that is not properly licensed may not sue to recover no-fault benefits.

Plaintiff opposes defendant’s argument on standing in its reply affirmation of counsel. Plaintiff states that no services involved in this action were provided during a period when the plaintiff or its principal were not properly licensed and that a physician may recover for medical services rendered when it was licensed, even if no longer licensed and/or registered, citing CKC Chiropractic v. Republic Western Ins. Co., 2004 NY Slip Op 24351 (Civ. Ct. Kings Co., 2004) . Defendant has properly raised an issue of fact as to whether the alleged principal of plaintiff corporation was properly licensed when the services sued for herein were provided to assignors Boglio and M. Perkins. These services were provided during a period of time when Dr. Michael Katz, the principal of plaintiff corporation, was allegedly suspended from the practice of medicine. The information provided by defendant is in the form of Orders of the New York Department of Health indicating that Dr. Katz was suspended from practicing medicine for one year from July 7, 2000 to July 6, 2001 and surrendered his license to practice medicine by signed Order, signed by him on November 18, 2003. As to the second standing issue raised by defendant, the only information provided concerning the ownership of plaintiff corporation is a purported copy of a web site listing. The Court holds that the web site information is hearsay and insufficient to establish or even raise a question of fact as to the ownership of plaintiff corporation.

There is no question that medical services must be provided by a licensed professional. The only services provided during the period of Dr. Katz’s suspension that are involved in this action are services provided to Kate Boglio on September 8, 2000 and to Mozeik Perkins on August 11, August 18 and September 6, 2000. As a question of fact has been raised as to whether Dr. Katz performed these services, the Court holds that summary judgment is denied only as to the claims of Kate Boglio and Mozeik Perkins and only on the issue of whether Dr. Katz performed these services. As to plaintiff’s standing to bring this action because of the status of the corporation’s license, its relationship to the corporation’s principal’s license and the ability to collect no-fault benefits, the Court holds that further discovery is necessary on the factual issues that underlie defendant’s argument.

DISCOVERY MOTION

Defendant moves this Court for an extension of the discovery ordered by this court in a discovery Order dated November 20, 2003, approximately three (3) months prior to defendant’s [*8]making their motion. Plaintiff’s opposition to the discovery motion was made five (5) months later. Defendant’s basis for its motion is law office failure: it neglected to timely attend to discovery in this matter after the Court Order on November 20, 2003. It should be noted that the discovery Order provides for discovery of all parties. Neither plaintiff nor defendant conducted any discovery pursuant to the Court’s Order. It should also be noted that defendant’s counsel attempted to resolve the discovery dispute by communicating with plaintiff’s counsel prior to making a motion to the Court. Defendant’s attempt at resolution of the discovery issue was unsuccessful and a motion was then necessary.

Because of the relative timeliness of defendant’s attempt to resolve the discovery dispute and neither party’s compliance with the Court’s Order, the Court is inclined to grant defendant’s motion to a limited extent consistent with the Court’s other rulings contained in this Decision and Order.

Generally, discovery should be completed before a motion for summary judgment is made. In the instant case plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was made only after defendant moved to extend discovery after unsuccessful attempts to obtain consent from plaintiff’s counsel to do so by stipulation. Plaintiff submitted its motion at the same time as its opposition to defendant’s motion and should have denominated its motion a cross-motion. Defendant properly argues that plaintiff’s motion is premature. However, consistent with the Court’s rulings herein on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the only issues that survive those rulings are related to plaintiff’s standing to bring this action, Further discovery on any other issues would have no effect on the Court’s decision.

The Court rules that the Discovery Order, dated November 20, 2003, is extended for forty-five (45) days from the date of this Decision and Order for discovery solely on the issues of the licensing of plaintiff and plaintiff’s principals and which medical professional performed the services provided to assignors Boglio and M. Perkins. Consistent with the Court’s rulings herein, in the event that plaintiff is found to have standing to bring this action, plaintiff would be entitled to summary judgment on all claims that have not already been paid.

CONCLUSION

Three of the claims brought, for services to assignors Korets, Savelyn and Yakhshibekov, have already been paid and are not considered in this motion. Either because of untimeliness or denials based on pending investigations, defendant has waived its defenses to all of the other claims. Defendant has also waived its defenses on the bases of the authentication of the assignment of benefits and the alleged invalidity of the verification of treatment forms for failure to raise these defenses in their denials. The Court has insufficient information to rule that plaintiff does or does not have standing to bring this action. Accordingly, on defendant’s discovery motion the Court’s prior discovery Order, dated November 20, 2003, is extended for forty- five (45) days from the date of this Order for the parties to engage in discovery solely on the issues of the licensing of plaintiff and plaintiff’s principals and which medical professional performed the services provided to assignors Boglio and M. Perkins. In the event that plaintiff is found to have standing to bring this action, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on all claims that have not already been paid. [*9]

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

DATED:February 17, 2005

______________________________

LOREN BAILY-SCHIFFMAN, J.C.C.

Civil Court, Kings County

056085/04

Loren Baily-Schiffman, J.

This is an action to recover benefits pursuant to the no-fault provisions of Insurance Law §5106 and regulations promulgated thereunder, 11 NYCRR §65-1.1 and for attorneys fees pursuant to 65 NYCRR §65.17 (b)(6)(v). Plaintiff provider, as assignee of patient Roy Antoine, moves this Court for summary judgment. Plaintiff asserts that defendant has not paid the assignor’s claim within thirty (30) days of receipt nor requested verification of the claim and the basis for the denial is insufficiently specific to satisfy the Insurance Law. Defendant opposes the motion on the basis that the Affidavit in support of the motion and the assignment annexed thereto are not in admissible form and the Health Insurance claim form was not signed by the assignor. Defendant moves for partial summary judgment on the basis that its denial is timely. Defendant also seeks to compel a deposition of plaintiff, plaintiff’s assignor and the assignor’s treating physician.

In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must make out a prima facie case of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, offering sufficient evidence to establish the absence [*2]of any material issues of fact. Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 (1986). After making out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to present sufficient evidence to show that there are material issues of fact in controversy which require a trial. Id. In a claim for no-fault benefits by a provider, the Plaintiff’s prima facie case is established by “the submission of a complete proof of claim and the amount of the loss. (See Insurance Law §5106[a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; Amaze Med. Supply Inc. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51701[U]{App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists])”. Ocean Diagnostic imaging PC A/A/O Jean Baptists Turenne, Johnson Turenne, v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, NYLJ, Sept 24, 2004, p. 28, col. 5 (App Term 2d & 11th Jud Dists, 2004).

Pursuant to Insurance Law §5101 et seq. and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 11 NYCRR §65.15 (g)(3), an insurer must either pay or deny a claim for no-fault benefits within thirty (30) days of receipt. The thirty (30) day period may be extended by an insurer’s request for verification of the claim within ten (10) business days for claims covered by the regulations in effect prior to April 5, 2002 and fifteen (15) business days for claims covered by the regulations that came into effect on April 5, 2002. 11 NYCRR 65.15 (d) & (e). If any insurer fails to timely deny a claim, the insurer is precluded from raising any defenses to the claim other than lack of coverage and fraud. Presbyterian Hosp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 278 (1997); Presbyterian Hosp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 233 AD2d 433 (2d Dept, 1996); Central Hospital v. Chubb, 90 NY2d 195 (1997); Mt. Sinai v. Triboro Coach, 263 AD2d, 11 (2d Dept 1999). An insurer’s failure to raise objections within the ten (10) or fifteen (15) day verification period constitutes a waiver of any defenses based thereon. Id.

Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case

Plaintiff asserts that it submitted its proof of claim to defendant. Defendant’s NF-10 denial form acknowledges receipt of the claim on December 15, 2003. The NF-10 is dated January 23, 2004, more than thirty (30) days after receipt of the claim. Annexed to plaintiff’s motion papers is a mailing log stamped by the Postal Service on December 11, 2003. It is conceded by defendant that this claim remains outstanding. Through this proof plaintiff has established its burden of showing that the subject claim was submitted to defendant and remains outstanding. The burden then shifts to defendant to prove by submission of evidence in admissible form that there are questions of fact in controversy that require a trial and that plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Defendant’s Opposition

Defendant submits that it timely denied the subject claim and that summary judgment should, therefore, be denied. Defendant also asserts that there are defects in plaintiff’s motion papers that preclude the grant of summary judgment. A denial of claim (NF-10) must be sent to the claimant within thirty (30) days of receipt in order to be timely unless the time to deny is extended by virtue of a request for verification or if the claim is based on fraud or lack of [*3]coverage. Presbyterian Hosp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra. In order to sustain its burden in opposing a motion for summary judgment where the issue is timeliness, the defendant/insurer must establish by competent evidence that the request for verification and the denial were timely mailed. Here, defendant has provided no competent evidence of the mailing of either the request for verification or the denial. Accordingly, all defenses other than fraud are untimely and the insurer is precluded from raising any non-fraud defenses to the claim. Id.; Presbyterian Hosp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 233 AD2d 433 (2d Dept, 1996); Central Hospital v. Chubb, 90 NY2d 195 (1997); Mt. Sinai v. Triboro Coach, 263 AD2d, 11 (2d Dept 1999).

Fraud Defense

Defendant’s NF-10 states the following as the reason for the denial:

“Our investigation, including but not limited to our SIU investigation, indicates that the alleged injuries were not, and could not have been caused by the alleged accident. Therefore, all no-fault benefits dating back to the alleged date of loss are denied based on a lack of credible proof of claim.”

Plaintiff asserts that the above quoted denial language is insufficiently specific to be effective. General Accident Insurance Group v. Cirucci, 46 NY2d 862 (1979). The court finds that the denial language is sufficient to put plaintiff on notice that the insurer was denying the claim on the basis of fraud. However, at this stage of the litigation, in order not to be precluded from asserting its late denial on the basis of fraud, defendant must present to the Court evidence in admissible form that it had a “founded belief that the alleged injur[ies] do [ ] not arise out of an insured incident”. Central General Hosp v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos, 90 NY2d 195, supra; Ocean Diagnostic Imaging v. State Farm Automobile Ins. Co., NYLJ, 9/24/04, p.28, col. 5 (App Term, 2d & 11th Jud. Dist., 2004); AB Medical Services, et al v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., NYLJ, 12/24/04, p. 32, col. 2 (App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists, 2004).

Here, defendant presented an unsworn “Examination Under Oath Report”, dated December 9, 2003 written on the letterhead of Armienti, DeBellis & Whiten, defendant’s prior attorney; the hearsay Affidavit of Susan Vanditto, a no-fault specialist employed by defendant; and the hearsay Affirmation of defendant’s counsel. None of the information presented in support of defendant’s fraud defense is in admissible form. Defendant, therefore, has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether it had a “founded belief” that the injuries alleged by the assignor do not arise from an insured accident. Accordingly, defendant is precluded from asserting its fraud defense to the instant claim.

As plaintiff has established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment and defendant has failed to rebut plaintiff’s showing or establish by competent proof that there are material issues of fact in controversy that require a trial, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted and defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment is denied. The other issues raised by the parties are without merit. Defendant’s motion to compel discovery is denied as [*4]moot.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

DATED:February 10, 2005

______________________________

LOREN BAILY-SCHIFFMAN, J.C.C.

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

97383/04

Eileen N. Nadelson, J.

Plaintiff instituted this action for first party benefits pursuant to New York’s No-Fault Insurance Law. Plaintiff allegedly provided its assignor with psychological services. Its bill was received by Defendant insurer on August 8, 2003, as evidenced by the statements appearing on its Denial of Claim Form.

According to Defendant, on the same day it received Plaintiff’s bill it mailed Plaintiff a verification request. This notice states:

We are writing to advise there will be a delay with regard to the disposition of

your Psychological claim.

Processing of this claim will be delayed pending our receipt of the results of an

independent medical examination scheduled to verify:

the injury is casually related to the motor vehicle accident [*2]

On September 10, 2003, Defendant avers that it mailed a second notice that states:

Pleased be advised we cannot consider payment due to the following:

We are delaying your bill pending the results of the causality IME

Plaintiff denies ever receiving these notices, and Defendant has not provided a legally sufficient proof of mailing said notices to Plaintiff.

On January 13, 2004, more than 30-days after receipt of the claim, Defendant issued its denial of claim, basing its denial of benefits on Plaintiff’s “failure to provide requested verification and examination under oath to support the rendition and necessity of services and to establish your entitlement to benefits.”

In its response to the instant motion, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has engaged in a consistent pattern of fraud with respect to billing for psychological services under the No-Fault statute. In support of this contention, Defendant provides a form it sent to the Frauds Bureau of the New York State Insurance Department and the affidavits of various assignors in other claims who indicate that they did not receive the services billed for from Plaintiff. The court notes that no such affidavit is provided for the instant assignor.

11 NYCRR sec. 65-3.3 states that an insurer must either pay or deny a claim for first party benefits under the No-Fault law within 30 days of receipt of a properly completed claim. This 30-day time period may be extended if the insurer requests verification of the claim, and until such verification is received the 30-day period is tolled. See generally Westchester County Medical Center v. New York Central Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 553, 692 N.Y.S. 2d 665 (2d Dept. 1999)

I n order to meet the mandates of the regulations, the insurer must demonstrate that the request for verification was properly mailed to the claimant. See Hospital for Joint Diseases v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 284 AD2d 374, 726 N.Y.S. 2d 443 (2d Dept. 2001). In the instant case, Plaintiff denies ever receiving such requests and Defendant has not refuted that allegation with an affidavit of a person with personal knowledge of the mailing or of the insurer’s mailing procedures. Allstate Social Work and Psychological Svcs PLLC v. GEICO General Insurance Co., 2005 NY Slip Op. 50024(U), 2005 WL 107046 (NY City Civ. Ct). Therefore, for this reason alone the court may conclude that the 30-day period prescribed under 11 NYCRR sec. 65-3.3 was not properly tolled.

Furthermore, the wording of the notices as written above do not constitute proper verification requests. The notices, as submitted in the papers to the court, merely state that the processing of the claim will be delayed pending the results of the verification, but nowhere has Plaintiff been specifically asked to verify the claim. Consequently, these notices do not constitute proper verification requests that would toll the 30-day period pursuant to 11 NYCRR sec. 65-3.8. [*3]

However, even though Defendant failed to adhere to statutory time requirements, the court must still address Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s claims are not covered because of fraud. The lateness of a denial or the absence of a required denial does not prohibit the insurer from raising the defense of lack coverage based upon the fact or founded belief that the alleged injury did not arise out of an insured incident. A.M. Medical Services, P.C. v. AIU Insurance Company, 4 Misc 3d 1027A, 2004 NY Slip Op. 5108(U) (Nassau 2004). The issue of fraud is not intended to escape the notice of the court simply because of a late denial. Valley Psychological, P.C. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 195 Misc 2d 540, 760 N.Y.S. 2d 627 (Albany 2002). However, although the affidavits submitted indicate serious problems with Plaintiff’s billing practices and services, Defendant has failed to demonstrate any fraud with respect to the instant claim.

All of the documents appearing in the papers refer to different claims with different assignors, and the court cannot rule based on the adage that “where there’s smoke, there’s fire.” The burden is on the Defendant to provide the court with adequate evidence of potential fraud with respect to the parties before it in order for the court to substantiate its decision. Therefore, the court cannot conclude that there was any problem with respect to the claim at bar.

Based on the foregoing, the court is forced to conclude that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment in the amount of $1200.92 plus statutory interest, attorney’s fees and costs.

Dated: February 10, 2005

__________________________

EILEEN N. NADELSON, J.C.C.

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

055906/04

Loren Baily-Schiffman, J.

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on claims for first party No-Fault benefits.^[FN1] Plaintiff, a provider of health services and the assignee of its patient’s claims for payment, seeks $1,559.33 plus statutory interest and attorneys fees for three claims for acupuncture services. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted.

In order to establish a prima facie case on behalf of a provider, plaintiff must submit proof that the claim was mailed and received and that defendant did not pay or deny the claim within thirty (30) days. Mary Immaculate Hosp. v. Allstate, 5 AD3d 742 (2d Dept 2004); Liberty Queens Medical P.C. v. Liberty Mutual, 2002 W.L. 31108069 (App. Term 2nd & 11th Dists., 2002). Pursuant to Insurance Law §5101 et seq. and the regulations promulgated [*2]thereunder, an insurer must either pay or deny a claim for No-Fault benefits within thirty (30) days of the date that the proof of claim is received. Insurance Law §5106; 11 NYCRR 65.15 (g)(3). The thirty (30) day period may be extended by an insurer’s request for verification of the claim within ten (10) business days for claims submitted prior to April 5, 2002 and fifteen (15) business days for subsequent claims. 11 NYCRR 65.15 (d) & (e). An insurer who fails to deny or pay a claim within the thirty (30) day period is precluded from raising any defenses to the claim, other than lack of coverage or fraud. Presbyterian Hospital v. Maryland Casualty Co., 90 NY2d 274 (1997); Presbyterian Hospital v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 233 AD2d 433 (2d Dept., 1996); Central Hospital v. Chubb, 90 NY2d 195 (1997); Mt. Sinai v. Triboro Coach, 263 AD2d 11 (2d Dept., 1999). An insurer’s failure to raise objections within the ten (10) or (15) day verification period constitutes a waiver of defenses based thereon. Id.

A party moving for summary judgment must show by admissible proof that there are no material issues of fact in controversy and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 (1986); Winegrad v. New York Univ. Medical Center, 64 NY2d 851 (1985). Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the opponent of summary judgment to come forward with proof in admissible form that there are material issues of fact in controversy that require a trial. Id.

Plaintiff asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment because defendant failed to pay any of the subject claims within thirty (30) days of receipt and denied the claims on an impermissible basis: failure of the assignor to appear for IME’s. Defendant opposes the motion on the following bases: 1) that plaintiff’s motion papers fail to prove the medical necessity of the services provided; 2) that the assignment of benefits is not authenticated; 3) the bills attached to the motion are not in admissible form and, as such, may not be considered in support of plaintiff’s motion; and 4) the claims were timely denied.

DISCUSSION

The case law in this Judicial District is clear that plaintiff need not prove medical necessity, authenticate the assignment of benefits or present its bills in admissible form in order to make out its prima facie case for summary judgment. Plaintiff need only submit proof that the claim was mailed and received and that defendant did not pay or deny the claim within thirty (30) days. Mary Immaculate Hosp. v. Allstate, 5 AD3d 742 (2d Dept 2004); Liberty Queens Medical P.C. v. Liberty Mutual, 2002 W.L. 31108069 (App. Term 2nd & 11th Dists., 2002). Accordingly, the only issues which need be decided by the Court are the timeliness of defendant’s denials of the three claims that are the subject of this action and, if the Court finds any of the denials to be timely, whether failure to appear for IME’s is a proper basis on which to deny a claim.

Defendant responded to plaintiff’s claims dated June 26, 2002, July 23, 2002 and August 19, 2002 with one denial dated September 9, 2002. In that denial, defendant indicates that the June 26, 2002 claim was received on July 29, 2002; the July 23, 2002 claim was received on [*3]August 21, 2002; and the August 19, 2002 claim was received on August 26, 2002. Each of plaintiff’s claims is accompanied by a postal log stamped by the Postal Service indicating that the claim was mailed on the day it is dated. The explanation for why each claim was received by defendant weeks after it was mailed comes from the Affirmation of Gary Coore, a Litigation Supervisor employed by defendant. Mr. Coore states that defendant received the June 26, 2002 claim on July 1, 2002 and on July 18, 2002 sent plaintiff a letter indicating that defendant was delaying investigation of the claim pending receipt of certain identified information. Defendant states that this letter is a request for verification that was timely requested within the fifteen (15) business days permitted by NYCRR §65-3.5. According to Mr. Coore, the requested information was received on July 29, 2002. Independent medical examinations (IMEs) were then scheduled for the assignor, Mason Cory. Mr. Cory allegedly failed to appear for six (6) IMEs scheduled for August 1, 2002 and then re-scheduled for August 15, 2002. A denial was issued on September 9, 2002 on the basis that the assignor failed to appear for IMEs. Defendant asserts that this denial was timely.

The Affidavit of Gary Coore states that the defendant received plaintiff’s July 23, 2002 claim on July 26, 2002 and on July 31, 2002 sent a delay letter to plaintiff requesting certain specified information. Mr. Coore also states that this claim was denied on September 9, 2002 for the assignor’s failure to appear at the IMEs scheduled for August 1, 2002 and then re-scheduled for August 15, 2002. Mr. Coore states that plaintiff’s August 19, 2002 claim was received on August 21, 2002 and denied on September 9, 2002 for failure to appear at the aforementioned IMEs.

Timeliness of June 26, 2002 Claim

This claim was received by defendant on July 1, 2002 accordingly to the admission of Mr. Coore contained in his Affidavit in opposition to the instant motion. Mr. Coore states that a request for verification was sent on July 18, 2002, but no proof of mailing of this document is provided to permit the Court to determine whether the request was timely sent. Mr. Coore goes on to admit that responses to the request for verification were received on July 29, 2002. The claim was denied on September 9, 2002 on several bases: 1) that all No-Fault benefits for injured person were denied effective May 19, 2002; and 2) that the injured person failed to appear for IME’s on August 1, 2002 and August 15, 2002.

Pursuant to 11 NYCRR §65.15(c)(3), after receipt of requested verification information, an insurer has thirty (30) days within which to pay or deny the subject claim. Here, defendant has admitted that it received the requested verification information on July 29, 2002, yet the claim was not denied until September 9, 2002. The actions of the insurer in scheduling IME’s after receipt of the requested information did not extend its time to pay or deny the claim Choicenet Chiropractic, PC v. Elco Administrative Services Co., 2002 NY Slip Op. 40382 (Civil Court, Queens Co.), nor is the failure to appear for IME’s a permissible basis upon which to deny a claim. Urban Medical Diagnostics, PC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 2001 NY [*4]Slip Op. 40655, (App. Term, 2d & 11th Jud. Dists, 2001); Millenium Medical Diagnostics, PC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 2001 NY Slip Op. 40654 (App. Term, 2d & 11th Jud. Dists., 2001). Accordingly, the July 26, 2002 claim was not timely denied.

Timeliness of July 23, 2002 Claim

The July 23, 2002 claim was received by the insurer on July 31, 2002 and denied on September 9, 2002. Annexed to Mr. Coore’s Affidavit is a document he refers to as a “pend letter” which by its terms requests that certain information be provided. However, there is no indication in the papers in opposition to the instant motion that this document was mailed to plaintiff, on what date or by what means it was mailed or if any response to the letter was received. Mr. Coore only states that IME’s were scheduled, the assignor failed to appear for the IME’s and a “timely denial” was issued on September 9, 2002.

As indicated above, the assignor’s failure to appear for IME’s is not a proper basis to deny a claim. Urban Medical Diagnostics, PC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra; Millenium Medical Diagnostics, PC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra. Moreover, as defendant has failed to prove that a request for verification was mailed to plaintiff, if the “pend letter” can be considered a request for verification, the thirty (30) day time period within which to deny a claim was never extended. The claim was received on July 31, 2002 and was not paid or denied within thirty (30) days thereafter. Accordingly, the denial of this claim is untimely.

Timeliness of August 19, 2002 Claim

This claim was received by the insurer on August 21, 2002. Defendant does not allege in its opposition papers that a request for verification of this claim was sent to plaintiff. Mr. Coore’s Affidavit states that IME’s were scheduled to be held prior to the receipt of this claim. The assignor failed to appear at these IME’s and

the insurer denied the claim on September 9, 2002 on the basis of the failure to appear at these previously scheduled IME’s. The insurer’s actions in response to this claim are analogous to situations where an insurer relies on a previous denial to deny a current claim. The Appellate Division, 1st Department, stated the following in A&S Medical, PC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2005 NY Slip Op. 00505 (1 Dept., 2005)

When a provider of medical services submits a claim as assignee of an insured, neither the statute nor the regulations contemplate the insurer simply sitting mute and failing to act upon the claim, silently and secretly relying upon an earlier denial issued directly to the insured.

Quoting Atlantis Medical, PC v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 NY Slip Op. 40043 (Dist Ct, Nassau Co,3d Dist, Great Neck Part). The statute and the regulations, similarly, do not permit the insurer after receipt of a claim to

simply sit mute” and deny the claim based upon an earlier failure to appear at IME’s. While this [*5]denial is timely, the basis for the denial is unavailable to defendant. Urban Medical Diagnostics, PC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra; Millenium Medical Diagnostics, PC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra.

For all the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is granted to plaintiff in the sum of $1559.33 plus statutory interest and attorneys to be computed by the Clerk of the Court.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated:February 9, 2005

__________________________

HON. LOREN BAILY-SCHIFFMAN

Footnotes

Footnote 1:Plaintiff has presented motion papers that are generic in nature and are more like a brief on No-Fault law than support for specific relief related to the claims and denials annexed as exhibits to the motion papers. The Court looks with disfavor on this practice which requires the Court to leaf through the exhibits to divine the factual basis for the relief sought in the motion.

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

307729/03

Delores J. Thomas, J.

Plaintiff moves for an order granting it summary judgment. The motion is granted.

Plaintiff, Ocean Diagnostic Imaging P.C. As Assignee of Mohammed Rahman (“Ocean Diagnostic”), commenced this action to recover the sum of $1,758.40 for medical services it provided to the assignor, Mohammed Rahman (“Rahman”), and its attorney’s fees [Summons And Complaint Plaintiff’s Exhibit A].

Defendant, American Protection Insurance Company (“American Protection”), opposes the motion in its entirety. Its counsel maintains that Ocean Diagnostic’s bills were properly denied [Affirmation In Opposition of Lawrence Chiarappo, Esq. dated May 28, 2004 Paragraph Five]. Defendant’s denial was based upon the Physician Peer Review conducted by Dr. Daniel G. Kassan, M.D. on March 2, 2003 [Defendant’s Exhibit B].

Dr. Kassan’s report stated the following: [*2]

There was no evidence of significant injury on physical examination of cervical spine or right knee that would support the need for MRI of cervical spine or right knee. The injuries described could be adequately evaluated with physical examination and close monitoring of progress.

Dr. Kassan concluded that the two MRIs “were inappropriate and without necessity.” He recommended that payment should not be made to the health care provider.

On March 13, 2003, American Protection denied the submitted claim based upon Dr. Kassan’s peer review.

Defendant’s denial stated that:

. . . there was no necessity for the MRI. Therefore, your bill is denied in full. Denial of Claim Form dated March 13, 2003 [Defendant’s Exhibit C].

Defendant sent the denial to plaintiff on March 13, 2003 [Affidavit of Kimberly Palmer dated May 26, 2004 Paragraph Seven].

In an action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered to its assignor, the health care provider establishes a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof it submitted the statutory claim form setting forth the fact and the amount of loss sustained and that the payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (Star Medical Services P.C. v. Eagle Insurance Company, 2004 NY Slip Op. 24482, 2004 WL 2779347 [App Term, 2nd & 11th Jud Dists, December 1, 2004]).

The insurer must submit proof in admissible form to rebut plaintiff’s prima facie showing to oppose a motion for summary judgment (A.B. Medical Services, PLLC v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, 4 Misc 3d 86, [App Term, 2nd & 11th Jud Dists, 2004]).

An insurer may timely deny a claim on the ground that the medical treatment was medically unnecessary based upon a peer review. The peer review must set forth a sufficient factual foundation and medical rationale for the rejection of the claim (Triboro Chiropractic and Acupuncture P.L.L.C. v. Electric Insurance Company, 2 Misc3rd 135(A) [App Term, 2nd & 11th Jud Dists, 2004]). The peer review must be affirmed (A.B. Medical Services, PLLC v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 3 Misc 3d 136(A), 2004 WL 1302031 [App Term, 2nd & 11th Jud Dists, 2004]) or sworn to (A.B. Medical Services, PLLC v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, supra). If the report is not affirmed or sworn to, the court may grant summary judgment to the plaintiff (A.B. Medical Services, PLLC v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, supra).

Notwithstanding defendant’s counsel’s representation [Chiarappo Affirmation Paragraph Nine], Dr. Kassan’s peer review was not affirmed. Nor did Dr. Kassan swear to the truth of the representations made in his report.

Since the peer review was not sworn to or affirmed, it is not admissible. Therefore, American Protection may not utilize Dr. Kassan’s report to oppose plaintiff’s application for summary relief.

In light of the fact that defendant has not offered any other basis for denying movant’s [*3]application, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety.

The clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of $1,758.40 with statutory interest measured from August 5, 2003, along with statutory attorney’s fees, and applicable costs and disbursements.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated:Brooklyn, New York

February 9, 2005

DELORES J. THOMAS

Judge Civil Court

Civil Court, Kings County

91337/04

Eileen N. Nadelson, J.

Petitioner, a medical provider, brought this action to vacate a Master Arbitration award rendered in favor of Respondent insurer. The initial arbitration award was affirmed by the Master, both arbitrators concluding that Petitioner lacked standing to institute this claim for first party benefits under New York’s No-Fault Insurance Law.

At the initial hearing, the arbitrator sua sponte raised the issue of Petitioner’s standing to receive no-fault benefits. Petitioner, at the time in question, was a professional corporation authorized under New York law. The sole owner of the corporation was a medical doctor, and the services for which this action was commenced were acupuncture treatments performed by a licensed acupuncturist under the auspices of the professional corporation. The physician who owned the corporation was neither licensed nor certified to perform acupuncture, and no evidenced was adduced to indicate whether the acupuncturist was an employee of the corporation or an independent contractor.

11 NYCRR sec. 63-3.16(a)(12) states that:

A provider of health care services is not eligible for reimbursement under

section 5102(a)(1) of the Insurance Law if the provider fails to meet any [*2]

applicable New York State or local licensing requirement necessary to

perform such services in New York or meet any applicable licensing

requirement necessary to perform such service in any other state in which

such service is performed.

Under New York law, an acupuncturist may only be employed by or contracted to provide licensed services to the public through certain entities, including a licensed or certified acupuncturist or partnership of licensed (or certified) acupuncturists; a professional corporation authorized to practice acupuncture; a limited liability company or partnership lawfully authorized to practice acupuncture; a hospital, nursing home, clinic or HMO. See Advisory Letter from the State Education Department, October 8, 2002.

In order to provide acupuncture services, a professional corporation must be owned, organized and operated by persons who are licensed or certified to practice acupuncture. See generally, New York Business Corporation Law sec. 1503. In the case at bar, although Petitioner’s owner was a licensed physician, he was neither licensed nor certified to practice acupuncture.

Cases in New York have held that proper licensing of a medical provider is a condition precedent to payment of benefits under the No-Fault Law. Valley Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, P.C. v. New York Central Mutual Insurance Comany, 193 Misc 2d 675, 753 N.Y.S. 2d 289 (2d Dept. 2002). Consequently, if Petitioner was not licensed to perform acupuncture, it may not recover first party No Fault benefits for such services.

In affirming the initial arbitration award, the Master stated that the award was based on the fact that Petitioner, although a licensed physician, presented no proof that such license encompassed acupuncture services. Such evidence was also not presented in the current petition. Therefore, because Petitioner was not licensed nor certified to perform acupuncture, it cannot bill for such services. 11 NYCRR sec. 65-3.16(a)(12).

In its papers, Petitioner focused on the circumstances that permit a court to vacate an arbitration award and specified the minium requirements that a health care provider must supply in order to prevail on a claim for No-Fault benefits. Petitioner completely failed to address the standing issue upon which the arbitration award was based. However, a health care provider’s standing based on licensing requirements is always an appropriate field of inquiry. See generally CKC Chiropractic v. Republic Western Insurance Co., 5 Misc 3d 492, 784 N.Y.S. 2d 350 (Kings County 2004).

Based on the foregoing, the court affirms the award of the arbitrator and Master Arbitrator. The court finds it unnecessary, based on this decision, to address the grounds that may be used to vacate such awards.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

[*3]Dated: February 8, 2005

__________________________

EILEEN N. NADELSON, J.C.C.

Civil Court, Kings County

070407/04

Ellen M. Spodek, J.

defendant State Farm Insurance Company moves for an order severing the action brought by plaintiff into separate actions on behalf of the individual assignors.

In this action, plaintiff seeks to recover first party No-Fault benefits with interest and statutory attorneys fees from defendant for alleged medical services provided to its assignors.

Defendant’s motion to sever is hereby denied. The Appellate Division has held that when “claims arise out of a uniform contract of insurance and involves interpretation of the same no-fault provisions of the Insurance Law” severance need not be granted. The Court found that even if the claims involved separate accidents and individuals they do not lose their character as a series of transactions because they occur at different places and times and if they involve a common question of law, as the case at bar does, joinder is proper. ( see Hempstead General Hosp. v Liberty Mut. Ins., 134 AD2d 569 [2d Dept. 1987]). Defendant failed to submit any [*2]documents to demonstrate that the causes of action do not share common questions of law.

Moreover, the instant case involves one plaintiff and one defendant and CPLR 601 permits, and even encourages, joinder with as many claims as one plaintiff might have against one defendant, regardless of whether such claims are related.

Here, this Court finds that joinder of only four assignees does not impose an undue burden on defendant nor would it create confusion for the fact-finder. (see Hempstead, supra )

Lastly, the granting or denial of severance is left to the discretion of the Court. (Sporn v Hudson Transit Lines, 265 App.Div. 360; St. James Realty Corp. Level Realty Corp., 155 N.YS.2d 44; Biltmore Knitwear Corporation v Chalfin, 25 NYS2d 947). Accordingly, defendant’s motion is denied.The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this court.

E N T E R,

Dated: January 20, 2005 __________________

Hon. Ellen M. Spodek

Judge, Civil Court

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

070376/04

Eileen N. Nadelson, J.

Plaintiff, a medical provider, instituted this action to recover first party no-fault benefits from Defendant insurer. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, alleging that Defendant neither paid nor denied the claim within the statutorily mandated thirty-day period after receipt of the claims. Ins. Law sec. 5106; Regulations sec. 65-3.8.

Defendant, in opposition, claimed that the denials were timely on their face; however, Plaintiff argued that Defendant failed to provide legally sufficient proof of mailing the subject denials within the thirty-day period.

Defendant’s proof of mailing consists of an affidavit from one of its employees who states that it is part of her regular duties and responsibilities to handle claims filed for no-fault benefits. The affidavit goes on to state that she reviewed the records of the instant claim and based on that review, has determined that the denial was mailed on the date appearing on the denial form. She finally states that, “as per the regular course of business of this office, the bill was timely denied .” [*2]

The question before the court, one that has caused much confusion and litigation, is the information that must appear on an affidavit of mailing to meet the requirements of New York’s no-fault law to evidence a proper proof of mailing.

Generally, proof of proper mailing gives rise to a presumption that the item was received by the addressee. This presumption may be created by either proof of actual mailing or proof of a standard office practice or procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed. Residential Holding Corp. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co., 286 A.D> 2d 679, 729 NYS2d 776 (2d Dept. 2001).

In A & S Medical, P.C. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2002 NY Slip Op. 50121(U) (1st Dept. 2002), the Plaintiff established proof of mailing the claim by an affidavit of one of its employees who actually placed the application in an envelop and then mailed the envelop at the post office herself by return receipt certified mail. This Plaintiff further presented the postal receipts, which the court concluded constituted proof of mailing the claim. In this case, the court further adduced that the defendant’s affidavit of an employee who reviewed the file and concluded that the claim was not received was inadequate to rebut the presumption of the plaintiff’s mailing of the claim.

Proof of proper mailing requires evidence of actual mailing or a standard office practice or procedure designed to ensure that the items are properly addressed and received. Affidavits that make no reference to the specifics of the office mailing practice or procedure, which merely aver that the bills were mailed within the statutory time period, are insufficient to establish proof of actual mailing. Comprehensive Medical v. Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co., 4 Misc 3d 133(A) (NY Sup. App. Term 2004).

Consequently, in order to meet its burden of proving that denials were mailed within the thirty-day period, an insurer must attach an affidavit of an employee who personally mailed the denial or, conversely, the affidavit of an employee with personal knowledge of the office’s mailing practices and procedures, who describes those practices or procedures in detail, indicating how he or she acquired the knowledge of such practices or procedures, and whose personal review of the file indicates that those practices or procedures were followed with respect to the claim under review.

In the instant case, Defendant has failed to meet its burden of proving that the denials were mailed within the thirty-day period because the affidavit of its employee with respect to the mailing is legally deficient. The employee states that she is familiar with the office practices and procedures, but neglects to specify the details of those procedures. The affiant fails to state how she became familiar with these procedures, and her “personal knowledge’ consists merely of a review of the files, without stating at what point in the claim process she reviewed those files or the basis for her belief that regular office procedures were followed. Without sufficient substantiation that the denials were in fact mailed on the date claimed, the court must find for Plaintiff. [*3]

Summary judgment is awarded to Plaintiff. The clerk of the court is ordered to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1,181.63, plus statutory interest, costs, and attorney fees.

Dated: January 17, 2005

__________________________

EILEEN N. NADELSON, J.C.C.

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County

55621/03

Delores J. Thomas, J.

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on this motion is as follows:

Plaintiff moves for an order granting it summary judgment.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover for medical services it provided to five of its assignors pursuant to the no-fault endorsement contained in an automobile policy issued by defendant.

Plaintiff, as to each of its assignors, submits a copy of an assignment of benefits signed by each assignor and a copy of a verification of treatment form for each assignor. With respect to three of the assignors,^[FN1] plaintiff submits a copy of the denial of claim forms issued by [*2]defendant, which on their face indicate receipt by the defendant, and indicate a failure to deny the claim within thirty (30) days of receipt. With respect to the other two assignors,^[FN2] plaintiff submits an affidavit from Fenelly Olivares, in which he claims that he personally mailed the no-fault claims on January 10, 2003, as indicated in the annexed mailing receipt. In addition, plaintiff submits an affidavit from Shiva Hakimian, in which she claims that she is responsible for handling the claims of said two assignors, and that defendant failed to either pay or deny the claims of the two assignors within thirty (30) days of receipt.

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for recovery of no-fault benefits by submitting a statutory verification of treatment form showing the amount of the loss (A. B. Medical Services, PLLC v. Lumbermens Casualty Co., 4 Misc 3d 86, 2004 WL 1301910 [AT 2nd & 11th Jud Dists.]; Choicenet Chiropractic, P.C. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2003 WL 1904296 [AT 2nd & 11th Jud. Dists.]).

In this case, by submitting copies of the assignments, proofs of claim, copies of defendant’s denial of claim forms as proof of mailing of the claims for three of its assignors, and submitting proof of mailing as to the claims for the other two assignors, plaintiff has presented a prima facie case for summary judgment. Defendant’s denial of claim forms which indicate the date the claims were received is sufficient proof of mailing (A.B. Medical Services v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 3 Misc 3d 136 [A], NYLJ, June 2, 2004, p. 27, col. 4, 2004 WL 1302031 [AT 2nd & 11th Jud Dists.]).

In this case, plaintiff seeks reimbursement for services provided to its assignors from October 22, 2002 through January 6, 2003. Plaintiff sent completed verification of treatment forms for said services to defendant in December 2002 and January 2003. With respect to three assignors, the denial of claim forms sent by defendant, after it received the verification of treatment forms, were sent more than thirty (30) days after receipt of the claims. With respect to two of the assignors, there is no indication that any denial of claim forms were sent after receipt of the verification of treatment forms.

In defense of this action, defendant does not rely on the denial of claim forms sent after receipt of the verification of treatment forms, but rather relies on denial of claim forms sent prior to receipt of the subject verification of treatment forms. Prior to receiving the subject verification of treatment forms, defendant sent denial of claim forms with respect to each assignor, indicating that it was the defendant’s position, based on an independent medical examination, that no further medical treatment was necessary for the injuries suffered by each of the assignors. In addition, each denial of claim form provided a cutoff date after which defendant would not pay for medical services. Annexed to each denial of claim form was a report from a doctor which supported the claim that further medical treatment was unnecessary. These types of denials are called blanket disclaimers. It is defendant’s position that once it sent a blanket disclaimer any treatment provided after the cutoff date contained in the denial form would be covered by the blanket disclaimer; so that even if the denial forms sent after receipt of the verification forms were sent more than thirty (30) days after receipt of the claim, they would be timely, based on the earlier blanket disclaimer.

In A & S Medical, P.C. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 196 Misc 2d 322 (AT 1st Dept. 2003), lv to appeal granted NY App. Div. 2004 Lexis 9836 (1st Dept. July 5, 2004), the court, in [*3]passing on blanket disclaimers, stated as follows:

“Although defendant argues otherwise, its belated denial of plaintiff’s no-fault claim is not properly ‘deemed’ timely on the basis of its earlier blanket disclaimer of responsibility to reimburse plaintiff’s assignor for further orthopedic treatment, a disclaimer which predated plaintiff’s rendition of the services billed for and the filing of plaintiff’s claim form. ‘When a provider of medical services submits a claim as assignee of an insured, neither the statute nor the regulations contemplate[s] the insurer simply sitting mute and failing to act upon the claim, silently and secretly relying upon an earlier denial issued directly to the insured.’

The contrary construction urged by defendant effectively authorizing the sub rosa denial of properly filed no-fault claims is inconsistent with the plain language of Insurance Law § 5106(a) and, if adopted, would serve to vitiate the so-called 30-day rule embodied in 11 NYCRR 65.15(g)(3) and to undermine a core objective of the no-fault scheme ‘to provide a tightly timed process of claim, disputation and payment.” (at p. 323-324, citations omitted).

The distinction between A & S Medical and this case is that in A & S Medical the blanket disclaimer was served on the assignor, while in this case, defendant claims that the blanket disclaimers were served on plaintiff, the medical provider. Phillip Asciolla, an employee of defendant, claims that he handles claims for no-fault benefits filed with defendant, and that he has reviewed defendant’s records which indicate that the annexed copies of the blanket disclaimer were mailed to plaintiff with respect to each assignor.

Plaintiff, citing several cases, claims that the affidavit submitted by defendant’s employee is not sufficient to prove that the blanket disclaimers were mailed. In the cases cited by plaintiff, the plaintiffs in those cases submitted evidence of the defendant’s failure to deny the claim within thirty (30) days of receipt, so that the defendant’s employee’s claim that he checked the defendant’s records and that the denials had been timely mailed was insufficient. In this case, while plaintiff has shown that defendant’s denials, generated by its verification of treatment forms, were not timely mailed, plaintiff fails to submit an affidavit from a person with knowledge, that plaintiff never received the blanket disclaimers prior to plaintiff’s treating its assignors. Under these circumstances, defendant’s proof of mailing of the blanket disclaimer forms, in the absence of a sworn denial of receipt by plaintiff, is sufficient.

As noted above, the only distinction between this case and A & S Medical is that in A & S Medical the blanket disclaimer was served on the assignor while in this case the blanket disclaimers were served on plaintiff medical supplier. This distinction need not lead to a different result, since the Appellate Term in A & S Medical took a strong position that the no-fault statutory scheme requires the insurer to deny each claim it receives in a timely fashion, and cannot rely on a blanket disclaimer served prior to receipt of the verification of treatment form. As the Appellate Term noted, permitting such a blanket disclaimer would vitiate the thirty-day rule within which a claim must be denied. [*4]

In addition, even if a previously served blanket disclaimer could serve as a timely denial for subsequent medical treatment, the blanket disclaimers herein cannot be used by defendant as a defense. The blanket disclaimers herein are incomplete. They do not list the name of the medical provider in item 23, and unlike the denials served after receipt of the verification of treatment forms, which list the plaintiff medical provider as the applicant for benefits, the blanket disclaimers list the assignors as the applicants for benefits. An incomplete blanket disclaimer, which makes no mention of the medical provider, cannot be considered a timely denial of a claim for treatment which was subsequently provided, even if the blanket disclaimers were served on the medical provider. At the very least, if defendant wishes to rely on a blanket disclaimer, it must be properly completed. Thus, defendant’s belated denials of plaintiff’s no-fault claims cannot be deemed timely denied based on the previously served, but improperly filled out, blanket disclaimers.

Defendant cites Hospital for Joint Diseases v. Allstate Insurance Co., 5 AD3d 441 (2nd Dept. 2004), as standing for the proposition that a blanket disclaimer can act as a timely denial of subsequent treatment. In that case, the plaintiff claimed that it was entitled to summary judgment on two no-fault claims it sent on March 6, 2002, since the defendant had failed to either pay or deny the claims within thirty (30) days of receipt. The defendant submitted evidence that it had previously notified the plaintiff’s assignor that it had terminated her no-fault benefits based on an independent medical examination. In addition, defendant showed that it had previously issued timely denials for identical claims previously submitted by the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had repeatedly resubmitted the identical claims, until, one time, the defendant failed to issue a timely denial. The court found that the defendant’s denial was timely, since it had previously timely denied the identical claim. This case is quite different from Hospital for Joint Diseases, since defendant herein never issued a timely denial.

A no-fault claim is overdue if it is not paid or denied within thirty (30) days of receipt. Insurance Law § 5106(a); 11 NYCRR § 65.15(g)(1)(i). Since the blanket disclaimers are not valid, and since defendant either failed to pay or deny the claims with thirty (30) days of receipt, or never issued a denial, plaintiff’s no-fault claim is overdue.

Where an insurance company fails to deny a no-fault claim within thirty (30) days of receipt, it is precluded from raising the defense of lack of medical necessity (Amaze Medical Supply, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2 Misc 3d 134[A], 2004 WL 758248 [AT 2nd & 11th Jud. Dists.]).

Defendant further argues that the fees sought by plaintiff exceed the Workers’ Compensation fee schedule. Since defendant failed to deny the claims within thirty (30) days of receipt, it is precluded from raising this defense (Mingmen Acupuncture Services, P.C. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 2002 WL 1362202 [AT 9th & 10th Jud Dists.]; Park Health Center v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 2001 WL 1803364 (AT 2nd 11th Jud Dists.]).

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Interest on overdue claims accrues at 2% interest per month. Insurance Law

§5106(a); 11 NYCRR § 65.15(h)(1).

In accordance with 11 NYCRR § 65.17(b)(6)(v), once a court action is commenced, a party may recover attorneys’ fees in the sum of 20% of the amount of no-fault benefits awarded, including the interest awarded thereon, to a maximum of $850.00 per claim (Smithtown General Hospital v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 207 AD2d 338 [2nd Dept. 1994]).

The clerk is directed to enter judgment against defendant on the first cause of action [*5]in the sum of $1360.00, with 2% interest per month, from January 23, 2003. The clerk is directed to enter judgment against defendant on the second cause of action for attorneys’ fees in the sum of 20% of the above amount, including the interest awarded thereon, to a maximum of $850.00.

The clerk is directed to enter judgment against defendant on the third cause of action in the sum of $727.15, with 2% interest per month, from January 23, 2003. The clerk is directed to enter judgment against the defendant on the fourth cause of action for attorneys’ fees in the sum of 20% of the above amount, including the interest awarded thereon, to a maximum of $850.00.

The clerk is directed to enter judgment against the defendant on the fifth cause of action in the sum of $812.15, with 2% interest per month, from January 23, 2003. The clerk is directed to enter judgment against the defendant on the sixth cause of action for attorneys’ fees in the sum of 20% of the above amount, including the interest awarded thereon, to a maximum of $850.00.

The clerk is directed to enter judgment against defendant on the seventh cause of action in the sum of $850.00, with 2% interest per month, from February 10, 2003. The clerk is directed to enter judgment against defendant on the eight cause of action for attorneys’ fees in the sum of 20% of the above amount, including the interest awarded thereon, to a maximum of $850.00.

The clerk is directed to enter judgment against the defendant on the ninth cause of action in the sum of $85.00, with 2% interest per month, from February 10, 2003. The clerk is directed to enter judgment against the defendant on the tenth cause of action for attorneys’ fees in the sum of 20% of the above amount, including the interest awarded thereon, to a maximum of $850.00.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated:Brooklyn, New York ________________________________

January 4, 2005 DELORES J. THOMAS

Judge, Civil Court

Footnotes

Footnote 1: Zoya Abayeva, Geraldine Aybar and Altagarcia Abayea.

Footnote 2: Alekandra Borukhova and Jeanne Rivkin.

[*1]

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County, December 21, 2004

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Baker, Barshay & Neuwirth, Hauppauge (Robert J. Baker of counsel), for plaintiff. Carmen Callahan & Ingham, Farmingdale (Kerry-Ann Davidson of counsel), for defendant.

{**6 Misc 3d at 888} OPINION OF THE COURT

Ellen Gesmer, J.

This case presents squarely the question of whether an assignment {**6 Misc 3d at 889}is an essential element of a claim for first-party no-fault benefits, and whether the failure to include it is a waivable defect. For the reasons set forth below, the court holds that an assignment is an essential element of a claim for no-fault benefits, which cannot be waived.

In this action, the verified complaint alleges that Melvin Reyes was injured in a car accident on May 12, 2003 and received treatment from plaintiff to whom he assigned his rights to benefits under No-Fault Insurance Law § 5101 et seq. Plaintiff brings this action, as the assignee of Mr. Reyes, to recover $3,080 in first-party no-fault benefits. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment, and defendant opposes it, because of plaintiff’s failure to establish that it submitted an assignment of benefits to defendant with its notice of claim. Plaintiff contends that submission of an assignment of benefits is not part of its prima facie case and that any objections to the assignment are waived if not asserted in the defendant’s denial. Here, defendant [*2]concededly did not object in its denial to plaintiff’s failure to include an assignment in its proof of claim.

In making its argument, plaintiff relies on New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (8 AD3d 640 [2d Dept 2004]). That case would appear to support plaintiff’s position. There, the Appellate Division held that the insurance company’s failure to prove that it had mailed timely requests for verification of the assignments upon which the respondents’ claims were based prevented it from objecting to the claims “on the basis of lack of proof of the assignments.” (At 641; see also New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v AIU Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 456 [2d Dept 2004].) Recently, citing New York Hosp. Med. Ctr., the Appellate Term for the 2d and 11th Judicial Districts reversed a trial court which had dismissed a no-fault case because the plaintiff had submitted an assignment which did not designate an assignee (Diagnostic Rehab. Med. Serv. PC v Travelers Indem. Co., 6 Misc 3d 68 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]). Specifically, the Appellate Term held (at 69) that the defendant insurer, “having failed to seek additional verification or allege any deficiency in the assignment in its denial of claim form, had waived any defenses with respect thereto.”

In its decision, the Appellate Term also overruled its own prior {**6 Misc 3d at 890}decision in A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Progressive Ins. (2003 NY Slip Op 50790[U], *1 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2003]), in which it had affirmed the denial of a plaintiff medical provider’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the “purported assignment” did not bear the name of any assignee. Strikingly however, the Appellate Term did not disown its decision in A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (4 Misc 3d 141[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51031[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2004]). In that case, decided three months after New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. (8 AD3d 640 [2004]), the Appellate Term reversed the grant of a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment finding, inter alia, that one of the plaintiffs had failed to prove its prima facie case because the record did not contain an assignment. The Appellate Term reached that result even though the decision does not indicate that the defendant asked for verification of the assignment or issued a timely denial on that basis. This court concludes that A.B. Med. Servs. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (4 Misc 3d 141[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51031[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2004]) is still good law, both because the Appellate Term did not overrule it and because, for the reasons set forth below, it is consistent with governing precedent. Applying that decision to this case, this court must deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment since it failed to prove that it included an assignment in its notice of claim.

The continued validity of A.B. Med. Servs. (4 Misc 3d 141[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51031[U]), notwithstanding the Appellate Division decision in New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. (8 AD3d 640 [2004]), is entirely consistent with the policies and principles stated in Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. (90 NY2d 195 [1997]). In that case, the Court of Appeals held that a defense of noncoverage cannot be waived in a no-fault case, even if the insurer fails to raise it in its denial. That decision extended [*3]to the no-fault context the Court’s holdings in Zappone v Home Ins. Co. (55 NY2d 131 [1982]) and Schiff Assoc. v Flack (51 NY2d 692 [1980]) that the defense of noncoverage could not be waived in cases concerning liability policies and professional indemnity insurance. The underlying theory of all of these cases is that if the insurer is not liable to the alleged insured under the contract of insurance, then contractual liability cannot be created by waiver (Schiff Assoc. v Flack, 51 NY2d 692, 698 [1980]; Zappone v Home Ins. Co., 55 NY2d 131, 135-136 [1982]; Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 201 [1997]). The Court of Appeals explained that, if for example, the insurance company had no contract of insurance at all with the alleged insured, or had no contract with its insured concerning the vehicle in the accident, then “there simply is no insurance at all and, therefore, no obligation to disclaim or deny.” (Zappone v Home Ins. Co., 55 NY2d 131, 139 [1982].){**6 Misc 3d at 891}

An assignment essentially extends the rights created by contract from the assignor to the assignee, so the assignee can sue on behalf of its assignor only if it has a valid assignment. Accordingly, the insurance company has no contractual obligation to the assignee in the absence of a valid assignment. Consequently, if the absence of an assignment could be waived by the insurance company’s failure to raise it, then contractual liability between the insurance company and the assured’s assignee would be created by waiver. But that should not be permitted, just as the courts do not permit a contractual obligation between the insurance company and its alleged insured to be created by waiver (Schiff Assoc. v Flack, 51 NY2d 692, 698 [1980]; Zappone v Home Ins. Co., 55 NY2d 131, 135-136 [1982]; Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 201 [1997]). Therefore, when no assignment is tendered, the insurance company has no contractual obligation to the assignee, and its objections to the absence of the assignment cannot be waived.

In this case, there simply was no assignment. Plaintiff did not attach one to its moving papers or to its reply papers. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to establish that defendant has any contractual obligation to it, and the court cannot grant summary judgment in its favor.