Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Jennifer G. Schecter, J.), entered September 18, 2013, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Jennifer G. Schecter, J.), entered September 18, 2013, affirmed with $10 costs.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that it timely and properly denied plaintiff’s claim for no-fault first-party benefits, through the affidavits of employees of its mailing center and of the entity which administers its no-fault claims, detailing their respective office mailing procedures, accompanied by a certificate of mailing (see Nassau Ins. Co. v Murray, 46 NY2d 828, 829 [1978]; Badio v Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 229,330 [2004]), and the peer review report of its orthopedic doctor, which set forth a sufficient factual basis and medical rationale for her stated conclusion that the medical supplies provided by plaintiff to its assignor were not medically necessary (see Triangle R. Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 143[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51663[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2011]). Plaintiff’s opposition, consisting of an attorney’s affirmation unaccompanied by any medical evidence or other competent proof, was insufficient to raise a triable issue as to medical necessity (see Munoz v Hollingsworth, 18 AD3d 278, 279 [2005]; CPT Med. Servs., P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 87 [2007]).

Plaintiff’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Elizabeth A. Taylor, J.), entered July 3, 2013, as denied, in part, its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Elizabeth A. Taylor, J.), entered July 3, 2013, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with $10 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted in its entirety. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff-provider’s claim for first-party no-fault benefits in the amount of $662.89, by establishing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for independent medical examinations (IMEs) to plaintiff’s assignor and his counsel, and that the assignor failed to appear (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas, 111 AD3d 423 [2013]; American Tr. Ins. Co. v Solorzano, 108 AD3d 449 [2013]). Contrary to plaintiff’s central argument, defendant submitted competent evidence of the assignor’s nonappearance in the form of an affirmation of the scheduled examining physician and a sworn affidavit of an employee of defendant’s third-party IME scheduler attesting to the affiants’ personal knowledge of their office practices and policies when an assignor fails to appear for a scheduled IME (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas, 111 AD3d at 424).

In opposition, plaintiff did not specifically deny the assignor’s nonappearance or otherwise raise a triable issue with respect thereto, or as to the mailing or reasonableness of the underlying notices (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff, as limited by its brief, appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County,(Jennifer G. Schecter, J.), dated July 16, 2013, as granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s no-fault claim in the amount of $355.

Per Curiam.

Order (Jennifer G. Schecter, J.), dated July 16, 2013, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with $10 costs, and plaintiff’s claim for first-party no-fault benefits in the amount of $355 reinstated.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s first-party no-fault claim seeking payment of $355 – stemming from acupuncture services rendered by plaintiff on December 1, 2009, December 10, 2009 and January 7, 2010 – should have been denied. Defendant failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that its denials were properly mailed (see Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Zabloski, 257 AD2d 506 [1999]). In this regard, the affidavit submitted by an employee of Farmers Insurance Exchange, defendant’s claims administrator, failed to adequately describe its office mailing procedures (see Matter of Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. [Collins], 135 AD2d 373, 375 [1987]), merely stating that items placed in its “mail bin” are picked up by a nonparty entity – Pitney Bowes Services, Inc. (“Pitney Bowes”) – which brings the items on a daily basis to the post office. The affiant professed no personal knowledge of, nor did she attempt to describe, the procedures utilized by Pitney Bowes to assure timely and proper delivery. Nor were these deficiencies remedied by defendant’s submission in its reply papers below of an affidavit from a Pitney Bowes representative (see Batista v Santiago, 25 AD3d 326 [2006]).

Moreover, even beyond defendant’s shortcomings in proof concerning the mailing issue, the report of defendant’s peer review acupuncturist failed to set forth sufficient facts or medical rationale for his stated conclusion that further acupuncture treatment of plaintiff’s assignor was not medically necessary. That the assignor may have subjectively reported during the course of the peer review examination that she “feels worse” after three months of acupuncture treatment did not, by itself and without any objective medical explanation by the peer reviewer, eliminate [*2]all triable issues regarding the medical necessity of continued acupuncture treatment.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Jennifer G. Schecter, J.), entered April 15, 2013, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Jennifer G. Schecter, J.), entered April 15, 2013, reversed, with $10 costs, motion denied and complaint reinstated.

The action, seeking recovery of first-party no-fault benefits, is not ripe for summary dismissal. The defendant insurer failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not timely receive the plaintiff provider’s no-fault claim. In this regard, defendant relied on the affidavit of a claims representative employed in the Hicksville, New York office of non-party Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Exchange”), the entity which “administers claims” on defendant’s behalf. Although the affiant averred that there was no record of the underlying no-fault claim in his office’s paper and computer files, he professed no personal knowledge of the practice and procedures put in place by defendant in connection with the handling of no-fault claims sent to its Oklahoma City office, the designated mailing address for the submission of such claims (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 69 AD3d 613, 614 [2010]).

In any event, plaintiff, in opposition, raised a triable issue as to the mailing of the claim by producing a stamped mailing certificate tending to support its assertion that it timely mailed the no-fault claim to defendant at its designated Oklahoma City address (see LMK Psychological Servs., P.C. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 30 AD3d 727 [2006]; Badio v Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 229 [2004]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Defendant, as limited by its brief, appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Ann E. O’Shea, J.), dated October 17, 2011, as granted plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment on the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Ann E. O’Shea, J.), dated October 17, 2011, affirmed, with $10 costs.

Plaintiffs-providers established prima facie their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the necessary billing documents were mailed to and received by defendant-insurer and that payment of the no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106[a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a][1]; Countrywide Ins. Co. v 563 Grand Med., P.C., 50 AD3d 313 [2008]).

In opposition, defendant failed to raise a triable issue. Although defendant showed that it timely denied the claim on the ground of medical necessity, it failed to submit the IME report upon which its denial was based or any other evidentiary proof to support its defense of medical necessity (see Vista Surgical Supplies, Inc. v Travelers Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 778 [2008]; Mollins v Allstate Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 141[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51616[U][App Term, 1st Dept 2008]; cf. NYU-Hospital for Joint Diseases v Esurance Ins. Co., 84 AD3d 1190 [2011]). In the absence of “evidentiary facts” showing that a “bona fide” issue exists (see Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1979]) as to the medical necessity of the services here at issue, plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment was properly granted.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (James E. d’Auguste, J.), entered February 27, 2013, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (James E. d’Auguste, J.), entered February 27, 2013, reversed, with $10 costs, motion denied, and complaint reinstated.

The action, seeking recovery of first-party no-fault benefits, is not ripe for summary dismissal since defendant “failed to . . . establish that the denial of claim form was in fact mailed to the plaintiff” (Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 564, 564-565 [2005]; see Mercury Cas. Co. v Encare, Inc., 90 AD3d 475 [2011]). The affidavit submitted by the defendant insurer to establish proof of mailing – identifying the affiant as a “mailroom representative” of a nonparty to this action, State-Wide Insurance Company (“State-Wide”) – neither stated that the affiant actually mailed the claim denial to plaintiff nor, so far as appears, described defendant’s mailing office practice and procedures (see New York and Presbyterian Hospital v Allstate Ins. Co., 29 AD3d 547 [2006]), as opposed to those generally followed by State-Wide. Conspicuously absent from defendant’s moving submission was any allegation or showing that a jural relationship existed between defendant and State-Wide. Given these shortcomings in defendant’s proof, we have no occasion to consider whether defendant’s purported mailing of the claim denial to the individual treating acupuncturist rather than the employing professional corporation was proper (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8[c])

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (James E. d’Auguste, J.), entered September 17, 2013, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (James E. d’Auguste, J.), entered September 17, 2013, modified by reinstating plaintiff’s claim for first-party no-fault benefits in the sum of $1,259.53; as modified, order affirmed, without costs.

The affidavits and other documentary evidence submitted by defendant established prima facie that defendant timely denied that portion of plaintiff’s first-party no-fault claim seeking payment of $1,182.53 – stemming from acupuncture services rendered by plaintiff during the period October 1, 2009 through October 21, 2009 – on the ground that the fees plaintiff charged exceeded the amount permitted by the applicable workers’ compensation fee schedule (see Akita Med. Acupuncture, P.C. v Clarendon Ins. Co., 41 Misc 3d 134[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51860[U][App Term, 1st Dept 2013]; Great Wall Acupuncture v Geico Ge. Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 23 [2007]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue as to the efficacy of defendant’s mailing of the denial form issued in connection with this claim or the calculation of the fee. Accordingly, defendant’s motion, insofar as it sought to dismiss the $1,182.53 claim – representing the difference between the amount charged for the services rendered and payment made to plaintiff pursuant to the fee schedule – was properly granted.

However, defendant failed to establish its entitlement to summary dismissal of plaintiff’s remaining claim of $1,259.53, since its motion papers below failed to address the validity of this claim.

We note, in passing, that while plaintiff’s complaint and defendant’s moving papers below did not make clear that two distinct no-fault claims are involved in this litigation, both the record as a whole and the parties’ appellate briefs plainly establish that point.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Defendant, as limited by its brief, appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (James E. d’Auguste, J.), entered August 9, 2013, as denied, in part, its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and, upon searching the record, granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $2,175.

Per Curiam.

Order (James E. d’Auguste, J.), entered August 9, 2013, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, with $10 costs.

We agree that the peer review report relied upon by the defendant-insurer was insufficient to establish, as a matter of law, that the acupuncture services underlying plaintiff’s $2,175 no-fault claim lacked medical necessity. The report addressed the medical necessity of acupuncture services rendered to plaintiff’s assignor during a time frame prior to that covered by the bills sued upon here, with defendant’s peer reviewer basing his finding of a lack of medical necessity on narrow grounds, viz., the perceived vagueness of the provider’s initial acupuncture report and treatment notes. In such form, and since defendant’s peer reviewer stopped short of concluding that the assignor’s medical condition could never be shown to warrant further acupuncture treatments, his report cannot be read so broadly as to justify, without more, the denial of any and all future claims for acupuncture services rendered to the assignor. Thus, summary judgment dismissal of this claim was properly withheld.

In the absence of a cross appeal by plaintiff, the propriety of the dismissal of plaintiff’s remaining claim is not properly before us.