Decided on April 14, 2015

Defendant appeals from an order the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Elizabeth A. Taylor, J.), entered October 10, 2013, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Elizabeth A. Taylor, J.), entered October 10, 2013, reversed, with $10 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the action for first-party no-fault benefits by establishing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for independent medical examinations (IMEs) to plaintiff’s assignor, and that the assignor failed to appear (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas, 111 AD3d 423 [2013]; American Tr. Ins. Co. v Solorzano, 108 AD3d 449 [2013]). Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant submitted competent evidence of the assignor’s nonappearance in the form of the sworn affidavits of the scheduled examining acupuncturists and an employee of defendant’s third-party IME scheduler attesting to the affiants’ personal knowledge of their office practices and policies when an assignor fails to appear for a scheduled IME (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas, 111 AD3d at 424).

In opposition, plaintiff did not specifically deny the assignor’s nonappearance or otherwise raise a triable issue with respect thereto, or as to the mailing or reasonableness of the underlying notices (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]; see also American Tr. Ins. Co. v Marte-Rosario, 111 AD3d 442 [2013]). Accordingly, when the assignor failed to appear for the requested acupuncture IME, defendant had the right to deny all claims retroactively to the date of loss, regardless of whether the denials were timely issued (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas, 111 AD3d at 424), and even though defendant initially denied certain of the claims on different grounds (see Unitrin, 82 AD3d at 560).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

[*1]

Marshall & Marshall, PLLC, Jericho (Jeffrey D. Kadushin of counsel), for appellant.

Dwyer & Taglia, New York (Joshua T. Reece of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Cynthia S. Kern, J.), entered February 14, 2014, which, upon granting reargument, vacated the amended order, same court and Justice, entered June 6, 2013, confirming an arbitration award in favor of petitioner and denying respondent’s cross petition seeking to vacate the arbitration award, and granted the cross petition, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Respondent made a prima facie showing that the offending vehicle in this no-fault arbitration was insured by Global Liberty Insurance of New York, by submitting a Department of Motor Vehicles expansion, indicating that Global had insured the vehicle subsequent to respondent’s coverage (see Matter of Eagle Ins. Co. v Kapelevich, 307 AD2d 927 [2d Dept 2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 503 [2003]; Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Youngblood, 270 AD2d 493 [2d Dept 2000]). By operation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313 (1) (a), the subsequent coverage terminated respondent’s coverage of the same vehicle as of the effective date and hour of Global’s coverage, irrespective of whether respondent had otherwise complied with the cancellation requirements of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., 45 NY2d 608, 611 [1978]). Thus, it was arbitrary and capricious for the arbitrator to find that respondent was the insurer of the vehicle at the time of the accident because it failed to demonstrate that it had properly cancelled its policy. The [*2]arbitration award was also in excess of the arbitrator’s authority, where it awarded coverage when none existed (cf. Countrywide Ins. Co. v Sawh, 272 AD2d 245 [1st Dept 2000]; Matter of State Farm Ins. Co. v Credle, 228 AD2d 191 [1st Dept 1996]). Concur—Friedman, J.P., Renwick, Moskowitz, Richter and Clark, JJ.

Decided on March 23, 2015

Decided on March 16, 2015

Decided on March 4, 2015

Decided on March 3, 2015
Tom, J.P., Friedman, Renwick, Manzanet-Daniels, Feinman, JJ.

The Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C., Garden City (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Peter H. Moulton, J.), entered July 2, 2014, which denied the petition seeking to vacate the determination of the Master Arbitrator, dated November 6, 2013, affirming the award of the lower arbitrator in this no-fault arbitration, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the petition granted, the arbitration award vacated, and the matter remanded for a new arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.

The no-fault arbitrator gave no weight to an independent medical examination (IME) report, prepared by a chiropractor and submitted by petitioner, because it was not notarized pursuant to CPLR 2106. The Master Arbitrator, in reviewing the award, deferred to the no-fault arbitrator’s determination of the weight to be given to the evidence, as did the IAS court.

We find that the no-fault arbitrator’s decision to adhere, with strict conformity, to the evidentiary rule set forth in CPLR 2106, although such conformity is not required (see 11 NYCRR § 65-4.5[o] [1] [“The arbitrator shall be the judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence offered and strict conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary.”], was arbitrary. Accordingly, the award must be vacated (see In re Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.] , 54 NY2d 207, 211 [1981]). We note that since no substantive determination regarding the weight of the IME report was ever made, the Master Arbitrator and the IAS court erred in deferring to the no-fault arbitrator’s determination.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER

OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: MARCH 3, 2015

CLERK

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Robert R. Reed, J.), entered September 30, 2013, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Robert R. Reed, J.), entered September 30, 2013, modified by reinstating plaintiff’s claim for first-party no-fault benefits billed under CPT codes 97039 and 97026; as modified, order affirmed, without costs.

Defendant’s documentary submissions established prima facie that it timely and properly denied plaintiff’s no-fault claims billed under CPT codes 97810, 97811 and 99203 on the ground that the amounts charged were in excess of the fees fixed by the applicable workers’ compensation fee schedule (see Akita Med. Acupuncture, P.C. v Clarendon Ins. Co., 41 Misc 3d 134[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51860[U][App Term, 1st Dept 2013]; Great Wall Acupuncture v Geico Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue as to the efficacy of defendant’s mailing of the denial forms or the calculation of the fees. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant’s April 12, 2010 denial of plaintiff’s claim in the amount of $2,690 was timely, since the last day of the 30 calendar days within which defendant was required to pay or deny the claim (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8[c]) fell on Saturday, April 10, 2010 (see General Construction Law § 20).

Triable issues remain, however, in connection with plaintiff’s claims billed under CPT codes 97039 (moxibustion) and 97026 (infrared treatment). The position taken by defendant’s affiant, a certified medical coder, that the above-mentioned services, although “within the scope of practice of an acupuncturist, . . cannot be considered for reimbursement” because the procedure codes billed under were listed in the workers’ compensation physical medicine fee schedule, is unpersuasive. Inasmuch as the superintendent of insurance has not adopted or established a fee schedule for reimbursement of acupuncture services performed by a licensed acupuncturist, an insurer may consider the “charges permissible for similar procedures under schedules already [*2]adopted or established by the superintendent” (11 NYCRR 68.5[b]) for purposes of determining the appropriate reimbursement rate (see Forrest Chen Acupuncture Servs., P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 54 AD3d 996 [2008]).

Plaintiff’s remaining arguments are either unpreserved or lacking in merit.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

[*1]

Buckley Law Group, P.A., New York (Erdal Turnacioglu of counsel), for appellant.

Boeggeman George & Corde, P.C., White Plains (Richard G. Corde of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Milton A. Tingling, J.), entered April 12, 2013, which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on its claim for defense costs expended in the underlying personal injury action, and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The underlying personal injury action was discontinued by stipulation, to which plaintiff’s insured was a signatory, agreeing that all cross claims between the defendants in that action were “discontinued and waived.” The stipulation contained no reservation of any insurer’s subrogation rights (see Weinberg v Transamerica Ins. Co., 62 NY2d 379, 381-382 [1984]; Ziegler v Raskin, 100 AD2d 814 [1st Dept 1984], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 925 [1985]). Thus, plaintiff, as subrogee of its insured, standing in its insured’s shoes and having no greater rights than its insured has, may not assert a subrogation claim against defendant (see Progressive Ins. Co. v Sheri Torah, Inc., 44 AD3d 837, 838 [2d Dept 2007]).

Plaintiff’s claim is also time-barred, because plaintiff is seeking common-law subrogation relief, and the statute of limitations on the underlying personal injury cause of action (three years) commenced to run as of the date of the accident (see General Construction Law § 20; Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex., 87 NY2d 36, 43 [1995]; CPLR 214 [5]; cf. Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214, 221 [1996] [subrogation rights created by no-fault statute commenced on date benefits were paid]).

Although defendant informed plaintiff six months before the limitations period expired that the lessee had failed to name plaintiff’s insured as an additional insured on his personal automobile insurance policy and that plaintiff’s insured was afforded coverage under the policy as a loss payee only, plaintiff did not assert a breach of contract claim against the lessee, or bring a declaratory judgment action against defendant or a subrogation action until well after the time to do so had expired (see Allstate Ins. Co. v Stein, 1 NY3d 416, 423 [2004]).

Thus, even if plaintiff were, as it contends, an additional insured solely by operation of [*2]the terms of the policy issued by defendant, and without reference to the terms of the lease, it could not assert a subrogation claim because its time to do so has expired. Concur—Friedman, J.P., Sweeny, Andrias, Moskowitz and DeGrasse, JJ.

Defendant, as limited by its briefs, appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Andrea Masley, J.), dated May 22, 2013, as denied, in part, its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Andrea Masley, J.), dated May 22, 2013, insofar as appealed from, modified by granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims seeking no-fault first-party benefits in the aggregate amount of $1,710.05; as modified, order affirmed, with $10 costs to defendant-appellant.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s no-fault claims in the total sum of $ 1,710.75, for medical supplies provided to plaintiff’s assignor on June 2, 2011 and June 22, 2011, by establishing its proper and timely mailing of the denial of claim forms at issue herein (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2d Dept 2008]), and submitting a sworn peer review report which set forth a sufficient factual basis and medical rationale for the stated conclusion that the medical supplies provided to the assignor were not medically necessary (see Triangle R. Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 143[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51663[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2011]). Plaintiff’s opposing submission, consisting of an attorney’s affirmation unaccompanied by any medical evidence or other competent proof, was insufficient to raise a triable issue (see Munoz v Hollingsworth, 18 AD3d 278, 279 [2005]; CPT Med. Servs., P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 87 [2007]). Plaintiff’s objections to the peer review doctor’s qualifications “go to the weight and not the admissibility of her opinion” (Solano v Ronak Med. Care, 114 AD3d 592 [2014]).

We sustain so much of the order under review as denied defendant’s motion for summary judgement dismissing plaintiff’s claim of $1,080 for medical supplies provided to plaintiff’s assignor on June 27, 2011, since defendant’s own moving papers tend to indicate that this claim was not timely denied (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d [*2]312, 317 [2007]; Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195 [1997]; Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Zabloski, 257 AD2d 506 [1990]).

Plaintiff’s remaining arguments are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.