Law Offices of Brian Rayhill (Lawrence Wolkow of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), entered February 8, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor was not an eligible injured person (EIP) for receipt of no-fault benefits as his injuries did not arise from the use or operation of an insured vehicle (see Insurance Law § 5103; 11 NYCRR 65-1.1 [d] [a]). Defendant contended that plaintiff’s assignor’s injuries were the result of an assault after the subject motor vehicle accident, relying on the truth of plaintiff’s assignor’s factual assertions contained within uncertified records of the Kings County Hospital Center, where plaintiff’s assignor was admitted one hour after the subject accident. Conceding that the statements were hearsay, defendant’s attorney argued that they were admissible as exceptions as party statements and/or statements relevant to diagnosis and treatment. By order entered February 8, 2023, insofar as appealed from, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion.

A review of the records shows that, contrary to defendant’s contentions, defendant failed to establish, as a matter of law, that plaintiff’s assignor was not an EIP as defined by the [*2]Insurance Law and no-fault regulations. Hospital and medical records are admissible to support a summary judgment motion if the records are certified pursuant to CPLR 4518 (c) or the proponent of the records submits foundational testimony pursuant to CPLR 4518 (a) (see Berkovits v Chaaya, 138 AD3d 1050 [2016]; Matter of Kai B., 38 AD3d 882 [2007]). Here, as plaintiff correctly contends, the hospital records were not certified and defendant failed to otherwise establish a proper foundation for their admissibility. Therefore, the statements relied upon by defendant were not admissible (see Yassin v Blackman, 188 AD3d 62 [2020]; Berkovits, 138 AD3d 1050; Matter of Kai B., 38 AD3d 882). Consequently, defendant failed to proffer competent evidence to establish, as a matter of law, its defense that plaintiff’s assignor was not an EIP (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; see e.g. Psychology & Massage Therapy Assoc., PLLC v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 12 Misc 3d 140[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51351[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]), and defendant’s motion was properly denied.

It is noted that, even if the hospital records and the statements contained therein were admissible, defendant would still not be entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint, as defendant’s motion failed to eliminate all material questions of fact as to whether plaintiff’s assignor’s injuries were the result of an assault and not the result of the use or operation of a motor vehicle.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

BUGGS, J.P., OTTLEY and HOM, JJ., concur.

Hollander Legal Group, P.C. (Allan S. Hollander of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Gabriel & Moroff, PC (Koenig Pierre of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, Fourth District (Garrett W. Swenson, Jr., J.), entered April 29, 2022. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claims for services rendered from June 8, 2020 through July 7, 2020 and from July 14, 2020 through October 5, 2020 on the ground that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claims for services rendered from June 8, 2020 through July 7, 2020 and from July 14, 2020 through October 5, 2020 on the ground that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the District Court as denied the branches of defendant’s motion which had sought summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claims for services rendered from June 8, 2020 through July 7, 2020 and from July 14, 2020 through October 5, 2020 on the ground that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).

For each bill at issue, defendant established prima facie that it timely mailed initial and [*2]follow-up EUO scheduling letters (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]); that plaintiff failed to appear for the scheduled EUOs; and that defendant then issued “timely and proper denial[s] of the claims following [plaintiff’s] failure to appear at the last scheduled EUO” (Quality Health Supply Corp. v Nationwide Ins., 216 AD3d 1013, 1014 [2023]). To the extent that the District Court stated that there was an issue of fact as to whether the EUOs were scheduled to be held in a location which was reasonably convenient for plaintiff, we note that the EUO scheduling letters offered to let plaintiff appear virtually. As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in response to defendant’s prima facie showing, defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon those claims (see id.; ARCO Med. NY, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 134[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52382[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claims for services rendered from June 8, 2020 through July 7, 2020 and from July 14, 2020 through October 5, 2020 on the ground that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath is granted.

GARGUILO, P.J., McCORMACK and WALSH, JJ., concur.

Hollander Legal Group, P.C. (Allan S. Hollander of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Gabriel & Moroff, PC (Koenig Pierre of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, Fourth District (Garrett W. Swenson, Jr., J.), entered June 21, 2022. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the District Court as denied defendant’s motion which had sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).

The affidavit submitted by defendant established that the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms, which denied the claims on the ground that plaintiff failed to appear for the EUOs, had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [l]). In addition, defendant submitted affidavits by its attorney who was scheduled to conduct the EUOs, as well as certified transcripts of the attorney’s statements of the nonappearances, which were sufficient to establish plaintiff’s failure to appear (see Pavlova v Nationwide Ins., 70 Misc 3d 144[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50213[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2021]; TAM Med. Supply Corp. v 21st Century Ins. Co., 57 Misc 3d 149[A], [*2]2017 NY Slip Op 51510[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]). Consequently, defendant established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596 [2014]). To the extent the court stated that there was an issue of fact as to whether the EUOs were scheduled to be held in a location which was reasonably convenient for plaintiff, the EUO scheduling letters offered to let plaintiff appear virtually. As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant’s motion, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

GARGUILO, P.J., McCORMACK and WALSH, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Brian Rayhill (Ivy Cherian and Lawrence Wolkow of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Keisha M. Alleyne, J.), dated April 18, 2023. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the policy limits had been exhausted, and denying plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

To obtain summary judgment on its asserted defense of policy exhaustion, defendant had to prove that it had paid the limits of the policy in accordance with 11 NYCRR 65-3.15 (see Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294 [2007]; Alleviation Med. Servs., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 191 AD3d 934 [2021]). Here, defendant failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that it had made any payments under the policy because, as plaintiff argues, defendant’s claim specialist did not lay a sufficient foundation for the payment log, upon which defendant relied, to be accepted as proof that the payments listed therein had been made (see CPLR 4518 [a]; People v Kennedy, 68 NY2d 569 [1986]; JPC Med., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 75 Misc 3d 136[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50562[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, [*2]11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]; JPF Med. Servs., P.C. v Nationwide Ins., 69 Misc 3d 127[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51122[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]; Charles Deng Acupuncture, P.C. v 21st Century Ins. Co., 61 Misc 3d 154[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51815[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). Consequently, defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment was properly denied, as plaintiff failed to establish that the claim at issue had not been timely denied (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]), or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim form that was conclusory, vague, or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

BUGGS, J.P., OTTLEY and HOM, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Brian Rayhill (Ivy Cherian and Lawrence Wolkow of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Keisha M. Alleyne, J.), dated April 10, 2023. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the policy limits had been exhausted, and denying plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

For the reasons stated in JSJ Anesthesia Pain Mgt., PLLC, as Assignee of Gardner-Bowlyn, Janet v Nationwide Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2024 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2023-655 K C], decided herewith), the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

BUGGS, J.P., OTTLEY and HOM, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Nicolini, Paradise, Ferretti & Sabella, PLLC (Francis J. Ammendolea of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Ellen E. Edwards, J.), dated February 22, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s late answer.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for services rendered to its assignor as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on April 22, 2015. Defendant was personally served with process at its Illinois office on September 29, 2020. Defendant did not timely appear or answer the complaint. It is undisputed that, in February 2021, defendant contacted plaintiff’s counsel and requested that the action be voluntarily discontinued on the ground that there was no coverage under the insurance policy, as the policy had been cancelled effective April 16, 2015 due to nonpayment of the premium. In an email sent on March 15, 2021, plaintiff’s counsel stated that it would not voluntarily discontinue the action. Defense counsel served an answer on March 25, 2021, and plaintiff rejected it as untimely.

By notice of motion dated June 16, 2021, defendant moved to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s late answer, pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d), alleging, as is relevant to this appeal, that there was a reasonable excuse for its delay in answering. In support of its motion, defendant submitted an affidavit of its employee who averred that the delay was due to defendant’s [*2]difficulty in connecting the summons and complaint to the imsurance policy and claim file. The policy was inactive and defendant had been served in Illinois even though the policy was issued in Nevada, and New York was the site of the accident and lawsuit. Once the policy and claim file were identified, there was an additional delay in answering, as defendant contacted plaintiff’s counsel to request that the action be voluntarily discontinued on the ground that there was no active policy coverage at the time of the accident. In opposition, plaintiff argued that defendant had failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for its delay in answering, instead admitting to mere law office neglect. By order dated February 22, 2023, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, the Civil Court granted defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff to accept its late answer, finding that defendant had proffered a reasonable excuse for its delay in serving its answer.

A court may compel a plaintiff to accept a defendant’s late answer “upon such terms as may be just and upon a showing of a reasonable excuse for delay” in answering (CPLR 3012 [d]; see also Pain Mgt. Ctr. of N.J., P.C. v All Car Rent-A-Car, 57 Misc 3d 138[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 51310[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]). “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the trial court’s discretion” (New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 120 AD3d 1322, 1323 [2014]). Under the particular circumstances presented, as well as defendant’s lack of willfulness and the absence of any prejudice to plaintiff, we find that the Civil Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff to accept its late answer (see CPLR 3012 [d]; Pain Mgt. Ctr. of N.J., P.C. v All Car Rent-A-Car, 2017 NY Slip Op 51310[U]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

BUGGS, J.P., OTTLEY and HOM, JJ., concur.

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Jaffe & Velasquez, LLP, for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal, on the ground of inadequacy, from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Larry Love, J.), entered September 14, 2023. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $500.23 pursuant to a stipulation of settlement entered into on February 3, 2003, awarded plaintiff statutory no-fault interest from February 14, 2017. The appeal from the judgment brings up for review so much of an order of that court entered February 22, 2018 as, sua sponte, tolled the accrual of statutory no-fault interest.

ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, so much of the February 22, 2018 order as, sua sponte, tolled the accrual of statutory no-fault interest is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a new judgment in accordance with this decision and order.

This action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for a claim arising out of an accident that occurred on October 6, 1999 was commenced in 2001 and settled on February 3, 2003. Defendant did not pay the settlement amount, and a judgment was subsequently entered on January 30, 2017 pursuant to CPLR 5003-a, awarding plaintiff statutory no-fault interest from the date of the settlement at a simple rate. On February 14, 2017, plaintiff moved, pursuant to CPLR 5019 (a), to, in effect, correct the January 30, 2017 judgment by recalculating the statutory no-fault interest from a simple rate to a compound rate. By order entered February 22, 2018, the Civil Court granted the motion and directed the clerk to recalculate the interest at a rate of 2% per month, compounded, but, sua sponte, tolled the accrual [*2]of statutory no-fault interest through February 14, 2017, the date plaintiff filed its motion. A judgment was entered on September 14, 2023 accordingly, from which plaintiff appeals on the ground of inadequacy.

Plaintiff correctly argues that the Civil Court erred in tolling the statutory no-fault interest from the date of the settlement to the date of plaintiff’s motion. Once the case settled, defendant was obligated to pay the agreed-upon amount to plaintiff (see CPLR 5003-a) and “plaintiff, as the prevailing party, was not required to make a demand for the money” (Seaside Rehabilitation v Allstate Ins. Co., 63 Misc 3d 162[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50918[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 5003-a [e]; NCT Diagnostics, Inc. v Countrywide Ins. Co., 77 Misc 3d 133[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 51247[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). Defendant did not demonstrate that plaintiff had prevented defendant in any way from paying the settlement amount (see ERHAL Holding Corp. v Rusin, 252 AD2d 473 [1998]; Juracka v Ferrara, 120 AD2d 822 [1986]; Craniofacial Pain Mgt. v Allstate Ins. Co., 61 Misc 3d 155[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51825[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). Therefore, the Civil Court erred in tolling the accrual of interest from the date of the settlement until the date plaintiff filed the instant motion (see Seaside Rehabilitation v Allstate Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 50918[U]).

Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, so much of the February 22, 2018 order as, sua sponte, tolled the accrual of statutory no-fault interest is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a new judgment in accordance with this decision and order.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Jaffe & Velasquez, LLP, for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal, on the ground of inadequacy, from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Maureen A. Healy, J.), entered September 13, 2023. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $1,704.68 pursuant to a stipulation of settlement entered into on July 10, 2010, awarded plaintiff statutory no-fault interest from January 9, 2017. The appeal from the judgment brings up for review so much of an order of that court entered October 22, 2018 as, sua sponte, tolled the accrual of statutory no-fault interest.

ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, so much of the October 22, 2018 order as, sua sponte, tolled the accrual of statutory no-fault interest is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a new judgment in accordance with this decision and order.

This action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for a claim arising out of an accident that occurred on January 5, 2000 was commenced in 2001 and settled on July 10, 2010. Defendant did not pay the settlement amount, and a judgment was subsequently entered on January 9, 2017 pursuant to CPLR 5003-a, awarding plaintiff statutory no-fault interest from the date of the settlement at a simple rate. On January 17, 2017, plaintiff moved, pursuant to CPLR 5019 (a), to, in effect, correct the January 9, 2017 judgment by recalculating the statutory no-fault interest from a simple rate to a compound rate. By order entered October 22, 2018, the Civil Court granted the motion and directed the clerk to recalculate [*2]the interest at a rate of 2% per month, compounded, but, sua sponte, tolled the accrual of statutory no-fault interest from the date of the settlement through January 9, 2017. A judgment was entered on September 13, 2023 accordingly, from which plaintiff appeals on the ground of inadequacy.

Plaintiff correctly argues that the Civil Court erred in tolling the statutory no-fault interest from the date of the settlement to January 9, 2017, the date of the original judgment. Once the case settled, defendant was obligated to pay the agreed-upon amount to plaintiff (see CPLR 5003-a) and “plaintiff, as the prevailing party, was not required to make a demand for the money” (Seaside Rehabilitation v Allstate Ins. Co., 63 Misc 3d 162[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50918[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 5003-a [e]; NCT Diagnostics, Inc. v Countrywide Ins. Co., 77 Misc 3d 133[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 51247[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). Defendant did not demonstrate that plaintiff had prevented defendant in any way from paying the settlement amount (see ERHAL Holding Corp. v Rusin, 252 AD2d 473 [1998]; Juracka v Ferrara, 120 AD2d 822 [1986]; Craniofacial Pain Mgt. v Allstate Ins. Co., 61 Misc 3d 155[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51825[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]). Therefore, the Civil Court erred in tolling the accrual of interest from the date of the settlement to the date of the original judgment (see Seaside Rehabilitation v Allstate Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 50918[U]).

Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, so much of the October 22, 2018 order as, sua sponte, tolled the accrual of statutory no-fault interest is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a new judgment in accordance with this decision and order.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for appellant. Jaffe & Velasquez, LLP, for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Terrence C. O’Connor, J.), entered April 5, 2018. The order, in effect, denied plaintiff’s motion to recalculate, from a simple rate to a compound rate, an award of statutory no-fault interest in a judgment of that court entered March 22, 2017.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and plaintiff’s motion to recalculate, from a simple rate to a compound rate, an award of statutory no-fault interest in a judgment entered March 22, 2017 is granted.

This action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for a claim submitted to defendant on or about May 4, 2000, arising from an accident that occurred on November 15, 1999 was commenced in 2002 and settled on July 31, 2008. Defendant did not pay the settlement amount, and a judgment was subsequently entered on March 22, 2017 (see CPLR 5003-a) awarding statutory no-fault interest at a simple 2% per month rate. Plaintiff moved, pursuant to CPLR 5019 (a), to have the interest recalculated pursuant to the pre-2002 regulations, which required no-fault interest to be calculated at a compound rate (see former 11 NYCRR 65.15 [h] [1]). Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which, in effect, denied its motion.

Plaintiff correctly argues that the claim involved herein is governed by the former regulations providing for compound interest because the accident occurred prior to the effective date of the current regulations, which now provide for a simple rate of interest (see 11 NYCRR [*2]65-3.9 [a], effective April 5, 2002; Matter of B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 197 AD3d 144, 155-156 [2021]; Health Value Med., P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 66 Misc 3d 127[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 52036[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]). Consequently, plaintiff’s motion should have been granted. We note that, contrary to the statement of the Civil Court, postjudgment interest in a no-fault action is governed by Insurance Law § 5106 and its implementing regulations, not the CPLR (see Matter of B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 197 AD3d 144; Health Value Med., P.C. v Country Wide Ins., 77 Misc 3d 128[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 51137[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and plaintiff’s motion to recalculate, from a simple rate to a compound rate, an award of statutory no-fault interest in a judgment entered March 22, 2017 is granted.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Maksin Leyvi and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Nicolini, Paradise, Ferretti & Sabella, PLLC (Francis J. Ammendolea of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (D. Bernadette Neckles, J.), dated December 15, 2022. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the policy limits had been exhausted, and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

For the reasons stated in Pain Med., PLLC, as Assignee of Van-Bochove, Nourine v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2024 NY Slip Op — [appeal No. 2023-753 K C], decided herewith), the order is modified by providing that defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

OTTLEY, J.P., BUGGS and HOM, JJ., concur.