SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal by defendant from an order of the Civil Court, Kings County (M. Mendez, J.), entered May 5, 2004, which denied defendant’s motion to preclude, or in the alternative, to compel compliance with discovery demands and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

Order affirmed without costs.

In this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff health care provider established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof that it submitted a statutory claim form, setting forth the fact and amount of the losses
sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; Amaze Med. Supply v Eagle Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51701[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). The burden then shifted to defendant to create a triable issue of fact (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).

Absent tolling of the statutory time (Hospital for Joint Diseases v ELRAC, Inc., 11 AD3d 432, 434 [2004]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 568, 570 [2004]), defendant’s conceded failure to deny the claim, received September 25, 2002, until March 28, 2003, violated the 30-day claim determination period and precluded it from interposing its defenses aside from the claim that the incident was staged to defraud. All post-claim requests for examinations under oath (EUO) pursuant to the verification regulations must [*2]be made within prescribed time frames (11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [a], [d]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.6 [b]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 583, 584-585 [2002]). “Any attempt by the insurer to deny the claim prior to exhausting the verification protocols is premature and of no effect” (King’s Med. Supply Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 128[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50451[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]; see also New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 5 AD3d at 570; King’s Med. Supply v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 5 Misc 3d 136[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51550[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Here, defendant’s initial EUO request, its letter dated December 10, 2002, was itself untimely and did not schedule the EUO within the prescribed time. The assignor was therefore under no duty to appear for the first scheduled EUO and it is irrelevant that defendant may have duly rescheduled the EUO upon assignor’s initial non-appearance.

As to the fraud claim, which survives the preclusion sanction (Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 [2002]), defendant’s proof thereof was not submitted in admissible form. None of the investigators’ reports or operators’ statements were sworn, and neither the affirmation of counsel, which alleged no basis to support an inference that any of the facts asserted in his statements were based on personal knowledge, nor the affidavit of defendant’s employee, which asserted merely the conclusory statement that “material misrepresentations [were] made in the presentation of the claim,” sufficed to allege the necessary facts. Thus, defendant failed to establish a triable issue of fraud and summary judgment was properly granted (see e.g. Ocean Diagnostic Imaging P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 134[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50189[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists] [claims examiner’s conclusory assertions as to fraud insufficient]; Ocean Diagnostic Imaging P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 62 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004] [unsworn investigation reports inadmissible in opposition to summary judgment motion]; Melbourne Med. P.C. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 92 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004] [attorney’s factual allegations, without personal knowledge of the investigation, mere unsubstantiated hearsay]; Dotzel v Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 NY Slip Op 50853[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists] [unsworn investigation reports inadmissible in opposition to summary judgment motion]).

In light of the foregoing, we need not address defendant’s remaining claims of error.

Pesce, P.J., and Patterson, J., concur.

Golia, J., dissents in part in a separate memorandum. [*3]
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM : 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT : PESCE, P.J., PATTERSON and GOLIA, JJ.
OCEAN DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING, P.C.
a/a/o ALICIA PRINCE,

Respondent,

-against-
UTICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant.

Golia, J., dissents in part and votes to modify the order and deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in the following memorandum:

Contrary to the holding of the majority, I find that the papers submitted by the defendant in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment were sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the defense of fraud was based upon a “founded belief that the alleged injur[ies] do[] not arise out of an insured incident” (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]).

For the reasons stated in my dissent in Ocean Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co. (6 Misc 3d 62 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]), I find that the unsworn reports when submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and accompanied by an affidavit which makes reference to such reports, are sufficient for the purpose of raising a triable issue of fact. This Court must, when deciding a motion for summary judgment, interpret the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant (see Weiss v Garfield, 21 AD2d 156 [1964]). This is especially true where there is an allegation of fraud.

Accordingly, I would modify the order of the lower court and would deny the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Decision Date: October 21, 2005

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal by plaintiffs from an order of the Civil Court, Kings County (E. Nadelson, J.), entered June 14, 2004, denying their motion for partial summary judgment in favor of D.A.V. Chiropractic P.C.

Appeal as taken by plaintiff Daniel Kim’s Acupuncture P.C. unanimously dismissed.

Order unanimously affirmed without costs.

In this action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical supplies furnished to its assignor, plaintiff D.A.V. Chiropractic P.C. established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof that it submitted claims, setting forth the fact and the [*2]
amounts of the losses sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 4 Misc 3d 86 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]; Amaze Med. Supply v Eagle Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51701[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Plaintiff, however, also submitted and relied upon defendant’s denial of claim forms which had unaffirmed peer reviews attached thereto. In opposition to the motion, defendant likewise relied upon said unaffirmed peer reviews which contained a sufficient factual basis and medical rationale so as to raise a triable issue of fact regarding medical necessity (see Pagano v Kingsbury, 182 AD2d 268 [1992]; Triboro Chiropractic & Acupuncture v Electric Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 135[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50215[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment was properly denied.

Inasmuch as plaintiff Daniel Kim’s Acupuncture P.C. does not appear to be an aggrieved party, the appeal as taken by it is dismissed (CPLR 5511).
Decision Date: October 21, 2005

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal by defendant from an order of the District Court, Nassau County (S. Jaeger, J.), entered March 31, 2004, which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, for an order compelling discovery.

Order unanimously affirmed without costs.

In this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff health care provider established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof that it submitted a statutory claim form setting forth the fact and amount of the loss sustained,
and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; Amaze Med. Supply v Eagle Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51701[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). The burden shifted to defendant to create a triable issue of fact (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). Defendant’s conceded failure to deny the claim (received September 12, 2002) until December 2, 2002, that is, well beyond the 30-day claim determination period, precluded most defenses unless defendant established a tolling of the statutory time (Hospital for Joint Diseases v ELRAC, Inc., 11 AD3d 432, 434 [2004]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 568, 570 [2004]).

All post-claim independent medical examination and examination under oath verification requests must be made within prescribed time frames (11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [a], [b], [d]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 583, 584-585 [2002]), and “[a]ny attempt by the insurer to deny the claim prior to exhausting the verification protocols is [*2]premature and of no effect” (King’s Med. Supply Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 128[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50451[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]; see also New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 5 AD3d at 570 [2004]; King’s Med. Supply v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 5 Misc 3d 136[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51550[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Neither of defendant’s initial examination requests were issued timely nor did they schedule the examination within the requisite 30-day period. Accordingly, defendant’s verification requests failed to toll the 30-day claim determination period.

As to the defense that the incident was staged to defraud, which defense survives the preclusion sanction (Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 [2002]), as plaintiff properly argued below, none of defendant’s proof offered to establish the defense was submitted in admissible form. Defendant’s counsel alleged no basis to support an inference that the facts asserted in his statements were based on personal knowledge. Defendant’s “no-fault suit specialist” asserted merely the conclusory reference to “a possible staged fraudulent accident” based on unspecified “material misrepresentations made in the presentation of her claims,” an unsworn police accident report, and unsworn investigators’ reports, the latter of which concerned only alleged irregularities in the treatment and billing process, not the traffic incident, and thus, did not support a defense that survived the preclusion sanction (see Ocean Diagnostic Imaging P.C. v Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., ____ Misc 3d _____, 2005 NY Slip Op ____ [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists, February 17, 2005] [“Since defendant failed (timely to deny the claim) . . . it is precluded from raising
. . . its defense of provider fraud”]; Melbourne Med., P.C. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 92 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]). The adverse operator’s statements as recorded on the police accident report, plainly self-serving, hearsay statements, were inadmissible for the purpose offered (Hoffman v Eastern Long Is. Transp. Enter., 266 AD2d 509, 510 [1999]; see also Cover v Cohen, 61 NY2d 261, 274 [1984]; Wolf v We Transp., 274 AD2d 514 [2000]). Thus, defendant failed to establish a triable issue of fraud (see e.g. Ocean Diagnostic Imaging P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 134[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50189[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists] [claims examiner’s conclusory assertions as to fraud insufficient]; Ocean Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 62 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004] [unsworn investigation reports inadmissible in opposition to summary judgment motion]; Melbourne Med. P.C. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 92 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004] [attorney’s factual allegations, without personal knowledge of the investigation, mere unsubstantiated hearsay]; Dotzel v Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 NY Slip Op 50853[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists] [unsworn investigation reports inadmissible in opposition to summary judgment motion]). [*3]

In light of the foregoing, defendant’s remaining contentions need not be addressed.
Decision Date: October 21, 2005

[*1]

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, October 21, 2005

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Amos Weinberg, Great Neck, for appellants. Bruno Gerbino & Macchia LLP, Melville (Charles W. Benton of counsel), for respondent.

{**10 Misc 3d at 51} OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Order insofar as appealed from modified by granting plaintiff A.B. Medical Services PLLC partial summary judgment in the sum of $6,765.47, plaintiff D.A.V. Chiropractic P.C. partial summary judgment in the sum of $593.94, and plaintiff Lvov Acupuncture P.C. partial summary judgment in the sum of $1,690.56, and as to those sums, the matter is remanded to the court below for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees, and for all further proceedings on said plaintiffs’ remaining claims; as so modified, affirmed without costs.

Appeal insofar as taken by plaintiff Square Synagogue Transportation Inc. unanimously dismissed.

Plaintiffs A.B. Medical Services PLLC, D.A.V. Chiropractic P.C. and Lvov Acupuncture P.C. established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof that they submitted statutory claim forms, setting forth the fact and amount of the losses sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; Amaze Med. Supply v Eagle Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51701[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2003]). Upon such proof, the burden shifted to defendant to create a triable issue of fact (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324[*2][1986]). Absent tolling of the statutory time (Hospital for Joint Diseases v ELRAC, Inc., 11 AD3d 432, 434 [2004]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 568, 570 [2004]), defendant’s conceded failure to deny the claims until December 2, 2002 violated the 30-day claim determination period and precluded it from interposing most defenses (aside from its claim that the incident was staged to defraud) as to all claims mailed on or before November 2, 2002.

As to the fraud defense, which survives the preclusion sanction (Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293{**10 Misc 3d at 52} AD2d 751 [2002]), none of the proof offered to establish that the underlying incident was staged to defraud defendant was submitted in admissible form. None of the investigators’ reports or operators’ statements were sworn, defendant’s counsel alleged no basis to support an inference that any of the facts asserted in his statements were based on personal knowledge, and Tonya Miller, defendant’s claims representative, asserted in her affidavit merely the conclusory statement that “material misrepresentations [were] made in the presentation of the claim” and failed to adopt any of the factual assertions contained in the attached reports and statements. Thus, defendant failed to establish a triable issue of fraud (Ocean Diagnostic Imaging P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 134[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50189[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]; Ocean Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 62 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]; see e.g. Melbourne Med., P.C. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 92 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004] [attorney’s factual allegations, without personal knowledge of the investigation, mere unsubstantiated hearsay]; Dotzel v Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 NY Slip Op 50853[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2003]).

Similarly, defendant did not establish proper verification requests with respect to its letters which, inter alia, indicated that it intended to examine “claimants” under oath. An insurer

“may not rely on a letter, even if denominated a verification request, that merely informs a claimant that a decision on the claim is delayed pending an investigation, and without specifying a particular form of verification and the person or entity from whom the verification is sought, to toll the 30-day claim determination period” (Melbourne Med., P.C. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d at 94; see also A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 137[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50255[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]; Ocean Diagnostic Imaging P.C. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 142[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51041[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]).

While the particular form of verification sought is stated, the persons sought to be examined are not identified, nor do the letters specify, inter alia, the time and place the examinations would take place (cf. 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [d], [e]). As the instant letters do not conform to the requirements of a proper examination under oath verification request in substantial respects, the{**10 Misc 3d at 53} letters are ineffective to toll the 30-day claim determination period.

Therefore, defendant must first demonstrate a tolling via proof that one or more of the notice of physical examination letters of October 2, 2002 and the follow-up letters of October 29, 2002 issued, that assignor failed to appear, and that the timing of said notice(s) and nonappearance(s) established a defense to any or all claims. As the December 2, 2002 denial was timely as to the final four post-November 2, 2002 claims, namely, plaintiff A.B. Medical Services PLLC’s claims for $323.36 and $71.40, plaintiff D.A.V. Chiropractic P.C.’s claim for $168.50, [*3]and plaintiff Lvov Acupuncture P.C.’s claim for $425 defendant need only establish that the denial as to said four claims was based on a meritorious defense (cf. Amaze Med. Supply v Allstate Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 43, 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004] [“A timely denial alone does not avoid preclusion where said denial is factually insufficient, conclusory, vague or otherwise involves a defense which has no merit as a matter of law . . .”]). It is initially noted that defendant’s claim denial form, which invoked only the eligible injured person’s failure to attend independent medical examinations (IMEs) on October 25, 2002 and November 8, 2002, is materially defective on its face. “A proper denial of claim must include the information called for in the prescribed denial of claim form” (Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 564 [2005] [“(A) denial of a claim form issued by (an insurer) . . . even if timely, (is) fatally defective (if) it omit(s) numerous items of requested information and thus (is) incomplete”]; see also 11 NYCRR 65-3.4 [c] [11]; Nyack Hosp. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 11 AD3d 664, 665 [2004] [the insurer’s “denial of claim, while timely, was nonetheless fatally defective in that it failed to include a number of basic items called for in the prescribed form,” citing Amaze Med. Supply v Allstate Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 43, 44 (2004), supra]; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 226 AD2d 613, 614 [1996] [preclusion sanction imposed where the insurer “fail(ed) to establish that it issued to the (claimant) a properly completed Denial of Claim Form within the (prescribed) 30-day period”]). Here, an accurate determination as to the significance of the IME demands for plaintiffs’ recovery of no-fault benefits depends on when defendant received each claim in the series, information which, in the first instance, is the insurer’s obligation to provide in a properly executed claim denial form. Moreover, as none of the six IME letters scheduled an examination for October 25, 2002, this verification request is unproved.{**10 Misc 3d at 54}

Nevertheless, in support of its motion, plaintiffs submitted a series of defendant’s IME request letters and a letter from counsel for plaintiff’s assignor to defendant wherein he admits that assignor failed to appear for IMEs on October 16, 18, and 19, 2002 and on November 8, 15, and 22, 2002. While defendant submitted no proof of mailing of any of the IME notification letters, plaintiffs’ concessions establish receipt of the November 8, 2002 IME request and assignor’s nonappearance, the only proved basis for the claims’ denial asserted in the claim denial form. The issue is whether defendant exhausted the verification protocols with respect to said IME request, and for that matter, the remaining IME requests which, while not invoked as a basis for the claims’ denial, are established on the instant record.

The insurance regulations permit preclaim IMEs, but without consequence for the running of the 30-day claim determination period (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 18 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]). All postclaim IME verification requests must be made within prescribed time frames, the initial request within 10 days of the claim’s filing (to be scheduled within 30 days of the claim’s receipt) and a “follow-up” request within 10 days of a subject’s nonappearance at the initially-scheduled IME (11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [a], [d]; 65-3.6 [b]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 583, 584-585 [2002]). “Any attempt by the insurer to deny the claim prior to exhausting the verification protocols is premature and of no effect” (King’s Med. Supply Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 128[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50451[U], *2 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]; see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 568, 570[*4][2004]; King’s Med. Supply Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 5 Misc 3d 136[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51550[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]). The request for the November 8, 2002 IME issued within 10 days only of plaintiff A.B. Medical Services PLLC’s claim for $71.06 and absent a follow-up IME request the claim determination period lapsed as to this claim. Further, said request predated receipt only of plaintiff A.B. Medical Services PLLC’s claims for $323.36 and $71.40, plaintiff Lvov Acupuncture P.C.’s claim for $425, and plaintiff D.A.V. Chiropractic P.C.’s claim for $168.50, and as an unattended preclaim IME, as to those claims, summary judgment was properly denied (cf. Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 18 [2004], supra). In any event, there was no follow-up IME request after the assignor{**10 Misc 3d at 55} failed to appear on November 8, 2002, and the December 2, 2002 claim denial preserved no meritorious defense as to any claim filed prior to the November 8, 2002 IME demand (Amaze Med. Supply v Allstate Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d at 44).

Plaintiff Square Synagogue Transportation Inc. concedes in appellants’ brief that it is not entitled to the relief sought upon the motion to the court below. Therefore, the appeal as taken by it is dismissed.

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to plaintiff A.B. Medical Services PLLC’s claims for $182.37, $230.10, $604.24, $751.83, $218.35, $360, $1,972.08, $1,999.12, $376.32, and $71.06, plaintiff D.A.V. Chiropractic, P.C.’s claim for $391.74 and $202.20, and plaintiff Lvov Acupuncture, P.C.’s claims for $1,180.56 and $510, and as to those sums, the matter remanded to the court below for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and for all further proceedings on said plaintiffs’ remaining claims.

Golia, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, and votes to dismiss the appeal insofar as taken by Square Synagogue Transportation Inc. and to modify the order, insofar as appealed from, by denying the motion of plaintiffs A.B. Medical Services PLLC, D.A.V. Chiropractic P.C. and Lvov Acupuncture P.C. for summary judgment and, upon searching the record, granting defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as to said plaintiffs in the following memorandum: I concur with the majority in their dismissal of the appeal by Square Synagogue Transportation Inc.

However, contrary to the holding of the majority, I find that the papers submitted by the defendant in opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment were sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the defense of fraud was based upon a “founded belief that the alleged injur[ies] do[ ] not arise out of an insured incident” (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]), i.e., as to whether it was a “staged” accident.

For the reasons stated in my dissent in Ocean Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co. (6 Misc 3d 62 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]), I find that the unsworn statements, when submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and accompanied by an affidavit which makes reference to such reports, are sufficient for the purpose of raising a triable issue{**10 Misc 3d at 56} of fact (see also Levbarg v City of New York, 282 AD2d 239, 241 [2001]). This court must, when deciding a motion for summary judgment, interpret the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant (see Weiss v Garfield, 21 AD2d 156 [1964]). This is especially true where there [*5]is an allegation of fraud.

I further find that it is uncontroverted that the defendant insurer sent notices to the plaintiff’s assignor to appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs) on October 16, 18 and 19, 2002 and, upon her failure to appear, gave her an additional opportunity to appear on November 8, 15 and 22, 2002. We know this is true because the plaintiff submitted a letter written by the assignor’s attorney dated January 21, 2003 acknowledging receipt of those notices as well as acknowledging the fact that assignor, Ms. Abbott, did not appear. The letter goes on to state that Ms. Abbott is a single mother and requests, through her attorney, to have all her IMEs held in one location and on the same date which must be a Saturday. In support of this demand, Ms. Abbott’s attorney admonished the insurance carrier that “[t]he no-fault regulations clearly state that all medical examinations requested by the insurer shall be held at [a] time and place reasonably convenient to the applicant.”

It is interesting to note that one of the IMEs was scheduled for Saturday, October 19, 2002 and the assignor still failed to appear. It is even more interesting to note that her claimed medical treatments consisted of 12 separate dates including several visits in a single week and only one visit claimed fell on a Saturday, and that was for transportation unconnected to any claimed medical treatment.

It should be observed that the provision of the no-fault regulation addressed by the assignor’s attorney is 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (e), which is part of the postclaim verification protocols.

As the majority of the appellate court stated in Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (7 Misc 3d 18, 20 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]):

“The insurance regulations provide, in the mandatory personal injury protection endorsement, which is independent of the verification protocols, that ‘[t]he eligible injured person shall submit to medical examination . . . when, and as often as, the Company may reasonably require‘ (11 NYCRR 65-12 [e], now 11 NYCRR 65-1.1 [d]) . . . and because this provision is included in the mandatory endorsement and not in the verification protocols, there appears{**10 Misc 3d at 57} to be no reason to preclude an insurer” (emphasis added).

To be clear, I filed a dissenting opinion in Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (7 Misc 3d 18 [2004], supra) and do not agree with reading the no-fault regulations as a fragmented collection of rules and regulations. It is for this reason that I believe that both requirements should be read together. Therefore, all eligible injured persons must submit to medical examinations when and as often as the company may reasonably require, and the company shall hold such examinations at a place and time reasonably convenient to the eligible injured person. [*6]

In the matter at hand, I find that the “company” fully complied with the regulations. It was the plaintiff’s assignor who clearly and intentionally chose not to submit to any independent medical examinations. The letter from the assignor’s attorney sent only after she failed to appear at any of the first noticed three IMEs (one of which was a Saturday) or any of the second noticed IMEs was merely a “red herring” meant solely to excuse her failures and not to comply with the regulations. Specifically, she had found the time on Wednesday, September 10, 2002, to attend a consultation ($230.10) with Dr. Schwartz and submit to SSEP testing ($604.24) with the same doctor, undergo physical therapy ($751.83) with Dr. Pegarum, and be treated ($391.74) by Dr. Konn, a chiropractor, all on the same day. Then on the following day, Thursday, September 11, 2002, she underwent substantial acupuncture treatment ($1,180.56) and analysis with Dr. Yuen. Indeed, she went for treatment on 11 separate days during the middle of the week.

Clearly, if it was reasonable for the assignor to attend all of her scheduled medical treatments during the work week, it was certainly not unreasonably inconvenient for her to attend the scheduled or rescheduled IMEs.

Accordingly, I would modify the order of the lower court insofar as appealed from and deny the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and, upon searching the record, I would dismiss the complaint for the reasons set forth in my dissent in the case of Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (7 Misc 3d 18 [2004], supra).

Pesce, P.J., and Patterson, J., concur; Golia, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate memorandum.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Francis D. Ricigliano, J.), entered October 1, 2004. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment.

Order unanimously modified by denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; as so modified, affirmed with $10 costs.

In this action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered to its assignor, plaintiff health care provider established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof that it submitted a claim, setting forth the fact and the
amount of the loss sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; Damadian MRI in Elmhurst v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51700[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]). Inasmuch as defendant herein failed to pay or deny the claim within the 30-day prescribed period (11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [c]), it was precluded from raising most defenses (see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 282 [1997]). Defendant was not, however, precluded from asserting the defense that the collision was in furtherance of an insurance fraud scheme, despite the untimely denial of the claim (see Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 [2002]). Contrary to the finding of the [*2]court below, the affidavit of defendant’s special investigator, which, inter alia, revealed numerous discrepancies in the examinations under oath of plaintiff’s assignor and defendant’s insured as to the circumstances surrounding the accident, was sufficient to demonstrate that said defense was based upon a “founded belief that the alleged injur[ies] do[] not arise out of an insured incident” (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]). Accordingly, since defendant raised a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a lack of coverage (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]), the court below erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Decision Date: October 20, 2005

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered August 18, 2004. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in regard to causes of action relating to assignors Romana Hernandez and Jaime Diaz.

Order, insofar as appealed from, unanimously reversed without costs and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment denied in causes of action relating to Romana Hernandez and Jaime Diaz.

In this action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical supplies rendered to their assignors, plaintiff established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment with regard to the causes of action relating to assignors Romana Hernandez and Jaime Diaz by proof that it submitted claims, setting forth the fact and the amounts of the losses sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; Amaze Med. Supply v Eagle Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51701[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Inasmuch as defendant failed to pay or deny the claims within the 30-day prescribed period (11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [c]), it was precluded from raising most defenses (see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 282 [1997]).

However, defendant was not precluded from asserting the defense that the various collisions were in furtherance of insurance fraud schemes, despite the untimely denials of the [*2]claims (see Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 [2002]). The affidavit of defendant’s claims representative, that the insureds in both cases were involved in intentionally caused collisions, was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the claims of assignors Hernandez and Diaz were [*3]
fraudulent (see A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 130[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50076[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]).
Decision Date: September 30, 2005

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Manuel J. Mendez, J.), entered September 28, 2004. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Order unanimously reversed without costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment granted and matter remanded to the court below for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees.

In this action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical equipment furnished to its assignors, plaintiff established its entitlement to summary judgment by its proof that it submitted the functional equivalent of the statutory claim forms (11
NYCRR 65-3.5 [a], [f]), setting forth the fact and amounts of the losses sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 4 Misc 3d 86 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]). Defendant’s failure to pay or deny [*2]assignor Figueroa’s claim for $580 and assignor Rivera’s claims for $840 and $1,085 within the statutory 30-day claim determination period (11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [c]), or to prove a tolling of said period precluded the defenses set forth in the claim denial forms (Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 282 [1997]; Triboro Chiropractic & Acupuncture PLLC v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 138[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50856[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]).

As for the defenses that survive the preclusion sanction, i.e., the alleged absence of an applicable policy and assignors’ fraudulent conduct with respect to the underlying traffic incidents (Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 [2002]; Mount Sinai Hosp. v Triboro Coach, 263 AD2d 11, 18-19 [1999]), defendant failed to establish that triable issues exist as to either defense. Defendant’s claim that plaintiff did not prove that its assignors are covered by a policy issued by defendant is without merit as plaintiff’s claim forms established the matter prima facie and defendant offered no proof to the contrary. Further, absent proof sufficient to create a triable issue as to whether any of the traffic accidents were staged with the intent to defraud, defendant failed to prove that the defense was based on “a founded belief that the alleged injur[ies] do[] not arise out of an insured incident” (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]).

Defendant based its partial denials of most of the remaining claims on the improper ground that the sums sought for the items of medical equipment exceeded an alleged average of suppliers’ prevailing rates in plaintiff’s geographic location. The insurance regulations governing medical equipment and supplies applicable to the instant action limit a provider’s recovery of medical equipment benefits to 150 percent of cost (11 NYCRR Appendix 17-C, part E [b] [1]). This “applicable fee schedule” constitutes the only limitation on recovery and a defendant’s denial of benefits on the ground that the fees sought exceeded prevailing rates for such equipment in the provider’s geographical location has been rejected as without merit (Amaze Med. Supply v Allstate Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 43, 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]; King’s Med. Supply v Allstate Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 127[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51681[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]). It is noted that pursuant to the revised Insurance Department regulations regarding durable medical equipment and supplies, effective October 6, 2004 (see Circular Letter No. 8 [2004]; 11 NYCRR Appendix 17-C, part F, eff. October 6, 2004), the current fee schedule for medical equipment sets forth, as an alternative to the 150 percent limit, whichever is less, the “usual and customary price charged to the general public” (11 NYCRR Appendix 17-C, part F [a] [2]).

As to the defense based on defective assignments, defendant’s failure to seek verification of the assignments or to allege any deficiency in the assignments in its claim denial forms “constitutes a waiver of any defenses with respect [to them]” (Ocean Diagnostic Imaging P.C. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 7 Misc 3d 137[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50790[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]; see also New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 640 [2004]; Capio Med., P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 129[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50526[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Defendant’s further claim that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for the delivery of equipment to the assignors because its manager-affiant did not personally supply the equipment or witness the equipments’ “turnover” is also without merit. The affidavit of plaintiff’s officer and billing manager sufficiently “[s]et forth [*3][his] duties so as to support the conclusion that the attached exhibits were sufficiently accurate and trustworthy to merit their admission into evidence pursuant to the business record exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518 [a]; People v Kennedy, 68 NY2d 569 [1986]), and said exhibits established that the supplies were furnished to the assignor” (King’s Med. Supply, Inc. v Hereford Ins. Co., 5 Misc 3d 55, 56 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2004]; see also Ocean Diagnostic Imaging P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 141[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51032[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]).

We have considered the remaining defenses and find them to be similarly without merit (see Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 564, 565 [2005]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 640, supra; Careplus Med. Supply Inc. v Travelers Home and Mar. Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 133[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50648[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]).

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the matter remanded to the court below for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Decision Date: September 20, 2005

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Eileen Nadelson, J.), entered October 8, 2004. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Order unanimously reversed without costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment granted and matter remanded to the court below for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees.

In this action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical equipment furnished to its assignors, plaintiff established its entitlement to summary judgment by its proof that it submitted the functional equivalent of the statutory claim forms (11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [a], [f]), setting forth the fact and amounts of the losses sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 4 Misc 3d 86 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]). Defendant’s claim that plaintiff failed to prove that its assignors are covered by a policy issued by defendant is without merit as plaintiff’s claim forms established the matter prima facie and defendant offered no proof to the contrary. The burden then shifted to [*2]defendant to raise a triable issue of material fact (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In our view, defendant failed to establish any basis for the motion’s denial.

Defendant based its partial denials of the claims on the improper ground that the sums sought for the items of medical equipment exceeded an alleged average of suppliers’ prevailing rates in plaintiff’s geographic location. The insurance regulations governing medical equipment and supplies applicable to the instant action limit a provider’s recovery of medical equipment benefits to 150 percent of cost (11 NYCRR Appendix 17-C, part E [b] [1]). This “applicable fee schedule” constitutes the only
limitation on recovery and a defendant’s denial of benefits on the ground that the fees sought exceeded prevailing rates for such equipment in the provider’s geographical location has been rejected as without merit (Amaze Med. Supply v Allstate Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 43, 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]; King’s Med. Supply v Allstate Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 127[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51681[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]). It is noted that pursuant to the revised Insurance Department regulations regarding durable medical equipment and supplies, effective October 6, 2004 (see Circular Letter No. 8 [2004]; 11 NYCRR Appendix 17-C, part F, eff. October 6, 2004), the current fee schedule for medical equipment sets forth, as an alternative to the 150 percent limit, whichever is less, the “usual and customary price charged to the general public” (11 NYCRR Appendix 17-C, part F [a] [2]).

As to the defense based on defective assignments, defendant’s failure to seek verification of the assignments or to allege any deficiency in the assignments in its claim denial forms “constitutes a waiver of any defenses with respect [to them]” (Ocean Diagnostic Imaging P.C. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 7 Misc 3d 137[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50790[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]; see also New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of
Queens v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 640 [2004]; Capio Med., P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 129[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50526[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Defendant’s further claim that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for the delivery of equipment to the assignors because its manager-affiant did not personally supply the equipment or witness the equipments’ “turnover” is also without merit. The affidavit of plaintiff’s officer and billing manager sufficiently “[s]et forth [his] duties so as to support the conclusion that the attached exhibits were sufficiently accurate and trustworthy to merit their admission into evidence pursuant to the business record exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518 [a]; People v Kennedy, 68 NY2d 569 [1986]), and said exhibits established that the supplies were furnished to the assignor” (King’s Med. Supply, Inc. v Hereford Ins. Co., 5 Misc 3d 55, 56 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2004]; see also Ocean Diagnostic Imaging P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 141[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51032[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]).

We have considered the remaining defenses and find them to be similarly without merit (see Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 564, 565 [2005]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 640, supra; Careplus Med. Supply Inc. v Travelers Home and Mar. Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 133[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50648[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). [*3]

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the matter remanded to the court below for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Decision Date: September 20, 2005

[*1]

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, September 20, 2005

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Amos Weinberg, Great Neck, for appellant. Troy & Troy, Lake Ronkonkoma (Hariharan Krishnaraj and Leonard Romano of counsel ), for respondent.

{**9 Misc 3d at 98} OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Order, insofar as appealed from, unanimously reversed without costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment granted and matter remanded to the court below for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees.

In this action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered to its assignor, plaintiff established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof that it submitted the claims, setting forth the fact and the amounts of the losses sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 4 Misc 3d 86 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]; Damadian MRI in Elmhurst v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51700[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2003]). Contrary to the determination of the court below, defendant’s denial of claim form, indicating the dates on which the claims were received, adequately established that plaintiff sent, and that defendant received, the claims (see Capio Med., P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 129[A], 2005 NY Slip{**9 Misc 3d at 99} Op 50526[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th [*2]Jud Dists 2005]; A.B. Med. Servs. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 136[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50507[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]). Defendant’s denial of claim forms indicate that defendant’s denial of plaintiff’s claims was not timely made within the 30-day statutory period within which it was required to pay or deny the claim (11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [c]). Accordingly, defendant is precluded from raising most defenses (see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 282 [1997]), including its defenses of nonconformity with the workers’ compensation schedules and excessive billing (see New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 583, 586 [2002]; Capio Med., P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 129[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50526[U] [2005], supra; Triboro Chiropractic & Acupuncture, PLLC v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 132[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50110[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]).

Defendant also denied the claims on the ground that the response submitted by plaintiff’s assignor to defendant’s wage verification request was fraudulent. In support thereof, defendant submitted the affirmation of its attorney and an attached unsworn report of a handwriting expert, who compared the writing in the wage verification form submitted by the plaintiff’s assignor and the wage verification form submitted by another claimant “involved” in the subject accident, and concluded that the forms had been prepared by the same individual, but could not give an opinion regarding the two signatures “because of the lack of similar letters.” Defendant argues that, despite its untimely denial, it is not precluded from asserting its defense of fraud. Defendant’s argument is without merit.

We note at the outset that the documentation submitted by defendant in support of its fraud defense, consisting of the affidavit of its attorney who is without personal knowledge, and the unsworn affidavit of a handwriting expert, does not constitute competent proof in admissible form (see A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v State-Wide Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 136[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50785[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]). In any event, defendant has failed to establish that its defense of fraud is not subject to the 30-day preclusion remedy.

In Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. (90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]), the Court of Appeals held that

“despite . . . [an insurer’s] failure to reject a claim within the 30-day period prescribed by Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and 11 NYCRR 65.15 (g) (3) [now 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 (c)], [it] may assert a lack of coverage defense premised on the fact or founded belief that the alleged injury does not arise out of an insured incident.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court specifically distinguished the insurer’s defense that the injuries were unrelated to the accident, a defense implicating “no coverage at all” (id. at 202), and hence exempt from the preclusion remedy, from the insurer’s defense of excessive medical treatment, which involves “excusal from payment of some part of no-fault benefits—a matter of degree at best” (id.), and is subject to the preclusion remedy. The lack of coverage defense also applies to a “collision . . . caused in the furtherance of an{**9 Misc 3d at 100} insurance fraud scheme” (see Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751, 751-752 [2002]) but does not encompass the defense of provider fraud which is precluded by an insurer’s untimely denial (see Melbourne Med., P.C. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 92 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]).

In the instant case, the defendant’s submissions in support of its defense of fraud fail to establish a lack of coverage defense that may be deemed exempt from the preclusion remedy. [*3]The expert’s conclusions are insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the medical services rendered “do[ ] not arise out of an insured incident” (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d at 199), so as to implicate a lack of coverage issue. Moreover, the acts allegedly constituting the fraudulent conduct are inadequate to demonstrate that the accident was in furtherance of an insurance fraud scheme so as to invoke the lack of coverage defense and exemption from the preclusion remedy (see Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 [2002], supra).

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of plaintiff and the matter is remanded to the court below for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

Rudolph, P.J., Angiolillo and Tanenbaum, JJ., concur.

APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County, entered March 30, 2004 (Irving Rosen, J.) which denied its motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

PER CURIAM:

Order entered March 30, 2004 (Irving Rosen, J.) reversed, with $10 costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, defendant’s cross motion is denied and the matter is remanded to Civil Court for a calculation of statutory interest, an assessment of attorney’s fees due thereon and entry of judgment.

Plaintiff health care provider commenced this action to recover $1,080.90 in first-party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered in February and March 2002 to its assignor, Harnarine Sumeer (Sumeer), for injuries allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident on December 17, 2001. Plaintiff mailed its claim on May 30, 2002 and defendant acknowledged receipt thereof on June 3, 2002. The suit is premised on defendant’s failure to pay or deny the claim within 30 days after its receipt. Defendant’s reason for denying the claim, as stated in its Denial Of Claim Form dated August 15, 2002, was Sumeer’s nonattendance at scheduled [*2]examinations under oath (EUOs).

Plaintiff established a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by proof that its claim had been mailed and received, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law 5106[a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp v Allstate Ins Co, 5 AD3d 742 [2004]).

Defendant failed to raise triable issues of fact since its submissions did not establish that the insurance policy in effect contained an endorsement authorizing EUOs pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-1.1(d). While plaintiff’s claim was submitted after the April 5, 2002 effective date of the revised insurance regulations which include EUOs in the Mandatory Personal Injury Protection Endorsement, the provisions of the revised regulations are not applicable to claims until new policies containing the revised endorsement are issued or renewed (see Star Medical Services PC v Eagle Insurance Company, 6 Misc3d 56 [2004]). Consequently, absent a showing that the subject policy contained an endorsement permitting EUOs, defendant was not entitled to a tolling of the 30-day period (11 NYCRR 65-3.8[c]) and its denial of plaintiff’s claim was untimely.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Decision Date: September 09, 2005