Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Melissa Betancourt, P.C. (Melissa Betancourt of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sharon Bourne-Clarke, J.), entered October 16, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that the two claims “were both timely and properly mailed,” and stated that the “sole issue that remains for trial is the issue of fee schedule.”

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the implicit CPLR 3212 (g) finding in plaintiff’s favor and the limitation of the trial to “the issue of fee schedule” are vacated; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for, among other things, summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that there was a lack of medical necessity for the supplies at issue; that plaintiff had failed to submit its two claims within 45 days of the date that the supplies set forth therein had been provided; and that the amounts sought exceeded the amounts permitted by the workers’ compensation fee schedule. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. As limited by its brief, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court entered October 16, 2018 as denied defendant’s motion, found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that the two claims “were both [*2]timely and properly mailed,” and stated that “sole issue that remains for trial is the issue of fee schedule.”

On this record, we find that there are triable issues of fact as to whether the supplies at issue were medically necessary and whether the claims had been timely submitted to defendant (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Consequently, while defendant is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint on those grounds, there was no basis for the Civil Court to find that the claims had been “timely and properly mailed” to defendant or to limit the trial to “the issue of fee schedule” (see Parisien v Travelers Ins. Co., 65 Misc 3d 154[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 51895[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; Quality Med. Healthcare of NY, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 30 Misc 3d 42 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]).

Defendant’s remaining contention lacks merit (see e.g. Metropolitan Diagnostic Med. Care, P.C. v Erie Ins. Co. of NY, 54 Misc 3d 129[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51815[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the implicit CPLR 3212 (g) finding in plaintiff’s favor and the limitation of the trial to “the issue of fee schedule” are vacated.

ALIOTTA, P.J., ELLIOT and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Goldberg, Miller & Rubin (Timothy Bishop of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sharon Bourne-Clarke, J.), entered October 16, 2018, deemed from a judgment of that court entered November 2, 2018 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the October 16, 2018 order denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granting plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,673.69.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, so much of the order entered October 16, 2018 as granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court entered October 16, 2018 denying defendant’s motion which had sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification, and granting plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment. A judgment was subsequently entered on November 2, 2018, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that it had timely mailed initial and follow-up requests for verification (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), that it had not received the requested verification, and that it had timely [*2]denied plaintiff’s claims on that ground (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [o]). However, the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in opposition to defendant’s motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the requested verification had been mailed to, and received by, defendant (see Compas Med., P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 49 Misc 3d 152[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51776[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). In light of the foregoing, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff provided the requested verification.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, so much of the order entered October 16, 2018 as granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

ALIOTTA, P.J., ELLIOT and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant. Zara Javakov, P.C. (Zara Javakov, Esq.), for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sharon Bourne-Clarke, J.), entered October 15, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the unpaid portion of plaintiff’s claims for services rendered April 17, 2014 through May 12, 2014 is granted; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

With respect to the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the unpaid portion of plaintiff’s claims for services rendered April 17, 2014 through May 12, 2014, which claims defendant had denied on the ground that the amount sought exceeded the amount permitted by the workers’ compensation fee schedule, defendant’s proof was sufficient to establish that defendant had properly paid those claims pursuant to the workers’ compensation fee schedule. In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to this branch of defendant’s motion.

Upon a review of the record, we agree with the Civil Court’s determination that there is a triable issue of fact regarding the medical necessity of the services rendered on May 23, 2014 (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the unpaid portion of plaintiff’s claims for services rendered April 17, 2014 through May 12, 2014 is granted.

ALIOTTA, P.J., ELLIOT and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Shaaker Bhuiyan of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Marina Josovich, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Richard J. Montelione, J.), entered October 9, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon the second and third causes of action, and denied the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those causes of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon the second and third causes of action are denied; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon the second and third causes of action, and denied the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those causes of action.

Defendant correctly argues that it submitted sufficient proof to demonstrate, prima facie, that it had not received the claim forms underlying plaintiff’s second and third causes of action. However, the affidavit of plaintiff’s billing administrator was sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether those claim forms had been mailed to defendant (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Thus, there is an issue of fact as to whether defendant had received the claims at issue (see Parisien v Travelers Ins. Co., 65 Misc 3d [*2]154[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 51895[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; Compas Med., P.C. v 21st Century Ins. Co., 47 Misc 3d 128[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50388[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; cf. Bright Med. Supply Co. v Tri State Consumer Ins. Co., 40 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51122[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon the second and third causes of action are denied.

ALIOTTA, P.J., ELLIOT and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

Decided on November 13, 2020

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on November 13, 2020

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on November 13, 2020

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on November 13, 2020

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on November 13, 2020

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Law Offices of Moira Doherty, P.C. (Maureen Knodel of counsel), for appellant. Gary Tsirelman, P.C. (David M. Gottlieb and Selina Chin of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Lorna J. McAllister, J.), entered August 1, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). In an order entered August 1, 2018, the Civil Court denied the motion, but implicitly found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that defendant had established the timely and proper mailing of the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim form, as well as plaintiff’s failure to appear for the EUOs. The Civil Court further found that the only remaining issue for trial was the reasonableness of defendant’s EUO requests.

To establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing a complaint on the ground that a provider failed to appear for an EUO, an insurer must demonstrate, as a matter of law, that it twice duly demanded an EUO from the provider, that the provider twice failed to appear, and that the insurer issued a timely denial of the claims (see Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596, 597 [2014])—all elements that the Civil Court found to have been established pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g).

Plaintiff does not argue that defendant did not demonstrate its prima facie case. Rather, plaintiff argues that defendant’s EUO requests were unreasonable. However, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant was not required to set forth objective reasons for requesting EUOs in order to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596 [2014]; 21st Century Pharm., Inc. v Ameriprise Ins. Co., 65 Misc 3d 134[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 51629[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; Parisien v Metlife Auto & Home, 54 Misc 3d 143[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50208[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]). As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

ALIOTTA, P.J., ELLIOT and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.