Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Lauren L. Esposito, J.), entered on or about February 3, 2025, which denied its motion for summary judgment and granted, in part, plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

Per Curiam.

Order (Lauren L. Esposito, J.), entered February 3, 2025, reversed, without costs, plaintiff’s cross-motion denied and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Defendant-insurer’s motion for summary judgment dismissing this action for first-party, no-fault benefits should have been granted. Defendant made a prima facie showing that plaintiff failed to appear at properly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs) (see Kemper Independence Ins. Co. v Cornerstone Chiropractic, P.C., 185 AD3d 468 [2020]; Hertz Vehs. LLC v Significant Care, PT, P.C., 157 AD3d 600, 601 [2018]; Mapfre Ins. Co. of NY v Manoo, 140 AD3d 468, 469 [2016]). The affidavit of defendant’s attorney sufficiently described the standard practices and procedures of his office for mailing EUO scheduling letters (see Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v George, 183 AD3d 755, 757 [2020]; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Five Boro Med. Equip., Inc. 130 AD3d 465, 465-466 [2015]), and counsel further represented, under penalty of perjury, that he had personal knowledge that the described practices and procedures were followed in this matter (id. at 466). This was adequate proof that the EUO letters were mailed to plaintiff.

In view of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Lauren L. Esposito, J.), entered on or about February 10, 2025, which denied its motion for summary judgment.

Per Curiam.

Order (Lauren L. Esposito, J.), entered February 10, 2025, reversed, without costs, defendant’s motion for summary judgment granted and the complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Defendant-insurer’s unopposed motion for summary judgment dismissing this action for first-party, no-fault benefits should have been granted. Defendant made a prima facie showing that plaintiff failed to appear at properly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs) (see Kemper Independence Ins. Co. v Cornerstone Chiropractic, P.C., 185 AD3d 468 [2020]; Hertz Vehs. LLC v Significant Care, PT, P.C., 157 AD3d 600, 601 [2018]; Mapfre Ins. Co. of NY v Manoo, 140 AD3d 468, 469 [2016]). The affidavit of defendant’s attorney sufficiently described the standard practices and procedures of his office for mailing EUO scheduling letters (see Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v George, 183 AD3d 755, 757 [2020]; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Five Boro Med. Equip., Inc. 130 AD3d 465, 465-466 [2015]), and counsel further represented, under penalty of perjury, that he had personal knowledge that the described practices and procedures were followed in this matter (id. at 466). This was adequate proof that the EUO letters were mailed to plaintiff.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Lauren L. Esposito, J.), entered February 10, 2025, which denied its motion for summary judgment.

Per Curiam.

Order (Lauren L. Esposito, J.), entered February 10, 2025, reversed, without costs, defendant’s motion for summary judgment granted and the complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Defendant-insurer’s unopposed motion for summary judgment dismissing this action for first-party, no-fault benefits should have been granted. Defendant made a prima facie showing that plaintiff failed to appear at properly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs) (see Kemper Independence Ins. Co. v Cornerstone Chiropractic, P.C., 185 AD3d 468 [2020]; Hertz Vehs. LLC v Significant Care, PT, P.C., 157 AD3d 600, 601 [2018]; Mapfre Ins. Co. of NY v Manoo, 140 AD3d 468, 469 [2016]). Contrary to the conclusion reached below, defendant’s request for verification one day beyond the prescribed 15-day period set forth in 11 NYCRR § 65—3.5 [b], but before the 30-day claim denial window expired, did not render its requests invalid, but merely reduced the 30-day time period for payment or denial of the claim (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 312, 318 [2007]; Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294, 300 [2007]; Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 Misc 3d 41, 43 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Freiberg, Peck & Kang, LLP (Yilo J. Kang of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Christopher McCollum (Christopher McCollum of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated June 28, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied the branch of defendant’s motion which had sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant did not receive the subject claims.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) dated June 28, 2024 as denied the branch of defendant’s motion which had sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant had not received the subject claims.

The affidavit submitted by defendant’s litigation specialist was insufficient to establish, prima facie, that defendant had not received the subject claims, as it failed to establish defendant’s practices and procedures for receiving and processing incoming mail (see Top Choice Med., P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 33 Misc 3d 137[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52063[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; see also Bright Med. Supply Co. v Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 58 Misc 3d 126[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 51700[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2017]; SMB Med. P.C. v Chubb Indem. Ins. Co., 47 Misc 3d 146[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50719[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2015]; cf. Liriano v Eveready Ins. Co., 65 AD3d 524, 525 [2009]; Rockland Family Med. Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 76 Misc 3d 126[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50766[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

OTTLEY, J.P., TOUSSAINT and MUNDY, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Odessa Kennedy, J.), dated September 9, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Odessa Kennedy, J.) dated September 9, 2024 granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs), and denying plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the affidavits of defendant’s employees were sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the EUO scheduling letters and denial of claim forms had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Horizon P.T. Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 78 Misc 3d 133[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50442[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2023]). In view of the foregoing, plaintiff has demonstrated no basis to disturb the order granting defendant’s motion and denying plaintiff’s cross-motion.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

OTTLEY, J.P., TOUSSAINT and MUNDY, JJ., concur.

Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for appellant. Gary Tsirelman, P.C. (David M. Gottlieb of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), entered May 31, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) entered May 31, 2024 as denied defendant’s motion which had sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). As relevant here, the Civil Court found, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that defendant had timely and properly mailed the letters scheduling plaintiff’s EUOs and the denial of claim forms, and limited the issues for trial to whether plaintiff failed to appear for the EUOs. The Civil Court held that defendant had not made a prima facie showing of plaintiff’s failure to appear for the scheduled EUOs because defendant did not submit the EUO transcripts to corroborate the attorney’s affirmation that was proffered to demonstrate plaintiff’s failures to appear.

Defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled EUOs by submitting the affirmation of an attorney averring that he was present in his firm’s office, where the EUOs were scheduled to take place, on the dates on which the EUOs were scheduled; that he would have either conducted the EUOs himself or assigned another attorney to [*2]do so had plaintiff appeared for either scheduled EUO; and that plaintiff did not appear on either date (see e.g. MAZ Chiropractic, P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co., 85 Misc 3d 135[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50492[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]; SVP Med Supply, Inc. v GEICO, 76 Misc 3d 134[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50931[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]; SVP Med Supply, Inc. v GEICO, 76 Misc 3d 127[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50775[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]; Parisien v Ameriprise Auto & Home, 75 Misc 3d 138[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50581[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). To the extent that plaintiff contends that an issue exists with respect to defendant’s counsel’s recollection of plaintiff’s failure to appear, such a contention lacks merit, as, on its face, counsel’s affirmation was not “unworthy of belief or incredible as a matter of law” (Joseph-Felix v Hersh, 208 AD3d 571, 573 [2022]; see e.g. MAZ Chiropractic, P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co., 2025 NY Slip Op 50492[U], *1-2; SVP Med Supply, Inc. v GEICO, 2022 NY Slip Op 50931[U], *2). Consequently, this affirmation, standing alone, was sufficient proof of plaintiff’s failure to appear for the EUOs, and, contrary to the determination of the Civil Court, submission of the EUO transcripts was unnecessary (see e.g. Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v George, 183 AD3d 755, 757 [2020]; SVP Med Supply, Inc. v GEICO, 2022 NY Slip Op 50931[U]; SVP Med Supply, Inc. v GEICO, 2022 NY Slip Op 50775[U]; Parisien v Ameriprise Auto & Home, 2022 NY Slip Op 50581[U]).

As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding its failure to appear for either scheduled EUO or challenge the CPLR 3212 (g) findings in defendant’s favor, defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

MUNDY, J.P., TOUSSAINT and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated January 12, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking to open its default and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s amended answer.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) as granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking to open its default and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s amended answer.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contentions, we find that the Civil Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the branches of defendant’s motion seeking to open its default and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s amended answer (see Arroyo v Starrett City, Inc., 170 AD3d 929 [2019]; Lyubomirsky v Lubov Arulin, PLLC, 125 AD3d 614 [2015]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

Freiberg, Peck & Kang, LLP (Yilo J. Kang of counsel), for appellant. Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Edward H. King, J.), entered June 4, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint only to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse hearing.

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Edward H. King, J.) entered June 4, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint only to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse hearing.

No appeal lies as of right from an order setting a matter down for a traverse hearing (see CCA 1702 [a] [2]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Omezie, 54 Misc 3d 136[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50110[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]; Wheeler v McCreight, 34 Misc 3d 144[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50143[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Citibank, N.A. v S & J Inzlicht, Inc., 8 Misc 3d 134[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51174[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]; see also Frost v Halvorsen, 100 AD2d 608 [1984]), and we decline to grant leave to appeal therefrom.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

Freiberg, Peck & Kang, LLP (Yilo J. Kang of counsel), for appellant. Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Edward H. King, J.), entered June 4, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint only to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse hearing.

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Edward H. King, J.) entered June 4, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint only to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse hearing.

For the reasons stated in Shamrock Med., P.C., as Assignee of Rexford Bishop v Personal Serv. Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2025 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2024-858 K C], decided herewith), the appeal is dismissed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

Freiberg, Peck & Kang, LLP (Yilo J. Kang of counsel), for appellant. Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Edward H. King, J.), entered June 4, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint only to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse hearing.

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Edward H. King, J.) entered June 4, 2024 as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint only to the extent of setting the matter down for a traverse hearing.

For the reasons stated in Shamrock Med., P.C., as Assignee of Rexford Bishop v Personal Serv. Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2025 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2024-858 K C], decided herewith), the appeal is dismissed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.