SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from a decision of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Kevin Kerrigan, J.), dated July 25, 2005, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered December 21, 2007 (see CPLR 5520 [c]). The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint.

Judgment affirmed without costs.

At the trial in this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff did not call any witnesses. Rather, plaintiff orally moved for the admission into evidence of its notice to admit and defendant’s response thereto, contending that they, and the exhibits annexed to plaintiff’s prior motion for summary judgment and defendant’s papers in opposition thereto, were sufficient to establish plaintiff’s prima facie case. Defendant objected and cross-moved for a directed verdict
dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court granted defendant’s cross motion for a directed verdict, holding that, without testimony from a witness to establish the admissibility of the documents upon which plaintiff sought to rely, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. This appeal by plaintiff ensued. A judgment was subsequently entered dismissing the complaint.

At trial, “it remained plaintiff’s burden to proffer evidence in admissible form, i.e., by introducing into evidence the claim form[s] in question by, inter alia, calling a witness to lay a foundation for the admissibility of the claim form[s] as . . . business record[s], which plaintiff failed to do. Accordingly, in light of plaintiff’s failure to establish the admissibility of its claim form[s] as . . . business record[s], plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case and defendant was entitled to judgment dismissing the complaint” (Bajaj v General Assur. Co., 18 Misc 3d 25, 28-29 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007] [citation omitted]; see also Art of Healing Medicine, [*2]P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 644 [2008]).

Weston Patterson, J.P., Golia and Steinhardt, JJ, concur.
Decision Date: March 05, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered August 13, 2007, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered August 30, 2007 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the August 13, 2007 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,131.

Judgment reversed without costs, so much of the order as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment vacated, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment denied, and matter remanded to the Civil Court for all further proceedings.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment. The instant appeal by defendant ensued. A judgment was subsequently entered.

On appeal, defendant argues that the affidavit by plaintiff’s billing manager, submitted in support of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers and that, as a result, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. We agree. The affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s billing manager was insufficient to demonstrate that she possessed personal knowledge of plaintiff’s [*2]practices and procedures so as to lay a foundation for the admission, as business records, of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers. Accordingly, plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment (see Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 144[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51161[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007], affd 55 AD3d 644 [2008]; Bath Med. Supply, Inc. v Deerbrook Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 135[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50179[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; Dan Med. P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). Consequently, the judgment is reversed, so much of the
order as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied. We note that no issue is raised with respect to the denial of defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment.

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 27, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Lee A. Mayersohn, J.), entered February 14, 2008. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant George German’s motion to vacate a default judgment as against him.

Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed without costs, defendant George German’s motion to vacate the default judgment as against him denied and default judgment as against George German reinstated.

Plaintiff’s subrogor was a passenger in a motor vehicle which, in 1999, was involved in an accident with a motor vehicle allegedly owned by defendant George German and operated by defendant Manuel C. German. As a result of the accident, plaintiff’s subrogor was injured, and received no-fault benefits from plaintiff in the sum of $14,511.93. Thereafter, plaintiff commenced this subrogation action against defendants. Upon defendants’ default, a judgment in the principal sum of $14,511.93 was entered against them in June of 2001.

In February of 2007, defendant George German (hereinafter defendant) moved to vacate [*2]the default judgment as against him and to restore the action to the calendar. The parties stipulated to vacate the judgment as against him and to permit his affidavit in support of the vacatur motion to serve as his answer. The matter was scheduled for trial, and when defendant failed to appear, the original default judgment against him was reinstated. Defendant moved three more times by order to show cause to vacate the reinstated default judgment as against him. The first time, the motion was marked off the calendar when defendant failed to appear. The second time, the motion was denied based upon defendant’s failure to set forth a meritorious defense. Defendant’s third order to show cause resulted in an order vacating the reinstated judgment as against him, and the matter was restored to the calendar.

A party seeking to vacate a default judgment must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; see also Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138 [1986]; Putney v Pearlman, 203 AD2d 333 [1994]). While the determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default generally lies within the sound discretion of the motion court (see Grutman v Southgate At Bar Harbor Home Owners’ Assn., 207 AD2d 526, 527 [1994]; Bergdorf Goodman Inc. v Hillard, 1 Misc 3d 127[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51544[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2003]), reversal is warranted where the motion court has improvidently exercised its discretion (see Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568 [1997]). Furthermore, where the record demonstrates a pattern of default or neglect, the default should be considered intentional and, therefore, not excusable (see Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead v Jablonsky, 283 AD2d 553 [2001]). In the instant case, defendant’s consistent and repeated defaults demonstrated a pattern of neglect, and the default should not be excused. We conclude that it was an improvident exercise of discretion for the Civil Court to have granted defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment as against him.

We note that in view of our finding that defendant failed to establish a
reasonable excuse for the default, it is unnecessary for us to address the issue of whether a meritorious defense was demonstrated.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, defendant George German’s motion to vacate the default judgment as against him is denied, and the default judgment is reinstated.

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 24, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, Third District (Edmund M. Dane, J.), entered December 12, 2007. The order denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

Order affirmed without costs.

In this action by providers to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Defendant opposed the motion on the grounds
of lack of coverage, failure by plaintiffs’ assignors to appear for independent medical examinations and lack of medical necessity. The court below denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, finding that although plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, defendant raised triable issues of fact. The instant appeal by plaintiffs ensued.

A provider generally establishes its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by [*2]proof of the submission of a statutory claim form, setting forth the fact and the amount of the loss sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]). A review of the record indicates that the affidavit submitted by plaintiffs’ billing manager sufficed to establish that the annexed claim forms constituted evidence in admissible form (see CPLR 4518; Fortune Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 136[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50243[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]). Consequently, the record establishes plaintiffs’ prima facie entitlement to summary judgment.

In opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, defendant asserted, inter alia, that the alleged injuries do not arise out of an insured incident (see Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 201 [1997]). In support of said defense, defendant submitted the affidavit of its litigation examiner, the police report, the affidavit of its investigator, and transcripts of statements made by the assignors and the insured, which demonstrated that defendant possessed a “founded belief that the alleged injur[ies] do[] not arise out of an insured incident” (Central Gen. Hosp. at 199).

Accordingly, the denial of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is affirmed, albeit on other grounds. In light of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.

Rudolph, P.J., Tanenbaum and LaCava, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 24, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered November 15, 2007, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered December 14, 2007 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the November 15, 2007 order denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment and granting plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $3,600.

Judgment reversed without costs, order entered November 15, 2007 vacated, plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment denied, defendant’s motion for summary judgment granted and complaint dismissed.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that it timely denied plaintiff’s claims based on plaintiff’s owner’s failure to appear for scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment. By order entered November 15, 2007, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, finding that defendant did not comply with the EUO scheduling regulations, since the initial EUO was not scheduled within 30 days of defendant’s receipt of plaintiff’s claims. This appeal by defendant ensued. A judgment was subsequently entered.

Defendant’s contention that plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case entitling it to summary judgment is without merit. A provider generally establishes its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof of the submission of a statutory claim form, setting forth the fact and the amount of the loss sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see [*2]Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]). In addition, the affidavit submitted by a provider in support of its summary judgment motion must lay a sufficient foundation to establish that the annexed documents constitute evidence in admissible form (see Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 644 [2008]; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). In the instant case, the affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s billing manager was sufficient to establish that she possessed personal knowledge of plaintiff’s practices and procedures so as to lay a foundation for the admission, as business records, of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers. Further, any deficiency in plaintiff’s moving papers regarding proof of mailing of the claim forms was cured by defendant’s claim denial forms and the affidavit of defendant’s no-fault litigation examiner, in which receipt of the claims in question was conceded (see East Acupuncture, P.C. v Electric Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51281[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; Oleg Barshay, D.C., P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 74 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). Accordingly, plaintiff made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment.

In support of its motion for summary judgment and in opposition to plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, defendant asserted that it timely denied plaintiff’s claims based on plaintiff’s owner’s failure to appear for scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Plaintiff asserts that the EUO scheduling letters were ineffective since they were not sent to plaintiff but rather to an attorney. However, since defendant’s counsel received a letter from said attorney a short time before the initial EUO scheduling letter was mailed advising counsel that the attorney represented plaintiff with respect to EUO requests which were already pending, such a contention lacks merit (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v American Tr. Ins. Co., 299 AD2d 338, 340 [2002]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 588, 591 [2002]).

A review of the record indicates that defendant established that the insurance policy in effect when the EUOs were sought contained an endorsement authorizing verification by EUO (cf. Capio Med., P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 129[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50526[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]; Star Med. Servs. P.C. v Eagle Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 56 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]). Inasmuch as the accident in which plaintiff’s assignor was allegedly injured occurred after the April 5, 2003 effective date of the emergency first amendment to revised Department of Insurance Regulation 68, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant was not required to schedule the EUO within 30 days of receiving plaintiff’s claims but only within a reasonable time thereafter (see Eagle Surgical Supply, Inc. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 49 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). Since the date selected for the EUO was reasonable and plaintiff did not appear for the scheduled EUO, defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted since the action was premature (see Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; see also Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1; Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]; 2003 Ops Ins Dept No. 03-02-12 [www.ins.state.ny.us/ogco2003/rg030212.htm; http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/webdocs/failure_to_attend_no_fault_ime.htm).

In light of the foregoing, the judgment is reversed, the order entered November 15, 2007 [*3]vacated, plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment denied, defendant’s motion for summary judgment granted and complaint dismissed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 20, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, Third District (Robert H. Spergel, J.), entered January 9, 2008. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Order, insofar as appealed from, affirmed without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs). In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted, inter alia, an affidavit of an employee of Independent Physical Exam Referrals, Inc. (IPER), the company which scheduled the IMEs. The District Court granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. On appeal, plaintiff argues only that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment should have been denied because the affidavit executed by IPER’s employee was insufficient to establish that defendant’s request and follow-up request for an IME were mailed to plaintiff’s assignor.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contentions, the affidavit submitted by defendant was sufficient to establish that defendant’s requests and follow-up requests for IMEs were mailed to plaintiff’s assignor (see Chi Acupuncture, P.C. v Kemper Auto & Home Insurance Co., 14 Misc 3d 141[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50352[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]). Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Rudolph, P.J., Tanenbaum and LaCava, JJ., concur. [*2]
Decision Date: February 13, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered September 21, 2007. The judgment, entered pursuant to an order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,217.50.

Judgment reversed without costs, order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment vacated and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. In opposition, defendant argued, inter alia, that there was an issue of fact as to the medical necessity of the supplies furnished by plaintiff. By order dated August 22, 2007, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Judgment was subsequently entered pursuant to the order. The instant appeal by defendant ensued.

On appeal, defendant argues that the affidavit of plaintiff’s billing manager and corporate officer, submitted in support of plaintiff’s motion, failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers and that, as a result, plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie case. We agree. The affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s billing manager and corporate officer was insufficient to establish that he possessed personal knowledge of plaintiff’s practices and procedures so as to lay a foundation for the admission, as business records, of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers. Accordingly, plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment (see Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 144[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51161[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists, 2007], affd 55 AD3d 644 [2008]; Bath Med. Supply, Inc. v Deerbrook Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 135[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50179[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d [*2]44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied.

Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 13, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Loren Baily-Schiffman, J.), entered October 29, 2007. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion to, inter alia, compel the deposition of defendant.

Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed without costs and plaintiff’s motion granted to the extent that defendant is ordered to appear for a deposition within 30 days of the date of the order entered hereon.

In this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved to, inter alia, compel the deposition of defendant. Defendant failed to oppose plaintiff’s motion or to seek a protective order. Accordingly, the motion should have been granted to the extent of compelling defendant to appear for a deposition (see Crossbay Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 110, 112 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 13, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Kenneth P. Sherman, J.), entered September 4, 2007. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Order reversed without costs and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack
of medical necessity. In opposition, plaintiff asserted, inter alia, that defendant did not establish that the subject denial of claim form was timely mailed. The court granted defendant’s motion. This appeal by plaintiff ensued.

The affidavit submitted by defendant’s litigation examiner failed to establish that defendant timely mailed its denial of claim form based upon its standard office practice or procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed, since it merely stated that the denial of claim form was mailed and did not sufficiently set forth the steps which comprise defendant’s mailing practices and procedures (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 29 AD3d 547 [2006]; Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]; Align for Health Chiropractic, P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 144[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51862[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Horton Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 142[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51682[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). As a result, defendant failed to establish that its defense of lack of medical necessity was not precluded (see e.g. Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Republic W. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 33 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). [*2]Accordingly, the order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment is reversed and defendant’s motion is denied.

In light of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.

Weston Patterson, J.P., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 11, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered December 5, 2007. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Order reversed without costs and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the services allegedly rendered to plaintiff’s assignor lacked medical necessity. Although the Civil Court found that defendant had timely denied the claims, the court denied defendant’s motion, apparently on the ground that the independent chiropractic examination report, upon which defendant had based its denials, was not in admissible form, notwithstanding the accompanying affidavit executed by the chiropractor. This appeal by defendant ensued.

Defendant demonstrated that it had timely mailed the denial of claim forms at issue based upon its standard office practice or procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed (Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant’s independent chiropractic examination report, together with the affidavit of the chiropractor, provided a factual basis and medical rationale for the chiropractor’s [*2]opinion that the services rendered were not medically necessary (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 142[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52450[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Crossbridge Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 143[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51761[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). As plaintiff failed to present any evidence to refute that showing, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 21 Misc 3d 142[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52450[U]; A. KhodadadiRadiology, P.C. v N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 09, 2009