SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (George J. Silver, J.), entered February 7, 2008. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, upon granting the branch of defendant’s motion seeking leave to reargue, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Order, insofar as appealed from, affirmed without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of medical necessity. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment and argued in opposition to defendant’s motion that defendant had failed to come forward with proof that the performed MRI was not medically necessary. The Civil Court denied defendant’s motion and plaintiff’s cross motion. By order entered February 7, 2008, the Civil Court granted defendant’s motion seeking leave to reargue and, upon reargument, summary judgment. As limited by the brief, plaintiff appeals from so much of the February 7, 2008 order as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the affidavit submitted by defendant’s claims representative sufficiently established that the denial of claim form at issue was timely mailed pursuant to defendant’s standard office practice and procedure (see Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). As the affirmed report by [*2]defendant’s examining physician provided a factual basis and medical rationale for his opinion that the billed-for MRI was not medically necessary (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 142[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52450[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Crossbridge Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Progressive Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 143[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51761[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]), and plaintiff failed to rebut such proof, the Civil Court properly granted defendant summary judgment. Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: July 09, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Margaret A. Chan, J.), entered October 5, 2007. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Order reversed without costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment granted and matter remitted to the Civil Court for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment established plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to such relief (see Insurance Law § 5106; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]; East Acupuncture, P.C. v Electric Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51281[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant did not submit papers opposing plaintiff’s motion. Consequently, the Civil Court improperly denied plaintiff’s unopposed motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: July 09, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), dated March 24, 2008. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed without costs and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, finding that there was a question of fact as to medical necessity. Defendant appeals from so much of the order as denied its cross motion.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the affidavit of defendant’s claims representative sufficiently established the timely mailing of the denial of claim form, which had denied plaintiff’s claim based upon a peer review report, since the affidavit described in detail, on the affiant’s personal knowledge, defendant’s standard office practice or procedure used to ensure that the denial was properly addressed and mailed (see Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). The papers submitted in support of defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint include the sworn peer review report by defendant’s doctor, which sets forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the doctor’s opinion that the medical services provided were medically unnecessary (see A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v American Tr. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 132[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50680[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; Amaze Med. Supply Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co., 12 Misc 3d [*2]142[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51412[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). In addition, defendant’s papers contain the medical records and reports prepared by the assignor’s various providers, which documents were relied upon by defendant’s doctor to establish that there was a lack of medical necessity for the services at issue. In view of the foregoing, defendant made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see e.g. Franchini v Palmieri, 1 NY3d 536 [2003]; Diaz v Anasco, 38 AD3d 295 [1st Dept 2007]; Tuna v Babendererde, 32 AD3d 574 [3d Dept 2006]) and shifted the burden to plaintiff, which stands in the shoes of its assignor (see Long Is. Radiology v Allstate Ins. Co., 36 AD3d 763, 765 [2007]), to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant’s cross motion.

The affidavit submitted by plaintiff in opposition was insufficient as it merely consisted of a conclusory statement by the affiant that he disagreed with the opinion of defendant s peer review doctor that there was no medical necessity for the services rendered. The affiant did not meaningfully refer to, or discuss, the determination of defendant’s doctor. Plaintiff’s remaining contentions similarly lack merit. Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted (see A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).
Pesce, P.J., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: July 09, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered January 9, 2008. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted so much of plaintiff’s motion as sought summary judgment upon its fifth cause of action.

Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed without costs and so much of plaintiff’s motion as sought summary judgment upon its fifth cause of action denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, upon its fifth cause of action, involving a claim in the sum of $398.61. In opposition to plaintiff’s
motion, defendant argued that it never received said claim. As limited by its brief, defendant appeals from so much of the Civil Court order as granted plaintiff summary judgment on its fifth cause of action.

A provider generally establishes its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof of the submission of a statutory claim form, setting forth the fact and the amount of the loss sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]). A provider ordinarily establishes the submission of the claim form by demonstrating proof of its proper mailing, which proof gives rise to the presumption that the claim form was received by the addressee. The presumption may be created either by proof of actual mailing, or by proof of a standard office practice or procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed (see Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Here, in light of the contradictions between the affidavit of plaintiff’s billing manager and the annexed post office ledger, upon which the billing manager relied, plaintiff did not establish submission of the $398.61 claim to defendant (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 29 AD3d 547 [2006]). Consequently, plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie entitlement [*2]to summary judgment on its fifth cause of action. Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and so much of plaintiff’s motion as sought summary judgment on its fifth cause of action is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: July 09, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Lila Gold, J.), entered November 26, 2007. The order denied the petition of 563 Grand Medical, P.C. to vacate a master arbitrator’s award and confirmed the award.

Order affirmed without costs.

563 Grand Medical, P.C. commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7511 to vacate a master arbitrator’s award which had upheld the denial of its claim for reimbursement of assigned first-party no-fault benefits. The Civil Court denied the petition, and this appeal ensued.

The papers submitted by petitioner to the Civil Court were insufficient on their face to warrant the granting of any relief (see Avanessov v State-Wide Ins. Co., 21 Misc
3d 132[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52131[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; SP
Med., P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 126[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51230[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). The only document submitted by petitioner in support of the petition was a document that was denominated an “Affirmation in Support,” which was not affirmed “to be true under the penalties of perjury” (CPLR 2106). Indeed, the attorney who purportedly signed the document merely indicated that he “states as follows,” which is insufficient under the law (cf. Puntino v Chin, 288 AD2d 202 [2001]; Jones v Schmitt, 7 Misc 3d 47 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]; see also A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Prudential Prop. [*2]& Cas. Ins. Co., 11 Misc 3d 137[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50504 [U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). Consequently, the document is insufficient as an affirmation (Avanessov, 21 Misc 3d 132[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52131[U]; SP Med., P.C., 20 Misc 3d 126[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51230[U]). In view of the foregoing, the order is affirmed, albeit on other grounds.

We note that a special proceeding should terminate in a judgment, not an order (see CPLR 411).

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: July 09, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered January 3, 2008, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered February 11, 2008 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the January 3, 2008 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and implicitly denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,864.25.

Judgment reversed without costs, order entered January 3, 2008 vacated, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action was premature because it was commenced before defendant received responses to its outstanding verification requests. The Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion and implicitly denied defendant’s cross motion. The instant appeal by defendant ensued. A judgment was subsequently entered (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

The record demonstrates that defendant timely mailed requests for verification and follow-up requests for verification (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] §§ 65-3.5 [b]; 65-3.6 [b]). Since plaintiff did not serve responses to the verification requests prior to the commencement of the action, defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the action as premature should have been granted, as defendant’s time to pay or deny the claim had not elapsed (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York [*2]Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]; Vista Surgical Supplies, Inc. v General Assur. Co., 12 Misc 3d 129[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51034[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]).

In light of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.

Weston, J.P., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: July 09, 2009

[*1]

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, July 9, 2009

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Short & Billy, P.C., New York City (Skip Short of counsel), for appellant. Cohen & Jaffe, LLP, Lake Success, for respondent.

{**25 Misc 3d at 20} OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Judgment affirmed without costs.

Plaintiff Dr. Albert Davydov, DDS, commenced the instant action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for dental services rendered. After a nonjury trial, the Civil Court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $6,569.27. This appeal by defendant ensued. A judgment was subsequently entered.

Defendant’s contention that plaintiff lacks standing since the assignment of the no-fault benefits executed by plaintiff’s assignor was in favor of Dr. Albert Davydov, DDS, P.C. rather than Dr. Albert Davydov, DDS is without merit. A copy of the assignment accompanied plaintiff’s claim form, and the discrepancy was apparent on its face. Defendant did not seek verification with respect to the assignment, and its denial of claim form did not deny the claim on the ground that the assignment was defective. As a result, defendant is now precluded from litigating this issue (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 312 [2007]; P.L.P. Acupuncture, P.C. v Travelers Indem. Co., 19 Misc 3d 126[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50484[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2008]).

A provider establishes a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting proof that the prescribed statutory billing forms were mailed and received, and that [*2]payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742{**25 Misc 3d at 21} [2004]). In the instant case, Dr. Davydov’s testimony and the exhibits admitted into evidence were sufficient to satisfy plaintiff’s burden. Contrary to defendant’s contention, the elements of a prima facie case to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits do not differ based upon the nature of the services provided by the plaintiff provider (see Globe Surgical Supply v GEICO Ins. Co., 59 AD3d 129 [2008]; A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 39 AD3d 779 [2007]; Mary Immaculate Hosp., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]).

Defendant contends that the trial court improperly curtailed defendant’s cross-examination and direct examination of Dr. Davydov. Defense counsel attempted to question Dr. Davydov regarding the medical necessity of the services rendered and whether the amount charged exceeded the amount set forth in the fee schedule. Since the parties did not stipulate to the timeliness of the denials, it was defendant’s burden to establish that it timely denied plaintiff’s claims so as to demonstrate that defendant’s proffered defenses were not precluded. Inasmuch as defendant called no witnesses and presented no evidence to show that its denials were timely mailed, defendant failed to establish that said defenses were not precluded (see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 282 [1997]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Republic W. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 33 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Consequently, the court properly curtailed examination of the witness with respect thereto.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Golia, J. (dissenting and voting to reverse the judgment and dismiss the complaint in the following memorandum). I find that plaintiff Dr. Albert Davydov, DDS was without standing to prosecute the instant proceeding. I conclude, contrary to the holding by the majority, that the factual circumstances of the instant matter are inapposite to the Court of Appeals’ holding in Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. (9 NY3d 312 [2007]).

In Hospital for Joint Diseases, the plaintiff medical provider submitted a claim form along with an assignment of benefits form that did not contain any signature, but which stated that the patient’s signature was “on file.” The insurance carrier in that case did not ask for further verification or demand a copy of the original document containing the signature that was purportedly “on file.” It eventually denied the claim on the{**25 Misc 3d at 22} grounds that such assignment was invalid and therefore the plaintiff did not have standing to prosecute the claim. The Court of Appeals held that inasmuch as the carrier was precluded from raising any affirmative defense as to the validity of the assignment of benefits form due to its failure to timely seek verification, it could not now contest the validity of such assignment. Therefore, the plaintiff therein had standing to bring the action and the assignment was deemed to be valid.

There is, however, a vitally important difference between that case and this one. In Hospital for Joint Diseases, the assignment of benefits form was drawn to the benefit of the [*3]plaintiff “Hospital for Joint Diseases,” whereas in the present case the subject assignment of benefits form is drawn to the benefit of an entirely different entity than this plaintiff who now seeks to benefit from the assignment.

In that case, the Court of Appeals found the assignment cannot be assailed and must be deemed valid. In this case, in light of defendant’s failure to seek appropriate verification, I do not suggest that the subject assignment of benefits form was not valid. Quite the contrary, I accept its validity. Nevertheless, I take exception to the holding of the majority inasmuch as the “valid” assignment of benefits form does not inure to the benefit of the person who is prosecuting this claim, to wit: the named plaintiff herein, Dr. Albert Davydov, DDS, individually.

To overlook this important distinction would be to say that “John Jones,” the Chairman of the Board of the Hospital for Joint Diseases, could properly demand that Travelers Property and Casualty Insurance Company make payment to his personal account merely because the carrier chose not to seek a verification of an assignment made to the benefit of the Hospital for Joint Diseases.

This court should not discount the important distinction that the assignee and the claimant are two very different and independent entities simply because the individual plaintiff/claimant is Dr. Albert Davydov, DDS and the assignee is named Dr. Albert Davydov, DDS, P.C. I would suggest that Dr. Davydov himself would argue vociferously that he as an individual has no obligation to pay the debts or expenses that might be incurred by Dr. Albert Davydov, DDS, P.C. and vice versa. That would be his right, for which fault would not attend. However, since he has chosen to conduct his business affairs in a corporate status, he cannot now choose to prosecute the claims of that corporate entity in favor of himself individually.{**25 Misc 3d at 23}

There is only one assignee herein and that assignee is not the plaintiff.

Pesce, P.J., and Weston, J., concur; Golia, J., dissents in a separate memorandum.

APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Mitchell J. Danziger, J.), entered February 9, 2007, which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Per Curiam.

Order (Mitchell J. Danziger, J.), entered February 9, 2007, affirmed, without costs.

In this action to recover first party no-fault benefits, defendant’s submission in support of its staged accident defense was insufficient to establish a “founded belief that the alleged injury [did] not arise out of an insured incident” (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]; see Vista Surgical Supplies, Inc. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 NY Slip Op 50493[U] [2009]). To the extent that defendant purports to rely upon a policy exclusion, any such defense is precluded in view of defendant’s failure to timely deny the claims (see Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d at 199).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: June 30, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, Third District (Robert A. Bruno, J.), dated June 30, 2008, deemed from an amended order entered September 24, 2008 (see CPLR 5520 [c]). The amended order denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

Amended order affirmed without costs.

In this action by providers to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. In opposition to the motion, defendant argued, inter alia, that plaintiffs had failed to lay a foundation for the admission, as business records, of the documents annexed to their motion. The District Court denied plaintiffs’ motion on the ground that the affidavit of plaintiffs’ billing manager was insufficient to satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule. This appeal by plaintiffs ensued.

Plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing of their entitlement to summary judgment since the affidavit submitted by plaintiffs’ billing manager failed to establish that the documents annexed to plaintiffs’ moving papers were admissible pursuant to CPLR 4518 (Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 644 [2008]; Fortune Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 136[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50243[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]). Consequently, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

In light of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.

Rudolph, P.J., Tanenbaum and Nicolai, JJ., concur. [*2]
Decision Date: June 29, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, Third District (Fred J. Hirsh, J.), entered September 8, 2008. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Order affirmed with $10 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. In opposition to the motion, defendant argued, inter alia, that plaintiff did not make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment
as a matter of law. The District Court denied plaintiff’s motion, holding that the affidavit by plaintiff’s billing manager failed to establish a prima facie case because it did not demonstrate that the documents annexed to plaintiff’s motion were admissible as business records. This appeal by plaintiff ensued.

Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment since the affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s billing manager failed to establish that the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers were admissible pursuant to CPLR 4518 (see Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 644 [2008]; Fortune Med., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 136[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50243[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]). Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

Rudolph, P.J., Molia and Nicolai, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: June 29, 2009