SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Noach Dear, J.), entered June 30, 2009. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted only to the extent of awarding plaintiff summary judgment in the sum of $160.56 for the initial acupuncture visit on September 2, 2005 and is otherwise denied, and by further providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment is granted only to the extent of awarding summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary
judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that it had properly reimbursed plaintiff for the acupuncture services it had rendered, by using the workers’ compensation fee schedule applicable to chiropractors who render the same services as those billed for herein. The Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion, stating that defendant had failed to submit the applicable fee schedule to the court.

We find that the workers’ compensation fee schedule, which is required by law (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 13) and incorporated by reference into the Insurance Department Regulations (see 11 NYCRR 68.1 [a]), is “of sufficient authenticity and reliability that it may be given judicial notice” (Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr. v Allstate Ins. Co., 61 AD3d 13, 20 [2009]; see also CPLR 4511 [b]). Defendant demonstrated that it had fully paid plaintiff for the services billed under codes 97810 and 97811 in accordance with the Official New York Workers’ Compensation Chiropractic Fee Schedule (see Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Since plaintiff did not object to the fee schedule amount set forth by the defense, nor contest the timely denial of the claims, so much of defendant’s motion as sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint as to these claims is granted. [*2]

Defendant did not proffer any evidence or argument to warrant the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim of $160.56 for the initial acupuncture visit on September 2, 2005, billed under fee schedule treatment code 99204 (cf. Rogy Med., P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50732[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Accordingly, we do not disturb so much of the order appealed from as granted the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment as to this claim, and which denied defendant’s cross motion insofar as it sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint as to this claim.

In light of the foregoing, the order is modified by providing that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted only to the extent of awarding plaintiff summary judgment in the sum of $160.56 for the initial acupuncture visit on September 2, 2005 and is otherwise denied, and by further providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment is granted only to the extent of awarding summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: September 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Alice Fisher Rubin, J.), entered August 27, 2009. The order granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5).

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the Civil Court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.

A defendant moving for dismissal on statute of limitations grounds bears the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired (see 6D
Farm Corp. v Carr, 63 AD3d 903 [2009]; Island ADC, Inc. v Baldassano Architectural Group, P.C., 49 AD3d 815 [2008]). The time within which an action must be commenced is computed “from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed” (CPLR 203 [a]). In this case, the claim was interposed when the summons and complaint were filed on June 27, 2007 (CCA 400). As the six-year statute of limitations for contract actions applies to the claims involved herein (CPLR 213 [2]; see Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 37 AD3d 775 [2007]), the statute of limitations bars any claim that accrued prior to June 27, 2001.

In the no-fault context, a cause of action accrues when payment of no-fault benefits becomes “overdue” (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; see also Benson v Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 134 AD2d 214 [1987]; New Era Acupuncture, P.C. v MVAIC, 18 Misc 3d 139[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50353[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). In this case, benefits became overdue 30 days after defendant’s receipt of proof of the claim (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; former Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65.15 [g], now Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8; Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169, 175 [1986]). The complaint alleges that a claim form in the amount of $1,707.97 was submitted to defendant on June 6, 2001. In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint as barred by the statute of limitations, the court must take the factual allegations of the complaint as true, and [*2]must resolve all inferences in favor of the plaintiff (see Island ADC, Inc., 49 AD3d 815). We note that defendant’s dismissal motion was based upon an allegation that defendant had received a bill for $1,467.95 on April 3, 2001, and that this bill, along with a bill for $240.02, are the bills which are the subject of this action. However, defendant failed to demonstrate that these two bills, one of which it claims to have received on April 3, 2001, are the subject of this action, where the complaint alleges that one bill for $1,707.97 was submitted on June 6, 2001.

As the earliest date defendant could have received the $1,707.97 bill was June 6, 2001 and the earliest date that benefits could have become overdue with respect to this bill was July 7, 2001, we find that defendant failed to meet its burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: September 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered June 30, 2009. The order, insofar as appealed from, in effect, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based upon, among other things, plaintiff’s assignor’s failure to attend independent medical examinations (IMEs), which had been scheduled by Allegiance Health, Inc. (Allegiance). The Civil Court, in effect, denied both the motion and the cross motion. Defendant appeals from so much of the order as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted an affidavit of an employee of Allegiance which sufficiently established that the IME requests had been timely mailed in accordance with Allegiance’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant also submitted an affidavit of the chiropractor/acupuncturist who was to perform the IMEs, which was sufficient to establish that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). In addition, an affidavit executed by defendant’s litigation examiner demonstrated that the claim denial forms, which denied the claims based on plaintiff’s assignor’s nonappearance at the IMEs, had been timely mailed pursuant to defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Since an assignor’s appearance at an IME “is a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability on the policy” (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722; see also Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1), defendant properly [*2]denied plaintiff’s claims based upon the assignor’s failure to satisfy a condition precedent to coverage and, thus, was not precluded from raising such issue (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2d Dept 2009]). Accordingly, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted. In light of our determination, we need not reach the remaining contentions raised on appeal.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: September 16, 2011

APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Raul Cruz, J.), entered November 10, 2010, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Raul Cruz, J.), entered November 10, 2010, reversed, with $10 costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

In this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant’s submissions established prima facie that it properly mailed initial and follow-up notices of independent medical examinations (IMEs) to the assignor and her attorney, and that the assignor failed to appear (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011]; Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 721 [2006]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue regarding the reasonableness of the IME requests or the assignor’s failure to attend (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co., 82 AD3d at 560; Inwood Hill Med., P.C. v General Assur. Co., 10 Misc 3d 18, 20 [2005]).

We have examined plaintiff’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: September 14, 2011

APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from that portion of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Raul Cruz, J.), entered October 20, 2010, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Raul Cruz, J.), entered October 20, 2010, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with $10 costs, defendant’s motion for summary judgment granted and complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

In this action by plaintiff to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant’s submissions sufficed to establish prima facie that the medical supplies provided by plaintiff to its assignor were not medically necessary (see Enko Enters. Intl., Inc. v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co., 30 Misc 3d 127[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52267[U] [2010]; Innovative Chiropractic, P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co., 25 Misc 3d 140[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52447[U] [2009]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The undated medical report relied upon by plaintiff was not properly sworn (see CPLR 2106, 2109), and should not have been considered (see CPT Med. Servs., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 87, 88 [2007]). Moreover, even if considered, the report was insufficient to defeat summary judgment (id.).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: September 09, 2011

APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant appeals from that portion of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Mitchell J. Danzinger, J.), dated November 12, 2010, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Mitchell J. Danzinger, J.), dated November 12, 2010, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with $10 costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

An insurer is not obligated to pay or deny a claim for no-fault benefits until it has received verification of the information requested (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8[b][3]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 903, 903-904 [2007]; Nyack Hosp. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 19 AD3d 569, 570 [2005]). In support of its motion for summary judgment, defendant established that its initial and follow-up verification letters were timely mailed and received by plaintiff (see Nassau Ins. Co. v Murray, 46 NY2d 828, 829 [1978]; LMK Psychological Servs., P.C. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 30 AD3d 727, 728 [2006]; Badio v Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 229 [2004]). It being undisputed on the record that plaintiff failed to respond to defendant’s verification requests, defendant established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the claim as premature (see St. Vincent Med. Care, P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 80 AD3d 599, 600 [2011]).

In opposition, plaintiff’s conclusory denial of receipt of the initial verification letter was insufficient to raise a triable issue (see Nassau Ins. Co. v Murray, 46 NY2d at 829-830; Pardo v Central Coop. Ins. Co., 223 AD2d 832, 833 [1996]; Abuhamra v New York Mut. Underwriters, 170 AD2d 1003, 1004 [1991]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT. [*2]
Decision Date: August 31, 2011

APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Ben R. Barbato, J.), entered December 14, 2010, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Ben R. Barbato, J.), entered December 14, 2010, reversed, with $10 costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

In this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant’s documentary submissions established prima facie that it mailed the notices of the independent medical examinations (IME) to the assignor and that the assignor failed to appear (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011]; Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 721 [2006]; Apollo Chiropractic Care, P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 139[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50911[U] [2010]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue regarding the reasonableness of the requests or the assignor’s failure to attend the IMEs (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d at 560; Inwood Hill Med., P.C. v General Assur. Co., 10 Misc 3d 18, 20 [2005]).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: August 24, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Kenneth P. Sherman, J.), entered October 7, 2009. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The affidavit submitted by defendant in support of its motion for summary judgment was sufficient to establish that defendant’s denial of claim forms, which denied the claims at issue on the ground of lack of medical necessity, had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant also submitted, among other things, an affirmed peer review report, as well as an affirmation executed by the physician who had performed the peer review, which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the conclusion that there was no medical necessity for the medical supplies at issue. As plaintiff failed to proffer an affidavit from a health care practitioner which meaningfully referred to, let alone rebutted, the conclusions set forth in the peer review report (see Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted (see Delta [*2]Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.

Steinhardt, J.P., dissents in a separate memorandum.

Steinhardt, J.P., dissents and votes to affirm the order in the following memorandum:

It is undisputed that plaintiff did not submit medical opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, which was based on lack of medical necessity. However, I am of the opinion that the documentation submitted by defendant in support of its motion is insufficient to shift the burden to plaintiff.

“Lack of medical necessity is a defense to an action to recover no-fault benefits, which an insurer may assert pursuant to a timely claim denial, based on . . . a sufficiently detailed peer review report” (Amaze Med. Supply v Eagle Ins., 2 Misc 3d 139[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50279[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]). To support a motion for summary judgment, a peer review report must set forth a factual basis and medical rationale sufficient to establish, prima facie, the lack of medical necessity (see Urban Radiology, P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 29 Misc 3d 142[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52157[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]).

In the instant matter, the peer review report of Dr. Ross did not “shed any light” on the assignor’s condition, nor did it state, in any sufficiently detailed manner, the reason the medical equipment at issue was not needed. The reader of the report is at a total loss to determine what actually happened to the assignor and what parts of her anatomy are amiss and in what way. “Bilateral shoulder and left elbow” injuries may range from a complicated fracture to a minor contusion. Without more, the report is conclusory and vague, and insufficient to shift the burden to plaintiff. I therefore vote to affirm the order denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Decision Date: August 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Alice Fisher Rubin, J.), entered February 6, 2009. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment as to claims for the sums of $1,205.50 and $1,675 and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment as to the claims for the sums of $1,205.50 and $1,675 are denied, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action, insofar as it pertained to plaintiff’s claims seeking to recover the sums of $1,205.50 and $1,675, was premature because it was commenced before defendant had received responses to its outstanding verification requests, and on the ground of lack of medical necessity as to plaintiff’s claim for $502.63. The Civil Court granted the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment on the $1,205.50 and $1,675 claims, and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, finding that a triable issue of fact exists as to the medical necessity of plaintiff’s $502.63 claim. This appeal by defendant ensued.

The affidavit of defendant’s litigation representative established that defendant had timely mailed its request and follow-up request for verification in accordance with its standard office practices and procedures to plaintiff and to the doctor who had prescribed the medical supplies at [*2]issue (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant demonstrated that it had not received the requested verification, and plaintiff did not show that the verification had been provided to defendant prior to the commencement of the action. Consequently, the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay the $1,205.50 and $1,675 claims did not begin to run (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]), and, thus, plaintiff’s action with respect to the $1,205.50 and $1,675 claims is premature.

With respect to the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it sought to recover the sum of $502.63, defendant demonstrated that it had timely denied the $502.63 claim on the ground of lack of medical necessity based upon an affirmed independent medical examination (IME) report (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d at 1124; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d at 17-18). The IME report set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the doctor’s opinion that there was a lack of medical necessity for the supplies at issue (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). As plaintiff failed to submit any medical evidence to rebut defendant’s showing of lack of medical necessity, the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the $502.63 claim should have been granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Nat. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment as to the claims for the sums of $1,205.50 and $1,675 are denied, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: August 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered November 24, 2009. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted defendant’s motion to strike the action from the trial calendar and compel plaintiff to respond to defendant’s discovery demands.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to compel plaintiff to respond to defendant’s discovery demands is granted to the extent of compelling plaintiff to provide the documents sought in items 19, 20, and 21 of defendant’s notice to produce and in interrogatory 11 (c) within 60 days of the date of the order entered hereon, and by further compelling plaintiff to produce its owner, John McGee, for an examination before trial within 30 days thereafter, or on such other date to which the parties shall agree, but in no event later than 60 days thereafter; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order as granted defendant’s motion to strike the action from the trial calendar and compel plaintiff to respond to defendant’s discovery demands and to produce its owner for an examination before trial (EBT).

It is uncontroverted that plaintiff filed a certificate of readiness for trial which stated that all pretrial discovery had been completed, despite the fact that its purported owner had not appeared for a scheduled EBT and there was outstanding documentary discovery. While defendant’s motion to strike the action from the trial calendar was untimely, under all of the circumstances presented, including the de minimis nature of the delay in moving to strike the [*2]action from the trial calendar, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, it cannot be said that the Civil Court’s determination to consider the motion rather than deny it as untimely was an improvident exercise of discretion (see CPLR 2004; Uniform Rules of the New York City Civil Court [22 NYCRR] § 208.17 [c]).

Defendant set forth detailed and specific reasons for believing that plaintiff is a professional service corporation which fails to comply with applicable state or local licensing laws and, thus, ineligible to recover no-fault benefits (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313 [2005]), a defense which is not precluded. By obtaining discovery of certain documents, such as plaintiff’s financial and tax records, defendant will be able to ascertain whether plaintiff is ineligible for reimbursement of no-fault benefits (see e.g. CPLR 3101 [a]; One Beacon Ins. Group, LLC v Midland Med. Care, P.C., 54 AD3d 738 [2008]).

The record indicates that plaintiff objected to producing items 19 through 21 of defendant’s notice to produce, which sought plaintiff’s bank statements and canceled checks (item 19), plaintiff’s federal and state tax returns including attachments and schedules (item 20), and plaintiff’s payroll tax filings (item 21), and to providing the W-2 or 1099 forms sought in interrogatory 11 (c). We find that plaintiff’s objection to the foregoing demands lacked merit. Defendant has shown that plaintiff’s bank records are material and necessary (see CPLR 3101 [a]), and that special circumstances exist which warrant the disclosure of plaintiff’s income tax returns and payroll tax filings (see CPLR 3101 [a]; Ava Acupuncture, P.C. v Autoone Ins. Co., 28 Misc 3d 134[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51350[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; Great Wall Acupuncture v State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 136[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51529[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Statewide Med. Servs., P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co., 13 Misc 3d 134[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 52014[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2006], revg 9 Misc 3d 1124[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51773[U] [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2005]; see also Dore v Allstate Indem. Co., 264 AD2d 804 [1999]; cf. Benfeld v Fleming Props., LLC, 44 AD3d 599, 600 [2007]; Altidor v State-Wide Ins. Co., 22 AD3d 435 [2005]). In addition, defendant is entitled to an EBT of McGee following the production of the documents (see CPLR 3101 [a]). However, as the record further reflects that plaintiff’s responses to the remainder of defendant’s interrogatories and defendant’s notice to produce were sufficient, the Civil Court should not have ordered plaintiff to provide additional responses.

In light of the foregoing and the misstatements of material facts contained within plaintiff’s certificate of readiness, the Civil Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the branch of defendant’s motion that sought to strike the action from the trial calendar and granting disclosure to the extent indicated above.

Pesce, P.J., Golia and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: August 10, 2011