SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered March 3, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by striking so much of the order as granted the branches of defendant’s motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss plaintiff’s $155.84 claim for services rendered September 18, 2007 through September 27, 2007 and plaintiff’s $134.80 claim for services rendered October 2, 2007 through October 11, 2007; as so modified, the order, insofar
as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a new determination of the aforesaid branches of defendant’s motion in accordance with the decision herein.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff, as limited by its brief, appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

We note, at the outset, that defendant denied all of the claims, except for claims in the sums of $155.84 and $134.80 for services rendered September 18, 2007 through October 11, 2007, on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear at any of three independent medical examinations (IMEs). The Civil Court found that defendant’s motion papers established the assignor’s failure to appear for the IMEs and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff contends on appeal that the scheduling of the examinations was unreasonable. However, since plaintiff failed to submit sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the scheduling of the IMEs, we leave undisturbed so much of the order as granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint with respect to all of the claims, other than the claims for $155.84 and $134.80 (see e.g. All Borough Group Med. Supply, Inc. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 146[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50949[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). [*2]

With respect to plaintiff’s claims for $155.84 and $134.80, defendant, in its brief, in effect concedes that it is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing these claims on the ground relied upon by the Civil Court. Defendant requests that these claims be “returned to the lower court for a determination as to the merits of defendant’s summary judgment motion” based upon the grounds set forth in its motion papers. As the record indicates that the Civil Court apparently did not consider the grounds upon which defendant sought summary judgment with respect to the claims for $155.84 and $134.80, so much of the Civil Court’s order as granted the branches of defendant’s motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss these claims is stricken, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a new determination with respect to these two claims.

Rios, J.P., Weston and Golia, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 19, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Alice Fisher Rubin, J.), entered February 5, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court found that plaintiff had established its prima facie case, that defendant had demonstrated that it had timely denied plaintiff’s claims and that the sole issue for trial was the medical necessity of the supplies provided to plaintiff’s assignor. Defendant appeals from so much of the order as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted, among other things, an affirmed peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the doctor’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the supplies at issue. Defendant’s showing that the supplies were not medically necessary was unrebutted by plaintiff.

As plaintiff has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. KhodadadiRadiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur. [*2]
Decision Date: December 19, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Margaret A. Pui Yee Chan, J.), entered October 22, 2009. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denying plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

In support of its motion, defendant submitted an affidavit of its litigation representative which was sufficient to establish that the denial of claim forms, which had denied the claims at issue on the ground of lack of medical necessity, had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant also submitted an affirmed peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the doctor’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the equipment provided to plaintiff’s assignor (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the fact that defendant did not annex the underlying medical records which the peer reviewer considered in formulating his opinion did not render the peer review report inadmissible (see Neomy Med., P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 137[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51532[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; Urban Radiology, P.C. v Tri-State Consumer Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 140[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50987[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). Since defendant [*2]established, prima facie, a lack of medical necessity for the equipment in question, the burden shifted to plaintiff to rebut defendant’s prima facie showing (see Alur Med. Supply, Inc. v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 132[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50700[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), but plaintiff failed to do so.

As plaintiff’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved or lack merit (see e.g. Quality Health Prods., Inc. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 141[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50990[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]), the order is affirmed (see A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Weston, J.P., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 19, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Margaret A. Pui Yee Chan, J.), dated October 23, 2009. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted an affidavit of its claims representative which established neither that the denial of claim forms, which denied the claims at issue on the ground that the fees sought exceeded the amount permitted by the workers’ compensation fee schedule, had actually been timely mailed nor that they had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures so as to give rise to the presumption of mailing (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Thus, defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied.

In view of the foregoing, we reach no other issue. Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Steinhardt, J.P., Pesce and Weston, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 19, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), entered April 29, 2010, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered August 11, 2010 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the April 29, 2010 order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of fraudulent procurement of the insurance policy by virtue of the assignor misrepresenting his state of residence in connection with the issuance of the insurance policy in question. The Civil Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. This appeal by plaintiff ensued. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

The sole argument raised on appeal is whether defendant proffered admissible evidence of a fraudulently procured insurance policy. Upon our review of the record, we find that the affidavits and investigative reports annexed to defendant’s motion papers sufficiently established that the assignor, who was also the insured under the subject insurance policy, had misrepresented his state of residence. Furthermore, the evidence submitted by defendant established that this misrepresentation was material since defendant would not have issued the policy had it known that the assignor resided in the State of New York, as defendant was not licensed to insure vehicles in New York at the time of this loss, and would not have issued the subject policy to him. Thus, the assignor was ineligible to receive first-party no-fault benefits under the insurance policy in question (see Matter of Insurance Co. of N. Am. v Kaplun, 274 AD2d 293 [2000]; Central Radiology Servs., P.C. v Commerce Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 146[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50948[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Commercial Mut. Ins. Co., 12 Misc 3d 8 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). In opposition, plaintiff, as assignee standing in the shoes of its assignor (see New York & Presbyt. [*2]Hosp. v Country Wide Ins. Co., NY3d , 2011 NY Slip Op 07149 [2011]), failed to submit any evidence sufficient to defeat defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Lisa S. Ottley, J.), entered April 27, 2010. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The affidavit submitted by defendant in support of its cross motion for summary judgment established that defendant had timely denied the claim at issue, on the ground of lack of medical necessity, in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Moreover, defendant annexed to its motion papers an affirmed peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the peer reviewer’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the supplies provided (see e.g. Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

In opposition to defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, since it did not submit an affirmation from a doctor rebutting the conclusions set forth in the peer review report (see Innovative Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 25 Misc 3d 137[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52321[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). While plaintiff asserted that the peer review report [*2]contained an electronic stamped facsimile of the peer reviewer’s signature and, as a result, the report was inadmissible, the record indicates that the facsimile signature was placed on the report by the doctor who had performed the peer review or at his direction (see Eden Med., P.C. v Eveready Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 140[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50265[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; cf. Orthotic Surgical & Med. Supply, Inc. v GEICO Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 137[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51540[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Radiology Today, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 70 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). Thus, the Civil Court properly granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Pamela L. Fisher, J.), entered June 17, 2010. The judgment, entered pursuant to so much of an order of the same court entered February 23, 2010 as granted the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $7,716.62.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, so much of the order entered February 23, 2010 as granted the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment is vacated and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, pursuant to a so-ordered stipulation, defendant was required to serve responses to plaintiff’s interrogatories by a specified date or “be precluded from offering evidence in this action.”

It is undisputed that defendant failed to timely serve responses to plaintiff’s interrogatories. Subsequently, plaintiff moved for an order precluding defendant and for summary judgment. By order entered February 23, 2010, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion, on the ground that since defendant was precluded from offering evidence, defendant could not rebut plaintiff’s entitlement to summary judgment. Defendant appeals from the judgment entered pursuant to the February 23, 2010 order.

The so-ordered stipulation functioned as a conditional order of preclusion, which became absolute upon defendant’s failure to sufficiently and timely comply (see e.g. Panagiotou v Samaritan Vil., Inc., 66 AD3d 979 [2009]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Hertz Corp., 43 AD3d 907 [2007]; Siltan v City of New York, 300 AD2d 298 [2002]). As a result, defendant is precluded from offering evidence in this action. However, plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment because its moving papers failed to establish a prima facie entitlement to such relief (see CPLR 4518; Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50602[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud [*2]Dists 2007]).

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, so much of the order entered February 23, 2010 as granted the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment is vacated and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Steinhardt, J.P., Pesce and Weston, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), entered May 27, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court found that plaintiff had established its prima facie case, that defendant had demonstrated that it had timely denied plaintiff’s claim and that the sole issue for trial was the medical necessity of the supplies provided to plaintiff’s assignor. Defendant appeals from so much of the order as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted, among other things, an affirmed peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the doctor’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the medical supplies at issue. Defendant’s showing that the supplies were not medically necessary was unrebutted by plaintiff.

As plaintiff has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. [*2]

Steinhardt, J.P., Pesce and Weston, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered March 23, 2010. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order denying its motion for summary judgment. The Civil Court found that plaintiff had established its prima facie case and that the only issue for trial was defendant’s defense that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs).

The affidavit submitted by defendant’s claims representative was insufficient to establish that the denial of claim form, which denied the claim based upon the assignor’s failure to appear for IMEs, had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). As a result, the defense that the assignor failed to appear for scheduled IMEs is precluded. As defendant has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that plaintiff is otherwise entitled to judgment, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2d Dept 2009]; but see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559 [1st Dept 2011]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the calculation of statutory
interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

Steinhardt, J.P., Pesce and Weston, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Kenneth P. Sherman, J.), entered March 30, 2010. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted an affidavit of an employee of Crossland Medical Services, P.C. (Crossland), the entity which had scheduled the independent medical examinations (IMEs) involved herein on behalf of defendant. The affidavit established that the IME scheduling letters had been timely mailed in accordance with Crossland’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). In addition, an affidavit executed by defendant’s litigation examiner demonstrated that the denial of claim forms, which denied the claims based upon the failure of plaintiff’s assignor to appear for the IMEs, had been timely mailed pursuant to defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Defendant also submitted an affidavit from its examining chiropractor/acupuncturist, who stated that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the scheduled IMEs. As a result, defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Inasmuch as plaintiff submitted only an affirmation from its counsel, which affirmation failed to raise a triable issue of [*2]fact, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted. In light of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.

Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Steinhardt, J.P., Pesce and Weston, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2011