SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Wavny Toussaint, J.), entered March 2, 2010. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order which denied its unopposed motion for summary judgment.

A no-fault provider establishes its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof of the submission to the defendant of a claim form, proof of the fact and the amount of the loss sustained, and proof either that the defendant had failed to pay or deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period, or that the defendant had issued a timely denial of claim that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). Here, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant’s denial of claim forms were either untimely or without merit as a matter of law.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 27, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered April 5, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 or, in the alternative, to compel plaintiff to respond to its discovery demands, to the extent of compelling plaintiff to respond to defendant’s discovery demands.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court denying its motion for summary judgment and granting defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 or, in the alternative, to compel plaintiff to respond to its discovery demands, to the extent of compelling plaintiff to provide defendant with, among other things, verified responses to its discovery demands “including 1099s, K-1s & W2s showing distributions . . ., proof of payment for spaces used and lease agreements, management agreements (and) corporate tax returns.”

While plaintiff argues that defendant is not entitled to the discovery ordered by the court, inasmuch as plaintiff failed to timely challenge the propriety of defendant’s notice for discovery and inspection (see CPLR 3122 [a]) or timely object to defendant’s “demand for verified written interrogatories” (see CPLR 3133 [a]), plaintiff is obligated to produce the information sought except as to matters which are privileged or palpably improper (see Fausto v City of New York, 17 AD3d 520 [2005]; Marino v County of Nassau, 16 AD3d 628 [2005]; Midborough Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 10 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Great Wall Acupuncture v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 136[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51529[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Misc 3d 71 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). To the extent the discovery demands concern matters relating to defenses which defendant is precluded from raising, they are palpably improper notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff did not specifically object thereto (see Midborough Acupuncture, P.C., 21 Misc 3d 10; Great Wall Acupuncture, 20 Misc 3d 136[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51529[U]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC, 11 Misc 3d 71).

Defendant set forth detailed and specific reasons for its belief that plaintiff may be [*2]ineligible to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits because it is a professional service corporation which fails to comply with applicable state or local licensing laws (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313 [2005]), a defense which is not precluded (Bath Med. Supply, Inc. v Allstate Indem. Co., 27 Misc 3d 92 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). By obtaining discovery of the documents directed by the Civil Court, defendant will be able to ascertain whether plaintiff is ineligible to recover assigned no-fault benefits (see e.g. One Beacon Ins. Group, LLC v Midland Med. Care, P.C., 54 AD3d 738 [2008]). Plaintiff’s remaining contentions lack merit. Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 27, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Jacqueline D. Williams, J.), entered May 3, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The appeal is deemed to be from a judgment of the same court entered June 28, 2010, pursuant to the May 3, 2010 order, awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $11,957.93 (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, so much of the order as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s motion is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Contrary to the finding of the Civil Court, plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment. Plaintiff relied upon its claim forms to establish the fact and the amount of the loss sustained; however, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the claim forms annexed to its motion papers were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, which allows a document to be used as proof of the “act, transaction, occurrence or event” recorded in the document (CPLR 4518 [a]; see Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 644 [2008]; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). As plaintiff failed to make out its prima facie case, its motion should have been denied. In light of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, so much of the order entered May 3, 2010 as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s motion is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 27, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered March 5, 2010, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered March 24, 2010 (see CPLR 5512 [a]; Neuman v Otto, 114 AD2d 791 [1985]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the March 5, 2010 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,773.25.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, the order entered March 5, 2010 is vacated, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. After a judgment was entered, plaintiff appealed from the order. We deem plaintiff’s appeal to be from the judgment (see CPLR 5512 [a]; Neuman v Otto, 114 AD2d 791 [1985]).

The affidavit of defendant’s claim specialist established that defendant had timely mailed requests and follow-up requests for verification (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Contrary to the finding of the Civil Court, the affidavit of defendant’s claim specialist was also sufficient to establish that plaintiff had failed to respond to those requests. It is noted that plaintiff never alleged that it had responded.

Consequently, the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay or deny plaintiff’s claims did not commence to run and plaintiff’s action is premature (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]). Thus, defendant’s cross motion should have been granted. In light of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, the order entered March 5, 2010 is vacated, [*2]plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 27, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Margaret A. Pui Yee Chan, J.), entered September 22, 2008. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims in the sums of $1,013.25, $549.18 and $844.13.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order as granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims in the sums of $1,013.25, $549.18 and $844.13.

The branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims in the sums of $1,013.25, $549.18 and $844.13 were granted due to the failure of plaintiff’s assignor to appear for examinations under oath (EUOs). On appeal, plaintiff contends that these branches of defendant’s motion should have been denied because defendant never proved that the applicable automobile insurance policy contained a provision entitling defendant to EUOs. This argument lacks merit (see Mega Supplies Billing, Inc. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 33 Misc 3d 136[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52023[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; Dover Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 28 Misc 3d 140[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51605[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2010]; Eagle Chiropractic, P.C. v Chubb Indem. Ins. Co., 19 Misc 3d 129[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50525[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]).

Plaintiff’s remaining contention is not properly before this court since it is raised for the first time on appeal.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 27, 2012

[*1]

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th and 13th Judicial Districts, April 27, 2012

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Law Offices of Alden Banniettis, Brooklyn (Jeff Henle of counsel), for appellant-respondent. Law Offices of Daniel J. Tucker, New York City (Netanel BenChaim of counsel), for respondent-appellant.

{**36 Misc 3d at 27} OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Ordered that the order is modified by providing that the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking a final order of preclusion is granted; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.{**36 Misc 3d at 28}

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the parties entered into a “so-ordered” stipulation in which defendant agreed to serve responses to plaintiff’s interrogatories within 60 days of the date of the “so-ordered” stipulation or be precluded from offering evidence at trial. After defendant failed to serve its responses by the specified date, in fact serving them more than one year later than required, plaintiff moved for a final order of preclusion and, upon preclusion, for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion, finding that plaintiff had not been prejudiced by the late service of the responses, and denied defendant’s cross motion, on the ground that there were issues of fact precluding summary judgment. Both parties appeal.

The “so-ordered” stipulation functioned as a conditional order of preclusion, which became absolute upon defendant’s failure to timely and sufficiently comply therewith (see Panagiotou v Samaritan Vil., Inc., 66 AD3d 979 [2009]; Blumenthal Chiropractic, P.C. v Praetorian Ins., 34 Misc 3d 135[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52386[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; Colonia Med., P.C. v Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 127[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52283[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). Nevertheless, plaintiff moved for a final order of preclusion. Although it was unnecessary for plaintiff to make such further application to the court, in doing so, plaintiff authorized the court to revisit the issue of preclusion and to consider defendant’s opposition thereto. In order to avoid the adverse impact of the stipulation, defendant was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the failure to timely comply with the stipulation, as well as the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to [*2]the action (see Kirkland v Fayne, 78 AD3d 660 [2010]). While defendant may have demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action, it failed to demonstrate any excuse for its failure to timely comply with the stipulation. The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion for preclusion and, upon preclusion, for summary judgment, thereby, in effect, vacating the final order of preclusion, which had become absolute. In our opinion, this was an improvident exercise of discretion since defendant did not offer any excuse for its 13-month delay in complying with the stipulation. Accordingly, the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking a final order of preclusion should have been granted.

A defendant’s preclusion from introducing evidence at trial does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to summary judgment{**36 Misc 3d at 29} or relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving its case (see Mendoza v Highpoint Assoc., IX, LLC, 83 AD3d 1 [2011]). In the instant case, plaintiff’s moving papers failed to establish a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see CPLR 4518; Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). Accordingly, the Civil Court properly denied the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment.

On appeal, defendant argues that it was not precluded from offering evidence in support of its cross motion for summary judgment because the so-ordered stipulation barred it only from offering evidence “at trial.” However, to allow defendant to use evidence in support of its cross motion which it is barred from introducing at trial “would perversely undermine the point of the order by allowing defendant to benefit from the shortcut of summary judgment by use of the same evidence that otherwise would have been barred at trial” (Mendoza, 83 AD3d at 9). Accordingly, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, which sought to establish that the equipment provided by plaintiff was not medically necessary, was properly denied, albeit on grounds other than those set forth by the Civil Court.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered February 2, 2010. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion, defendant established that it had timely denied (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) the claim at issue on the ground of lack of medical necessity. Contrary to the Civil Court’s conclusion, the peer review report and accompanying affidavit by the peer reviewer were sufficient to demonstrate a lack of medical necessity for the services rendered, thereby establishing defendant’s prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Since the affidavit by plaintiff’s supervising physician failed to justify with specificity the additional studies, it did not rebut the conclusions set forth in the peer review report. Thus, plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact (see Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Consequently, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 142[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52450[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d [*2]128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 25, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, Third District (Andrea Phoenix, J.), dated November 22, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the branch of plaintiffs’ motion seeking summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by providers to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had timely denied plaintiffs’ claims based upon the assignor’s eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits, and that there was an issue as to whether plaintiffs’ assignor had been injured during the course of employment, thereby requiring that the matter be submitted to the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board). The District Court denied the motion and cross motion without prejudice and held the action in abeyance pending a determination by the Board, finding that there were mixed questions of law and fact regarding the availability of workers’ compensation benefits, over which the Board had primary jurisdiction. Plaintiffs appealed from so much of the order as denied without prejudice their motion for summary judgment and held the action in abeyance. On appeal, by order dated June 18, 2009, this court modified the District Court’s order “by striking the provision denying without prejudice plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and by remitting plaintiffs’ motion to the District Court to be held in abeyance pending a prompt application to the Workers’ Compensation Board for a determination of the parties’ rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law. In the event plaintiffs fail to file proof with the District Court of such application within 90 days of the date of the order entered hereon, the District Court shall deny plaintiffs’ motion and grant reverse summary judgment in favor of defendant dismissing the complaint unless plaintiffs show good cause why the complaint should not be dismissed” (A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v American Tr. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 75, 76 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2009]; see LMK Psychological Servs., P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 64 AD3d 752 [2009]).

Thereafter, plaintiffs moved for leave to renew their prior motion for summary judgment. [*2]Defendant opposed plaintiffs’ motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to this court’s June 18, 2009 order. By order dated November 22, 2010, the District Court, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, denied the branch of plaintiffs’ motion seeking summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, finding that a proper application to the Board, pursuant to this court’s June 18, 2009 order, had not been made.

Since plaintiffs did not demonstrate that a proper application for workers’ compensation benefits had been made in accordance with the Workers’ Compensation Law (see e.g. Workers’ Compensation Law § 33) within the time provisions set forth in this court’s order dated June 18, 2009, they failed to establish that they had complied with this court’s order. Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Iannacci, J.P., Nicolai and Molia, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 25, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine Levine, J.), entered May 24, 2010, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered October 19, 2010 (see CPLR 5512 [a]; Neuman v Otto, 114 AD2d 791 [1985]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the May 24, 2010 order denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granting defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. After judgment was entered, plaintiff appealed from the order. We deem plaintiff’s appeal to be from the judgment (see CPLR 5512 [a]; Neuman v Otto, 114 AD2d 791 [1985]).

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the affidavit of defendant’s claim representative was sufficient to establish that defendant had timely denied plaintiff’s claims (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). As this is the sole issue raised on appeal by plaintiff, the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 25, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Alan L. Lebowitz, J.H.O.), dated July 19, 2010. The order granted plaintiff’s motion to restore the case to the trial calendar and denied defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that plaintiff’s motion to restore the case to the trial calendar is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this breach of contract action in 1998 to recover no-fault benefits for medical treatments she had received from healthcare providers for injuries she had sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident. In July 1999, plaintiff withdrew her notice of inquest, and the case was apparently marked off the calendar. The parties then proceeded with discovery through May 2001. In April 2010, defendant served plaintiff with a 90-day notice. Plaintiff then attempted, within the 90-day period, to file a notice of trial. A clerk in the Civil Court rejected the filing and instructed plaintiff to move to restore the case to the calendar, which plaintiff did by notice of motion returnable in June 2010. Defendant cross-moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3404. Thereafter, by order dated July 19, 2010, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion and denied defendant’s cross motion.

On appeal, defendant contends that plaintiff’s motion to restore the case to the calendar should have been denied and its cross motion to dismiss the complaint granted. An action that has been marked off the calendar, and which is not restored to the calendar within one year, may be restored only if the plaintiff demonstrates, among other things, a meritorious cause of action and a reasonable excuse for the delay in moving to restore (see e.g. Vitality Chiropractic, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Misc 3d 130[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52114[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), which plaintiff failed to do. Consequently, plaintiff’s motion should have been denied.

Defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint invoked CPLR 3404. However, as CPLR 3404 applies solely to cases in the Supreme or County Courts (see Chavez v 407 Seventh Ave. Corp., 39 AD3d 454 [2007]), the Civil Court properly denied defendant’s CPLR 3404 cross motion to dismiss. We note that were the cross motion to be deemed as having been brought pursuant to CPLR 3216 seeking to dismiss for want of prosecution, it would have been premature [*2]since it was made prior to the expiration of the 90-day period. Thus, defendant’s cross motion was properly denied.

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that plaintiff’s motion to restore the case to the trial calendar is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 25, 2012