SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Wavny Toussaint, J.), dated October 22, 2010. The judgment, entered upon a decision dated April 10, 2010, made after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint.

ORDERED that on the court’s own motion, the notice of appeal from the decision is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5520 [c]); and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

At a nonjury trial in this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff’s owner testified that he had mailed the claim form in question by certified mail, return receipt requested. However, the certified mail receipt and domestic return receipt which he offered as proof of mailing lacked certain material information. Significantly, the certified mail receipt did not contain amounts for postage and fees, and did not have a clerk identification and date, and the return receipt was not signed by a recipient and did not indicate a date of delivery. Defendant’s witness testified that defendant had not received the claim form in question until after the commencement of the action, some three years after the purported mailing. [*2]

In a decision after trial, the Civil Court found that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case as it had not proved a timely mailing of the claim form in question. A judgment dismissing the complaint was subsequently entered. We deem the notice of appeal from the decision to be a premature notice of appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5520 [c]).

The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court’s conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). The determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as the trial court’s opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510 [1991]).

In the present case, the record supports the determination of the Civil Court, based upon its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the proof adduced at trial, that plaintiff failed to satisfy its burden of proving that the claim form in question had been timely and properly mailed to defendant. Accordingly, as we find no basis to disturb the Civil Court’s findings, the judgment is affirmed.

Rios, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: June 11, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Elizabeth A. Taylor, J.), dated December 15, 2010, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Elizabeth A. Taylor, J.), dated December 15, 2010, reversed, with $10 costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

In opposition to the defendant-insurer’s prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, plaintiff failed to raise a material issue requiring a trial of its claim for no-fault first-party benefits. The affidavit of plaintiff’s medical billing supervisor, while explaining in general terms the office procedure followed by plaintiff in “document[ing] receipt of [verification] request[s] into our computer system,” failed to set forth any facts tending to indicate that the affiant or anyone else in plaintiff’s billing department in fact checked the “computer system” to ascertain whether the verification letters shown to have been sent by defendant had been “documented” as received. The professed status of plaintiff’s affiant as “custodian” of the case file was insufficient, on this record and without more, to overcome the presumption of receipt created by defendant’s proof of proper mailing of its verification letters (see Nassau Ins. Co. v Murray, 46 NY2d 828, 829-830 [1978]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
I concur [*2]
Decision Date: May 29, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Margaret A. Pui Yee Chan, J.), entered June 15, 2010, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered November 3, 2010 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the June 15, 2010 order denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granting defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court found that defendant had established that it had timely denied the claims in question on the ground that the supplies at issue were not medically necessary, and that plaintiff had failed to rebut defendant’s evidence. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Contrary to plaintiff’s argument on appeal, defendant was not required to annex to its motion papers copies of the medical records which had been reviewed by defendant’s peer [*2]reviewer (see Elmont Open MRI & Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 30 Misc 3d 126[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52222[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010]; Urban Radiology, P.C. v Tri-State Consumer Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 140[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50987[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). Furthermore, while plaintiff argues that the peer review report contained an electronic stamped facsimile of the peer reviewer’s signature and, as a result, the report was inadmissible, the record indicates that the facsimile signature was permissibly placed on the report by the chiropractor who had performed the peer review (see Quality Health Prods. v Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 129[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52299[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; Eden Med., P.C. v Eveready Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 140[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50265[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]).

As plaintiff’s remaining contentions on appeal are similarly without merit, the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: May 15, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered January 14, 2010. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.The affidavit by an employee of Independent Physical Exam Referrals, the entity which had scheduled the independent medical examinations (IMEs) involved herein on behalf of defendant, established that the IME scheduling letters had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). In addition, the affidavits executed by defendant’s claims examiner and claims support services supervisor demonstrated that the denial of claim forms, which denied the claims based upon the [*2]failure of plaintiff’s assignor to appear for the IMEs, had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Defendant also submitted affirmations from its examining physician, chiropractor and acupuncturist, all of whom stated that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the scheduled IMEs. As a result, defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Inasmuch as plaintiff submitted only an affirmation in opposition from its counsel, which failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the Civil Court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Pesce and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: May 15, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Peter Paul Sweeney, J.), entered October 1, 2009. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the third and sixth causes of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as
granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the third and sixth causes of action.

The affidavit of defendant’s claims examiner established that defendant had timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) its requests and follow-up requests for verification to plaintiff and that plaintiff [*2]had failed to provide the requested verification.

In opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff did not demonstrate that it had provided defendant, prior to the commencement of the action, with the requested verification. Consequently, the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay or deny the claims did not begin to run, and plaintiff’s causes of action upon these claims are premature (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [a]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 903 [2007]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]). Thus, the Civil Court properly granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the third and sixth causes of action.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Pesce and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: May 15, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Lisa S. Ottley, J.), entered May 4, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The appeal is deemed to be from a judgment of the same court entered November 3, 2010 dismissing the complaint (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order as denied its motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court found that defendant had established that it had timely denied the subject claims on the ground that the services at issue were not medically necessary, and that plaintiff had failed to rebut defendant’s evidence. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which this appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Contrary to plaintiff’s argument on appeal, defendant was not required to annex to its motion papers copies of the medical records which were reviewed by defendant’s peer reviewer [*2](see Elmont Open MRI & Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 30 Misc 3d 126[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52222[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010]; Urban Radiology, P.C. v Tri-State Consumer Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 140[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50987[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). As plaintiff’s remaining contentions on appeal are similarly without merit, the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: May 14, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Kathryn E. Freed, J.), entered December 4, 2009. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted affidavits from its claims division employees which sufficiently established that the claim denial forms had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). The affidavits further established that defendant had properly used the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors to determine the amount which plaintiff was entitled to receive for the services underlying the second through fifth causes of action (see Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23 [App [*2]Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). As it is undisputed that defendant, prior to the commencement of this action, had paid plaintiff the full amount to which plaintiff was entitled for these causes of action, the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing these causes of action should have been granted.

Furthermore, defendant denied the bill underlying plaintiff’s first cause of action based upon a sworn peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the peer reviewer’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the services provided (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). In opposition to the branch of the cross motion seeking to dismiss this cause of action, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from its licensed acupuncturist which failed to meaningfully refer to, let alone rebut, the conclusions set forth in the peer review report (see Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Consequently, the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action should also have been granted (see A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Weston, J.P., Pesce and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: May 14, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Genine D. Edwards, J.), entered December 17, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The appeal is deemed from a judgment of the same court entered January 18, 2011, pursuant to the December 17, 2010 order, dismissing the complaint (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, so much of the order as granted the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing
the complaint as to services rendered from August 2, 2007 to August 9, 2007 is vacated, and that branch of defendant’s cross motion is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order as granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

While defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that it had timely denied the claims at issue, by submitting an affidavit of an employee of its claims division setting forth defendant’s standard [*2]office practices and procedures for mailing denial of claim forms (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), plaintiff’s employee’s affidavit, submitted in support of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, created a triable issue of fact as to whether the claim for services rendered from August 2, 2007 to August 9, 2007 had been timely denied. As a result, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should not have been granted as to that claim.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, so much of the order as granted the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint as to the services rendered from August 2, 2007 to August 9, 2007 is vacated, and that branch of defendant’s cross motion is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: May 11, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Terrence C. O’Connor, J.), entered October 25, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The appeal is deemed from a judgment of the same court entered December 15, 2011, pursuant to the order entered October 25, 2010, dismissing the complaint (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Contrary to plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal, the record does not demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant denied any of the claims at issue. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: May 11, 2012

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Margaret A. Pui Yee Chan, J.), entered June 16, 2010. The order denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff’s motion was withdrawn, and defendant’s cross motion was denied.

The affidavits submitted by defendant were sufficient to establish that defendant had timely denied plaintiff’s claim (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb
Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) on the ground of lack of medical necessity. Defendant also submitted a peer review report, which set forth the factual basis and medical rationale for the chiropractor’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the services at issue, as well as an affidavit executed by the chiropractor who had performed the peer review. Contrary to the Civil Court’s finding and plaintiff’s argument on [*2]appeal, the annexed copy of the peer review report and the accompanying affidavit established, prima facie, a lack of medical necessity for the services at issue. Consequently, the burden shifted to plaintiff to rebut defendant’s prima facie showing (see Alur Med. Supply, Inc. v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 132[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50700[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), but plaintiff failed to do so.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Weston, J.P., Pesce and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: May 11, 2012