SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered May 2, 2011. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment are remitted to the Civil Court for a new determination after final resolution of a prompt application to the Workers’ Compensation Board to determine the parties’ rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law. In the event plaintiff fails to file proof with the Civil Court of such application within 90 days of the date of this decision and order, the Civil Court shall grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and deny plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment unless plaintiff shows good cause why the complaint should not be dismissed. [*2]

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based upon plaintiff’s assignors’ alleged eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits, and plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. The Civil Court denied defendant’s motion, on the ground that defendant had failed to proffer evidence in admissible form in support of its defense, and granted plaintiff’s cross motion.

Defendant proffered sufficient evidence in admissible form of the alleged facts which gave rise to its contention that there was an issue as to whether plaintiff’s assignors had been acting as employees at the time of the accident, and that therefore workers’ compensation benefits might be available (see e.g. Jamaica Med. Supply, Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 133[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52371[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; D.A.V. Chiropractic, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 29 Misc 3d 128[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51738[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; AR Med. Rehabilitation, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50708[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; Response Equip., Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 145[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51176[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; cf. Westchester Med. Ctr. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 848 [2009]). This issue must be resolved in the first instance by the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) (see O’Rourke v Long, 41 NY2d 219, 225 [1976]; see also Dunn v American Tr. Ins. Co., 71 AD3d 629 [2010]; Jamaica Med. Supply, Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 133[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52371[U]; D.A.V. Chiropractic, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 29 Misc 3d 128[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51738[U]; AR Med. Rehabilitation, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50708[U]; Response Equip., Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 145[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51176[U]).

Accordingly, defendant’s motion and plaintiff’s cross motion should not have been determined. Instead, the Civil Court should decide the motions after final Board resolution. A prompt application to the Board, as set forth above, is required in order to determine the parties’ rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law (see Dunn v American Tr. Ins. Co., 71 AD3d 629; LMK Psychological Serv., P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 64 AD3d 752 [2009]).

Rios, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 08, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Barry A. Schwartz, J.), entered May 2, 2011. The order granted defendant’s motion to stay the action pending a determination of the Workers’ Compensation Board of the parties’ rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion to stay the action pending a determination of the Workers’ Compensation Board of the parties’ rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

We agree with the Civil Court that defendant proffered sufficient evidence in admissible form of the alleged facts which gave rise to its contention that there was an issue as to whether plaintiff’s assignor had been acting as an employee at the time of the accident, and that therefore workers’ compensation benefits might be available (see e.g. Jamaica Med. Supply, Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 133[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52371[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; D.A.V. Chiropractic, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 29 Misc 3d 128[A], [*2]2010 NY Slip Op 51738[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; AR Med. Rehabilitation, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50708[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; Response Equip., Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 145[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51176[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; cf. Westchester Med. Ctr. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 848 [2009]). This issue must be resolved in the first instance by the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) (see O’Rourke v Long, 41 NY2d 219, 225 [1976]; see also Dunn v American Tr. Ins. Co., 71 AD3d 629 [2010]; Jamaica Med. Supply, Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 133[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52371[U]; AR Med. Rehabilitation, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50708[U]; Response Equip., Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 145[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51176[U]).

In view of the foregoing, the Civil Court properly granted defendant’s motion for a stay pending the Board’s determination of the parties’ rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law (see Dunn v American Tr. Ins. Co., 71 AD3d 629; LMK Psychological Serv., P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 64 AD3d 752 [2009]; see also Jamaica Med. Supply, Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 133[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52371[U] [holding, among other things, that in the event plaintiff failed to file proof with the motion court of an application to the Workers’ Compensation Board within 90 days of the date of the Appellate Term’s decision and order, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment would be granted unless plaintiff could show good cause why the complaint should not be dismissed]; D.A.V. Chiropractic, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 29 Misc 3d 128[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51738[U] [same]; AR Med. Rehabilitation, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50708[U] [same]).

Accordingly, the order of the Civil Court is affirmed.

Rios, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 08, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Maureen A. Healy, J.), entered February 3, 2011. The order granted defendant’s motion to stay the action pending a determination by the Workers’ Compensation Board of the parties’ rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion to stay the action pending a determination by the Workers’ Compensation Board of the parties’ rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

We find that defendant’s proof, including the police accident report, was sufficient to raise a question of fact as to whether plaintiff’s assignor had been acting as an employee at the time of the accident, which issue must be resolved by the Workers’ Compensation Board (O’Rourke v Long, 41 NY2d 219, 224 [1976]; Matter of Pilku v 24535 Owners Corp., 19 AD3d [*2]722, 723 [2005]; Santigate v Linsalata, 304 AD2d 639, 640 [2003]; Response Equip., Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 145[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51176[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; see also D.A.V. Chiropractic, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 29 Misc 3d 128[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51738[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; AR Med. Rehabilitation, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50708[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). Plaintiff’s remaining contention lacks merit.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 04, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered May 4, 2011. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint or, in the alternative, an order compelling plaintiff to appear for an examination before trial and granted the branch of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking a finding, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that plaintiff had established its prima facie case.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to compel plaintiff to appear for an
examination before trial is granted and the examination shall be held within 60 days of
the date of this decision and order, at such time and place to be specified in a written notice by defendant of not less than 10 days, or at such other time and place as the parties may agree upon; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint or, in the alternative, for a finding, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that “the dated correspondence are timely, valid and that these facts [*2]have been proved prima facie,” and for an order compelling plaintiff to appear for an examination before trial (EBT). Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for a finding, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that plaintiff had established its prima facie case. The Civil Court “granted” both motions to the extent of finding that the “only issues remaining for trial related to the medical necessity of the services provided and . . . if the billing was in accordance with the New York State Workers’ Compensation Fee Schedule.” Defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of the order of the Civil Court as denied the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint or, in the alternative, an order compelling plaintiff to appear for an EBT and granted the branch of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking a finding, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that plaintiff had established its prima facie case.

Plaintiff submitted an affirmation by its treating physician which was sufficient to raise triable issues of fact as to the medical necessity of the services rendered (see Alur Med. Supply, Inc. v GEICO Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 126[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50438[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]), and as to whether the fees charged were in accordance with the Workers’ Compensation fee schedule. Consequently, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment was properly denied. However, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking an order compelling plaintiff to appear for an EBT should have been granted (see CPLR 3101 [a]). Defendant’s moving papers established that defendant had served plaintiff with a notice for an EBT, which examination was material and necessary to defendant’s defense.

With respect to the Civil Court’s finding, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that plaintiff had established its prima facie case, we conclude, contrary to defendant’s contention, that the affidavit by plaintiff’s billing and collection department administrator was sufficient to establish that the claim forms annexed to plaintiff’s cross motion were admissible as proof of the acts, transactions, occurrences, or events recorded therein, pursuant to CPLR 4518 (a) (see Matter of Carothers v GEICO Indem. Co., 79 AD3d 864 [2010]; Art of Healing Medicine, P .C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 644 [2008]; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to compel plaintiff to appear for an EBT is granted upon the terms set forth above.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 29, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Johnny Lee Baynes, J.), entered April 27, 2011. The order denied the branches of defendant’s motion seeking leave to renew and reargue defendant’s opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order as denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking leave to reargue its opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is dismissed as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order, insofar as reviewed, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. When defendant attempted to file opposing papers almost two months after their stipulated due date, the Civil Court (Carolyn E. Wade, J.) rejected defendant’s papers and, by order entered June 11, 2010, granted plaintiff’s motion on default. Thereafter, defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 2221 (d) and (e), for leave to “renew and reargue” its [*2]opposition to plaintiff’s prior motion for summary judgment and, upon renewal and reargument, to deny plaintiff’s motion. Defendant’s motion also sought to vacate the June 11, 2010 order pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1). By order entered April 27, 2011, the Civil Court (Johnny Lee Baynes, J.) denied the branches of defendant’s motion seeking leave to renew and reargue. The order did not address the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the June 11, 2010 order.

The appeal from so much of the order as denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking leave to “reargue” must be dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument (see Barrafato v Franzitta, 308 AD2d 468 [2003]).

The denial of the branch of defendant’s motion seeking leave to “renew” its “opposition” to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was proper since defendant had defaulted in opposing plaintiff’s motion and, thus, defendant’s remedy was to seek to vacate the default order. Finally, the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), to vacate the June 11, 2010 order was not addressed in the order appealed from and, therefore, remains pending and undecided (see Creese v Long Is. Light. Co., 98 AD3d 708, 711 [2012]; Katz v Katz, 68 AD2d 536 [1979]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as reviewed, is affirmed.
Rios, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 29, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sylvia G. Ash, J.), entered December 15, 2009. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion, defendant established that its denial of claim forms and verification requests had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant also demonstrated that, with respect to plaintiff’s third cause of action, plaintiff had failed to respond to defendant’s verification requests. In opposition to the cross motion, plaintiff did not show that it had sent information responsive to defendant’s requests. Consequently, defendant was entitled to [*2]summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s third cause of action as premature (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [a]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 903 [2007]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]).

Defendant submitted, among other things, affirmed peer review reports which set forth the factual basis and medical rationale for the doctor’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the services at issue in plaintiff’s first, second and fourth causes of action. The affidavit by plaintiff’s treating doctor submitted in opposition to the cross motion failed to meaningfully rebut the conclusions set forth in the peer review reports (see Innovative Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 25 Misc 3d 137[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52321[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). As a result, the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s first, second and fourth causes of action should have been granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Rios, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 29, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant, as limited by its briefs, appeals from that portion of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Raul Cruz, J.), dated August 30, 2012, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Raul Cruz, J.), dated August 30, 2012, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with $10 costs, motion granted in toto and complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the no-fault claims at issue by establishing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for independent medical examinations (IMEs) to plaintiff’s assignor, and that the assignor failed to appear (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]; cf. Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 721 [2006]). In opposition, plaintiff did not deny the assignor’s nonappearance or otherwise raise a triable issue with respect thereto, or as to the mailing or reasonableness of the underlying notices (see Unitrin at 560). The assignor’s “denial of receipt, standing alone, is insufficient” (Badio v Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 229, 230 [2004]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: March 27, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Pamela L. Fisher, J.), entered June 17, 2011. The order denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied its motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), on the ground that the complaint failed to sufficiently establish the transactions that gave rise to the causes of action.

As noted by the Civil Court, on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and provide the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). “The test to be applied is whether the complaint gives sufficient notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences intended to be proved and whether the requisite elements of any cause of action known to our law can be discerned from its averments” (JP Morgan Chase v J.H. Elec. of NY, Inc., 69 AD3d 802, 803 [*2][2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Contrary to defendant’s arguments both in the Civil Court and on appeal, the complaint in this case did state a cognizable cause of action and was sufficient to give defendant notice of the transactions intended to be proved.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 21, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sylvia G. Ash, J.), entered January 20, 2010. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted an affirmation from its attorney who stated that upon review of his office file and “knowledge of his office practices and procedures,” plaintiff failed to appear at a properly noticed examination under oath (EUO).

The affidavit of defendant’s attorney was of no probative value as it lacked personal knowledge of the nonappearance of plaintiff. It is well settled that a motion for summary judgment must be supported by an affidavit from a person having knowledge of the facts (CPLR [*2]3212 [b]). A conclusory statement from an attorney which fails to demonstrate his or her personal knowledge is insufficient to support summary judgment (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]; Piltser v Donna Lee Mgt. Corp., 29 AD3d 973 [2006]; Gomez v Sammy’s Transp., Inc., 19 AD3d 544 [2005]; Spearmon v Times Sq. Stores Corp, 96 AD2d 552 [1983]). To the extent our prior decisions (see e.g. W & Z Acupuncture, P.C. v Amex Assur. Co., 24 Misc 3d 142[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51732[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Points of Health Acupuncture, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 28 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51338[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]) would require a different result, they should no longer be followed.

While a medical provider is required to submit to examinations under oath when requested by the insurer (Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1), as a condition precedent to payment of a claim, their alleged noncompliance must be established by admissible evidence (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]).

Based upon the foregoing, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 21, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Lisa S. Ottley, J.), entered April 30, 2010. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon a claim for services rendered to assignor Jeannette Lugaro is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied its motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In its respondent’s brief, defendant concedes that it was not entitled to summary judgment [*2]dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon a claim for services rendered to Jeannette Lugaro because defendant failed to annex a copy of the peer review report pertaining to such services. However, plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment upon this claim because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant’s denial of this claim was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]).

With respect to the remaining claims, for services rendered to assignors Boris Gurevich, Isabel Guaraca and Lydia Best, the affidavit submitted by defendant in support of its cross motion for summary judgment established that defendant had timely denied (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) these claims. Defendant annexed to its cross motion papers sworn peer review reports, which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the peer reviewer’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the services rendered to these three assignors. As defendant’s prima facie showing was unrebutted by plaintiff, the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the claims of these three assignors were properly granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon a claim for services rendered to assignor Jeannette Lugaro is denied.

Rios, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 20, 2013