SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered June 22, 2011. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

For the reasons stated in LOF Med. Supply, Inc. v Geico Gen. Ins. Co. (39 Misc 3d 136[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50595[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]), the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: June 25, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), dated June 3, 2011. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

For the reasons stated in LOF Med. Supply, Inc. v Geico Gen. Ins. Co. (39 Misc 3d 136[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50595[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]), the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: June 25, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings

County (Nancy M. Bannon, J.), entered May 13, 2011. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Defendant’s cross motion papers established that defendant had timely denied the claim at issue (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) based on a lack of medical necessity. In addition, defendant submitted an affirmed peer review report which set forth a factual basis and a medical rationale for the peer reviewer’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the services at issue. As defendant’s showing that the services were not medically necessary was not rebutted by plaintiff, defendant’s cross motion should have been granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & [*2]13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). In light of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: June 17, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Leslie J. Purificacion, J.), entered June 9, 2011. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted an affidavit by an employee of the entity which had scheduled, on behalf of defendant, the independent medical examinations (IMEs) involved herein. The affidavit established that the IME scheduling letters had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [*2][App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). In addition, the affidavits submitted by defendant demonstrated that its denial of claim forms, which denied the claims in question based upon the failure of plaintiff’s assignor to appear for the IMEs, had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Defendant also submitted an affirmation by its examining physician and affidavits by its examining chiropractor, psychologist and acupuncturist, respectively, each of which stated that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the scheduled IMEs. As a result, defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Inasmuch as, in opposition to the motion, plaintiff submitted only an affirmation of counsel, which affirmation failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the Civil Court should have granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: June 17, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered April 11, 2011. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant had timely and properly denied plaintiff’s claims based upon plaintiff’s assignor’s failure to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.

Contrary to plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal with respect to defendant’s cross motion, defendant properly demonstrated that it had mailed the EUO scheduling letters and denials at issue (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). As plaintiff raises no other argument with respect to the granting of [*2]defendant’s cross motion, the order denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granting defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: June 17, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Rudolph E. Greco, Jr., J.), entered April 7, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from, (1) upon, in effect, granting the branches of defendant’s motion seeking leave to reargue or, in the alternative, to renew its prior motion to vacate an order of the same court (William A. Viscovich, J.) entered December 19, 2008, which had granted plaintiff’s unopposed motion for leave to enter a default judgment, adhered to the prior determination denying such vacatur, and (2) upon, in effect, granting the branch of defendant’s motion seeking leave to reargue its prior motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8), adhered to the prior determination denying the motion.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff obtained leave to enter a default judgment against defendant pursuant to an order of the Civil Court (William A. Viscovich, J.) entered December 19, 2008. Defendant then moved pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate the order and permit it to defend the action. Two months later, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8). In support of the [*2]latter motion, defendant alleged, among other things, that plaintiff had failed to serve process upon defendant and, instead, had mistakenly served defendant’s third-party claims administrator. By order entered February 2, 2010, the Civil Court (Rudolph E. Greco, Jr., J.) denied both of defendant’s motions.

Thereafter, defendant moved for 1) leave to reargue or, in the alternative, to renew its prior motion to vacate the December 19, 2008 order and, upon reargument or, in the alternative, renewal, to vacate said order, and 2) leave to reargue its prior motion to dismiss the complaint and, upon reargument, to dismiss the complaint.

By order entered April 7, 2010, the Civil Court (Rudolph E. Greco, Jr., J.), upon, in effect, granting defendant leave to reargue and renew its prior motion to vacate the December 19, 2008 order, adhered to its prior determination denying such vacatur. Additionally, the court, upon, in effect, granting defendant leave to reargue its prior motion to dismiss the complaint, adhered to its prior determination denying the motion.

The Civil Court properly denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking, upon reargument, to dismiss the complaint. A defendant’s voluntary participation in litigation in which the lack of jurisdiction could be, but was not, raised constitutes a submission to the jurisdiction of the courts (see generally Gager v White, 53 NY2d 475, 488 [1981]; Parasconda v Club Mateem, Inc., 33 Misc 3d 141[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52201[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). In the instant case, defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the court when, in its initial motion, it sought to vacate the December 19, 2008 order, and permit it to “defend this action on the merits,” rather than seeking to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction (see Parasconda v Club Mateem, Inc., 33 Misc 3d 141[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52201[U]).

The Civil Court also properly denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking, upon reargument, to vacate the December 19, 2008 order pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1). A movant seeking to vacate a default based on an excusable default is required to demonstrate both that there was a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; Codoner v Bobby’s Bus Co., Inc., 85 AD3d 843 [2011]; Lane v Smith, 84 AD3d 746 [2011]; Solomon v Ramlall, 18 AD3d 461 [2005]). Defendant failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense as it did not submit adequate proof to raise a question of fact regarding whether the assignor had been acting within the course of her employment when the accident had occurred. The affidavit of defendant’s third-party claims administrator merely alleged in a conclusory manner that the assignor “was injured during the course of her employment and therefore, workers’ compensation was primary for this loss,” without substantiating this assertion with any evidence (see A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v American Tr. Ins. Co., 8 Misc 3d 127[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50959[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: June 17, 2013

[*1]

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th and 13th Judicial Districts, June 17, 2013

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Joseph Sparacio, P.C., Staten Island (Joseph Sparacio of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Karen C. Dodson, New York City (Tricia D. Prettypaul of counsel), for respondent.

{**40 Misc 3d at 78} OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Ordered that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff mailed to defendant insurer, pursuant to CPLR 312-a, a copy of the summons and verified complaint, dated February 13, 2004. The record contains no signed acknowledgment of receipt, as is required by CPLR 312-a. On March 24, 2004, defendant served a verified answer, in which it asserted the affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction as service of process had not been “perfected.”

There was no further activity in the case until February 13, 2009, when plaintiff purchased an index number and, for the first time, filed with the Civil Court the 2004 summons and complaint, along with defendant’s 2004 answer. There is no proof of service upon defendant of the summons and complaint following the 2009 Civil Court filing (see CCA 411). On [*2]November 30, 2009, plaintiff mailed a notice of trial and certificate of readiness to defense counsel, and filed it with the Civil Court on December 1, 2009.

By notice of motion dated April 23, 2010, defendant moved for, among other things, leave to amend its answer to interpose the affirmative defense that the action had not been commenced within the time prescribed by law and that it was therefore barred by the statute of limitations, and, upon such amendment, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court entered July 29, 2010 as implicitly granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking leave to amend the answer and, upon such amendment, dismissed the complaint. The court held that plaintiff’s action had not been properly commenced within the period of the statute of limitations because defendant had not executed an acknowledgment of receipt, and, therefore, service had not been properly effectuated in accordance with the provisions of CPLR 312-a.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the action was properly commenced “upon service of the summons and complaint.” Although {**40 Misc 3d at 79}plaintiff admits that defendant did not return the acknowledgment of receipt required by CPLR 312-a, plaintiff claims that by serving its answer on March 24, 2004, defendant made an appearance in the action, which is “equivalent to personal service of the summons” (CPLR 320 [b]), and then waived its defense of improper service by failing to move to dismiss the complaint on this ground within 60 days of service of its answer, as required by CPLR 3211 (e). Plaintiff further argues that any “mistake, omission, defect or irregularity . . . in the filing process” may be disregarded (CPLR 2001).

CPLR 312-a, as an alternative to the other methods of personal service authorized by CPLR 307, 308, 310, 311 or 312, permits personal service to be made by first class mail, by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint, together with two copies of a statement of service by mail and acknowledgment of receipt, with a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the plaintiff (CPLR 312-a [a]). The defendant must complete the acknowledgment of receipt and mail or deliver it within 30 days from the date of receipt. Under CPLR 312-a, service is complete on the date the signed acknowledgment of receipt is mailed or delivered to the plaintiff (but cf. CCA former 410 [b]). The signed acknowledgment of receipt constitutes proof of service (CPLR 312-a [b] [1]; 306 [d]).

In 2004, when plaintiff sought to serve defendant pursuant to CPLR 312-a, the “commencement-by-service” system was still in effect in the Civil Court, i.e., an action in the Civil Court was commenced by service of the summons (CCA former 400). Service of the summons was complete upon filing proof of service (CCA former 410 [b]), or, in the case of service pursuant to CPLR 312-a, by filing the acknowledgment of receipt, which constitutes proof of service (CPLR 312-a [b] [1]; 306 [d]). The filing of the acknowledgment of receipt has the effect of establishing the completion of service for purposes of initiating the time in which a defendant must respond (see Deepdale Gen. Hosp. v American Colonial Ins. Co., 144 Misc 2d 917 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 1989]), but here there was no acknowledgment of receipt, thus, none was filed and, technically, no action had been commenced by virtue of plaintiff’s actions (see Nagy v Heuss House Drop In Shelter for the Homeless, 198 AD2d 115 [1993]). Consequently, defendant’s time to answer did not commence to run. As has been noted, plaintiff, until early 2009, attempted no other means of service (CPLR 312-a [e]) nor otherwise took any further measures. [*3]

{**40 Misc 3d at 80}Although no action had been commenced and, thus, defendant’s time to answer had not yet commenced, on March 24, 2004, defendant nevertheless served plaintiff with an answer, in which it asserted, as an affirmative defense, lack of personal jurisdiction. Thus, having preserved its jurisdictional defense, the answer could not be deemed the “equivalent to personal service of the summons upon” defendant (CPLR 320 [b]). The question remains, however, whether, under the circumstances presented, defendant was required, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (e), to move to dismiss the “action” on that ground within 60 days of serving its answer, or risk waiver of that defense. Defendant failed to make such a motion. However, as there was no viable pending action, defendant cannot be deemed to have waived its defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to make a motion to dismiss this “action.” Therefore, since plaintiff had never served the summons and complaint, the action was never commenced in 2004.

In February 2009 (after the commencement-by-filing system had gone into effect in 2005 in the New York City Civil Court), plaintiff purchased an index number and filed the 2004 summons and complaint, as well as defendant’s 2004 answer, in the Civil Court. In December 2009, plaintiff served and filed its notice of trial and certificate of readiness. Since, under the current version of CCA 400 (1), “[a]n action is commenced . . . by filing a summons and complaint,” plaintiff clearly commenced its action in 2009. Plaintiff did not, however, serve upon defendant a copy of the summons and complaint, and, therefore, plaintiff did not acquire personal jurisdiction over defendant under the new system (see CCA 400 [2]). Since there was no service, there could be no filing of proof of service (CCA 410 [b]), which filing would mark the date when service was complete and from which defendant’s time to answer would commence to run. The fact that plaintiff filed defendant’s 2004 answer with the summons and complaint did not mean that it had acquired jurisdiction over defendant, and did not represent proof of service.

Thereafter, defendant successfully moved to amend its 2004 answer to add the affirmative defense that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and, upon such amendment, to dismiss on that ground. Even if we assume that defendant thereby waived its defense based on lack of personal jurisdiction (see e.g. CPLR 3211 [e]), there was merit to defendant’s statute of limitations defense.{**40 Misc 3d at 81}

The time within which an action must be commenced is computed “from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed” (CPLR 203 [a]). A defendant asserting a statute of limitations defense must establish that the plaintiff commenced the action after the expiration of the statute of limitations. A no-fault cause of action accrues when payment of no-fault benefits becomes “overdue” (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; see also Matter of Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v Glenwood Med., P.C., 48 AD3d 319, 320 [2008]; Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 37 AD3d 775 [2007]; Acupuncture Works, P.C. v MVAIC, 27 Misc 3d 131[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50646[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). For statute of limitations purposes, plaintiff’s claim accrued on January 14, 2003, the date that defendant issued and mailed its denial of claim form. Since the six-year statute of limitations applies to the claim involved herein (CPLR 213 [2]; see Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 37 AD3d 775 [2007]), in order for plaintiff’s action to be timely, it had to have been commenced by January 14, 2009. As we view the action as having first been commenced on February 13, 2009, when plaintiff purchased the index number and filed with the Civil Court the [*4]2004 summons and complaint along with defendant’s answer, the action is, necessarily, time-barred.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Pesce and Rios, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Cheree A. Buggs, J.), entered May 5, 2011. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with $25 costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered. At a nonjury trial, plaintiff called no witnesses and offered no claim forms into evidence. Instead, plaintiff argued that a 2005 order of the Civil Court, which had granted summary judgment in another action to plaintiff on claims that are not part of the present action, warranted judgment upon the claims at issue because the order further provided that plaintiff was entitled to recover upon a specified claim number if that claim had not been paid. At plaintiff’s request, the Civil Court admitted into evidence deposition testimony given in 2007 by defendant’s employee, who stated that three claims on behalf of assignor John Tran had been denied based on a peer review report, but she was not asked about the claim numbers for these bills. Defendant’s employee did not testify at the present trial. Plaintiff maintained that the [*2]deposition testimony was sufficient to make a connection between the 2005 order of the Civil Court and the present claims, and to prove that the present claims were unpaid. After the trial, judgment was entered in favor of defendant dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff’s contention that, by virtue of the 2005 Civil Court order, it was entitled to judgment in the instant action lacks merit (see Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303-304 [2001]; Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343, 349 [1999]; Comprehensive Med. Care of NY, P.C. v Hausknecht, 55 AD3d 777 [2008]). At trial, plaintiff failed to proffer any evidence to identify the claim forms upon which plaintiff seeks to recover, let alone establish that such claim forms bore the claim number which was set forth in the 2005 Civil Court order upon which plaintiff relied. In any event, plaintiff failed to establish that the claim forms being sued upon in the instant case remained unpaid. As a result, plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case demonstrating its entitlement to recover (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Davydov v Progressive Ins. Co., 25 Misc 3d 19 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; see also Bajaj v General Assur., 18 Misc 3d 25 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: June 06, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Andrea Phoenix, J.), dated July 12, 2011. The order granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed and the order of the District Court dated July 12, 2011 granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is vacated.

Plaintiff commenced this action in Supreme Court, Nassau County, pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (c), for de novo adjudication of defendant provider’s assigned first-party no-fault benefits claim that had resulted in an arbitration award in favor of the provider. The ground for the de novo adjudication request was that the arbitration award exceeded $5,000. The complaint sought a determination that defendant was not entitled to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits under plaintiff insurer’s policy. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for, among other things, failure to state a cause of action, and plaintiff opposed the motion. While the motion was pending, the Supreme Court transferred the action to the District Court of Nassau County pursuant to CPLR 325 (d). By order dated July 12, 2011, the District Court granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint.

This action seeks, in essence, a declaratory judgment and not monetary damages. While we cannot review the propriety of the order of the Supreme Court transferring this declaratory judgment action to the District Court pursuant to CPLR 325 (d) (see e.g. Priel v Linarello, 7 Misc 3d 64 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005], affd 44 AD3d 835 [2007]; Green v Lakeside Manor Home for Adults, Inc., 30 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]), it is, nevertheless, not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the District Court to adjudicate this particular type of declaratory judgment action (see CPLR 3001; cf. UDCA 212-a [conferring subject matter jurisdiction on the District Court to render a declaratory judgment with respect to certain actions commenced by a party aggrieved by an arbitration award issued pursuant to the New York State Fee Dispute Resolution Program]). “The act of transferring [the action] from Supreme Court to [District Court] did not automatically confer the former’s subject matter jurisdiction upon the latter” (Priel v Linarello, 7 Misc 3d at 66). Thus, as the District Court [*2]lacked subject matter jurisdiction, its order is a nullity (see Green v Lakeside Manor Home for Adults, Inc., 30 Misc 3d 16; Briscoe v White, 8 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2004]).

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the District Court’s order dated July 12, 2011 is vacated.

LaSalle, J.P., Nicolai and Iannacci, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: May 23, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, Third District

(C. Stephen Hackeling, J.), dated March 21, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon plaintiff’s claims in the sums of $2,516.58, $967.52 and $832.92, respectively, are granted; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits upon 15 claims, defendant appeals from so much of an order as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

As to 12 of the 15 claims at issue, defendant established that it had timely denied (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]) those claims on the ground of lack of medical necessity. Defendant also submitted an affirmed report of an independent medical examination (IME) with respect to 11 of the 12 claims, and a peer review report with respect to the 12th, each of which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the conclusion that the services in question were not medically necessary.

In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff submitted an affirmed report of an IME, conducted by a different doctor one day after the IME performed by defendant’s doctor. The IME report submitted by plaintiff contradicted the findings of defendant’s IME report and was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to the medical necessity of the 11 claims which had been denied based upon defendant’s IME report (see Park Slope Med. & Surgical Supply, Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 22 Misc 3d 141[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50441[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

However, plaintiff failed to offer any medical evidence to rebut the conclusions of [*2]defendant’s peer review report, which established a lack of medical necessity for the
12th claim. Accordingly, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon plaintiff’s claim for $2,516.58, which was denied based upon the peer review, should have been granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

With regard to two of the three remaining claims, for $967.52 and $832.92, respectively, defendant established that it had timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Residential Holding Corp., 286 AD2d 679) initial and follow-up requests for verification to plaintiff (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] §§ 65-3.5 [b]; 65-3.6 [b]). Defendant also established that it had never received responses to these requests. Thus, the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon those two claims should have been granted, as defendant’s time to pay or deny those claims had not begun to run (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [a]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 903 [2007]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]).

Finally, as to the 15th claim, defendant failed to establish as a matter of law that the fee charged exceeded the amount set forth in the workers’ compensation fee schedule (see Rogy Med., P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50732[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), and therefore it was not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon plaintiff’s claims for $2,516.58, $967.52 and $832.92, respectively, are granted.

LaSalle, J.P., Nicolai and Iannacci, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: May 22, 2013