SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered September 21, 2011, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered November 29, 2011 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the September 21, 2011 order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Upon a review of the record, we find that defendant established, prima facie, that it had paid the claim at issue, and that plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 26, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered May 5, 2011. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Defendant denied the claim at issue based upon the alleged failure by plaintiff’s assignor to appear at duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). However, according to the affirmation submitted by defendant’s counsel, the initial EUO had been rescheduled by mutual agreement, prior to the date it was to occur. A mutual rescheduling, which occurs prior to the date of the scheduled EUO, does not constitute a failure to appear (see DVS Chiropractic, P.C. v Interboro Ins. Co., 36 Misc 3d 138[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51443[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Vitality Chiropractic, P.C. v Kemper Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 94 [App Term, 2d & [*2]11th Jud Dists 2006]). Therefore, as defendant did not demonstrate that there had been a failure to appear at both an initial and a follow-up EUO, defendant did not prove that plaintiff had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (see DVS Chiropractic, P.C., 36 Misc 3d 138[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51443[U]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 26, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered June 14, 2011. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, stating that the only issue for trial was the medical necessity of the services at issue (see CPLR 3212 [g]).

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted a sworn peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the reviewer’s determination that there was no medical necessity for the services at issue. Defendant’s prima facie showing was not rebutted by plaintiff. Since plaintiff has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d [*2]136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 26, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered June 13, 2011. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, stating that the only issue for trial was the medical necessity of the services at issue (see CPLR 3212 [g]).

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted a sworn peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the reviewer’s determination that there was no medical necessity for the services at issue. Defendant’s prima facie showing was not rebutted by plaintiff. Since plaintiff has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d [*2]136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 26, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Dawn Jimenez Salta, J.), entered August 10, 2011. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the services at issue were not medically necessary. Plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Upon a review of the record, we find that there is a triable issue of fact regarding the medical necessity of the services at issue (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied. We decline plaintiff’s request to limit the issues for trial (see CPLR 3212 [g]).

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 26, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered August 18, 2011. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granted the branches of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment with respect to so much of the complaint as sought to recover on a claim for $319.97 for services rendered on February 17, 2009 and a claim for $42.02 for services rendered from December 31, 2008 to January 28, 2009.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover on a claim for $249.96 for services rendered on January 19, 2009, a claim for $3,119.44 for services rendered on January 28, 2009, a claim for $230.09 for additional services rendered on January 28, 2009 and a claim for $272.92 for services rendered on February 17, 2009 are granted; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs. [*2]

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. The Civil Court denied defendant’s motion and granted the branches of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment with respect to so much of the complaint as sought to recover on a claim for $319.97 for services rendered on February 17, 2009, which claim defendant alleged it had never received, and a claim for $42.02, which was the balance found to be due after defendant had allegedly paid plaintiff for services rendered from December 31, 2008 to January 28, 2009 pursuant to the worker’s compensation fee schedule. The court otherwise denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, defendant argues that its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted because it demonstrated that it had timely and properly denied the claims at issue on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to
appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Defendant had raised this defense in the Civil Court with regard to a claim for $3,119.44 for services rendered on January 28, 2009, a claim for $230.09 for services rendered on January 28, 2009, a claim for $249.96 for services rendered on January 19, 2009 and a claim for $272.92 for services rendered on February 17, 2009. Defendant did not raise this defense in the Civil Court with respect to the claim for $319.97 for services rendered on February 17, 2009 and the claim for $42.02 for services rendered from December 31, 2008 to January 28, 2009, nor did it establish that it had timely denied the latter claims on that ground. Since defendant did not, in its appellate brief, proffer any argument as to why the Civil Court’s award of summary judgment to plaintiff on these claims was in error, we do not disturb the part of the order appealed from that granted summary judgment to plaintiff with respect to so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon these two claims.

Defendant demonstrated that the first four claims listed above had been denied within 30 days of their receipt (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [a]; see also St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled EUOs. The affidavits submitted by defendant established that its EUO scheduling letters had been mailed in accordance with its standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16), and that the EUOs had been properly scheduled (see ARCO Med. NY, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 134[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52382[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). Defendant also established that plaintiff had failed to appear at the duly scheduled EUOs, through both an affidavit by the investigator who had been assigned to conduct the EUOs, and statements made on the record by the same investigator (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Since defendant demonstrated that plaintiff had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage, the branches of its motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon these claims should have been granted.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint [*3]as sought to recover upon a claim for $249.96 for services rendered on January 19, 2009, a claim for $3,119.44 for services rendered on January 28, 2009, a claim for $230.09 for additional services rendered on January 28, 2009 and a claim for $272.92 for services rendered on February 17, 2009 are granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 26, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered February 15, 2011. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, the Civil Court denied defendant’s cross motion.

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted an affidavit by a supervisor of Media Referral, Inc., a company retained by defendant to schedule independent medical examinations (IMEs), which sufficiently established that the IME requests had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant also submitted, among other things, an affidavit by the doctor who was to perform the physiatrist/PMR IMEs, as well as an affidavit by the chiropractor who was to perform the chiropractic IMEs, which were sufficient to establish that plaintiff’s assignor had [*2]failed to appear for those duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). In addition, an affidavit executed by defendant’s claims examiner demonstrated that the denial of claim forms, which denied plaintiff’s claims based on plaintiff’s assignor’s nonappearance at the IMEs, had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Consequently, defendant established its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722; see also Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 26, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), entered March 1, 2011. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, alleging that the claims at issue had been timely denied because the medical supplies at issue were not medically necessary. Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied its motion.

The papers submitted by defendant in support of its motion were sufficient to establish that defendant had timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) the denial of claim forms at issue, which denied the claims on the ground of lack of medical necessity. Moreover, defendant submitted a sworn peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the reviewer’s determination that there was no medical necessity for the medical supplies at issue. In [*2]opposition, plaintiff submitted an affirmation by a doctor which failed to meaningfully refer to, let alone rebut, the conclusions set forth in the peer review report (see Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted (see A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 26, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered March 25, 2011. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court denied both motions, finding that plaintiff had established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, that defendant had timely denied the claims based upon plaintiff’s assignor’s failure to appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs), and that defendant had timely and properly requested IMEs. Thus, the only issue for trial was “the no-show of the assignor at the IMEs.”

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted an affidavit by the healthcare professional retained to perform the IMEs which established that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear at IMEs on June 12, 2009 and June 25, 2009. As an appearance at an IME is a condition precedent to an insurer’s liability on a policy (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 [*2]NYCRR] § 65-1.1; Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]) and plaintiff has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 26, 2013

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Cheree A. Buggs, J.), entered December 8, 2010. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiff had raised a triable issue of fact and stating that the only issue for trial was the medical necessity of the supplies at issue (see CPLR 3212 [g]).

In support of its motion, defendant submitted a sworn peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the reviewer’s determination that there was no medical necessity for the medical supplies at issue. In opposition, plaintiff submitted an affirmation by a doctor which failed to meaningfully refer to, let alone rebut, the conclusions set forth in the peer review report (see Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). In view of the foregoing, and as [*2]plaintiff has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted (see A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 26, 2013