Reported in New York Official Reports at Epic Pain Mgt. & Anesthesia Consultants, LLC v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 51391(U))
| Epic Pain Mgt. & Anesthesia Consultants, LLC v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 51391(U) [44 Misc 3d 143(A)] |
| Decided on September 16, 2014 |
| Appellate Term, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on September 16, 2014
PRESENT: Lowe, III, P.J., Schoenfeld, Shulman, JJ.
13-453
against
New York Central Mutual Fire Ins. Co. Defendant-Respondent.
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Mitchell J. Danziger, J.), entered July 29, 2013, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Per Curiam.
Order (Mitchell J. Danziger, J.), entered July 29, 2013, reversed, with $10 costs, motion denied and complaint reinstated.
The action, seeking recovery of assigned first-party no-fault benefits arising from a series of epidural injections administered by plaintiff in its Hackensack, New Jersey office, is not ripe for summary dismissal. Defendant’s moving submission below relied exclusively on a worker’s compensation fee schedule defense, and failed to address, much less refute the applicability of Insurance Department regulation (11 NYCRR) § 68.6, which provides that where, as here, a reimbursable health service “is performed outside New York State, the permissible charge for such service shall be the prevailing fee in the geographic location of the provider.” Notably absent from defendant’s moving papers was any discussion of the proper “geographic location” of the plaintiff provider — which apparently maintains offices in both New York and New Jersey — or of the “prevailing fee” were such location determined to be in New Jersey. Defendant’s attempts to rectify these deficiencies in its reply papers below were untimely (see e.g. Ambac Assur. Corp. v DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc., 92 AD3d 451, 452 [2012]) and, even if defendant’s newly raised arguments were considered, they create rather than eliminate genuine triable issues.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
I concurI concurI concur
Decision Date: September 16, 2014
Reported in New York Official Reports at Okslen Acupuncture P.C. v Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 51290(U))
| Okslen Acupuncture P.C. v Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 51290(U) [44 Misc 3d 140(A)] |
| Decided on August 22, 2014 |
| Appellate Term, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on August 22, 2014
PRESENT: Schoenfeld, J.P., Hunter, Jr., Ling-Cohan,JJ.
570045/14
against
Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co., Defendant-Respondent.
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Robert R. Reed, J.), entered November 26, 2012, which conditionally granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint unless plaintiff complied with defendant’s notice of deposition.
Per Curiam.
Order (Robert R. Reed, J.), entered November 26, 2012, reversed, with $10 costs, and defendant’s motion denied.
The defendant-insurer failed to demonstrate entitlement to depositions relating to its excessive treatment and fee schedule defenses, in the absence of any affirmative showing that it preserved those defenses by timely denying plaintiff’s 2006 first-party no-fault claim (see Triangle R. Inc. v Progressive Ins. Co., 36 Misc 3d 151[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51685[U][App Term, 1st Dept 2012]). In view of the foregoing, we need not and do not address plaintiff’s alternative argument that the noticed depositions were otherwise unwarranted.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
I concurI concurI concur
Decision Date: August 22, 2014
Reported in New York Official Reports at Great Health Care Chiropractic, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 51324(U))
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
against
American Transit Ins. Co., Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Barry A. Schwartz, J.), entered February 28, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and, upon a search of the record, granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.
Great Health Care Chiropractic, P.C. (Great Health) commenced this action on February 14, 2012 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for services provided to its assignor as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident on December 10, 2010. After issue had been joined, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and
defendant opposed the motion on the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish its prima facie case. While this no-fault action was pending, defendant, American Transit Insurance Company (American Transit), commenced a declaratory judgment action in Supreme Court, New York County, against Great Health and its assignor, among others, alleging that the assignor had breached the terms of the insurance policy by failing to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs) and that, as a result, American Transit is not obligated to pay any claims for first-party no-fault benefits submitted by Great Health as assignee of Kareem Lindsay arising out of the December 10, 2010 accident. Great Health asserted in its answer in Supreme Court that American Transit did not demonstrate good cause for requesting an EUO. The Supreme Court initially denied a motion by American Transit for, among other things, summary judgment but, upon reargument, granted the motion, finding that American Transit had demonstrated that it had timely mailed EUO scheduling letters to Great Health’s assignor; that the assignor had failed to appear for scheduled EUOs; and that Great Health had failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the motion. The Supreme Court awarded American Transit a declaratory judgment, dated January 25, 2013.
After being awarded the declaratory judgment, American Transit submitted, in this action, a supplemental affirmation by its counsel, in opposition to plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment, in which he argued that plaintiff’s action is barred by res judicata. By order entered February 28, 2013, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and, upon a search of the record, granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice. This appeal by plaintiff ensued.
Plaintiff’s moving papers failed to establish either that defendant had failed to pay or deny the claims within the requisite 30-day period (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]), or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]). Consequently, plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment.
Moreover, the Civil Court properly determined that the action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata (see EBM Med. Health Care, P.C. v Republic W. Ins., 38 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Ava Acupuncture, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 149[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50233[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; SZ Med., P.C. v Erie Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), as any judgment in favor of plaintiff in this action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the Supreme Court declaratory judgment (see Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307 [1929]; SZ Med., P.C. v Erie Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U]). Defendant’s failure to serve the Supreme Court’s order upon plaintiff with notice of entry is not fatal, in view of the binding and conclusive effect of the order (see All Boro Psychological Servs., P.C. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., ___ Misc 3d ___, 2014 NY Slip Op 24161 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]). While plaintiff argues that the Civil Court improvidently exercised its discretion in considering defendant’s untimely supplemental affirmation in opposition to plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, we reject this contention in view of the justification shown for the delay and plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate any prejudice arising therefrom (see Lawrence v Celtic Holdings, LLC, 85 AD3d 874 [2011]; cf. Mosheyeva v Distefano, 288 AD2d 448 [2001]; Risucci v Zeal Mgt. Corp., 258 AD2d 512 [1999]). In view of the foregoing, we decline to disturb so much of the order as, upon a search of the record, granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
Accordingly, the order is affirmed.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: August 20, 2014
Reported in New York Official Reports at Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v National Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 51322(U))
| Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v National Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 51322(U) [44 Misc 3d 142(A)] |
| Decided on August 20, 2014 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on August 20, 2014
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ.
2013-653 K C
against
National Liability & Fire Insurance Co., Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Ingrid Joseph, J.), entered November 20, 2012. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary
judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had obtained the insurance policy in question through fraud. The Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion and denied defendant’s cross motion.
Inasmuch as defendant raises no issue on appeal with respect to plaintiff’s prima facie case, we do not pass upon the propriety of the Civil Court’s implicit determination with respect thereto.
The papers submitted by defendant were sufficient to establish that defendant had timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) its denial of claim form, which denied the claim on the ground of the fraudulent procurement of the insurance policy in question by virtue of the assignor’s misrepresentation of his place of residence. Furthermore, defendant’s papers demonstrated that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether plaintiff’s assignor had provided a fraudulent address when he had obtained the insurance policy at issue. Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).
With respect to defendant’s cross motion, upon the record before us, we find that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment dismissing the complaint as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: August 20, 2014
Reported in New York Official Reports at Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 51321(U))
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
against
American Transit Ins. Co., Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered January 18, 2013. The order implicitly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.
Ultimate Health Products, Inc. (Ultimate Health) commenced this action in the Civil Court, Queens County, to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for supplies provided to its assignor as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. While this no-fault action was pending, defendant, American Transit Insurance Company (American Transit), commenced a declaratory judgment action in Supreme Court, New York County, against Ultimate Health and its assignor, among others, alleging that the assignor had breached the terms of the insurance policy by failing to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath and that, as a result, American Transit is not obligated to pay any claims for first-party no-fault benefits submitted by Ultimate Health as assignee of Carlos Martinez arising from the car accident in question. In December of 2011, plaintiff moved in the Civil Court for summary judgment. On May 15, 2012, the Supreme Court awarded American Transit a declaratory judgment on default. American Transit subsequently cross-moved in the Civil Court, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), to dismiss plaintiff’s action, contending that this action is barred by virtue of the declaratory judgment. Plaintiff opposed defendant’s cross motion and now appeals from an order of the Civil Court, entered January 18, 2013, which implicitly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion dismissing the complaint.
The Supreme Court determined that Ultimate Health’s assignor was not an eligible injured person entitled to no-fault benefits under the applicable policy, and that American Transit was not obligated to pay claims submitted by Ultimate Health as assignee of Carlos Martinez in any current or future proceedings arising under that policy from the car accident in question. In light of the declaratory judgment, the present action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata (see EBM Med. Health Care, P.C. v Republic W. Ins., 38 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Ava Acupuncture, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 149[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50233[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; SZ Med., P.C. v Erie Ins. [*2]Co., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), as any judgment in favor of plaintiff in this action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the Supreme Court declaratory judgment (see Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307 [1929]; SZ Med., P.C. v Erie Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U]). Plaintiff’s remaining arguments lack merit or were not preserved for appeal.
Accordingly, the order is affirmed.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: August 20, 2014
Reported in New York Official Reports at Lotus Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 51315(U))
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
against
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Joseph E. Capella, J.), entered August 3, 2012, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered September 28, 2012 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the August 3, 2012 order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denying plaintiff’s cross motion to, among other things, disqualify defendant’s law firm from representing defendant in this action, dismissed the complaint.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). The motion was supported by, among other things, an affirmation from a partner in the law firm representing defendant, attesting to plaintiff’s failure to appear. Plaintiff cross-moved to, among other things, disqualify the law firm representing defendant, pursuant to rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0), on the ground that a member of the firm was a necessary witness in this case. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court entered August 3, 2012 granting defendant’s motion and denying plaintiff’s cross motion. A judgment was subsequently entered dismissing the complaint, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).
As to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, we find that, contrary to plaintiff’s arguments on appeal, defendant submitted sufficient proof to show that the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim form had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), and that plaintiff had failed to appear at either of the duly scheduled EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). An appearance at an EUO is a condition precedent to an insurer’s liability on a policy (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1; Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d 720). Therefore, and as plaintiff’s remaining contentions with respect to this motion lack merit, we find that the Civil Court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
In light of the foregoing, plaintiff’s request that defendant’s law firm be disqualified based [*2]on the attorney/witness rule is “moot since, summary judgment having been granted, there will be no trial of this matter” (Quiros v Mount St. Michael Academy, 303 AD2d 185, 186 [2003]; see also Lombino v Town Bd. of Town of Rye, 206 AD2d 462 [1994]). In any event, plaintiff failed to establish that disqualification of defendant’s law firm was warranted (see S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v 777 S. H. Corp., 69 NY2d 437 [1987]; see also e.g. Magnus v Sklover, 95 AD3d 837 [2012]; Matter of Advent Assoc., LLC v Vogt Family Inv. Partners, L.P., 56 AD3d 1023 [2008]; Hudson Val. Mar., Inc. v Town of Cortlandt, 54 AD3d 999 [2008]; Daniel Gale Assoc., Inc. v George, 8 AD3d 608 [2004]; Broadwhite Assoc. v Truong, 237 AD2d 162 [1997]; Matter of Cowen & Co. v Tecnoconsult Holdings, 234 AD2d 86 [1996]; Talvy v American Red Cross in Greater NY, 205 AD2d 143 [1994], affd 87 NY2d 826 [1995]; Kaplan v Maytex Mills, 187 AD2d 565 [1992]).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
Pesce, P.J., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: August 20, 2014
Reported in New York Official Reports at Natural Therapy Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 51310(U))
| Natural Therapy Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 51310(U) [44 Misc 3d 141(A)] |
| Decided on August 20, 2014 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on August 20, 2014
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., WESTON and ALIOTTA, JJ.
2012-947 K C
against
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered March 14, 2012. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court found that defendant had timely and properly denied the claims at issue on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage, in that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant failed to prove that it had mailed its EUO scheduling letters and denial of claim forms or that plaintiff had failed to appear for the EUOs; that defendant lacked justification for its EUO requests; and that defendant’s motion should have been denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), as plaintiff had not received discovery regarding the reasonableness of defendant’s EUO requests.
Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the affidavits submitted by defendant established that the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), and the affirmation submitted by defendant’s attorney, who was present in his office to conduct plaintiff’s EUO on the scheduled dates, was sufficient to establish that plaintiff had failed to appear. Furthermore, since plaintiff does not claim to have responded in any way to the EUO requests, its objections regarding the EUO requests will not now be heard (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 35 Misc 3d 127[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50579[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Crescent Radiology, PLLC v American Tr. Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 134[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50622[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2011]). Consequently, discovery relevant to the reasonableness of the EUO requests was not necessary for plaintiff to oppose defendant’s motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]).
Accordingly, the order is affirmed.
Pesce, P.J., Weston and Aliotta, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: August 20, 2014
Reported in New York Official Reports at SS Med. Care, P.C. v Eveready Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 51305(U))
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
against
Eveready Ins. Co., Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered July 26, 2011. The order, insofar as appealed from, upon denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, made CPLR 3212 (g) findings in plaintiff’s favor, and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, the CPLR 3212 (g) findings in plaintiff’s favor are vacated, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for, among other things, summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action is premature due to plaintiff’s failure to provide requested verification. Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, the Civil Court, upon denying plaintiff’s motion, made CPLR 3212 (g) findings in plaintiff’s favor, denied defendant’s cross motion, and limited the issues for trial.
In support of its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, defendant submitted an affidavit by its claims examiner which established that defendant had timely mailed its verification requests and follow-up verification requests (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant demonstrated that it had not received the requested verification. Plaintiff did not oppose defendant’s cross motion. Contrary to the Civil Court’s statement, there is nothing in the record which would require defendant to prove that the copies of the verification letters annexed to defendant’s cross motion had not been tampered with or altered (see Schozer v William Penn Life Ins. Co. of NY, 84 NY2d 639, 643 [1994]; People v Dicks, 100 AD3d 528 [2012]; Rotanelli v Longo, 210 AD2d 392 [1994]). As the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay or deny the claims did not begin to run (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]; D & R Med. Supply v American Tr. Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 144[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51727[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]), plaintiff’s action is premature.
Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, the CPLR 3212 (g) findings in plaintiff’s favor are vacated, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: August 20, 2014
Reported in New York Official Reports at Okslen Acupuncture P.C. v Travco Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 51209(U))
| Okslen Acupuncture P.C. v Travco Ins. Co. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 51209(U) [44 Misc 3d 135(A)] |
| Decided on August 11, 2014 |
| Appellate Term, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on August 11, 2014
PRESENT: Schoenfeld, J.P., Shulman, Hunter, Jr., JJ.
570417/13
against
Travco Ins. Co., Defendant-Respondent.
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Fernando Tapia, J.), entered August 16, 2011, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Per Curiam.
Order (Fernando Tapia, J.), entered August 16, 2011, affirmed, with $10 costs.
This action seeks recovery of assigned first-party no-fault benefits arising from acupuncture services provided to plaintiff’s assignor by a licensed acupuncturist. The affidavits submitted by defendant in support of its motion for summary judgment established prima facie that defendant timely and properly denied plaintiff’s no-fault claim to the extent plaintiff sought reimbursement in an amount greater than that authorized by the workers’ compensation fee schedule applicable to physicians who render acupuncture services (see Akita Med. Acupuncture, P.C. v Clarendon Ins. Co., 41 Misc 3d 134[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51860[U][App Term, 1st Dept 2013]; Great Wall Acupuncture v Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 23 [2007]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue as to the efficacy of defendant’s mailing of the claim denial or the calculation of the fee. With respect to the latter, the affirmation submitted by plaintiff’s counsel did not address the nature of the acupuncture services rendered to plaintiff’s assignor, much less demonstrate that those services were not “similar” to acupuncture services generally provided by physicians, so as to exempt plaintiff from the reach of the physicians’ workers’ compensation fee schedule (see 11 NYCRR 68.5[b]). Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim – which sought the difference between the amount charged for the services and payments made to plaintiff pursuant to the fee schedule – was properly granted.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
I concurI concurI concur
Decision Date: August 11, 2014
Reported in New York Official Reports at Optimal Well-Being Chiropractic, P.C. v Infinity Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 24227)
| Optimal Well-Being Chiropractic, P.C. v Infinity Ins. Co. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 24227 [46 Misc 3d 27] |
| Accepted for Miscellaneous Reports Publication |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| As corrected through Wednesday, February 11, 2015 |
[*1]
| Optimal Well-Being Chiropractic, P.C., as Assignee of Waldy Collado, Respondent, v Infinity Ins. Co., Appellant. |
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th and 13th Judicial Districts, August 11, 2014
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Freiberg, Peck & Kang, LLP, Armonk (Yilo J. Kang of counsel), for appellant.
{**46 Misc 3d at 28} OPINION OF THE COURT
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, the order dated February 28, 2012 is vacated, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant argued that a conflict-of-law analysis required the application of Pennsylvania law, pursuant to which there was a lack of coverage due to a rescission of the automobile insurance policy in question. Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court dated February 28, 2012, which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).
[1] Defendant issued the automobile insurance policy in Pennsylvania to the insured, who purportedly resided in Pennsylvania, for a vehicle which was purportedly garaged in Pennsylvania. The only connection between the policy and New York State is that plaintiff’s assignor was injured while riding in the insured’s vehicle in New York. Consequently, we find that{**46 Misc 3d at 29} Pennsylvania law is controlling under New York’s conflict-of-law rules (see Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Nichols, 8 AD3d 564 [2004]; Matter of Eagle Ins. Co. v Singletary, 279 AD2d 56, 58 [2000]).
[2] Although Pennsylvania law provides for a common-law right by the insurer to rescind a policy of insurance, in Erie Ins. Exch. v Lake (543 Pa 363, 375, 671 A2d 681, 687 [1996]), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an automobile insurance policy cannot be retroactively rescinded with respect to third parties who were harmed through no fault of their own. In the case at bar, during his examination before trial, plaintiff’s assignor testified that his mother, the insured, had never resided in Allentown, Pennsylvania, and that he had driven his mother to Pennsylvania for the sole purpose of renewing her automobile insurance because the insurance [*2]was cheaper in Pennsylvania than in New York. Inasmuch as the aforementioned acts of the assignor make him complicit in the fraud perpetrated by his mother, he is not an innocent third party and, therefore, rescission of the subject insurance policy is effective with respect to him. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, the order dated February 28, 2012 is vacated, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of coverage due to the rescission of the insurance policy is granted.
The decision and order of this court dated December 9, 2013 are hereby recalled and vacated (see 2014 NY Slip Op 80108[U] [motion decided simultaneously herewith]).
Pesce, P.J., and Weston, J., concur; Rios, J., taking no part.