Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered March 13, 2013, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered March 27, 2013 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the March 13, 2013 order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

In support of its motion, defendant submitted an affidavit by its claims representative, which affidavit sufficiently established the timely mailing of the denial of claim forms (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Although the claims representative’s affidavit, which was notarized outside the State of New York, failed to conform to the requirements set forth in CPLR 2309 (c) and Real Property Law § 299-a regarding the submission of a certificate of conformity, the absence of a certificate of conformity is not a fatal defect (see Fuller v Nesbitt, 116 AD3d 999 [2014]; Fredette v Town of Southampton, 95 AD3d 940 [2012]; see also Gonzalez v Perkan Concrete Corp., 110 AD3d 955 [2013]; Smith v Allstate Ins. Co., 38 AD3d 522 [2007]; Active Chiropractic, P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 43 Misc 3d 134[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50634[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]), as the defect may be disregarded pursuant to CPLR 2001 where a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced (see Midfirst Bank v Agho, 121 AD3d 343 [2014]; Rivers v Birnbaum, 102 AD3d 26 [2012]). In the present case, plaintiff failed to make any showing of prejudice.

Defendant denied plaintiff’s claims on the grounds that they exceeded the amount permitted by the workers’ compensation fee schedule, and that defendant had fully paid for the billed-for services in accordance with the fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the affidavit executed by a fee schedule adjuster [*2]for defendant’s vendor, Managed Care Network, established that defendant had properly used the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors to determine the amount which plaintiff was entitled to receive for the services at issue (see Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Plaintiff’s papers failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant’s motion. Consequently, the Civil Court properly granted defendant’s motion and denied plaintiff’s cross motion.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Defendant, as limited by its briefs, appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Andrea Masley, J.), dated May 22, 2013, as denied, in part, its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Andrea Masley, J.), dated May 22, 2013, insofar as appealed from, modified by granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims seeking no-fault first-party benefits in the aggregate amount of $1,710.05; as modified, order affirmed, with $10 costs to defendant-appellant.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s no-fault claims in the total sum of $ 1,710.75, for medical supplies provided to plaintiff’s assignor on June 2, 2011 and June 22, 2011, by establishing its proper and timely mailing of the denial of claim forms at issue herein (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2d Dept 2008]), and submitting a sworn peer review report which set forth a sufficient factual basis and medical rationale for the stated conclusion that the medical supplies provided to the assignor were not medically necessary (see Triangle R. Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 143[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51663[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2011]). Plaintiff’s opposing submission, consisting of an attorney’s affirmation unaccompanied by any medical evidence or other competent proof, was insufficient to raise a triable issue (see Munoz v Hollingsworth, 18 AD3d 278, 279 [2005]; CPT Med. Servs., P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 87 [2007]). Plaintiff’s objections to the peer review doctor’s qualifications “go to the weight and not the admissibility of her opinion” (Solano v Ronak Med. Care, 114 AD3d 592 [2014]).

We sustain so much of the order under review as denied defendant’s motion for summary judgement dismissing plaintiff’s claim of $1,080 for medical supplies provided to plaintiff’s assignor on June 27, 2011, since defendant’s own moving papers tend to indicate that this claim was not timely denied (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d [*2]312, 317 [2007]; Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195 [1997]; Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Zabloski, 257 AD2d 506 [1990]).

Plaintiff’s remaining arguments are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Decided on December 31, 2014

Decided on December 30, 2014

Decided on December 22, 2014

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on December 19, 2014

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on December 19, 2014

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Joseph E. Capella, J.), entered May 15, 2012, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered June 13, 2012 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the May 15, 2012 order granting the branches of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon the first, second and third causes of action and denying the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those causes of action, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,958.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, so much of the order entered May 15, 2012 as granted the branches of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon the first, second and third causes of action and denied the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those causes of action is vacated, the branches of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon the first, second and third causes of action are denied, and the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those causes of action are granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted the branches of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon the first, second and third causes of action and denied the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those causes of action. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see [*2]CPLR 5501 [c]).

The branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s second and third causes of action, were supported by an affidavit executed by defendant’s litigation examiner which sufficiently described defendant’s standard mailing practices and procedures so as to establish the timely mailing of defendant’s request for additional verification (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). In addition, the affidavit demonstrated that, after defendant had received the requested additional verification, defendant had timely denied the claims (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16) on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs). Defendant submitted an affidavit by an employee of the company which had been retained by defendant to schedule IMEs, which affidavit established that the scheduling letters had been timely mailed in accordance with that office’s standard mailing practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Defendant also submitted affidavits by the healthcare professionals who were to perform the IMEs, which affidavits established that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Since defendant demonstrated that plaintiff had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage, the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s second and third causes of action should have been granted.

With respect to plaintiff’s first cause of action, the affidavit of defendant’s litigation examiner established that defendant had timely mailed verification requests and follow-up verification requests (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Defendant also demonstrated that it had not received all of the verification requested, and plaintiff did not show that such verification had been provided to defendant prior to the commencement of this action. Consequently, the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay or deny the claim did not begin to run (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]; D & R Med. Supply v. American Tr. Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 144[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51727[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; Doshi Diagnostic Imaging Servs. v State Farm Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 42 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), and, thus, plaintiff’s first cause of action is premature. As a result, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s first cause of action should also have been granted.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, so much of the order entered May 15, 2012 as granted the branches of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon the first, second and third causes of action and denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those causes of action is vacated, the branches of plaintiff’s cross motion seeking summary judgment upon the first, second, and third causes of action are denied and the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those causes of action are granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Genine D. Edwards, J.), entered April 18, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

An affidavit submitted by defendant’s no-fault claims examiner established that, with respect to two bills for services rendered on December 22, 2009, a bill for services rendered on December 23, 2009, and a bill for $340 for services rendered from January 15, 2010 to January 21, 2010, defendant had timely mailed verification requests and follow-up verification requests (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th [*2]Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant demonstrated that it had not received the verification requested, and plaintiff did not show that such verification had been provided to defendant. Consequently, the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay or deny those claims did not begin to run (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]), and so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon those claims should have been dismissed as premature.

With respect to the remaining claims at issue, defendant submitted an affidavit by an employee of the company which had been retained by defendant to schedule independent medical examinations (IMEs), which affidavit established that the scheduling letters had been timely mailed in accordance with that office’s standard mailing practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Defendant also submitted affidavits by the healthcare professionals who were to perform the IMEs, which affidavits established that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). An affidavit executed by defendant’s litigation examiner sufficiently described the standard mailing practices and procedures to establish the timely mailing of the denial of claim forms (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Since an assignor’s appearance at an IME is a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability on the policy (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722), the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon the remaining claims should have been granted.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Decided on December 19, 2014

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS