Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Devin P. Cohen, J.), entered March 23, 2012. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).

Defendant’s motion should have been denied, as defendant failed to establish, as a matter of law, its defense that plaintiff had failed to appear for properly scheduled EUOs (see e.g. Alrof, Inc. v Safeco Natl. Ins. Co., 39 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50458[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]; Bright Med. Supply Co. v IDS Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 40 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51123[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Raul Cruz, J.), entered February 9, 2012, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Raul Cruz, J.) entered February 9, 2012, reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff-provider’s claim for first-party no-fault benefits by establishing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for independent medical examinations (IMEs) to plaintiff’s assignor, and that the assignor failed to appear (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas, 111 AD3d 423 [2013]; American Tr. Ins. Co. v Solorzano, 108 AD3d 449 [2013]). The affidavit of defendant’s third-party IME scheduler, who had personal knowledge of his office’s standard mailing practices and procedures, sufficiently established the mailing of the IME notices (see Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v Donnelly, 22 NY3d 1169 [2014]). Defendant also submitted competent evidence of the assignor’s nonappearance in the form of the sworn affidavits of the scheduled examining chiropractor and acupuncturist, as well as the IME scheduler, setting forth sufficient facts to demonstrate the affiants’ personal knowledge of the assignor’s repeated failures to appear for the IMEs and the office practices and policies when an assignor fails to appear (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas, 111 AD3d at 424).

In opposition, plaintiff did not specifically deny the assignor’s nonappearance or otherwise raise a triable issue with respect thereto, or as to the mailing or reasonableness of the underlying notices (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Joseph E. Capella, J.), entered March 19, 2014, which denied, in part, its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Joseph E. Capella, J.), entered March 19, 2014, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, with $10 costs.

This action, seeking recovery of first-party no-fault benefits, is not ripe for summary dismissal, since defendant-insurer failed to establish the proper and timely mailing of the denial of claim forms at issue (see Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 564, 564—565 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 284 AD2d 374 [2001]). The affidavit submitted by defendant to establish proof of mailing, identifying the affiant as an employee of nonparty Tower Insurance Group (“Tower”), an entity remotely related to defendant, lacked probative value, since it failed to set forth the basis of affiant’s personal knowledge of the internal mailing practices and procedures of defendant during the pertinent period (see Gogos v Modell’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 87 AD3d 248, 253-254 [2011]), especially given that affiant began his employment with Tower after the denial at issue was allegedly mailed by defendant (see Nocella v Fort Dearborn Life Ins. Co. of NY, 99 AD3d 877, 879 [2012]). “It is the burden of the proponent of an affidavit to demonstrate the basis of the affiant’s knowledge . . . and here, defendant failed to meet that burden” (Gogos v Modell’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 87 AD3d at 254).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Decision Date: April 16, 2015

Defendant, as limited by its briefs, appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Donald A. Miles, J.), entered March 20, 2013, as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Donald A. Miles, J.), entered March 20, 2013, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with $10 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the action for first-party no-fault benefits. The evidentiary proof submitted by defendant established that, following the timely denial of plaintiff-provider’s claim on the ground of lack of medical necessity, the governing insurance policy’s coverage limits had been exhausted through payment of no-fault benefits in satisfaction of arbitration awards rendered in favor of other health care providers, and that such payments were made in compliance with the priority of payment regulation (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.15; Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294 [2007]; New York and Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 28 AD3d 528 [2006]).

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant was not precluded by 11 NYCRR 65-3.15 from paying other providers’ legitimate claims subsequent to the denial of plaintiff’s claims. Adopting plaintiff’s position, which would require defendant to delay payment on uncontested claims, or, as here, on binding arbitration awards – pending resolution of plaintiff’s disputed claim – “runs counter to the no-fault regulatory scheme, which is designed to promote prompt payment of legitimate claims” (Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Accept. Corp., 8 NY3d at 300).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Appeal from an order of the City Court of Long Beach, Nassau County (Frank D. DiKranis, J.), entered March 20, 2013. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it

In support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, defendant submitted an affidavit of its counsel’s paralegal, who was responsible for creating EUO scheduling letters and who had personally mailed the letters. The affidavit established that the EUO notices had been sent to plaintiff’s assignor in accordance with the law office’s standard practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Richard Morgan Do, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 22 Misc 3d 134[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50242[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2009]; Chi Acupuncture, P.C. v Kemper Auto & Home Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 141[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50352[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant also proffered transcripts of the scheduled EUOs, which established that the assignor had failed to appear (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). In addition, defendant sufficiently established that the denial of claim form had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d at 1124). The opposing affirmation submitted by plaintiff’s counsel was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant’s motion.

An appearance at an EUO “is a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability on the policy” (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722). Contrary to the determination of the City [*2]Court, no provision of No-Fault Regulation 68 requires an insurer to set forth any objective standards for requesting an EUO (see Flow Chiropractic, P.C. v Travelers Home and Mar. Ins. Co., 44 Misc 3d 132[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51142[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Tolbert, J.P., Garguilo and Connolly, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Steven Z. Mostofsky, J.), entered January 7, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, the Civil Court denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action. On appeal, defendant argues that the first cause of action should have been dismissed as premature.

The affidavit of defendant’s claims examiner established that defendant had timely mailed its verification request and follow-up verification request (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant demonstrated that it had not received the verification requested, and plaintiff did not show that the verification had been provided to defendant prior to the commencement of the action. Thus, with respect to the first cause of action, the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay or deny the claim did not begin to run, and the Civil Court should have dismissed the first cause of action as premature (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]; D & R Med. Supply v American Tr. Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 144[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51727[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action is granted.

Weston, J.P., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ulysses Bernard Leverett, J.), entered June 13, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of outstanding verification. The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion, finding that the action was premature since plaintiff had not responded to defendant’s requests for additional verification.

CPLR 2219 (a) requires that an order deciding a motion recite the papers upon which the motion was decided (see Matter of Dondi, 63 NY2d 331, 339 [1984]). Although plaintiff’s appellate brief indicates that plaintiff may have served papers in opposition to defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, the order appealed from recites that the court did not consider any papers opposing defendant’s cross motion. As a result, this court’s review is limited to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

With respect to defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the affidavits of defendant’s no-fault examiner and mail room supervisor established that defendant had timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) its verification requests and follow-up verification requests. Defendant demonstrated that it had not received all of the verification requested, and plaintiff did not show that such verification had been provided to defendant prior to the commencement of the action. Thus, the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay or deny the claims did not begin to run (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]; D & R Med. Supply v American Tr. Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 144[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51727[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]), and plaintiff’s action is premature. In light of the foregoing, plaintiff’s [*2]contention that its motion for summary judgment should have been granted is rendered moot. Plaintiff’s remaining contention is not properly before this court, as this argument is, on this record, being raised for the first time on appeal, and we decline to consider it (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]; Gulf Ins. Co. v Kanen, 13 AD3d 579 [2004]). Consequently, the Civil Court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Larry L. Love, J.), entered May 29, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8), on the ground that the Civil Court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant. In several affidavits in support of the motion, two of defendant’s casualty managers as well as defendant’s claims casualty supervisor asserted that defendant is a Pennsylvania company, which is not licensed to do business in New York, maintains no offices in New York, has no bank accounts in New York, has no agents operating out of or representatives soliciting business in New York, does not “contact” [sic] or solicit business in New York, and does not own, use or possess any real property in New York. In opposition to the motion, plaintiff submitted only an affirmation in which plaintiff’s counsel conclusorily stated, among other things, that defendant was involved in the “transaction of business” (Insurance Law § 1213 [b] [1]; see also CCA 404 [a] [1]) in New York by “knowingly issuing policies to New York drivers” and by virtue of defendant’s alleged establishment of an ongoing attorney-client relationship with New York defense counsel, thereby subjecting defendant to jurisdiction in New York. By order entered May 29, 2013, the Civil Court granted defendant’s motion. On appeal, plaintiff’s sole contention is that the Civil Court should have denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and ordered jurisdictional discovery, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (d), because plaintiff could not properly oppose defendant’s motion without such discovery.

Plaintiff’s argument that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3211 [d]) is not properly before us, as this contention is raised by plaintiff for the first time on appeal (see Copp v Ramirez, 62 AD3d 23 [2009]). Even if the argument were before us, neither the unverified complaint nor the conclusory affirmation of plaintiff’s counsel in opposition to defendant’s motion constituted the “tangible evidence” (Mandel v Busch Entertainment Corp., 215 AD2d 455, 455 [1995]) necessary to substantiate plaintiff’s allegations that jurisdiction could exist, thereby demonstrating that plaintiff’s assertion of the existence of a jurisdictional predicate was not “frivolous” (Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463, 467 [*2][1974]). Thus, plaintiff did not make a “sufficient start” (id.) by showing that essential jurisdictional facts might exist to warrant discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction over defendant. Consequently, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint was properly granted.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.