Appeal from an order of the City Court of Long Beach, Nassau County (Frank D. DiKranis, J.), entered March 20, 2013. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it

In support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, defendant submitted an affidavit of its counsel’s paralegal, who was responsible for creating EUO scheduling letters and who had personally mailed the letters. The affidavit established that the EUO notices had been sent to plaintiff’s assignor in accordance with the law office’s standard practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Richard Morgan Do, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 22 Misc 3d 134[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50242[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2009]; Chi Acupuncture, P.C. v Kemper Auto & Home Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 141[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50352[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant also proffered transcripts of the scheduled EUOs, which established that the assignor had failed to appear (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). In addition, defendant sufficiently established that the denial of claim form had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d at 1124). The opposing affirmation submitted by plaintiff’s counsel was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant’s motion.

An appearance at an EUO “is a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability on the policy” (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722). Contrary to the determination of the City [*2]Court, no provision of No-Fault Regulation 68 requires an insurer to set forth any objective standards for requesting an EUO (see Flow Chiropractic, P.C. v Travelers Home and Mar. Ins. Co., 44 Misc 3d 132[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51142[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Tolbert, J.P., Garguilo and Connolly, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Steven Z. Mostofsky, J.), entered January 7, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, the Civil Court denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action. On appeal, defendant argues that the first cause of action should have been dismissed as premature.

The affidavit of defendant’s claims examiner established that defendant had timely mailed its verification request and follow-up verification request (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant demonstrated that it had not received the verification requested, and plaintiff did not show that the verification had been provided to defendant prior to the commencement of the action. Thus, with respect to the first cause of action, the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay or deny the claim did not begin to run, and the Civil Court should have dismissed the first cause of action as premature (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]; D & R Med. Supply v American Tr. Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 144[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51727[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action is granted.

Weston, J.P., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ulysses Bernard Leverett, J.), entered June 13, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of outstanding verification. The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion, finding that the action was premature since plaintiff had not responded to defendant’s requests for additional verification.

CPLR 2219 (a) requires that an order deciding a motion recite the papers upon which the motion was decided (see Matter of Dondi, 63 NY2d 331, 339 [1984]). Although plaintiff’s appellate brief indicates that plaintiff may have served papers in opposition to defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, the order appealed from recites that the court did not consider any papers opposing defendant’s cross motion. As a result, this court’s review is limited to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

With respect to defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the affidavits of defendant’s no-fault examiner and mail room supervisor established that defendant had timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) its verification requests and follow-up verification requests. Defendant demonstrated that it had not received all of the verification requested, and plaintiff did not show that such verification had been provided to defendant prior to the commencement of the action. Thus, the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay or deny the claims did not begin to run (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]; D & R Med. Supply v American Tr. Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 144[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51727[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]), and plaintiff’s action is premature. In light of the foregoing, plaintiff’s [*2]contention that its motion for summary judgment should have been granted is rendered moot. Plaintiff’s remaining contention is not properly before this court, as this argument is, on this record, being raised for the first time on appeal, and we decline to consider it (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]; Gulf Ins. Co. v Kanen, 13 AD3d 579 [2004]). Consequently, the Civil Court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Larry L. Love, J.), entered May 29, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8), on the ground that the Civil Court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant. In several affidavits in support of the motion, two of defendant’s casualty managers as well as defendant’s claims casualty supervisor asserted that defendant is a Pennsylvania company, which is not licensed to do business in New York, maintains no offices in New York, has no bank accounts in New York, has no agents operating out of or representatives soliciting business in New York, does not “contact” [sic] or solicit business in New York, and does not own, use or possess any real property in New York. In opposition to the motion, plaintiff submitted only an affirmation in which plaintiff’s counsel conclusorily stated, among other things, that defendant was involved in the “transaction of business” (Insurance Law § 1213 [b] [1]; see also CCA 404 [a] [1]) in New York by “knowingly issuing policies to New York drivers” and by virtue of defendant’s alleged establishment of an ongoing attorney-client relationship with New York defense counsel, thereby subjecting defendant to jurisdiction in New York. By order entered May 29, 2013, the Civil Court granted defendant’s motion. On appeal, plaintiff’s sole contention is that the Civil Court should have denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and ordered jurisdictional discovery, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (d), because plaintiff could not properly oppose defendant’s motion without such discovery.

Plaintiff’s argument that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3211 [d]) is not properly before us, as this contention is raised by plaintiff for the first time on appeal (see Copp v Ramirez, 62 AD3d 23 [2009]). Even if the argument were before us, neither the unverified complaint nor the conclusory affirmation of plaintiff’s counsel in opposition to defendant’s motion constituted the “tangible evidence” (Mandel v Busch Entertainment Corp., 215 AD2d 455, 455 [1995]) necessary to substantiate plaintiff’s allegations that jurisdiction could exist, thereby demonstrating that plaintiff’s assertion of the existence of a jurisdictional predicate was not “frivolous” (Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463, 467 [*2][1974]). Thus, plaintiff did not make a “sufficient start” (id.) by showing that essential jurisdictional facts might exist to warrant discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction over defendant. Consequently, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint was properly granted.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Wavny Toussaint, J.), entered March 9, 2012. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, as the affidavit submitted in support of its motion failed to establish that the claim at issue had not been timely denied or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; see also Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]). Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied. However, defendant’s cross motion should also have been denied, as defendant failed to establish, as a matter of law, its defense that plaintiff had failed to appear for properly scheduled examinations under oath (see e.g. Alrof, Inc. v Safeco Natl. Ins. Co., 39 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50458[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]; Bright Med. Supply Co. v IDS Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 40 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51123[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Margaret A. Chan, J.), entered December 17, 2012, which granted defendant’s motion to consolidate four related actions and to limit any potential recovery of attorneys’ fees in the consolidated action to $850.

Per Curiam.

Order (Margaret A. Chan, J.), entered December 17, 2012, insofar as appealable, affirmed, with $10 costs.

We sustain so much of the order under review as limited the amount of any recovery of attorneys’ fees to the sum of $850, the maximum allowable pursuant to Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-4.6(e). Since this provision provides that attorneys’ fees in a no-fault action are to be calculated based on the “aggregate of all bills for each insured” disputed in any action, up to a maximum of $850 (LMK Psychological Servs., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 12 NY3d 217 [2009]), the $850 limit was properly applied to the claims at issue in this consolidated action, all of which involve the same parties and assignor, and arise from the same accident.

Plaintiff’s appeal from that portion of the order granting consolidation must be dismissed, inasmuch as plaintiff expressly “agree[d] to consolidation.” No appeal lies from an order entered on consent of the appealing party (see CPLR 5511; Shteierman v Shteierman, 29 AD3d 810 [2006]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered April 17, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Because plaintiff failed to establish either that defendant had failed to pay or deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]), or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]), plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment. Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Wavny Toussaint, J.), entered August 23, 2012. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court found that defendant had timely and properly denied the claims at issue on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage, in that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant failed to prove that it had mailed its EUO scheduling letters and denial of claim forms or that plaintiff had failed to appear for the EUOs; that defendant lacked justification for its EUO requests; and that defendant’s motion should have been denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), as plaintiff had not received discovery regarding the reasonableness of defendant’s EUO requests.

Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, the affidavits submitted by defendant established that the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), and the affirmation submitted by defendant’s attorney, who was present in his office to conduct plaintiff’s EUO on the scheduled dates, was sufficient to establish that plaintiff had failed to appear. Furthermore, since plaintiff does not claim to have responded in any way to the EUO requests, its objections regarding the EUO requests will not now be heard (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 35 Misc 3d 127[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50579[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Crescent Radiology, PLLC v American Tr. Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 134[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50622[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2011]). Consequently, discovery relevant to the reasonableness of the EUO requests was not necessary for plaintiff to oppose defendant’s motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.