Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered October 26, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion to strike the complaint and dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3126.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion to strike the complaint and dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3126 is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, on June 22, 2012, the parties entered into a so-ordered stipulation pursuant to which

A conditional so-ordered stipulation becomes absolute upon a party’s failure to sufficiently and timely comply (see e.g. Panagiotou v Samaritan Vil., Inc., 66 AD3d 979 [2009]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Hertz Corp., 43 AD3d 907, 908 [2007]; Siltan v City of New York, 300 AD2d 298 [2002]; Blumenthal Chiropractic, P.C. v Praetorian Ins., 34 Misc 3d 135[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52386[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). To avoid the adverse impact of the conditional so-ordered stipulation, plaintiff was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its failure to timely comply with the stipulation and the existence of a meritorious cause of action (see e.g. Panagiotou, 66 AD3d at 980; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 43 AD3d at 908). We find that plaintiff failed to meet this burden. Plaintiff’s opposing affirmation made no attempt to demonstrate the existence of a meritorious cause of action and failed to present sufficient facts to establish a reasonable excuse for its failure to [*2]comply with the so-ordered stipulation. Accordingly, as the order of preclusion prevents plaintiff from establishing its prima facie case, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion to strike the complaint and dismiss the action is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Aliotta, JJ., concur.

Defendant, as limited by its briefs, appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Elizabeth A. Taylor), entered July 8, 2014, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Elizabeth A. Taylor), entered July 8, 2014, insofar as appealed from, modified by granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claim in the sum of $212.37; as modified, order affirmed, without costs.

We agree that the conflicting medical expert opinions adduced by the parties sufficed to raise a triable issue as to the medical necessity of the orthopedic surgery underlying plaintiff’s first-party no-fault claim in the sum of $3,408.11. However, defendant made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s no-fault claim in the sum of $212.37, by the affidavit of its claims adjuster demonstrating that plaintiff submitted the claim beyond the 45-day time limit for submission of claims (see 11 NYCRR 65-1.1[d]; Liriano v Eveready Ins. Co., 65 AD3d 524, 525 [2009]). Plaintiff’s opposing submissions failed to raise any triable issue. The affidavit of plaintiff’s office manager did not allege a personal mailing of the claim within the 45-day period or describe plaintiff’s regular office mailing practice and procedure (see Tower Ins. Co. of NY v Ray & Frank Liq. Store, 104 AD3d 482 [2013]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v. Countrywide Ins. Co., 45 AD3d 676, 677 [2007]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Larry Love, J.), entered July 31, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant did not provide insurance coverage for the vehicle in question on the date of the accident at issue. By order entered July 31, 2013, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.

In support of its cross motion and in opposition to plaintiff’s motion, defendant submitted an affidavit by its employee, who described the details of a record search which she had performed and stated that her search had revealed that there was no Allstate Insurance Company policy in effect on the date of the accident in question. We find that defendant’s affidavit was sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that plaintiff’s claim did not arise out of a covered incident (see Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]). As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the Civil Court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Aliotta, J.P., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Wavny Toussaint, J.), entered January 29, 2013. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor, the insured, had fraudulently procured the insurance policy. Defendant appeals from an order entered January 24, 2013 which denied the motion.

For the reasons stated in Jamaica Dedicated Med. Care, P.C. as Assignee of Lalbachan Sooklall v Praetorian Ins. Co. ( Misc 3d , 2014 NY Slip Op [Appeal No. 2013-1345 K C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Wavny Toussaint, J.), entered January 24, 2013. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor, the insured, had fraudulently procured the insurance policy. By order entered January 24, 2013, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion due to defendant’s failure to annex to its motion papers a copy of the original insurance policy.

The Civil Court properly denied defendant’s motion, since defendant did not submit sufficient evidence in support of its motion to establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. While the transcript of the insured’s testimony at an examination under oath (EUO) was admissible (see American States Ins. Co. v Huff, 119 AD3d 478 [2014]), the insured’s EUO testimony failed to eliminate all material issues of fact as to his actual residence at the time he procured the policy (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Furthermore, the investigative report submitted by defendant in support of its motion was based upon statements that constituted inadmissible hearsay (see Petrillo v Town of Hempstead, 85 AD3d 996 [2011]; Saunders v 551 Galaxy Realty Corp., 64 AD3d 564 [2009]). Consequently, as defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the insured had fraudulently procured the insurance policy, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly denied.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Devin P. Cohen, J.), entered March 23, 2012. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).

Defendant’s motion should have been denied, as defendant failed to establish, as a matter of law, its defense that plaintiff had failed to appear for properly scheduled EUOs (see e.g. Alrof, Inc. v Safeco Natl. Ins. Co., 39 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50458[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]; Bright Med. Supply Co. v IDS Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 40 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51123[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Raul Cruz, J.), entered February 9, 2012, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Raul Cruz, J.) entered February 9, 2012, reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff-provider’s claim for first-party no-fault benefits by establishing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for independent medical examinations (IMEs) to plaintiff’s assignor, and that the assignor failed to appear (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas, 111 AD3d 423 [2013]; American Tr. Ins. Co. v Solorzano, 108 AD3d 449 [2013]). The affidavit of defendant’s third-party IME scheduler, who had personal knowledge of his office’s standard mailing practices and procedures, sufficiently established the mailing of the IME notices (see Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v Donnelly, 22 NY3d 1169 [2014]). Defendant also submitted competent evidence of the assignor’s nonappearance in the form of the sworn affidavits of the scheduled examining chiropractor and acupuncturist, as well as the IME scheduler, setting forth sufficient facts to demonstrate the affiants’ personal knowledge of the assignor’s repeated failures to appear for the IMEs and the office practices and policies when an assignor fails to appear (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas, 111 AD3d at 424).

In opposition, plaintiff did not specifically deny the assignor’s nonappearance or otherwise raise a triable issue with respect thereto, or as to the mailing or reasonableness of the underlying notices (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Joseph E. Capella, J.), entered March 19, 2014, which denied, in part, its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Joseph E. Capella, J.), entered March 19, 2014, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, with $10 costs.

This action, seeking recovery of first-party no-fault benefits, is not ripe for summary dismissal, since defendant-insurer failed to establish the proper and timely mailing of the denial of claim forms at issue (see Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 564, 564—565 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 284 AD2d 374 [2001]). The affidavit submitted by defendant to establish proof of mailing, identifying the affiant as an employee of nonparty Tower Insurance Group (“Tower”), an entity remotely related to defendant, lacked probative value, since it failed to set forth the basis of affiant’s personal knowledge of the internal mailing practices and procedures of defendant during the pertinent period (see Gogos v Modell’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 87 AD3d 248, 253-254 [2011]), especially given that affiant began his employment with Tower after the denial at issue was allegedly mailed by defendant (see Nocella v Fort Dearborn Life Ins. Co. of NY, 99 AD3d 877, 879 [2012]). “It is the burden of the proponent of an affidavit to demonstrate the basis of the affiant’s knowledge . . . and here, defendant failed to meet that burden” (Gogos v Modell’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 87 AD3d at 254).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Decision Date: April 16, 2015

Defendant, as limited by its briefs, appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Donald A. Miles, J.), entered March 20, 2013, as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Donald A. Miles, J.), entered March 20, 2013, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with $10 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the action for first-party no-fault benefits. The evidentiary proof submitted by defendant established that, following the timely denial of plaintiff-provider’s claim on the ground of lack of medical necessity, the governing insurance policy’s coverage limits had been exhausted through payment of no-fault benefits in satisfaction of arbitration awards rendered in favor of other health care providers, and that such payments were made in compliance with the priority of payment regulation (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.15; Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294 [2007]; New York and Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 28 AD3d 528 [2006]).

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant was not precluded by 11 NYCRR 65-3.15 from paying other providers’ legitimate claims subsequent to the denial of plaintiff’s claims. Adopting plaintiff’s position, which would require defendant to delay payment on uncontested claims, or, as here, on binding arbitration awards – pending resolution of plaintiff’s disputed claim – “runs counter to the no-fault regulatory scheme, which is designed to promote prompt payment of legitimate claims” (Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Accept. Corp., 8 NY3d at 300).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.