Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered November 21, 2012. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Since a claim need not be paid or denied until all demanded verification with respect thereto is provided (see Westchester County Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 553, 554 [1999]), any action to recover payment is premature when the provider has failed to respond to a request for verification (see Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492, 493 [2005]). In support of its cross motion, defendant demonstrated it had timely mailed initial and follow-up requests for verification (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). However, upon the record before us, we find that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff responded to those verification requests and, therefore, neither party is entitled to summary judgment (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

Plaintiff’s remaining contention lacks merit.

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered November 21, 2012. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

As plaintiff correctly argues, neither the affidavit executed by defendant’s claim representative nor the affirmation executed by the attorney from the law firm defendant had retained to schedule and conduct the examinations under oath (EUOs) of plaintiff’s assignor, established actual mailing of the EUO scheduling letters or that they were mailed pursuant to a standard office practice or procedure. Consequently, defendant failed to establish that the EUO scheduling letters had been timely mailed to plaintiff’s assignor (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). As a result, defendant was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on the assignor’s alleged failure to appear at duly scheduled EUOs.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, its motion for summary judgment was properly denied, as plaintiff’s moving papers failed to demonstrate plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing either that defendant had failed to pay or deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]), or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered November 20, 2012. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant established that the chiropractic independent medical examination (IME) scheduling letters had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), and that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Since defendant demonstrated that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (id. at 722) and that defendant had timely denied (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16) the claims on that ground, defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In light of the foregoing, we need not pass upon plaintiff’s contention that defendant failed to establish that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled orthopedic IMEs or examinations under oath. Plaintiff’s remaining contentions either lack merit, or are not properly before this court as they are being raised for the first time on appeal, and we decline to consider them (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]; Gulf Ins. Co. v Kanen, 13 AD3d 579 [2004]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Dawn Jimenez Salta, J.), entered October 12, 2012. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff’s main argument on appeal with respect to defendant’s cross motion is that defendant failed to demonstrate that it had properly reduced the sum billed for CPT code 20553 from $4,000 to $645.90 pursuant to the workers’ compensation fee schedule. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the affidavit submitted by defendant was sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that Ground Rule 3 and Ground Rule 5 were appropriately applied to the services billed, and that defendant properly applied CPT code 20552 in order to determine the amount due, which it calculated to be $645.90. It is of no relevance to the determination of this appeal that defendant has described a potential alternate calculation which, had defendant used it, would have concluded that only $416.85 was due.

Although plaintiff further argues that defendant’s proffered defense was not set forth in its denial of claim form, a checked box on the form indicated that benefits were denied because the fees were not in accordance with the fee schedule, and the denial referenced an attached “Explanation of Review.”

In view of the foregoing, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly granted and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Ingrid Joseph, J.), entered August 3, 2011. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $5,483.27.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with $25 costs.

At a nonjury trial in this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the sole witness was plaintiff’s third-party biller. Although defendant’s counsel argued that plaintiff had failed to establish its prima facie case—since the witness was incapable of establishing a business record foundation, pursuant to CPLR 4518, for plaintiff’s claim forms, which had been admitted into evidence—the Civil Court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff.

Pursuant to the holding in Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co. (114 AD3d 33 [2013]), the testimony of plaintiff’s witness was sufficient to establish plaintiff’s prima facie case. As defendant failed to proffer a defense, the judgment is affirmed (see id.; Peace of Mind, Social Work, P.C. v Travelers Aetna Prop. Cas. Corp., 43 Misc 3d 127[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50475[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]).

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered September 6, 2012. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

In support of its motion, plaintiff submitted an affidavit executed by plaintiff’s owner which demonstrated, prima facie, that the claim forms at issue had been mailed to and received by defendant, and that defendant had failed to pay or deny the claim within the prescribed 30-day period (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country—Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33, 35 [2013]). Consequently, plaintiff established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based on the untimeliness of the denials. However, the affidavits submitted by defendant in opposition to plaintiff’s motion sufficiently described defendant’s standard mailing practices and procedures to establish the timely mailing of the denial of claim forms (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). As defendant raised a triable issue of fact (see NYU-Hospital for Joint Diseases v Esurance Ins. Co., 84 AD3d 1190 [2011]), plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Joseph E. Capella, J.), entered October 9, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much the complaint as sought to recover upon the portion of a claim that was billed under code 97810.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much the complaint as sought to recover upon the portion of a claim that was billed under code 97810 is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment on the single claim form that was the basis of the complaint, alleging that plaintiff had failed to respond to defendant’s verification requests. The single claim form involved two types of services, each of which was billed under a separate code. The Civil Court found that defendant had established its defense as to one code, but not as to code 97810. Defendant appeals from so much of the order as denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much the complaint as sought to recover upon the portion of the claim that was billed under code 97810.

Since a claim need not be paid or denied until all demanded verification with respect thereto is provided (see Westchester County Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 553, 554 [1999]), a timely verification request tolls an insurer’s time to pay or deny the entire claim. Thus, any action to recover payment on that claim is premature when the provider has failed to respond to a request for verification (see Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492, 493 [2005]). In support of its motion, defendant demonstrated that it had timely mailed initial and follow-up requests for verification (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) and that it had not received the requested verification.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much the complaint as sought to recover upon the portion of the claim that was billed under code 97810 is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.