Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Dawn Jimenez Salta, J.), entered January 16, 2013. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The affidavit by defendant’s claims adjuster was sufficient to establish that defendant did not receive the claims at issue. However, as the affidavit by plaintiff’s billing manager demonstrated that the claim forms had been mailed to defendant, there is an issue of fact as to whether defendant’s time to pay or deny these claims ever began to run (see Healing Health Prods., Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 Misc 3d 59 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]; cf. Bright Med. Supply Co. v Tri State Consumer Ins. Co., 40 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51122[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). Consequently, the Civil Court properly denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Larry Love, J.), entered March 6, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion, granted the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s second cause of action as premature because plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification, and granted the branches of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the remaining causes of action due to the failure of plaintiff’s assignor to appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs) and examinations under oath (EUOs).

In support of the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s second cause of action, defendant submitted an affidavit by its claims examiner which established that defendant had timely mailed its verification request and follow-up verification request (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant demonstrated prima facie that it had not received the requested verification and thus that plaintiff’s second cause of action is premature (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]). As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the Civil Court properly granted the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing this cause of action.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant established that the IME and EUO scheduling letters had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16), that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs and EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]), and that defendant had timely denied (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta [*2]Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16) the claims underlying the remaining causes of action on that ground. Since defendant demonstrated that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722) and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the remaining causes of action.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Dawn Jimenez Salta, J.), entered January 18, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The denial of claim forms at issue were untimely on their face. Plaintiff argues, among other things, that defendant failed to establish its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint because defendant failed to demonstrate that it tolled its time to pay or deny the claims at issue by sending timely examination under oath (EUO) scheduling letters to plaintiff. A review of the record reveals that the EUO scheduling letters annexed in support of defendant’s motion identified the dates of loss, claim numbers and the names of eligible injured persons to which these EUO scheduling letters were applicable. As the annexed EUO scheduling letters do not include the name of plaintiff’s assignor, his date of loss or the claim number applicable to claims concerning him, defendant failed to establish as a matter of law that it tolled its time to pay or deny the claims at issue. In light of the foregoing, we need not pass upon plaintiff’s remaining arguments.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ulysses Bernard Leverett, J.), entered February 20, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had timely and properly denied the claims based on plaintiff’s assignor’s failure to appear for examinations under oath (EUOs). The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.

Contrary to plaintiff’s sole contention on appeal with respect to the merits of defendant’s cross motion, defendant established that the EUO scheduling letters had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (James E. d’Auguste, J.), entered December 7, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. The Civil Court denied both the motion and the cross motion, but, in effect, limited the issues for trial pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), stating that “the only issue for trial shall be medical necessity.” As limited by its brief, defendant appeals from so much of the order as denied its motion for summary judgment.

In support of its motion, defendant submitted a sworn peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the reviewer’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the services at issue. In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff submitted two letters of medical necessity. However, as neither letter of medical necessity was sworn or even signed, they were of no probative value (see Rivers v Birnbaum, 102 AD3d 26, 45 [2012]). As a result, defendant’s prima facie showing that the services were not medically necessary was unrebutted by plaintiff. In view of the foregoing, and as plaintiff has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered October 22, 2012. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant had timely and properly denied the claims at issue based on plaintiff’s failure to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). The Civil Court denied defendant’s motion.

Because defendant failed to submit proof by someone with personal knowledge of the nonappearance of plaintiff for the EUOs in question, defendant’s motion was properly denied (see Alrof, Inc. v Safeco Natl. Ins. Co., 39 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50458[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]; Bright Med. Supply Co. v IDS Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 40 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51123[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered April 2, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon claims for dates of service May 21, 2008 through July 31, 2008.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it sought to recover upon claims for dates of service May 21, 2008 through July 31, 2008.

On appeal, plaintiff’s sole arguments are that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of lack of medical necessity, and, in any event, that the affidavit of the acupuncturist which plaintiff submitted was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Both arguments lack merit.

The affirmed independent medical examination (IME) report from the doctor who had performed an IME, as well as the IME reports and accompanying affidavits executed by the chiropractor and acupuncturist who had also performed IMEs, set forth a factual basis and a medical rationale for the IME providers’ determinations that there was no medical necessity for the acupuncture services at issue. In opposition, plaintiff submitted an affidavit by an acupuncturist which, as the Civil Court found, failed to meaningfully refer to or rebut the conclusions of the IME doctors (see Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Therefore, defendant’s cross motion was properly granted (see A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Alice Fisher Rubin, J.), entered September 23, 2010, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered April 9, 2012 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the September 23, 2010 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $3,877.85.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. By order entered September 23, 2010, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion and denied defendant’s cross motion. Defendant’s appeal from the order is deemed to be from the judgment entered pursuant thereto on April 9, 2012 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). On appeal, defendant argues that plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment and that the cross motion should have been granted.

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in support of its motion was sufficient to establish plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]). Moreover, defendant admits that it received plaintiff’s claims in September and October of 2007, and it is undisputed that the claims were not paid or denied within 30 days of their receipt. Defendant has not established that its time to pay or deny the claims had been tolled. As defendant failed to demonstrate that the claims had been timely denied, it failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly granted and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment was properly denied (see ARCO Med. NY, P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 135[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52384[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

The decision and order of this court dated November 26, 2013 (41 Misc 3d 139[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51996[U]) are hereby recalled and vacated (see motion decided simultaneously herewith).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), entered April 27, 2012. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by providers to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its motion, defendant submitted an affidavit by an employee of the company which had been retained by defendant to schedule independent medical examinations (IMEs), which affidavit established that the IME scheduling letters had been timely mailed in accordance with that office’s standard mailing practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant also submitted an affidavit by the healthcare professional who was to perform the IMEs, which affidavit established that plaintiffs’ assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). In addition, an affidavit by defendant’s claims representative, as well as an affidavit of service with respect to each denial of claim form, demonstrated that the denial of claim forms, which denied the claims based on plaintiffs’ assignor’s nonappearance at the IMEs, had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Since appearance at a duly scheduled IME is a condition precedent to an insurer’s liability on a policy (see 11 NYCRR 65-1.1; Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d 720), the Civil Court should have granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.