Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ulysses Bernard Leverett, J.), entered February 19, 2013. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, alleging that the claim at issue had been timely and properly denied based upon plaintiff’s assignor’s failure to appear at duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, the Civil Court denied defendant’s cross motion, finding that there was an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled EUOs.

The affirmation submitted by defendant’s attorney in support of defendant’s cross motion sufficiently described the standard practices and procedures of his office for mailing EUO scheduling letters (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Furthermore, defendant established, based upon the personal knowledge of the attorney who was responsible for conducting the EUOs at issue, that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for either of the duly scheduled EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]; Olmeur Med., P.C. v Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., 41 Misc 3d 143[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 52031[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). Contrary to the determination of the Civil Court, defendant’s annexation of EUO transcripts demonstrating that a different assignor had also failed to appear for that assignor’s EUOs did not demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact in the instant action. Since defendant demonstrated that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722) and that defendant had timely denied (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123) the claim on that ground, defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), entered February 14, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon its third cause of action is granted and the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the third cause of action is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees with respect to this cause of action; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant established that the independent medical examination (IME) and examination under oath (EUO) scheduling letters had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs and EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]), and that defendant had timely denied (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123) the claims underlying the first, second, and fourth through eighth causes of action on these grounds. Since defendant demonstrated that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722) and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant’s cross motion, defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing these causes of action.

However, with respect to the third cause of action, the record establishes that the claim at issue was not denied within 30 days of its receipt (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]) and defendant did not demonstrate that the 30-day claim determination period (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8) had been tolled. As a result, since defendant is precluded from asserting, with respect to this claim, its defense that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs and EUOs (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2009]), plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment upon its third cause of action.

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon its third cause of action is granted and the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the third cause of action is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees with respect to this cause of action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and the [*2]regulations promulgated thereunder.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered April 30, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $25 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, alleging that the claim at issue had been timely and properly denied on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear at duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Plaintiff opposed the motion. By order entered April 30, 2013, the Civil Court granted defendant’s motion.

Pursuant to the No-Fault Regulations, “any additional verification required by the insurer to establish proof of claim shall be requested within 15 business days of receipt of the [NF-3]” (11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [b] [emphasis added]). This rule applies to requests for EUOs (see e.g. Longevity Medical Supply, Inc. v IDS Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 44 Misc 3d 137[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51244[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014])” (O & M Med., P.C. v Travelers Indem. Co., 47 Misc 3d 134[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50476[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). As defendant’s moving papers reflect that defendant’s first EUO scheduling letter was mailed about 50 days after defendant had received the claim at issue in this action, defendant failed to demonstrate that it had properly denied the claim based upon plaintiff’s failure to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (see O & M Med., P.C., 47 Misc 3d 134[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50476[U]; St. Vincent Med. Care, P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 144[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50446[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered March 26, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contentions, the independent medical examination (IME) and examination under oath (EUO) scheduling letters were not mere delay letters. Moreover, defendant properly established that the scheduling letters had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs and EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]), and that defendant had timely denied (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123) the claims at issue. Since defendant demonstrated that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722) and plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact, defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered April 4, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The affidavit of defendant’s no-fault litigation supervisor submitted in support of defendant’s cross motion established that defendant had timely mailed its denial of claim forms in accordance with its standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), which forms denied the claims on the ground that the assignor had not submitted proper notice of the accident to defendant within 30 days of the accident. Defendant’s cross-moving papers further demonstrated that defendant had first learned of the accident more than 30 days after it had occurred. As defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifted to plaintiff. Despite being informed by the denial of claim forms that it had the opportunity to “submit[] written proof providing clear and reasonable justification for the failure” to timely advise defendant of the accident (11 NYCRR 65-1.1; 65-2.4), plaintiff did not present any evidence that it had availed itself of the opportunity or that it had given timely notice.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Alexander M. Tisch, J.), dated January 7, 2015, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Alexander M. Tisch, J.), dated January 7, 2015, affirmed, with $10 costs.

The affidavits and other documentary evidence submitted by defendant in support of its motion for summary judgment established, prima facie, that it timely denied (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]) plaintiff’s claim for assigned first-party no-fault benefits on the ground that the fees plaintiff charged for the acupuncture services rendered to its assignor exceeded the amount permitted by the worker’s compensation fee schedule (see Akita Med. Acupuncture, P.C. v Clarendon Ins. Co., 41 Misc 3d 134[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51860[U][App Term, 1st Dept [2013]; Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d Dept 2009]). The mistake contained in the notary’s jurat (as to the year) was properly disregarded, since no substantial right of a party was affected (see CPLR 2001).

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue as to the efficacy of defendant’s mailing of the denial or the calculation of the fee. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim – which sought the difference between the amount charged for the services and payments made to plaintiff pursuant to the fee schedule – was properly granted.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Julia I. Rodriguez, J.), dated March 20, 2009, which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Julia I. Rodriguez, J.), dated March 20, 2009, affirmed, with $10 costs.

In opposition to plaintiff’s prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on its complaint to recover first-party no-fault benefits (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]), defendant failed to raise a triable issue. While defendant contended that the claim was premature because plaintiff failed to respond to its verification requests, the affidavit of defendant’s no-fault claims supervisor, who had no personal knowledge that the verification letters were actually mailed, and described in only the most general terms her office’s mailing practices and procedures, was insufficient to raise an issue of fact (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Countrywide Co., 45 AD3d 676, 677 [2007]). Accordingly, Civil Court properly granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. In view of our determination, we reach no other issues.