Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered April 30, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that it had properly used the workers’ compensation fee schedule applicable to chiropractors who render the same services as acupuncturists to reimburse plaintiff for the acupuncture services plaintiff had rendered. The Civil Court granted defendant’s motion.

Plaintiff argues on appeal, as it did in the Civil Court, that defendant failed to establish that its fee schedule reductions were proper. We disagree and find that defendant demonstrated that it had fully paid plaintiff for the services at issue in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors (see Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered November 1, 2013. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court granting plaintiff’s motion and denying defendant’s cross motion.

Defendant established that it had timely and properly mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]) its EUO scheduling letters and its denial of claim forms, which denied the claims on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear at duly scheduled EUOs. Although the Civil Court found that defendant had established plaintiff’s nonappearances, the court held, as plaintiff argues, that defendant’s EUO scheduling letters were defective. However, under the circumstances presented, as plaintiff does not claim to have responded in any way to defendant’s EUO requests, plaintiff’s objections regarding the EUO scheduling letters will not be heard (see Eagle Surgical Supply, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co., 46 Misc 3d 128[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51798[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 35 Misc 3d 127[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50579[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]). In light of the foregoing, defendant’s cross motion should have been granted. We pass on no other issue.

Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Weston, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Dawn Jimenez Salta, J.), entered August 1, 2012. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs).

Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the affidavit of defendant’s employee was sufficient to establish the mailing of the EUO scheduling letters (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]).

Plaintiff also argues that the affirmation by the managing partner of defendant’s law firm, which had been retained to conduct the EUOs, did not establish that the assignor had failed to appear for the EUOs. This argument lacks merit, as that affirmation was not the proof submitted by defendant to establish the assignor’s failure to appear.

As plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any basis to disturb the Civil Court’s order, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered May 10, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant did not provide insurance coverage for the vehicle in question on the date of the accident at issue. By order entered May 10, 2013, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.

In support of its cross motion and in opposition to plaintiff’s motion, defendant submitted an affidavit by its employee, who described the details of a record search which she had performed and stated that her search had revealed that there was no Allstate Insurance Company policy covering the vehicle in question on the date of the accident. We find that defendant’s affidavit was sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that plaintiff’s claim did not arise out of a covered incident (see Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]). As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant’s cross motion, the Civil Court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered May 13, 2013. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon the third and fourth causes of action are denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. By order entered May 13, 2013, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion.

Defendant’s contention—that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment because plaintiff did not establish that the supplies furnished by plaintiff had actually been delivered to plaintiff’s assignor and by whom they had been delivered—lacks merit, as it is not part of plaintiff’s prima facie case to establish these facts (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]; Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d 556 [2008]). Since defendant has raised no other issue in the Civil Court or on appeal with respect to plaintiff’s establishment of its prima facie case, we do not pass on the propriety of the determination of the Civil Court with respect thereto.

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s motion should have been denied because defendant raised a triable issue of fact by demonstrating that it had timely denied plaintiff’s claims on the grounds of lack of medical necessity and that the fees sought exceeded the amount permitted by the workers’ compensation fee schedule. We find that defendant’s opposition papers were sufficient to establish that the denial of claim forms pertaining to the claims underlying the third and fourth causes of action had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Consequently, the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon the third and fourth causes of action should have been denied, as defendant in its opposition papers raised triable issues of fact with respect to these causes of action. However, as defendant failed to establish that it had timely mailed the denial of claim forms pertaining to the claims underlying the first and second causes of action, there is no basis to disturb so much of the order as granted the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon these causes of action.

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branches of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon the third and fourth causes of action are denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered April 19, 2013. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had timely and properly denied the claim at issue based upon plaintiff’s assignor’s failure to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs). The Civil Court denied defendant’s motion.

Defendant’s motion papers failed to establish that the letters scheduling the IMEs of plaintiff’s assignor had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Consequently, defendant failed to demonstrate that the IMEs had been properly scheduled and, thus, that defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on plaintiff’s assignor’s failure to appear at duly scheduled IMEs.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered May 2, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, alleging that the claims at issue had been timely and properly denied on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear at duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Plaintiff opposed the motion. By order entered May 2, 2013, the Civil Court granted defendant’s motion.

In support of its motion, defendant failed to establish that the initial and follow-up EUO scheduling letters had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). As a result, defendant failed to demonstrate that the EUOs had been properly scheduled and, thus, that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear at duly scheduled EUOs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 722 [2006]). Consequently, defendant is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), entered May 1, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that it had properly used the workers’ compensation fee schedule applicable to chiropractors who render the same services as acupuncturists to reimburse plaintiff for the acupuncture services plaintiff had rendered. The Civil Court granted defendant’s motion.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, raised in the Civil Court and on appeal, defendant established that the denial of claim form at issue had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Defendant further demonstrated that it had fully paid plaintiff for the services at issue in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors (see Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Consequently, defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.