Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered July 23, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for services billed using CPT code 97026.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for services billed using CPT code 97026 is denied.

In this action by provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the portion of the complaint as sought to recover for services billed using CPT code 97026.

Upon a review of the record, we find that defendant’s moving papers failed to demonstrate defendant’s prima facie entitlement to summary judgment with respect to so much of the complaint as sought to recover for services billed using CPT code 97026 (Rogy Med., P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co., 23 Misc 3d 132[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50732[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; see generally Sunrise Acupuncture PC v Tri-State Consumer Ins. Co., 42 Misc 3d 151[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50435[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2014]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover for services billed using CPT code 97026 is denied.

Elliot, J.P., Weston and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Lisa S. Ottley, J.), entered July 29, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to strike defendant’s answer and affirmative defenses, and to compel defendant to respond to discovery demands.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to strike defendant’s answer and affirmative defenses, and to compel defendant to respond to discovery demands. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court granting defendant’s motion and denying plaintiff’s cross motion.

For the reasons stated in Professional Health Imaging, P.C., as Assignee of Jennifer Donofrio v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (____ Misc 3d _____, 2016 NY Slip Op ______ [appeal No. 2014-1991 K C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.

Elliot, J.P., Weston and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Devin P. Cohen, J.), entered August 8, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to strike defendant’s answer and affirmative defenses, and to compel defendant to respond to discovery demands.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to strike defendant’s answer and affirmative defenses, and to compel defendant to respond to discovery demands. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court granting defendant’s motion and denying plaintiff’s cross motion.

For the reasons stated in Professional Health Imaging, P.C., as Assignee of Jennifer Donofrio v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (____ Misc 3d _____, 2016 NY Slip Op ______ [appeal No. 2014-1991 K C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.

Elliot, J.P., Weston and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carol Ruth Feinman, J.), entered July 8, 2014. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to strike defendant’s answer and affirmative defenses, and to compel defendant to respond to discovery demands.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to strike defendant’s answer and affirmative defenses, and to compel defendant to respond to discovery demands. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court granting defendant’s motion and denying plaintiff’s cross motion.

For the reasons stated in Professional Health Imaging, P.C., as Assignee of Jennifer Donofrio v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (____ Misc 3d _____, 2016 NY Slip Op ______ [appeal No. 2014-1991 K C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.

Elliot, J.P., Weston and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), entered August 12, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff’s contention that its motion for summary judgment should have been granted lacks merit. Plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law since it did not establish either that defendant had failed to deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]), or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th and 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

We decline defendant’s request that we search the record and grant defendant summary judgment dismissing portions of each of plaintiff’s claims.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Elliot, J.P., Weston and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Maureen A. Healy, J.), entered July 9, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant had never received the claim at issue.

Although the affidavit of defendant’s claims examiner established prima facie that defendant had not received the claim at issue, in opposition to the motion, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from plaintiff’s owner, which affidavit was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the claim form had been timely mailed to, and received by, defendant (see Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]). In light of the foregoing, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the claim at issue was timely submitted to defendant.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Jose A. Padilla, Jr., J.), entered February 11, 2015, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

Per Curiam.

Order (Jose A. Padilla, Jr., J.), entered February 11, 2015, affirmed, with $10 costs.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the action for first-party no-fault benefits by establishing that it timely denied certain no-fault claims on the ground that the fees plaintiff charged for the acupuncture services it rendered to the assignor exceeded the amount permitted by the worker’s compensation fee schedule (see Akita Med. Acupuncture, P.C. v Clarendon Ins. Co., 41 Misc 3d 134[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51860[U][App Term, 1st Dept 2013]; Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), and that the remaining claims were paid by defendant pursuant to a settlement agreement.

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue as to the efficacy of defendant’s mailing of the denials (see Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 122 [1999]), or the calculation of the fee. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims – which sought the difference between the amount charged for the acupuncture services and payments made to plaintiff pursuant to the fee schedule or settlement agreement, was properly granted.

Plaintiff’s remaining contentions are either without merit or, where plaintiff failed to articulate any specific arguments in its appellate brief, abandoned on appeal (see Mendoza v Akerman Senterfitt LLP, 128 AD3d 480, 483 [2015]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Defendants appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Elizabeth A. Taylor, J.), entered July 8, 2014, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Order (Elizabeth A. Taylor, J.), entered July 8, 2014, reversed, with $10 costs, and defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the action for first-party no-fault benefits by establishing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for examinations under oath (EUOs) to plaintiff’s assignor (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Marte-Rosario, 111 AD3d 442 [2013]), and that the assignor failed to appear at two scheduled EUOs (see Allstate Ins. Co. v Pierre, 123 AD3d 618 [2014]; Hertz Corp. v Active Care Med. Supply Corp., 124 AD3d 411 [2015]). Contrary to plaintiff’s specific contention, defendant established that it requested the EUOs within the applicable time frames set forth in the no-fault regulations, by submitting its EUO letters dated February 4, 2011 and March 1, 2011 (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5[b], 65-3.6[b]; cf. National Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v Tam Med. Supply Corp., 131 AD3d 851 [2015]). Moreover, the attorney who was assigned by defendant to take an EUO of plaintiff’s assignor with respect to the subject claim, and “who would have conducted the EUO if the [assignor] had appeared certainly was in a position to state that the [assignor] . . . did not . . . appear in his office on the date[s] indicated” (Hertz Corp., 124 AD3d at 411).

In opposition to defendant’s prima facie showing, plaintiff did not specifically deny the [*2]assignor’s nonappearance at the scheduled EUOs, or otherwise raise a triable issue with respect thereto, or as to the mailing or reasonableness of the underlying notices (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.