Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered September 12, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court found that defendant had timely and properly denied the claims at issue on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage, in that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant failed to prove that it had mailed its EUO scheduling letters and denial of claim forms, or that plaintiff had failed to appear for the EUOs; that defendant lacked justification for its EUO requests; that defendant’s motion should have been denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), as plaintiff had not received discovery regarding the reasonableness of defendant’s EUO requests; and that defendant failed to prove that plaintiff had willfully obstructed defendant’s investigation.

For the reasons stated in Vladenn Med. Supply Corp., as Assignee of Sonie Jeanty v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (___ Misc 3d ___, 2016 NY Slip Op ____ [appeal No. 2013-2364 Q C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered July 1, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that defendant had timely and properly denied the claims at issue based on plaintiff’s failure to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff argued, among other things, that defendant had not established plaintiff’s failure to appear for the EUOs. By order entered July 1, 2013, the Civil Court granted defendant’s motion.

Because defendant failed to submit proof by someone with personal knowledge of the nonappearance of plaintiff for the EUOs in question, defendant’s motion should have been denied (see Bright Med. Supply Co. v IDS Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 40 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51123[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]; Alrof, Inc. v Safeco Natl. Ins. Co., 39 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50458[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). In light of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), entered July 29, 2013. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, alleging that the claim at issue had been timely and properly denied based upon plaintiff’s failure to appear at duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). The Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion and denied defendant’s cross motion, finding that defendant had failed to sufficiently establish plaintiff’s failure to appear for EUOs.

Since defendant raises no issue on appeal with regard to plaintiff’s establishment of its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, we do not pass upon the propriety of the Civil Court’s implicit determination with respect thereto (see Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]).

Defendant’s contention that its cross motion for summary judgment should have been granted due to plaintiff’s failure to appear for duly scheduled EUOs lacks merit, as the Civil Court correctly found that defendant had failed to submit proof by someone with personal knowledge of the nonappearance of plaintiff for the EUOs in question (see Bright Med. Supply Co. v IDS Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 40 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51123[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]; Alrof, Inc. v Safeco Natl. Ins. Co., 39 Misc 3d 130[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50458[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). Since defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether it had timely denied plaintiff’s claims (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2009]), defendant’s contention that its papers were sufficient, at least, to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff had failed to appear for the scheduled EUOs is irrelevant.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Maureen A. Healy, J.), entered April 25, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had timely and properly denied the claims based on plaintiff’s assignor’s failure to appear for independent medical examinations. The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention on appeal, the affidavit submitted by defendant in support of its motion established the timely and proper mailing of the denial of claim form (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). As plaintiff’s remaining contentions are improperly raised for the first time on appeal and are speculative, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered June 28, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that it had fully paid plaintiff in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule. The Civil Court granted defendant’s motion.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered June 28, 2013. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that it had fully paid plaintiff in accordance with the workers’ compensation fee schedule. The Civil Court granted defendant’s motion.

Plaintiff’s argument—that defendant is precluded from raising its defense that the fees charged exceeded the amount allowed by the workers’ compensation fee schedule because defendant’s denial of claim form did not set forth this defense with sufficient particularity—lacks merit (see A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 39 AD3d 779 [2007]). To the extent plaintiff seeks to challenge defendant’s calculation of the amount plaintiff was entitled to recover pursuant to the workers’ compensation fee schedule, this argument is not properly before this court as it is being raised for the first time on appeal, and we decline to consider it (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]; Gulf Ins. Co. v Kanen, 13 AD3d 579 [2004]). Consequently, plaintiff has demonstrated no basis to disturb the order.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Jodi Orlow, J.), entered June 21, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs). The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant failed to establish that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled IMEs and that, as a result, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been denied. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the affidavits submitted by defendant were sufficient to establish that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs. An assignor’s appearance at an IME “is a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability on the policy” (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 722 [2006]).

We note that plaintiff’s remaining contention is not properly before this court, as this argument is being raised for the first time on appeal, and we decline to consider it (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]; Gulf Ins. Co. v Kanen, 13 AD3d 579 [2004]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.