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Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Niagara County (Amy J. Fricano, J.), entered May 7, 2003. The order granted the application of petitioner for a permanent stay of arbitration.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously reversed on the law with costs and the application is denied.

Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, seeking a permanent stay of arbitration of respondents’ claim for supplementary uninsured motorist (SUM) benefits based on the failure of respondents to provide the requisite written notice of their claim “[a]s soon as practicable,” in accordance with the automobile policy issued by petitioner to respondents. We previously reversed an order of Supreme Court (Joslin, J.) referring petitioner’s application for a stay of arbitration to an arbitrator, and we remitted the matter to Supreme Court for a hearing to determine whether respondents provided timely notice (Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. [Guarino], 283 AD2d 982 [2001]). Respondents appeal from an order of Supreme Court (Fricano, J.) that, following the hearing, granted petitioner’s application for a permanent stay of arbitration based on respondents’ failure to provide timely notice. We reverse.

Respondent Sue Guarino (claimant) was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle accident on March 8, 1997. Although claimant immediately consulted with various medical providers for treatment of her back and neck injuries, all indications at the time were that claimant had not sustained a serious injury as defined by Insurance Law § 5102 (d). A report of an MRI performed in October 1997 recited that claimant had a “minimal right C5-6 disc bulge causing no apparent compromise” to the nerve and that claimant’s cervical spine was “otherwise normal.” Moreover, according to the report of a neurologist who performed an independent medical evaluation (IME) of claimant on March 17, 1998 on behalf of petitioner, claimant did not sustain a herniated disc in her neck or a cervical radiculopathy as a result of the accident. Instead, the IME physician concluded that claimant had sustained only cervical and lumbar strains, which are “soft tissue injuries [that] would be expected to heal in a matter of weeks to months,” and in any event the IME physician could not “clearly relate her ongoing discomforts to the motor vehicle [*2]accident.” On the basis of that IME report, petitioner in March 1998 denied claimant’s application for no-fault benefits. We note that it is both inconsistent and inequitable, in light of that denial of no-fault benefits, for petitioner now to contend that claimant was then on notice that she had a viable claim for SUM benefits.

The record establishes that it was not until mid-July 1998, at the earliest, that claimant was on notice that she had sustained a serious injury as a result of the accident. At that time, claimant received the report of her orthopedic surgeon, who indicated that the October 1997 MRI might have been misread and might in fact show a disc herniation at C5-6. Claimant was referred for another MRI that, according to a second report of the surgeon issued one month later, showed “a right-sided paracentral herniation at C5-6 with extrusion” as well as a “bulging of the annulus fibrosis at L5-S1 . . . [that] may be due to an annular tear.” Within six weeks of the issuance of that second report, respondents gave petitioner written notice of the SUM claim.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the court erred in determining that respondents did not give timely notice of the claim and in granting petitioner’s application to stay arbitration on that ground. We conclude that claimant acted with due diligence in ascertaining the medical facts underlying her SUM claim, and that respondents established that the overall 19-month delay in notifying petitioner of the SUM claim was reasonable (see Medina v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 303 AD2d 987, 988-989 [2003]; Matter of Nationwide Ins. Co. [Bellreng], 288 AD2d 925 [2001]; Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. [Earl], 284 AD2d 1002, 1004 [2001]; Matter of Nationwide Ins. Enter. [Leavy], 268 AD2d 661, 662-663 [2000]; see also Matter of Travelers Ins. Co. [DeLosh], 249 AD2d 924, 925-926 [1998]). Present—Green, J.P., Kehoe, Martoche and Hayes, JJ.

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In an action to recover no-fault medical payments, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Cozzens, J.), dated October 1, 2003, which denied their motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs submitted evidentiary proof that the defendant insurance company had not responded to their February 19, 2003, and January 15, 2003, claims for no-fault medical benefits within 30 days as required by Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and 11 NYCRR 65.15 (g) (3). In opposition to the motion, the defendant submitted documentary evidence and an affidavit of an employee asserting that the same claims had originally been billed over one year earlier and that timely denial of claim forms had been mailed to the plaintiffs at that time.

The evidence submitted by the plaintiffs satisfied their burden of establishing a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). However, the defendant submitted admissible evidence in opposition to the motion, which raised triable issues of fact as to the dates on which the plaintiffs mailed the no-fault claims to the defendant (see New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 583, 585 [2002]) and whether the defendant properly denied those claims (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 284 AD2d 374, 375 [2001]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly denied the motion for summary judgment. Florio, J.P., S. Miller, Rivera and Lifson, JJ., concur.

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Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John F. O’Donnell, J.), entered April 1, 2003. The order denied the petition for an order permanently staying arbitration.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is reversed on the law without costs and the petition is granted.

Memorandum: Respondent submitted claims for no-fault insurance benefits for injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident in September 1995. Petitioner denied respondent’s claim for lost wages on May 6, 1996 and denied the balance of respondent’s claim on September 3, 1996. Respondent served a demand for arbitration dated August 29, 2002 via Federal Express overnight mail with signature required. Petitioner thereupon commenced this proceeding seeking a permanent stay of arbitration.

We conclude that Supreme Court erred in denying the petition. We agree with petitioner that service of the demand for arbitration by Federal Express mail is jurisdictionally defective because Federal Express mail is not one of the permitted methods of service set forth in CPLR 7503 (c) (see Matter of Spychalski [Continental Ins. Cos.], 58 AD2d 193, 196 [1977], affd 45 NY2d 847 [1978]; Matter of Yak Taxi v Teke, 41 NY2d 1020 [1977]; Matter of Nationwide Ins. Enter. [Denga], 302 AD2d 929 [2003]; Matter of Cartier v County of Nassau, 281 AD2d 477 [2001]; Matter of Metropolitan Cas. & Prop. Ins. Co. v Suggs, 268 AD2d 240 [2000]; cf. CPLR 3216; Balancio v American Optical Corp., 66 NY2d 750, 751 [1985]). We therefore reverse the order and grant the petition.

All concur except Green and Scudder, JJ., who dissent and vote to modify in accordance with the following memorandum.

Green and Scudder, JJ. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent. We disagree with the majority that the demand for arbitration by Federal Express mail is jurisdictionally defective because it is not one of the permitted methods of service set forth in CPLR 7503 (c), i.e., “in the same manner as a summons or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.” In our view, the procedure used herein is analogous to personal service by mail as provided for in CPLR 312-a. Furthermore, such service is the functional equivalent of registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, inasmuch as both methods provide for accountability and reliability with [*2]respect to the mailing and receipt of the demand for arbitration (see generally Secreto v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 194 Misc 2d 512, 513-514 [2003]). We therefore conclude that the demand for arbitration was properly served (see Matter of Andy Floors [Tyler Constr. Corp.], 202 AD2d 938, 939 [1994]).

Having concluded that the service is not jurisdictionally defective, we further conclude that respondent’s demand for arbitration is not time-barred with respect to the denial of respondent’s claim in September 1996. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the demand was properly served within the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]; 7502 [b]; see generally Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 55 NY2d 184, 193 [1982], rearg denied 56 NY2d 567 [1982], cert denied 459 US 837 [1982]). The remaining issue therefore is whether respondent’s demand for arbitration is time-barred with respect to the denial of respondent’s claim in May 1996. Respondent contends with respect thereto that, by filing the instant demand, he “re-filed” a demand for arbitration that was originally filed with the New York State Insurance Department and served on petitioner on October 1, 1997. He contends that his original demand was treated by the American Arbitration Association as “withdrawn without prejudice” because of settlement. Also pending at that time was a demand for arbitration made by a medical provider to which respondent had assigned his rights. Although the record establishes that arbitration hearings were scheduled and then adjourned by the American Arbitration Association, the record does not establish whether the hearings were to be conducted with respect to respondent’s claim, the medical provider’s claim, or both.

In denying the petition, Supreme Court determined that respondent filed a demand for arbitration in 1997 and that, because petitioner participated in a prior arbitration proceeding, it is barred from now seeking a stay of arbitration (see CPLR 7503 [b]). The court’s determination that respondent filed a demand for arbitration in 1997 is unsupported by the record, which contains only a copy of a cover letter from respondent’s attorney to the New York State Insurance Department and does not contain the demand for arbitration or the other enclosures discussed in the cover letter. Petitioner contends that it received only the cover letter. Petitioner further contends that it was never served with respondent’s demand for arbitration and thus that it participated only in arbitration proceedings with respect to the medical provider.

As respondent correctly concedes, arbitration with respect to the denial of his claim in May 1996 is time-barred if it is determined that there was no prior arbitration proceeding between these parties. If, however, it is determined that there was a prior arbitration proceeding between these parties, then petitioner’s “participation in the arbitration [proceeding] constituted a waiver of any right on [petitioner’s] part to . . . obtain a stay of arbitration on statute of limitations grounds” (Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Erie County White Collar Unit Local #815 [County of Erie], 303 AD2d 1050, 1051; see CPLR 7503 [b]). We cannot determine from this record, however, whether there was any such prior arbitration proceeding and therefore conclude that the issue whether that claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a threshold question requiring a trial forthwith (see CPLR 7503 [a]). Thus, we would modify the order accordingly, and we would grant a trial with respect to that issue. Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Green, Wisner, Scudder and Gorski, JJ.

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Mugglin, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Kavanagh, J.), entered April 21, 2003 in Ulster County, which granted petitioner’s application pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5) for judicial approval, nunc pro tunc, of a personal injury settlement.

After sustaining injuries in a May 1990 work-related automobile accident, petitioner applied for and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits. In November 1992, respondent, who had commenced payment of workers’ compensation benefits shortly after petitioner’s accident, notified petitioner that it was reserving its claim to a continuing lien on any recovery for injuries or damages arising out of the May 1990 accident not constituting payments in lieu of first party no-fault benefits (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 [1-a]; Insurance Law § 5104 [a]). Respondent further informed petitioner of its obligation to obtain respondent’s written consent for any settlement or compromise of a lawsuit brought in connection with the automobile accident (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 [5]). Petitioner had, in fact, commenced a third-party action and ultimately settled the matter for $60,000 pursuant to the terms of a July 1993 agreement. It is undisputed that no attempt was made by petitioner to obtain respondent’s consent prior to executing that agreement. Citing petitioner’s failure in that regard, respondent suspended the payment of benefits in January 1994 and, thereafter, refused petitioner’s July 1994 [*2]request for retroactive consent of the settlement agreement. After affording petitioner the opportunity to provide evidence that consent was obtained, the Workers’ Compensation Board approved the termination of further benefit awards and closed the case in May 1995. In November 2002, some nine years after the execution of the July 1993 settlement agreement, petitioner sought judicial approval of the settlement nunc pro tunc. Supreme Court granted petitioner’s application, prompting this appeal by respondent.

Workers Compensation Law § 29 (5) is clear “[that] an employee must obtain the written approval of the employer or its workers’ compensation carrier prior to any settlement of a third-party action” (Matter of Bernthon v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 279 AD2d 728, 728 [2001]; see Matter of Johnson v Buffalo & Erie County Private Indus. Council, 84 NY2d 13, 19 [1994]). However, an employee also has the option of seeking judicial approval of the settlement from the court in which the third-party action is pending within three months after the case has been settled (see Matter of Stiffen v CNA Ins. Cos., 282 AD2d 991, 992 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 612 [2002]). Where, as here, a petitioner has failed to do either, such petitioner is barred from receiving future workers’ compensation benefits unless he or she can demonstrate that (1) the delay in submitting the application was not the result of the petitioner’s fault or neglect, (2) the settlement is reasonable and (3) the carrier was not prejudiced by the delay (see id. at 992; Matter of Wilbur v Utica Mut. Co., 228 AD2d 928, 929 [1996]). A reviewing court should also consider the length of the delay as an additional relevant factor (see Matter of Rifenburgh v James, 297 AD2d 901, 902 [2002]; Dennison v Pinke, 211 AD2d 853, 854 [1995]).

Here, the nine-year delay between the execution of the settlement agreement and petitioner’s application for judicial approval thereof was inordinate. There is no dispute that, as early as November 1992, petitioner was fully aware of respondent’s intention to assert its right to impose a workers’ compensation lien and require written consent of any third-party settlement agreement. Respondent’s intention to avail itself of this statutory remedy was further emphasized by the 1994-1995 proceedings before the Workers’ Compensation Board and in respondent’s January 1995 correspondence denying petitioner’s request for retroactive consent. Unfortunately, even in light of these circumstances, petitioner did not seek judicial approval of the settlement agreement until 2002.

Even assuming that the settlement was reasonable and respondent’s claim of prejudice not significant, in light of the above uncontroverted facts, we find unpersuasive petitioner’s attempts to characterize the delay as excusable. Under the circumstances, we must conclude that Supreme Court’s grant of petitioner’s application constituted an improvident exercise of discretion and reversal is required (see Scannell v Karlin, 252 AD2d 552 [1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 805 [1999]).

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Peters and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, and application denied.

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In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under insurance contracts, the defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Parga, J.), dated April 4, 2003, as granted those branches of the plaintiffs’ motion which were for summary judgment on the causes of action to recover no-fault medical payments allegedly due to Mary Immaculate Hospital, as assignee of Scaarlin Morales-Soriano, and to recover no-fault medical payments allegedly due to Brooklyn Hospital Center, as assignee of Alberto Lopez.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the motion which were for summary judgment on the causes of action to recover no-fault medical payments allegedly due to Mary Immaculate Hospital, as assignee of Scaarlin Morales-Soriano, and to recover no-fault medical payments allegedly due to Brooklyn Hospital Center, as assignee of Alberto Lopez, are denied.

A complete proof of claim is a prerequisite to receiving no-fault benefits (see Insurance Law § 5106). Written proof of such a claim must be submitted to the insurance company within 180 days after the date services were rendered or 180 days after the date written notice of the claim was given to the insurance company, whichever is later (see 11 NYCRR 65.12). Within 30 days of receiving a claim, the insurer shall either pay or deny the claim in whole or in part (see 11 [*2]NYCRR 65.15 [g] [3]). This 30-day period may be extended by a timely demand by the insurance company for further verification of a claim (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [d] [1]). A claim need not be paid or denied until all demanded verification is provided (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [1] [i]; Westchester County Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 553 [1999]). In the event an insurer fails to timely deny a claim or request verification from the hospital, the insurer is precluded from asserting that the claim was untimely or incomplete (see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 282 [1997]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 583 [2002]; St. Clare’s Hosp. v Allcity Ins. Co., 201 AD2d 718 [1994]).

Despite the fact that the proof of claim submitted by Brooklyn Hospital Center, as assignee of Alberto Lopez (hereinafter Brooklyn Hospital), was incomplete, and the proof of claim submitted by Mary Immaculate Hospital, as assignee of Scaarlin Morales-Soriano (hereinafter Mary Immaculate), was untimely, both of these plaintiffs demonstrated a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with evidence that their claims were neither denied nor paid within the requisite time period (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [3]; St. Clare’s Hosp. v Allcity Ins. Co., supra). In opposition, the defendant offered sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact whether Mary Immaculate’s claim was denied as untimely, and whether the defendant timely sought verification of Brooklyn Hospital’s claim (see 11 NYCRR 65.12, 65.15 [d] [1]; St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 274 AD2d 511 [2000]; Westchester County Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., supra). Thus, summary judgment should not have been granted on those causes of action.

The parties’ remaining contentions either are unnecessary to address in light of the determination or are without merit. Santucci, J.P., Goldstein, Luciano and Mastro, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under certain insurance contracts, the defendant appeals (1), as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Franco, J.), dated July 29, 2003, as granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the second, third, and fourth causes of action, and (2) from a judgment of the same court, entered August 21, 2003, which, upon the order, is in favor of the plaintiffs St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hospital, New York and Presbyterian Hospital, Mary Immaculate Hospital, and St. John’s Hospital-Catholic Medical Center and against it in the principal sum of $14,043.92.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho,39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been [*2]considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

In support of their motion for summary judgment, the respondents submitted proof, inter alia, with respect to the second, third, and fourth causes of action, that they mailed and the appellant received the hospital facility forms for the related claims demonstrating the amounts of loss sustained, and that the appellant failed to either pay or deny each respective claim within the 30-day statutory period under Insurance Law § 5106 (a). Accordingly, the respondents established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on their claims, including statutory interest and an award of an attorney’s fee (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [3]; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 1 AD3d 498 [2003]).

In opposition, the appellant failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). The affidavits submitted by the appellant failed to establish that it mailed the requests for verification of the assignments upon which the respondents’ claims were based (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 284 AD2d 374, 375 [2001]). Thus, the appellant’s objections to the claims on the basis of lack of proof of the assignments were without merit (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [d]; St. Clare’s Hosp. v Allcity Ins. Co., 201 AD2d 718 [1994]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the second, third, and fourth causes of action.

The parties’ remaining contentions either are academic or without merit. Krausman, J.P., Luciano, Cozier and Spolzino, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under five insurance contracts, the plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Galasso, J.), dated October 23, 2003, as denied those branches of their motion which were for summary judgment on the first and fifth causes of action and granted that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action and upon, in effect, searching the record, dismissed the fifth cause of action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action to recover payments for medical services provided by the plaintiff Hospital for Joint Diseases and correctly granted that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action. An insurer is not required to pay a claim where the policy limits have been exhausted (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 568 [2004]). “[W]here, as here, an insurer has paid the full monetary limits set forth in the policy, its duties under the contract of insurance cease” (Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 216 AD2d 448 [1995]; see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v General Acc. Ins. Co. of Am., 229 AD2d 479, 480 [1996]). The evidence submitted by the defendant was [*2]sufficient to establish that the subject policy limits for personal injury protection benefits had been exhausted by prior claims. No triable issue of fact was raised by the plaintiffs in opposition to the defendant’s motion.

Moreover, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the fifth cause of action to recover payments for medical services provided by the New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens (hereinafter the NYHMCQ) and, in effect, upon searching the record, dismissed that cause of action. An insurer is not obligated to pay or deny a claim until it has received verification of all relevant information requested (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [1] [i]; [2] [iii]; St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v American Tr. Ins. Co., 299 AD2d 338, 340 [2002]). It is undisputed that the NYHMCQ failed to respond to the defendant’s verification requests for medical records. Accordingly, the period within which the defendant was required to respond to this claim did not begin to run, and any claim for payment was premature (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., supra; St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v American Tr. Ins. Co., supra).

There is no merit to the argument of the NYHMCQ that the defendant’s verification requests were ineffective to toll the defendant’s time to pay or deny the claims because they were made by letter rather than by prescribed form (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v American Tr. Ins. Co., supra at 339; Nyack Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 296 AD2d 482, 483 [2002]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 588, 590 [2002]). Ritter, J.P., Goldstein, Crane and Spolzino, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover no-fault benefits under an insurance contract, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Joseph, J.), dated July 7, 2003, as denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment on the first and second causes of action to recover no-fault benefits for medical services rendered by the plaintiff New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

The Supreme Court erred in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the first and second causes of action on the ground that the hospital facility forms submitted by the plaintiffs lacked necessary signatures. The defendant’s failure to object to the completeness of the hospital facility forms within 10 days of receipt constituted a waiver of any defenses based thereon (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 287 AD2d 699, 701 [2001]; Mount Sinai Hosp. v Triboro Coach, 263 AD2d 11, 17 [1999]; St. Clare’s Hosp. v Allcity Ins. Co., 201 AD2d 718, 720 [1994]). In opposition to the plaintiffs’ prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [3]), the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 412 [2002]; cf. Hospital for Joint Diseases v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 284 AD2d 374, 375 [2001]). [*2]

As the plaintiffs established their entitlement to the no-fault benefits, as well as to statutory interest and attorney’s fees (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-4.6), we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, to calculate the amount owed to the plaintiff for no-fault benefits, statutory interest, and attorney’s fees. S. Miller, J.P., Adams, Cozier and Rivera, JJ., concur.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Doris Ling-Cohan, J.), entered July 10, 2003, which denied the application of Utica Mutual Insurance Company to vacate its default in failing to answer a petition brought by Victoria Insurance Company to confirm three arbitration awards, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Utica Mutual did not, in support of its vacatur application, make the necessary showing of merit. Contrary to its contention, the arbitrator did not commit misconduct in refusing to grant an adjournment to permit Utica’s investigator to appear, since Utica had not given notice that it would call a witness. In any event, the investigator’s testimony would have been duplicative of reports previously submitted in an attempt to establish that the claims paid by Victoria Insurance and for which it sought reimbursement from Utica were fraudulent. Furthermore, since Utica has not offered any affidavit from its insured, the owners of the truck that caused the accident, to show that, contrary to Department of Motor Vehicles records, the truck was not modified to increase its weight to more than 6,500 pounds, we perceive no basis to conclude that there is merit to Utica’s argument that this was not an instance in which reimbursement of otherwise nonreimbursable no-fault benefits was permitted pursuant to Insurance Law § 5105 (a).

Although the awards did not meet the requirements of CPLR 7507 that they be signed and affirmed by the arbitrator, and the issue is a question of law that can be raised for the first time on appeal (see Chateau D’If Corp. v City of New York, 219 AD2d 205, 209-210 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 811 [1996]), Utica is estopped from now raising the issue. Had it been raised as one of the affirmative defenses asserted by Utica in its proposed answer, Victoria would have been able to obtain a signed copy of the award from the arbitrator within the one-year period for bringing a proceeding to confirm an award. [*2]

We have reviewed Utica’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Tom, J.P., Saxe, Ellerin, Williams and Gonzalez, JJ.

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In an action to recover no-fault benefits, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Parga, J.), dated November 12, 2003, as granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff met its initial burden of demonstrating its entitlement to summary judgment by establishing that the defendant did not deny or pay the two claims in question within 30 days (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195 [1997]; Bonetti v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 269 AD2d 413, 414 [2000]). The defendant thereafter failed to submit sufficient evidence in admissible form to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether the medical treatment alleged in the first cause of action was not causally related to an insured accident and whether the underlying contract of insurance alleged in the third cause of action had been cancelled. Therefore, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly granted.

In light of our determination, the defendant’s remaining contentions are academic. Smith, J.P., S. Miller, Crane and Rivera, JJ., concur.