—In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under certain insurance contracts, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Franco, J.), dated March 5, 2003, which denied their motion for leave to reargue that branch of their prior motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action to recover no-fault benefits for the treatment of Adrienne Corn, which was denied by prior order of the same court dated December 10, 2002.

Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, with costs.

We reject the appellant’s contention that the instant appeal was taken from an order denying a motion for leave to renew. The order appealed from decided a motion which the appellant itself denominated as one for leave to reargue that branch of its prior motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action. Further, the thrust of the appellant’s motion was that the Supreme Court purportedly overlooked controlling law in making its prior order. In addition, the appellant neither submitted new facts not offered on the prior motion, nor demonstrated a change in the law, that would change the prior determination (see CPLR 2221 [e] [2]). Accordingly, the motion was one for leave to reargue, the denial of which is not appealable (see Gutierrez v Rockefeller Group, 307 AD2d 335 [2003]; Lapadula v Sang Shing Kwok, 304 AD2d 798 [2003]; Kisswani v Manikis, 303 AD2d 643, 644 [2003]; Misirlakis v East Coast Entertainment Props., 303 AD2d 389 [2003]). Ritter, J.P., H. Miller, Crane and Cozier, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under certain insurance contracts, the defendant appeals from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Skelos, J.), dated April 7, 2003, which, upon granting those branches of the plaintiffs’ motion which were for summary judgment on their first, fourth, fifth, and seventh causes of action, is in favor of the plaintiff Mary Immaculate Hospital, as assignee of Lucretia Hall and Sosamma Johnkutty, and against it in the total sum of $124,035.43, in favor of the plaintiff New York United Hospital, as assignee of Jean A. Cudilio, and against it in the total sum of $6,633.33, and in favor of the plaintiff White Plains Hospital, as assignee of Rashid Chugstai, and against it in the total sum of $116.14.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the plaintiff hospitals made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidentiary proof that the prescribed statutory billing forms had been mailed and received, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [3]; St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 1 AD3d 498 [2003]; St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 303 AD2d 743 [2003]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 412 [2002]; see also Matter of Pradip Das/N.Y. Med. Rehab v Allstate Ins. Co., 297 AD2d 321 [2002]). Furthermore, the defendant’s submissions in opposition were insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether it timely issued a partial denial of the claim asserted by the plaintiff Mary Immaculate Hospital, as assignee of Lucretia Hall, or paid the claim asserted by the plaintiff New York United Hospital, as assignee of Jean A. Cudilio. Santucci, J.P., Krausman, Luciano and Townes, JJ., concur.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard Braun, J.), entered May 5, 2003, which denied petitioner insurer’s application to stay arbitration of respondent’s underinsured motorist claim, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The application to stay arbitration was properly denied on the ground that it was not made within 20 days after service of respondent’s demand (CPLR 7503 [c]). It does not avail petitioner that it timely commenced a proceeding to stay the arbitration in Queens County, which the Queens County court ordered transferred to New York County, and that it instituted the instant stay proceeding only because of ministerial difficulties it encountered in effectuating the transfer (cf. Matter of Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. [Coping], 179 AD2d 499 [1992]). In any event, as the motion court also held, the petition lacks merit. Respondent notified petitioner insurer of the accident immediately after it happened, in connection with a no-fault claim. Neither at this time nor at any other time prior to the grant of summary judgment in the personal injury action respondent had brought, could she have known that the only defendant in that action with significant insurance coverage, the driver of the car in which she was a passenger and also insured by petitioner, would be absolved of liability, and that she therefore had a viable underinsurance claim against petitioner. Under such circumstances, it was the grant of summary judgment to defendant in the personal injury action that marked the commencement of respondent’s obligation to give written notice of claim “as soon as practicable” (see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Sala, 226 AD2d 172 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 801 [1996]). Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Mazzarelli, Saxe and Friedman, JJ.

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In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under five insurance contracts, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Joseph, J.), dated December 20, 2002, which granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and (2) a judgment of the same court dated December 27, 2002, which is in favor of the plaintiffs and against it in the principal sum of $37,040.67.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, those branches of the plaintiffs’ motion which were for summary judgment on their first, second, and fifth causes of action are denied, those branches of the defendant’s cross motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first and fifth causes of action are granted, and the order dated December 20, 2002, is modified accordingly.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

This action was commenced by three hospitals to recover unpaid no-fault benefits from the defendant Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (hereinafter Progressive), arising from five separate automobile accidents involving persons and/or vehicles it allegedly insured. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

The Insurance Law and regulations promulgated thereunder provide that “[w]ithin 30 calendar days after proof of claim is received, the insurer shall either pay or deny the claim in whole or in part” (11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [3]; see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]). This 30-day period may be extended by, inter alia, a timely demand by the insurance company for further verification of a claim (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [d] [1]; [e]). Such a demand must be made within 10 days of receipt of a completed application (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [d] [1]). If the demanded verification is not received within 30 days, the insurance company must issue a follow-up request within 10 days of the insured’s failure to respond (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [e] [2]). A claim need not be paid or denied until all demanded verification is provided (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [1] [i]; Westchester County Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 553, 554 [1999]). When a hospital fails to respond to a verification request, the 30-day period in which to pay or deny the claim does not begin to run, and any claim for payment by the hospital is premature (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v American Tr. Ins. Co., 299 AD2d 338, 340 [2002]; Nyack Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 296 AD2d 482, 483 [2002]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 588, 590 [2002]). No-fault benefits are overdue, however, if not paid within 30 calendar days after the insurer receives verification of all of the relevant information requested pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65.15 (d) (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [1] [i]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 583, 584 [2002]). Additionally, when a claim is submitted, an insurer will be liable only if there is insurance to cover the claim. An insurer is not required to pay a claim where the policy limits have been exhausted (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v Allstate Ins. Co., 294 AD2d 425 [2002]).

Applying these rules to the facts of this case, the Supreme Court correctly granted those branches of the plaintiffs’ motion which were for summary judgment on the third and fourth causes of action concerning the Sharon Brown and Richard Bochert claims. The plaintiffs demonstrated their entitlement to summary judgment as to each of those causes of action by proving that they submitted the requisite documents for payment, but Progressive neither paid nor denied the claims, nor requested verification within the requisite periods. In opposition, Progressive failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact. As to the Brown claim, Progressive offered only conclusory hearsay assertions of telephonic verification requests, unsupported by an affidavit of a representative with personal knowledge. As to the Bochert claim, Progressive proffered prior verification requests relevant to a different claim.

The Supreme Court erred in granting the plaintiffs’ motion as to the Byung Park claim pled in the second cause of action. In opposition to the plaintiffs’ prima facie showing, Progressive demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the verification requests it submitted related to the same claim as was pleaded in the second cause of action.

The Supreme Court also erred in granting those branches of the plaintiffs’ motion which were for summary judgment on their first and fifth causes of action concerning the Thomas Salese and Margarita Bonilla claims. Furthermore, the court should have granted Progressive’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing those causes of action. Progressive demonstrated, as a matter of law, that it paid the Salese claim up to the pertinent policy limits, and was not obligated to pay the claim in full (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v Allstate Ins. Co., supra at 425-426; cf. Nyack Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., supra). As to the Bonilla claim, Progressive established that it did not issue a policy of insurance covering that claim. Notwithstanding that Progressive did not notify the plaintiff Westchester Medical Center of its noncoverage of this claim, Progressive properly proved its freedom from liability thereon (see Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]; Zappone v Home Ins. Co., 55 NY2d 131, 134 [1982]; Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 [2002]).

We do not consider Progressive’s contention that the five claims herein were improperly joined, as this contention was raised for the first time on appeal (see Matter of DelGaudio v Aetna Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 641 [1999]; M.S.N.S. Holding Corp. v City of New York, 253 AD2d 793, 794 [1998]; Matter of Matarrese v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 247 AD2d 475, 476 [1998]; cf. Weiner v MKVII-Westchester, 292 AD2d 597, 598 [2002]; Libeson v Copy Realty Corp., 167 AD2d 376, 377 [1990]). S. Miller, J.P., H. Miller, Crane and Rivera, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover unpaid benefits due under the no-fault provisions of the Insurance Law, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Cozzens, J.), dated January 31, 2003, which denied its motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff Hospital for Joint Diseases, as assignee of its patient, alleged in its complaint that the defendant no-fault insurer was liable for two no-fault claims which were mailed on March 6, 2002, because it neither paid nor denied the claims within 30 days of receipt, as required by Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and the corresponding regulation of the Insurance Department, 11 NYCRR 65.15 (g) (3). Thereafter, the plaintiff made the same argument in a motion for summary judgment.

The defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, submitting evidence that before the medical services at issue were rendered, it had notified the plaintiff’s assignor that it had terminated her no-fault benefits based upon an independent medical examination, and that the plaintiff had previously submitted claims for these same billings which the defendant timely denied. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s motion, granted the defendant’s cross motion, and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appeals.

We affirm. Under the no-fault law, a claimant whose claim for benefits has been denied is entitled to “seek immediate redress, and to recover both the amount of any overdue claim and reasonable attorney’s fees in securing payment” (Roggio v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 66 NY2d 260, 262 [1985]). A claimant may either file suit seeking payment of the claim, or, pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (b), submit the dispute to arbitration, pursuant to simplified procedures promulgated by the Insurance Department. In this case, the plaintiff did neither, opting instead to repeatedly resubmit the denied claims, apparently in the hope that eventually the defendant would fail to issue a denial within 30 days of receipt. We hold, however, that the 30-day period in which to deny a claim for no-fault benefits does not run anew as the result of the re-submission of a previously-denied claim.

Since the plaintiff’s complaint was predicated solely upon the defendant’s failure to pay or deny the claims sent March 6, 2002, within 30 days of receipt, and the defendant established that it previously issued timely denials for identical claims submitted by the plaintiff, the defendant was properly granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In light of the foregoing, we do not reach the parties’ remaining contentions. Smith, J.P., Goldstein, Luciano and Adams, JJ., concur.

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Mercure, J.P. Appeals from an order and an amended order of the Supreme Court (Kavanagh, J.), entered January 2, 2003 in Ulster County, upon a decision of the court in favor of plaintiff.

In September 1999, plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident while driving a car insured by defendant. Plaintiff suffered an injury to her right shoulder for which defendant paid no-fault benefits, including medical expenses, household help reimbursement and lost wages, through March 31, 2000. Thereafter, defendant denied further benefits, asserting that an independent medical examination demonstrated that plaintiff was no longer injured as a result of the accident.

Plaintiff then commenced this action seeking a declaration that defendant was obligated to continue paying benefits in an amount not to exceed $50,000. Based upon the parties’ submitted affidavits, Supreme Court determined that plaintiff was completely disabled from the date of the accident through December 2000 and was thereafter partially disabled. The court directed defendant to pay plaintiff $4,225 plus interest to cover expenses from the period of April 1, 2000 to September 16, 2000, plus lost wages. Defendant appeals, asserting that Supreme Court erred in concluding that plaintiff’s disability continued beyond March 2000. We disagree.

Inasmuch as Supreme Court’s decision was rendered after a nonjury trial, we ” ‘independently consider the probative weight of the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom’ ” upon review (Glencoe Leather Corp. v Parillo, 285 AD2d 891, 891 [2001], quoting Jump v Jump, 268 AD2d 709, 710 [2000]). While we normally afford deference to a trial court’s determination regarding witness credibility, such deference is not warranted here because the determination was made upon submitted affidavits (see Bauer v Goodrich & Sherwood Assoc., 304 AD2d 957, 958 [2003]). Nevertheless, we agree with Supreme Court that plaintiff established a continuing disability beyond March 2000.

Plaintiff presented an affirmation from her treating physician, Andrew Dubin, indicating that he diagnosed her with “right upper extremity brachial plexopathy” which was caused by the automobile accident and exacerbated a preexisting condition, disabling her. Dubin stated in his affirmation and in prescription notes that plaintiff required on-going household assistance, initially could not work and, from December 8, 2000, was restricted to part-time employment. Dubin noted in an April 2000 letter that nerve studies confirmed his brachial plexopathy diagnosis. While notes from plaintiff’s surgeon, William Levine, indicated continuing improvements in her range of motion and eventual resolution of the brachial plexopathy, Levine also recommended that she stay out of work initially and then return on a graduated basis beginning in December 2000.

In opposition, defendant submitted an affidavit and report of physician Norman Heyman concluding, based on a March 2000 independent medical examination, that plaintiff was not disabled but had “voluntarily sacrificed function and range of motion for relief of pain and demonstration of decreased . . . motion.” Heyman opined that further treatment would not impact plaintiff’s condition and that there was no need for household help and other services or additional diagnostic tests. We note that this evidence is undercut by a subsequent October 2000 letter from Mary Godesky, a physician who examined plaintiff on behalf of Allstate Insurance Company, the insurance carrier in the personal injury action arising out of the accident. Godesky determined that plaintiff had sustained a contusion of the right shoulder in the accident, which aggravated a preexisting condition and continued to limit plaintiff’s range of motion. Godesky recommended continuing physical therapy. Given Godesky’s letter and the affirmation and notes of plaintiff’s doctors, we agree with Supreme Court that defendant improperly denied plaintiff benefits after March 2000.

We further conclude that Supreme Court correctly awarded plaintiff first-party benefits in the form of $25 per day plus interest for housekeeping expenses, as reasonable and necessary expenses, through September 16, 2000, or one year from the date of the accident (see Insurance Law § 5102 [a] [3]; § 5106 [a]). We agree with defendant, however, that Supreme Court erred in determining that plaintiff demonstrated that her income prior to the accident was $450 per week. In connection with her demand for payment from defendant, plaintiff submitted a verification of self-employment income form indicating that she spent $240 per week on substitute services (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [8]). Our review of the record reveals that of the other prescribed forms listed in the applicable regulation (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [c] [3]), plaintiff submitted only an application for motor vehicle no-fault benefits in demanding loss of wages. On that form, plaintiff claimed that her average weekly earnings were $450. However, the verification of self-employment income form—in which plaintiff claimed $240 per week for substitute services—is the proper form for determining plaintiff’s loss (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [8]) and a claim for substitute services is primary in determining the loss of earnings benefit where an employee claims both substitute services and loss of earnings (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [o] [2] [x] [b]). Although the verification of self-employment income form also includes a place for an applicant to set forth net loss of earnings in addition to the cost of substitute services, plaintiff failed to properly include on that form such a loss of earnings. Thus, the $240 figure listed on the verification of self-employment income form must be used in determining plaintiff’s loss.

Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff is entitled to 80% of her $240 weekly salary from September 17, 1999 until December 8, 2000 and, thereafter, to 80% of half her weekly salary to reimburse her for the time she was required to work four-hour days, together with interest (see Insurance Law § 5102 [b] [1]; § 5106 [a]) and subject to the $50,000 statutory cap on all basic economic loss and three-year limitation on recovery of lost wages (see Insurance Law § 5102 [a]; Normile v Allstate Ins. Co., 87 AD2d 721, 722 [1982], affd on op below 60 NY2d 1003 [1983]). Because the record is unclear regarding whether plaintiff has already been reimbursed for any of her lost wages or other basic economic loss, we remit the matter for a recalculation of the amount of first-party benefits to which plaintiff is entitled and for a calculation of the amount of counsel fees due, up to the limit set forth in the applicable regulation (see 11 NYCRR 65.17 [b] [6]).

Spain, Carpinello, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order and amended order are modified, on the law and the facts, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as calculated plaintiff’s entitlement to loss of wage benefits; matter remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.

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In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under an insurance contract, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Burke, J.), dated January 3, 2003, as granted the defendant’s cross motion to vacate (1) an order of the same court dated May 14, 2002, granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment upon the defendant’s failure to oppose the motion, and (2) a judgment of the same court entered June 21, 2002, upon the order.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and as a matter of discretion, with costs, the cross motion is denied, and the order dated May 14, 2002, and the judgment entered June 21, 2002, are reinstated.

A party seeking to be relieved of its default must establish both a reasonable excuse and a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015; Eretz Funding v Shalosh Assoc., 266 AD2d 184, 185 [1999]). In this case, the defendant was aware that the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against it and took no steps to vacate the default until the plaintiff moved to hold the defendant in contempt of court for failing to comply with an information subpoena designed to enforce the judgment. Such conduct constituted an intentional default, which was not excusable (see Eretz Funding v Shalosh Assoc., supra; Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568, 568-569 [1997]). Therefore, the defendant’s motion to vacate its default should have been denied. Florio, J.P., Krausman, Luciano, Townes and Rivera, JJ., concur.

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Kane, J. Appeal from an order and judgment of the Supreme Court (Nolan, Jr., J.), entered November 8, 2002 in Saratoga County, upon a decision of the court in favor of plaintiff.

Bruce Campbell, Jr. was driving a vehicle insured by defendant. After the vehicle stalled and Campbell could not restart it, he pushed the vehicle down a hill to a safer spot, pushed it to the shoulder of the road against a snowbank, turned on its hazard flashers, locked the doors and walked home. Approximately 15 minutes later, he returned in another vehicle and attempted to jump start the disabled vehicle. These attempts were fruitless. Campbell then locked the vehicle again and went to a friend’s home in order to get someone to tow the disabled vehicle. About 20 to 25 minutes later, as he was heading back to the vehicle, he was informed that two snowmobiles had collided with the disabled car. Plaintiff, who was operating one of those snowmobiles, was injured. After defendant denied plaintiff’s request for no-fault benefits, plaintiff commenced this action. The sole issue was whether the disabled vehicle was in “use or operation” at the time of the accident, thus permitting plaintiff to recover no-fault benefits pursuant to Insurance Law § 5103 (a) (1). After a bench trial, Supreme Court found that the vehicle was in use and granted judgment to plaintiff. We agree.

In McConnell v Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Co. (49 AD2d 676 [1975]), the plaintiff, while operating a snowmobile, struck a locked, unoccupied automobile parked on the street. The Fourth Department held that the automobile was not in “use” within the meaning of the Insurance Law (id. at 677). Unlike the vehicle owner in McConnell, Campbell did not voluntary place his vehicle near his residence intending that to be his permanent parking place for the night (cf. Wooster v Soriano, 167 AD2d 233 [1990]). He experienced an unplanned stop due to the temporary disability of his car in a place where a vehicle would not normally be parked. Campbell activated the hazard lights to warn other drivers, and his sole purpose in leaving the vehicle was to gain assistance to return and retrieve it as soon as possible. These circumstances constituted an “on-going activity relating to the vehicle” which would necessitate a conclusion that the vehicle was in use (compare Matter of Celona v Royal Globe Ins. Co., 85 AD2d 635 [1981]; Gering v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 75 AD2d 321, 323 [1980]). Because the vehicle he struck was in “use or operation” at the time of the accident, plaintiff is entitled to no-fault benefits.

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Peters and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.