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Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John F. O’Donnell, J.), entered April 1, 2003. The order denied the petition for an order permanently staying arbitration.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is reversed on the law without costs and the petition is granted.

Memorandum: Respondent submitted claims for no-fault insurance benefits for injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident in September 1995. Petitioner denied respondent’s claim for lost wages on May 6, 1996 and denied the balance of respondent’s claim on September 3, 1996. Respondent served a demand for arbitration dated August 29, 2002 via Federal Express overnight mail with signature required. Petitioner thereupon commenced this proceeding seeking a permanent stay of arbitration.

We conclude that Supreme Court erred in denying the petition. We agree with petitioner that service of the demand for arbitration by Federal Express mail is jurisdictionally defective because Federal Express mail is not one of the permitted methods of service set forth in CPLR 7503 (c) (see Matter of Spychalski [Continental Ins. Cos.], 58 AD2d 193, 196 [1977], affd 45 NY2d 847 [1978]; Matter of Yak Taxi v Teke, 41 NY2d 1020 [1977]; Matter of Nationwide Ins. Enter. [Denga], 302 AD2d 929 [2003]; Matter of Cartier v County of Nassau, 281 AD2d 477 [2001]; Matter of Metropolitan Cas. & Prop. Ins. Co. v Suggs, 268 AD2d 240 [2000]; cf. CPLR 3216; Balancio v American Optical Corp., 66 NY2d 750, 751 [1985]). We therefore reverse the order and grant the petition.

All concur except Green and Scudder, JJ., who dissent and vote to modify in accordance with the following memorandum.

Green and Scudder, JJ. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent. We disagree with the majority that the demand for arbitration by Federal Express mail is jurisdictionally defective because it is not one of the permitted methods of service set forth in CPLR 7503 (c), i.e., “in the same manner as a summons or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.” In our view, the procedure used herein is analogous to personal service by mail as provided for in CPLR 312-a. Furthermore, such service is the functional equivalent of registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, inasmuch as both methods provide for accountability and reliability with [*2]respect to the mailing and receipt of the demand for arbitration (see generally Secreto v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 194 Misc 2d 512, 513-514 [2003]). We therefore conclude that the demand for arbitration was properly served (see Matter of Andy Floors [Tyler Constr. Corp.], 202 AD2d 938, 939 [1994]).

Having concluded that the service is not jurisdictionally defective, we further conclude that respondent’s demand for arbitration is not time-barred with respect to the denial of respondent’s claim in September 1996. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the demand was properly served within the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]; 7502 [b]; see generally Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 55 NY2d 184, 193 [1982], rearg denied 56 NY2d 567 [1982], cert denied 459 US 837 [1982]). The remaining issue therefore is whether respondent’s demand for arbitration is time-barred with respect to the denial of respondent’s claim in May 1996. Respondent contends with respect thereto that, by filing the instant demand, he “re-filed” a demand for arbitration that was originally filed with the New York State Insurance Department and served on petitioner on October 1, 1997. He contends that his original demand was treated by the American Arbitration Association as “withdrawn without prejudice” because of settlement. Also pending at that time was a demand for arbitration made by a medical provider to which respondent had assigned his rights. Although the record establishes that arbitration hearings were scheduled and then adjourned by the American Arbitration Association, the record does not establish whether the hearings were to be conducted with respect to respondent’s claim, the medical provider’s claim, or both.

In denying the petition, Supreme Court determined that respondent filed a demand for arbitration in 1997 and that, because petitioner participated in a prior arbitration proceeding, it is barred from now seeking a stay of arbitration (see CPLR 7503 [b]). The court’s determination that respondent filed a demand for arbitration in 1997 is unsupported by the record, which contains only a copy of a cover letter from respondent’s attorney to the New York State Insurance Department and does not contain the demand for arbitration or the other enclosures discussed in the cover letter. Petitioner contends that it received only the cover letter. Petitioner further contends that it was never served with respondent’s demand for arbitration and thus that it participated only in arbitration proceedings with respect to the medical provider.

As respondent correctly concedes, arbitration with respect to the denial of his claim in May 1996 is time-barred if it is determined that there was no prior arbitration proceeding between these parties. If, however, it is determined that there was a prior arbitration proceeding between these parties, then petitioner’s “participation in the arbitration [proceeding] constituted a waiver of any right on [petitioner’s] part to . . . obtain a stay of arbitration on statute of limitations grounds” (Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Erie County White Collar Unit Local #815 [County of Erie], 303 AD2d 1050, 1051; see CPLR 7503 [b]). We cannot determine from this record, however, whether there was any such prior arbitration proceeding and therefore conclude that the issue whether that claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a threshold question requiring a trial forthwith (see CPLR 7503 [a]). Thus, we would modify the order accordingly, and we would grant a trial with respect to that issue. Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Green, Wisner, Scudder and Gorski, JJ.

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Mugglin, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Kavanagh, J.), entered April 21, 2003 in Ulster County, which granted petitioner’s application pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5) for judicial approval, nunc pro tunc, of a personal injury settlement.

After sustaining injuries in a May 1990 work-related automobile accident, petitioner applied for and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits. In November 1992, respondent, who had commenced payment of workers’ compensation benefits shortly after petitioner’s accident, notified petitioner that it was reserving its claim to a continuing lien on any recovery for injuries or damages arising out of the May 1990 accident not constituting payments in lieu of first party no-fault benefits (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 [1-a]; Insurance Law § 5104 [a]). Respondent further informed petitioner of its obligation to obtain respondent’s written consent for any settlement or compromise of a lawsuit brought in connection with the automobile accident (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 [5]). Petitioner had, in fact, commenced a third-party action and ultimately settled the matter for $60,000 pursuant to the terms of a July 1993 agreement. It is undisputed that no attempt was made by petitioner to obtain respondent’s consent prior to executing that agreement. Citing petitioner’s failure in that regard, respondent suspended the payment of benefits in January 1994 and, thereafter, refused petitioner’s July 1994 [*2]request for retroactive consent of the settlement agreement. After affording petitioner the opportunity to provide evidence that consent was obtained, the Workers’ Compensation Board approved the termination of further benefit awards and closed the case in May 1995. In November 2002, some nine years after the execution of the July 1993 settlement agreement, petitioner sought judicial approval of the settlement nunc pro tunc. Supreme Court granted petitioner’s application, prompting this appeal by respondent.

Workers Compensation Law § 29 (5) is clear “[that] an employee must obtain the written approval of the employer or its workers’ compensation carrier prior to any settlement of a third-party action” (Matter of Bernthon v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 279 AD2d 728, 728 [2001]; see Matter of Johnson v Buffalo & Erie County Private Indus. Council, 84 NY2d 13, 19 [1994]). However, an employee also has the option of seeking judicial approval of the settlement from the court in which the third-party action is pending within three months after the case has been settled (see Matter of Stiffen v CNA Ins. Cos., 282 AD2d 991, 992 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 612 [2002]). Where, as here, a petitioner has failed to do either, such petitioner is barred from receiving future workers’ compensation benefits unless he or she can demonstrate that (1) the delay in submitting the application was not the result of the petitioner’s fault or neglect, (2) the settlement is reasonable and (3) the carrier was not prejudiced by the delay (see id. at 992; Matter of Wilbur v Utica Mut. Co., 228 AD2d 928, 929 [1996]). A reviewing court should also consider the length of the delay as an additional relevant factor (see Matter of Rifenburgh v James, 297 AD2d 901, 902 [2002]; Dennison v Pinke, 211 AD2d 853, 854 [1995]).

Here, the nine-year delay between the execution of the settlement agreement and petitioner’s application for judicial approval thereof was inordinate. There is no dispute that, as early as November 1992, petitioner was fully aware of respondent’s intention to assert its right to impose a workers’ compensation lien and require written consent of any third-party settlement agreement. Respondent’s intention to avail itself of this statutory remedy was further emphasized by the 1994-1995 proceedings before the Workers’ Compensation Board and in respondent’s January 1995 correspondence denying petitioner’s request for retroactive consent. Unfortunately, even in light of these circumstances, petitioner did not seek judicial approval of the settlement agreement until 2002.

Even assuming that the settlement was reasonable and respondent’s claim of prejudice not significant, in light of the above uncontroverted facts, we find unpersuasive petitioner’s attempts to characterize the delay as excusable. Under the circumstances, we must conclude that Supreme Court’s grant of petitioner’s application constituted an improvident exercise of discretion and reversal is required (see Scannell v Karlin, 252 AD2d 552 [1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 805 [1999]).

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Peters and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, and application denied.

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In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under insurance contracts, the defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Parga, J.), dated April 4, 2003, as granted those branches of the plaintiffs’ motion which were for summary judgment on the causes of action to recover no-fault medical payments allegedly due to Mary Immaculate Hospital, as assignee of Scaarlin Morales-Soriano, and to recover no-fault medical payments allegedly due to Brooklyn Hospital Center, as assignee of Alberto Lopez.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the motion which were for summary judgment on the causes of action to recover no-fault medical payments allegedly due to Mary Immaculate Hospital, as assignee of Scaarlin Morales-Soriano, and to recover no-fault medical payments allegedly due to Brooklyn Hospital Center, as assignee of Alberto Lopez, are denied.

A complete proof of claim is a prerequisite to receiving no-fault benefits (see Insurance Law § 5106). Written proof of such a claim must be submitted to the insurance company within 180 days after the date services were rendered or 180 days after the date written notice of the claim was given to the insurance company, whichever is later (see 11 NYCRR 65.12). Within 30 days of receiving a claim, the insurer shall either pay or deny the claim in whole or in part (see 11 [*2]NYCRR 65.15 [g] [3]). This 30-day period may be extended by a timely demand by the insurance company for further verification of a claim (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [d] [1]). A claim need not be paid or denied until all demanded verification is provided (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [1] [i]; Westchester County Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 553 [1999]). In the event an insurer fails to timely deny a claim or request verification from the hospital, the insurer is precluded from asserting that the claim was untimely or incomplete (see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 282 [1997]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 583 [2002]; St. Clare’s Hosp. v Allcity Ins. Co., 201 AD2d 718 [1994]).

Despite the fact that the proof of claim submitted by Brooklyn Hospital Center, as assignee of Alberto Lopez (hereinafter Brooklyn Hospital), was incomplete, and the proof of claim submitted by Mary Immaculate Hospital, as assignee of Scaarlin Morales-Soriano (hereinafter Mary Immaculate), was untimely, both of these plaintiffs demonstrated a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with evidence that their claims were neither denied nor paid within the requisite time period (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [3]; St. Clare’s Hosp. v Allcity Ins. Co., supra). In opposition, the defendant offered sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact whether Mary Immaculate’s claim was denied as untimely, and whether the defendant timely sought verification of Brooklyn Hospital’s claim (see 11 NYCRR 65.12, 65.15 [d] [1]; St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 274 AD2d 511 [2000]; Westchester County Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., supra). Thus, summary judgment should not have been granted on those causes of action.

The parties’ remaining contentions either are unnecessary to address in light of the determination or are without merit. Santucci, J.P., Goldstein, Luciano and Mastro, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under certain insurance contracts, the defendant appeals (1), as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Franco, J.), dated July 29, 2003, as granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the second, third, and fourth causes of action, and (2) from a judgment of the same court, entered August 21, 2003, which, upon the order, is in favor of the plaintiffs St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hospital, New York and Presbyterian Hospital, Mary Immaculate Hospital, and St. John’s Hospital-Catholic Medical Center and against it in the principal sum of $14,043.92.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho,39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been [*2]considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

In support of their motion for summary judgment, the respondents submitted proof, inter alia, with respect to the second, third, and fourth causes of action, that they mailed and the appellant received the hospital facility forms for the related claims demonstrating the amounts of loss sustained, and that the appellant failed to either pay or deny each respective claim within the 30-day statutory period under Insurance Law § 5106 (a). Accordingly, the respondents established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on their claims, including statutory interest and an award of an attorney’s fee (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [3]; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 1 AD3d 498 [2003]).

In opposition, the appellant failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). The affidavits submitted by the appellant failed to establish that it mailed the requests for verification of the assignments upon which the respondents’ claims were based (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 284 AD2d 374, 375 [2001]). Thus, the appellant’s objections to the claims on the basis of lack of proof of the assignments were without merit (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [d]; St. Clare’s Hosp. v Allcity Ins. Co., 201 AD2d 718 [1994]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the second, third, and fourth causes of action.

The parties’ remaining contentions either are academic or without merit. Krausman, J.P., Luciano, Cozier and Spolzino, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under five insurance contracts, the plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Galasso, J.), dated October 23, 2003, as denied those branches of their motion which were for summary judgment on the first and fifth causes of action and granted that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action and upon, in effect, searching the record, dismissed the fifth cause of action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action to recover payments for medical services provided by the plaintiff Hospital for Joint Diseases and correctly granted that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action. An insurer is not required to pay a claim where the policy limits have been exhausted (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 568 [2004]). “[W]here, as here, an insurer has paid the full monetary limits set forth in the policy, its duties under the contract of insurance cease” (Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 216 AD2d 448 [1995]; see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v General Acc. Ins. Co. of Am., 229 AD2d 479, 480 [1996]). The evidence submitted by the defendant was [*2]sufficient to establish that the subject policy limits for personal injury protection benefits had been exhausted by prior claims. No triable issue of fact was raised by the plaintiffs in opposition to the defendant’s motion.

Moreover, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the fifth cause of action to recover payments for medical services provided by the New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens (hereinafter the NYHMCQ) and, in effect, upon searching the record, dismissed that cause of action. An insurer is not obligated to pay or deny a claim until it has received verification of all relevant information requested (see 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [1] [i]; [2] [iii]; St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v American Tr. Ins. Co., 299 AD2d 338, 340 [2002]). It is undisputed that the NYHMCQ failed to respond to the defendant’s verification requests for medical records. Accordingly, the period within which the defendant was required to respond to this claim did not begin to run, and any claim for payment was premature (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., supra; St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v American Tr. Ins. Co., supra).

There is no merit to the argument of the NYHMCQ that the defendant’s verification requests were ineffective to toll the defendant’s time to pay or deny the claims because they were made by letter rather than by prescribed form (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v American Tr. Ins. Co., supra at 339; Nyack Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 296 AD2d 482, 483 [2002]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 588, 590 [2002]). Ritter, J.P., Goldstein, Crane and Spolzino, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover no-fault benefits under an insurance contract, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Joseph, J.), dated July 7, 2003, as denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment on the first and second causes of action to recover no-fault benefits for medical services rendered by the plaintiff New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

The Supreme Court erred in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the first and second causes of action on the ground that the hospital facility forms submitted by the plaintiffs lacked necessary signatures. The defendant’s failure to object to the completeness of the hospital facility forms within 10 days of receipt constituted a waiver of any defenses based thereon (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 287 AD2d 699, 701 [2001]; Mount Sinai Hosp. v Triboro Coach, 263 AD2d 11, 17 [1999]; St. Clare’s Hosp. v Allcity Ins. Co., 201 AD2d 718, 720 [1994]). In opposition to the plaintiffs’ prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65.15 [g] [3]), the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 412 [2002]; cf. Hospital for Joint Diseases v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 284 AD2d 374, 375 [2001]). [*2]

As the plaintiffs established their entitlement to the no-fault benefits, as well as to statutory interest and attorney’s fees (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-4.6), we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, to calculate the amount owed to the plaintiff for no-fault benefits, statutory interest, and attorney’s fees. S. Miller, J.P., Adams, Cozier and Rivera, JJ., concur.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Doris Ling-Cohan, J.), entered July 10, 2003, which denied the application of Utica Mutual Insurance Company to vacate its default in failing to answer a petition brought by Victoria Insurance Company to confirm three arbitration awards, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Utica Mutual did not, in support of its vacatur application, make the necessary showing of merit. Contrary to its contention, the arbitrator did not commit misconduct in refusing to grant an adjournment to permit Utica’s investigator to appear, since Utica had not given notice that it would call a witness. In any event, the investigator’s testimony would have been duplicative of reports previously submitted in an attempt to establish that the claims paid by Victoria Insurance and for which it sought reimbursement from Utica were fraudulent. Furthermore, since Utica has not offered any affidavit from its insured, the owners of the truck that caused the accident, to show that, contrary to Department of Motor Vehicles records, the truck was not modified to increase its weight to more than 6,500 pounds, we perceive no basis to conclude that there is merit to Utica’s argument that this was not an instance in which reimbursement of otherwise nonreimbursable no-fault benefits was permitted pursuant to Insurance Law § 5105 (a).

Although the awards did not meet the requirements of CPLR 7507 that they be signed and affirmed by the arbitrator, and the issue is a question of law that can be raised for the first time on appeal (see Chateau D’If Corp. v City of New York, 219 AD2d 205, 209-210 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 811 [1996]), Utica is estopped from now raising the issue. Had it been raised as one of the affirmative defenses asserted by Utica in its proposed answer, Victoria would have been able to obtain a signed copy of the award from the arbitrator within the one-year period for bringing a proceeding to confirm an award. [*2]

We have reviewed Utica’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Tom, J.P., Saxe, Ellerin, Williams and Gonzalez, JJ.

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In an action to recover no-fault benefits, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Parga, J.), dated November 12, 2003, as granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff met its initial burden of demonstrating its entitlement to summary judgment by establishing that the defendant did not deny or pay the two claims in question within 30 days (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195 [1997]; Bonetti v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 269 AD2d 413, 414 [2000]). The defendant thereafter failed to submit sufficient evidence in admissible form to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether the medical treatment alleged in the first cause of action was not causally related to an insured accident and whether the underlying contract of insurance alleged in the third cause of action had been cancelled. Therefore, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly granted.

In light of our determination, the defendant’s remaining contentions are academic. Smith, J.P., S. Miller, Crane and Rivera, JJ., concur.

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Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Chautauqua County (Joseph Gerace, J.), entered February 19, 2003. The order denied petitioner’s motion for a permanent stay of arbitration and respondent’s cross motion for summary judgment and ordered that the matter proceed to arbitration.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Respondent sustained injuries in a single-car accident at 2:51 a.m. on March 31, 2000. A blood test at the hospital at 4:20 a.m. indicated that respondent had a blood alcohol content of .10%. Respondent was charged with driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]) and subsequently pleaded guilty to driving while ability impaired (§ 1192 [1]). Respondent applied for no-fault benefits under her motor vehicle insurance policy, but petitioner denied the claim on the ground that it fell within the intoxication exclusion of the policy. Respondent filed a demand for arbitration, contending that she was not intoxicated at the time of the accident, and petitioner in turn commenced this proceeding seeking a stay of arbitration. After Supreme Court granted petitioner’s order to show cause for a temporary stay, petitioner moved for a permanent stay of arbitration. Respondent cross-moved for summary judgment granting her no-fault benefits as a matter of law. The court denied the motion and cross motion and ordered that the matter proceed to arbitration, concluding that, while res judicata did not apply to bar arbitration, respondent raised an issue of fact whether she was actually intoxicated within the meaning of the policy.

We affirm, but for a different reason. We conclude that petitioner’s supporting affidavit fails to allege a sufficient basis upon which to grant a stay of arbitration (see CPLR 7503 [b]). There are only three threshold questions to be resolved by a court faced with a motion to stay arbitration: whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate; if so, whether there was compliance with the agreement; and whether the claim would be time-barred if asserted in State court (see Matter of Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v Luckie, 85 NY2d 193, 201-202 [1995], rearg denied 85 NY2d 1033 [1995]; Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr. Co.], 51 NY2d 1, 6-7 [1980]). The insurance policy at issue here contains a broad agreement to arbitrate “any matter relating to the [*2]claim” and thus it is for the arbitrator to decide whether respondent was intoxicated and thus not entitled to no-fault benefits under the policy (see Matter of Cowper Co. [Hires-Turner Glass Co.], 72 AD2d 934 [1979], affd 51 NY2d 937 [1980]; see also Matter of Resnick v Serlin, 119 AD2d 825 [1986]). Further, the policy does not contain a condition precedent to arbitration and there is no dispute over a limitations period. Thus, we conclude that the parties agreed to arbitrate the instant dispute and that it is for the arbitrator to address the merits of the dispute (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Alfarone, 62 AD2d 1034, 1035 [1978]; see also CPLR 7501). Present—Green, J.P., Wisner, Hurlbutt, Kehoe and Lawton, JJ.

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In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim, Rajeev Singh appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCarty, J.), dated September 17, 2002, which denied his cross motion to dismiss the petition, granted the petition, and permanently stayed the arbitration.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the cross motion is granted, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed.

The appellant, Rajeev Singh, claimed injuries as a result of an accident on August 4, 2001, caused by an allegedly uninsured vehicle that stopped short and then drove off following the accident. On March 8, 2002, Singh’s attorney sent to his insurer, the petitioner, Nationwide Insurance Company (hereinafter Nationwide), by certified mail, return receipt requested, a letter enclosing an application for no-fault insurance benefits and a notice “with respect to uninsured [*2]and/or underinsured motorist benefits.” This notice to which the letter referred was captioned “Notice of Intention to Make Claim and Arbitrate.” It contained a statement pursuant to CPLR 7503 (c) that Singh “intends to demand arbitration” and that Nationwide would be precluded from raising the objection, inter alia, that a valid agreement had not been made or complied with unless Nationwide applied to stay arbitration within 20 days after receipt of the notice.

The letter was sent to Nationwide at its North Syracuse office, and its receipt is undisputed. On March 18, 2002, Robert Marino from Nationwide’s Woodbury Claims Department sent a letter of disclaimer, inter alia, because the insured had failed to notify Nationwide of his claim as soon as practicable.

By a document dated June 12, 2002, Singh notified Nationwide that he was demanding arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter the AAA) and that “unless the time to apply for a stay of arbitration has already expired” he repeated the preclusion warning authorized by CPLR 7503 (c) would apply. This document was served on Nationwide at its Woodbury office by certified mail, return receipt requested. Within 20 days of its receipt of this demand for arbitration, Nationwide commenced this proceeding to stay arbitration on the ground, inter alia, that Singh’s notification of his claim was untimely.

Singh cross-moved to dismiss on the ground that the proceeding itself was not timely commenced. He relied on his notice of intention to arbitrate transmitted by his attorney’s letter dated March 8, 2002, by certified mail, return receipt requested. In opposition, Nationwide’s counsel argued in an affirmation that the notice of intention to arbitrate was not a formal demand to arbitrate against which a proceeding to stay would be required. Counsel further made passing mention that the notice of intention to arbitrate had been served on Nationwide in North Syracuse and that the demand for arbitration was served on Robert Marino in the Woodbury Claims Department, who was handling the uninsured motorist benefit claim.

The Supreme Court granted the petition to stay arbitration, holding that the proceeding was timely. It held that the notice of intention to arbitrate in its timing and circumstances was intended to mislead. Thus, the 20-day preclusion was measured from the later demand for arbitration. This was error.

The basis on which Nationwide sought to justify the timeliness of its application was that a notice of intention to arbitrate is not a demand for arbitration and that the 20-day preclusion of CPLR 7503 (c) applies only to the demand. However, CPLR 7503 (c) provides: “A party may serve upon another party a demand for arbitration or a notice of intention to arbitrate [containing the 20-day preclusion warning].” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the preclusion applies identically to a demand for arbitration and a notice of intention to arbitrate (see Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C7503:6). Indeed, the notice of intention has been characterized, as Singh’s lawyer did in his March 8, 2002, letter, as simply a “Notice” by Professor David D. Siegel in New York Practice (Siegel, NY Prac § 593, at 1002 [3d ed). Also, the seminal case on the preclusive effect of CPLR 7503 (c), Matter of Jonathan Logan, Inc. (Stillwater Worsted Mills) (31 AD2d 208 [1968], affd 24 NY2d 898 [1969]), arose not from a demand for arbitration but from a notice of intention to arbitrate. [*3]

It is true, as Nationwide contends, that service intended to conceal a notice of intention to arbitrate and to precipitate an insurer’s default will not be given preclusive effect when the notice is buried among unrelated documents or is served on a remote office of the insurer (see Crawford v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 35 NY2d 291, 296 [1974] [notice for arbitration before AAA not served on attorneys representing the defendant in action in which the defendant had moved to compel arbitration before NYSE, but was served on an office different from the one on which the summons commencing the action had been served; notice contained misleading statements suggesting that the plaintiff was joining in the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration before the NYSE]; Matter of Insinga v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 265 AD2d 411, 412 [1999] [notice, served on respondent, not its attorneys, was hidden among voluminous other documents to prevent respondent from contesting arbitrability]; Matter of Balboa Ins. Co. v Barnes, 123 AD2d 691 [1986] [demand for arbitration enclosed in the middle of a packet of 11 documents mailed to the insurer’s home office in California despite a prior request that future correspondence be sent to the New York office]; Rider Ins. Co. v Marino, 84 AD2d 832 [1981] [demand mailed to insurer at address unrelated to the business at hand and placed amidst a packet of documents submitted in support of the claim with a covering letter adumbrating reference to the demand]). Yet, these cases were not decided in a vacuum. The issue of misleading tactics had to be raised by the petitioners who tardily sought to stay arbitration, and had to be supported by someone with knowledge of the facts on the basis of which they contended that they had been misled.

In the case at hand, Nationwide never claimed to have been misled; this came only from the Supreme Court. Furthermore, no affidavit by a Nationwide claims employee was submitted that would support the conclusion that Nationwide was misled. This Court confronted just such a situation in Matter of State-Wide Ins. Co. v Rowe (228 AD2d 606 [1996]). There, the tardy motion to stay arbitration (sought by way of a notice of intention to arbitrate) was rejected by the court on the one ground originally asserted in the petition (see Matter of Steck, 88 NY2d 827 [1996]). It was not until State-Wide Insurance Company moved for renewal that it raised the claim of a defective and misleading notice of intention to arbitrate. In Rowe, at least the contention was supported with an affidavit of the claims department manager. This Court affirmed the rejection of this new ground articulated in the renewal motion since the argument and facts were known at the time of the original petition.

The Rowe case compels us to reverse the grant of a stay of arbitration of Singh’s uninsured motorist claim. Nationwide never made the claim, interposed in the Rowe case only on renewal, that its time to move to stay arbitration was defeated by trickery. Nor does it seem that it could support such a claim. Singh’s attorney did not bury the notice of intention to arbitrate among a sheaf of other documents. He only transmitted one other document with it, namely an application for no-fault benefits. Furthermore, this was transmitted, quite understandably, to Nationwide’s North Syracuse office because that is the location of its no-fault division. The record demonstrates that this location had no adverse effect on Nationwide’s ability to respond with alacrity and to move to stay arbitration within 20 days because Nationwide, in fact, sent a disclaimer letter dated a mere 10 days later from its Woodbury office.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in denying Singh’s cross motion to dismiss and in granting Nationwide’s untimely petition to stay arbitration since the evidence does not support the conclusion that Nationwide was misled into filing an untimely petition, and Nationwide itself never raised this issue. Santucci, J.P., Adams, Crane and Cozier, JJ., concur.