—[*1]

In an action to recover no-fault benefits under an insurance contract, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mahon, J.), entered January 20, 2005, which, after a nonjury trial, and upon denying the defendant’s application to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of standing, is in favor of the plaintiffs and against it in the total sum of $33,452.77.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The defendant correctly contends that the plaintiff hospitals lacked standing. The proof adduced at trial included unsigned assignment of benefit forms (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]). Schmidt, J.P., Adams, Luciano and Lifson, JJ., concur.

Decided on June 13, 2006

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y. (Mark Green of counsel), for
appellants.
McDonnell & Adels, P.C., Garden City, N.Y. (Martha S.
Henley of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault medical payments, the plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCarty III, J.), dated February 18, 2005, as denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment on the second cause of action, granted that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the third cause of action, and, upon granting that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment on the fourth cause of action, awarded interest only until the date of the determination and provided that the fourth cause of action “shall not bear interest until entry of the judgment disposing of the action.”

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by (1) deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the second cause of action and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion, and (2) deleting the provisions thereof which, upon granting that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the fourth cause of action, awarded interest only until the date of the Supreme Court’s determination, and provided that the fourth cause of action shall not bear interest until entry of the judgment disposing of the action, and substituting therefor a provision awarding interest on the fourth cause of action for the period commencing 30 days after each claim was [*2]presented to the defendant until the date the claim was paid; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the plaintiffs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a) and 11 NYCRR 65-3.5, insurers are required either to pay or deny a claim for no-fault automobile insurance benefits within 30 days from the date the applicant supplies proof of claim (see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 278). Failure to comply with the 30-day limit results in the claim becoming overdue, which could result in the waiver of the insurer’s defenses (id.). The one exception to this rule is if the insurer requests medical verification (see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 233 AD2d 431, 432).

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the third cause of action. The defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the third cause of action by submitting an affidavit of one of its claims representatives, which demonstrated that the defendant requested medical verification of the plaintiffs’ claim within 30 days of receiving notice of the claim, and that it never received such verification. The plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

However, the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the second cause of action. The plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the second cause of action by submitting a hospital bill with a signed certified mail receipt and by submitting the affidavit of a third-party biller, who testified that he billed the defendant for the subject medical treatment, and that “[t]he defendant failed to either pay the entire claim or to issue a Denial of Claim Form.”

In opposition, the defendant produced a denial of claim form dated within 30 days from their receipt of the plaintiff’s claim. However, the defendant failed to supply any evidence that this form had been timely transmitted to the plaintiff, and therefore failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, supra).

The Supreme Court further erred in awarding interest on the fourth cause of action only until the date of the determination, instead of the date the claim was paid. An insurer, such as the defendant, that is held liable for failure to pay no-fault insurance benefits is required to pay interest at the rate of 2% per month on the claim for “the period commencing 30 days after the claim was presented to the defendant for payment until the date the claim was or is paid” (Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v Insurance Co. of N. Am., 208 AD2d 501; see Insurance Law § 5106[a]). Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for calculation of the interest accrued on the second and fourth causes of action for the period commencing 30 days after each claim was presented to the defendant until the date the claim was paid, and for the entry of an appropriate judgment.
ADAMS, J.P., SANTUCCI, LUNN and DILLON, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

James Edward Pelzer

Clerk of the Court

—[*1]

Spain, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McNamara, J.), entered June 1, 2005 in Albany County, which, inter alia, partially granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs commenced this action as the assignees of the no-fault insurance claim rights of 15 individuals to whom plaintiffs provided psychological treatment following automobile accidents. Asserting that defendant had failed to timely deny coverage or seek verification of the insurance claims, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Defendant cross-moved for sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR part 130 and for severance of the claims. Supreme Court granted summary judgment with respect to the third, a portion of the seventh, tenth, eleventh and thirteenth causes of action and otherwise denied plaintiffs’ motion. The court denied defendant’s cross motion for sanctions and severance. On defendant’s appeal, we affirm.

“[A]n insurer is required to either pay or deny a claim for no-fault automobile insurance benefits within 30 days from the date an applicant supplies proof of claim” (Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 278 [1997]; see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR former 65.15 [g]; 65-3.8; LaHendro v Travelers Ins. Co., 220 AD2d 971, 972 [1995]). A plaintiff may obtain summary judgment on a cause of action to recover first-party no-fault benefits by “submitting evidentiary proof that the prescribed statutory billing forms had been [*2]mailed and received, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue” (Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742, 742-743 [2004]; see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]).

Defendant asserts that plaintiffs failed to provide adequate proof that the claim forms were properly mailed and, thus, did not establish a prima facie case of entitlement to benefits. Plaintiffs supplied direct proof of actual mailing by producing signed and stamped mailing certificates (see Badio v Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 229, 230 [2004]). In addition, plaintiffs’ officer, Jonathan Kogen, provided an affidavit stating—based on his review of plaintiffs’ business records and his own personal knowledge—that plaintiffs mailed the claim forms to defendant and that none were returned as undeliverable. This “proof of proper mailing gives rise to a presumption that the item was received by the addressee” (Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679, 680 [2001]). Defendant has not submitted proof to rebut this presumption; indeed, defendant does not deny receipt of the claims and, in fact, its papers in opposition include evidence that claims were received on dates which correspond to those in the mailing receipts produced by plaintiffs. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs met their prima facie burden of proof with regard to mailing of the claim forms.

Defendant also asserts that plaintiffs failed to establish a valid assignment of benefits because the assignor’s signature on the assignment forms was not properly authenticated. Upon receipt of the allegedly defective assignments, defendant had 10 days to request verification (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [a]; former 65.15 [d]). “[F]ailure to object to the adequacy of . . . claim forms within 10 days of receipt constitute[s] a waiver of any defenses based thereon, including the alleged lack of a valid assignment of benefits” (Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 564, 565 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 713 [2005]; see Nyack Hosp. v Encompass Ins. Co., 23 AD3d 535, 535-536 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Allstate Ins. Co., 21 AD3d 348, 348-349 [2005]; but see Siegel v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 6 Misc 3d 888 [2004]). Inasmuch as defendant failed to request verification of the assignments at issue within the 10-day period proscribed by regulation, its objection to the assignments was waived.

Next, we are unpersuaded by defendant’s arguments that summary judgment was premature because discovery was incomplete. In opposition to the prima facie case established by plaintiffs, defendant “did not make the required showing that ‘further discovery may raise a triable issue of fact’ ” (Williams v General Elec. Co., 8 AD3d 866, 867 [2004], quoting Mitchell v Atlas Copco N. Am., 307 AD2d 635, 636 [2003]; see Herba v Chichester, 301 AD2d 822, 823 [2003]). Indeed, it is undisputed that defendant did not send timely delay notices or claim denials; thus, defendant is precluded from raising any defense to payment of the claims unless such denial is based on lack of coverage (see Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., supra at 282). Defendant’s remaining argument in opposition to summary judgment—that plaintiffs committed fraud by misrepresenting Kogen as a “treating doctor” although he did not personally provide or supervise the psychological services rendered by plaintiffs, and that such fraud falls within the narrow “lack of coverage” exception, obviating the need for a timely denial—has been rejected by this Court (see Valley Psychological v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 30 AD3d 718 [2006] [decided herewith]).

Defendant asserts that Supreme Court abused its discretion in failing to sanction plaintiffs for asserting frivolous causes of action because several of the claims asserted had been paid or settled. Sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR part 130 should be awarded for taking legal actions which are completely without merit in law, are undertaken primarily to delay the [*3]resolution of the litigation or assert false material statements of fact (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]; Ireland v GEICO Corp., 2 AD3d 917, 919 [2003]; Mountain Lion Baseball v Gaiman, 263 AD2d 636, 639 [1999]). That level of misconduct has not been established here. The record reveals that plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew one of the allegedly frivolous claims and the others were not dismissed because Supreme Court found issues of fact existed as to whether payment had been made or a settlement had been reached. Under these circumstances and absent proof of actual payment or settlement, we find no basis to interfere with Supreme Court’s sound discretion (see Northern Adirondack Cent. School Dist. v La Plante Co., 229 AD2d 764, 766 [1996]; Golden v Barker, 223 AD2d 769, 770 [1996]).

Finally, we discern no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court’s decision not to sever the claims (see CPLR 603; State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v Dayco Prods., Inc., 19 AD3d 923, 924-926 [2005]; Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 134 AD2d 569, 570 [1987]).

Cardona, P.J., Carpinello, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

—[*1]

Kane, J. Appeal from an order of the County Court of Albany County (Breslin, J.), entered May 16, 2005, which affirmed an order of the City Court of the City of Albany dismissing the claim.

Plaintiff alleges that it provided psychological testing and psychotherapy to a woman after her involvement in a motor vehicle accident. It is undisputed that the woman was injured in an accident involving a vehicle insured by defendant, thus invoking coverage by defendant. As assignee of the woman’s no-fault insurance claims, plaintiff submitted to defendant two bills for services rendered. Defendant denied both claims, but those denials were issued more than 30 days after the claims were received. Plaintiff filed a commercial claim in Albany City Court seeking payment. At trial, defendant asserted a defense of provider fraud, alleging that plaintiff submitted fraudulent bills because its principal licensed psychologist did not provide active and personal supervision over the employees providing services to plaintiff’s assignor as required by workers’ compensation schedules.^[FN*] City Court determined that defendant’s assertion of a fraud [*2]defense was not precluded by its untimely denial, then dismissed the claim based on the fraud defense (195 Misc 2d 540 [2002]). Upon plaintiff’s appeal, County Court affirmed. Plaintiff now appeals to this Court.

Because defendant’s untimely denial precluded it from asserting the defense raised here, plaintiff was entitled to judgment in its favor. While our review of this City Court claim is limited to whether “substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law” (UCCA 1807; see Sten v Desrocher, 8 AD3d 915, 915 [2004]), the misapplication of substantive law in this case mandates a reversal. The law requires an insurer to accept or deny a claim for no-fault benefits within 30 days after the claimant provides proof of the claim (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR former 65.15 [g]; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 278 [1997]). An insurer that fails to deny a claim within the 30-day period is precluded from raising most defenses (see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., supra at 282; Loudermilk v Allstate Ins. Co., 178 AD2d 897, 898 [1991]; Ultra Diagnostics Imaging v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 9 Misc 3d 97, 98 [2005]). Untimely disclaimers, however, do not preclude an insurer from denying liability “on a strict lack of coverage ground” (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 198 [1997]).

Defendant successfully argued in City Court and County Court that its fraud defense asserted a lack of coverage thereby rendering its untimely denials irrelevant. We disagree. In contrast to fraudulent conduct such as staging an automobile accident, which results in no coverage at all—thus not requiring a timely denial—coverage is not extinguished by allegations, or even proof, that a medical services provider unilaterally schemed to defraud the insurer by providing unnecessary or excessive treatment—thus requiring a timely denial to avoid preclusion of the defense (see Ultra Diagnostics Imaging v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra at 99-100; Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 9 Misc 3d 76, 78-79 [2005]; Melbourne Med., P.C. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 92, 94 [2004]). In fact, the Court of Appeals expressly noted that the fraud exception from preclusion for untimely denials does not apply to a defense that the provider’s treatment was excessive, as that defense does “not ordinarily implicate a coverage matter” (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., supra at 199, 202). Because the defense raised here was analogous to an argument that the treatment was excessive or unnecessary, it does not implicate coverage and therefore required a timely denial. Since defendant’s fraud defense was precluded, substantial justice was not meted out according to the substantive law, requiring reversal and remittal for City Court to determine the amount of judgment to be entered in plaintiff’s favor (see UCCA 1807).

Crew III, J.P., Peters, Carpinello and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and matter remitted to the City Court of the City of Albany for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision.

Footnotes

Footnote *: Medical providers must comply with workers’ compensation payment schedules to qualify for payment under the no-fault law (see Insurance Law § 5108; 11 NYCRR 68.1)

—[*1]

In an action to recover no-fault insurance benefits under certain insurance contracts, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Cozzens, J.), dated July 21, 2005, as granted the defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment of the same court entered December 8, 2004, which is in favor of the plaintiffs and against it in the principal sum of $43,425.51, upon the defendant’s failure to appear or answer, and to extend its time to answer.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Service upon the defendant was effectuated through delivery of the summons and complaint upon the Deputy Secretary of Insurance pursuant to Insurance Law § 1212. Although the defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment was made pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), under the circumstances of this case, it may be treated as a motion made under CPLR 317 as well (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 142-143 [1986]). A defendant served with a summons other than by personal delivery or to an agent designated under CPLR 318 may obtain relief pursuant to CPLR 317 upon a showing that it did not receive notice of the summons in time to defend, and has a meritorious defense (see Marine v Federal Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 721 [2002]). Unlike [*2]a motion to vacate under CPLR 5015 (a) (1), it is unnecessary for a defendant seeking relief under CPLR 317 to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its default (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., supra at 141; Marinoff v Natty Realty Corp., 17 AD3d 412, 413 [2005]; Rifelli v Fireside Homes Corp., 152 AD2d 629, 631 [1989]; Simon & Schuster v Howe Plastics & Chems. Co., 105 AD2d 604, 605 [1984]). The defendant met its burden of showing that it did not receive actual notice of the summons in time to defend (see Marine v Federal Ins. Co., supra; cf. Kaperonis v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 254 AD2d 334 [1998]; Board of Mgrs. of Landings at Patchogue Condominium v 263 Riv. Ave. Corp., 243 AD2d 668 [1997]; Fleetwood Park Corp. v Jerrick Waterproofing Co., 203 AD2d 238, 239 [1994]; Anchor Sav. Bank v Alpha Developers, 143 AD2d 711, 713-714 [1988]) and that its defenses are meritorious (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]; Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v General Acc. Ins. Co. of Am., 229 AD2d 479 [1996]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in vacating the default judgment and extending the defendant’s time to answer. Miller, J.P., Ritter, Luciano, Spolzino and Dillon, JJ., concur.

—[*1]

In a subrogation action to recover insurance benefits paid to the plaintiff’s insured, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rosengarten, J.), dated February 17, 2005, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

We agree with the plaintiff’s contention that the no-fault provisions of the Insurance Law (see Insurance Law § 5102 [a], [b]; § 5103 [a]) do not bar it from seeking recovery of benefits it paid to its insured for “extended economic loss” pursuant to an “additional personal injury protection” endorsement (Allstate Ins. Co. v Stein, 1 NY3d 416, 417 [2004]; see Allstate Ins. Co. v Mazzola, 175 F3d 255 [2d Cir 1999]). However, the defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that the plaintiff’s subrogor unsuccessfully sought to recover damages for his extended economic loss from them in a prior action, which culminated in a jury verdict in their favor. An insurance company which has paid additional personal injury protection benefits for extended economic loss has a traditional equitable right of subrogation, and thus acquires only the rights that its subrogor had, with no enlargement or diminution (see Allstate Ins. Co. v Stein, supra). Since the plaintiff’s subrogor unsuccessfully sought to recover damages for extended [*2]economic loss in a prior action, the jury verdict in that action is entitled to preclusive effect on the issue of the plaintiff’s entitlement to recoup the benefits it paid to its subrogor for extended economic loss. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly granted. Schmidt, J.P., Krausman, Luciano and Covello, JJ., concur.

—[*1]

In an action to recover no-fault medical payments, the plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brandveen, J.), dated February 7, 2005, as denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment on their second cause of action to recover payments for medical services rendered by the plaintiff New York and Presbyterian Hospital, as assignee of Cindy Garone. Justice Crane has been substituted for former Justice Cozier (see 22 NYCRR 670.1 [c]).

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiffs, as the proponent of the summary judgment motion, had the initial burden of showing their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidentiary proof that the prescribed statutory billing forms were mailed and received, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 564 [2005]). The plaintiffs failed to submit a proper affidavit of service to establish as a matter of law that the subject hospital bill was mailed and received by the defendant.

Generally, “proof that an item was properly mailed gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the item was received by the addressee” (Matter of Rodriguez v Wing, 251 AD2d 335, 336 [1998] [internal quotation marks omitted]). “The presumption may be created by either proof of actual mailing or proof of a standard office practice or procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed” (Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679, 680 [2001]). Here, no presumption of mailing was created because the affidavit of the plaintiffs’ billing service representative did not state that he actually mailed the particular claim alleged in the second cause of action to the defendant Allstate Insurance Company (hereinafter Allstate) or describe his office’s practice and procedure for mailing no-fault claims to insurers (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 284 AD2d 374, 375 [2001]).

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contentions, the certified mail receipt and the United States Postal Service “Track and Confirm” printout do not prove that the particular claim alleged in the second cause of action was actually received where, as here, there is no evidence that this claim was mailed to Allstate under that certified mail receipt number and no signed certified mail return receipt card has been produced (cf. Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. [Kankam], 3 AD3d 418, 419 [2004]). The plaintiffs’ submissions were insufficient to raise a presumption that Allstate received the claim (see Nassau Ins. Co. v Murray, 46 NY2d 828 [1978]).

Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of Allstate’s papers in opposition (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Mariaca-Olmos v Mizrhy, 226 AD2d 437, 438 [1996]). Schmidt, J.P., Crane, Rivera and Fisher, JJ., concur.

—[*1]In an action to recover no-fault insurance benefits, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mahon, J.), entered February 14, 2005, as, upon granting the plaintiffs’ motion, in effect, for reargument of their motion for summary judgment which was denied in a prior order dated May 11, 2004, and, in effect, for reargument of the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment which was granted in the prior order dated May 11, 2004, granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action and denied that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and upon reargument, that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on their first cause of action is denied and that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action is granted, and the first cause of action is dismissed.

The defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the first cause of action on the ground that the policy limits had been exhausted (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 579 [2004]; see also Pantaleone v Viewmore Homes, 225 AD2d 599 [1996]). The plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. [*2]

The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit. Florio, J.P., Santucci, Goldstein and Skelos, JJ., concur.

—[*1]

In an action to recover no-fault benefits under an insurance contract, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bucaria, J.), dated March 17, 2005, which granted the motion of the plaintiff New York and Presbyterian Hospital, as assignee of Yaakov Elman, for summary judgment on the first cause of action and denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is denied, the cross motion is granted, and the first cause of action is dismissed.

The Supreme Court should have denied the motion of the plaintiff New York and Presbyterian Hospital, as assignee of Yaakov Elman (hereinafter the hospital), for summary judgment on the first cause of action to recover no-fault benefits under an insurance contract its assignee had with the defendant Allstate Insurance Company (hereinafter the insurer). The hospital failed to establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see CPLR 3212; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320-327).

The Supreme Court should have granted the insurer’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action. The insurer made a prima facie showing, through the affidavits of its claims representatives, the “denial of claim” forms sent to the hospital and to Mount Sinai Hospital (the healthcare provider whose claim exhausted the policy limits), and its payment [*2]log listing all payments made to other healthcare providers under the subject policy, that it had exhausted the policy’s coverage limits before it became obligated to pay the hospital’s claim and that such payments were made in compliance with 11 NYCRR 65-3.15 (see Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 27 AD3d 96 [2005]). In opposition, the hospital failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

The hospital’s remaining contentions are without merit. Adams, J.P., Skelos, Fisher and Lunn, JJ., concur.

—[*1]

In an action to recover no-fault insurance benefits under certain insurance contracts, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Dunne, J.), dated August 18, 2005, which granted the defendant’s motion to vacate a judgment entered April 1, 2005, upon its failure to appear or answer, awarding the plaintiffs the principal sum of $28,060.13, and for an extension of time to answer pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d), and granted the defendant’s separate motion to quash an information subpoena.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion to vacate its default in answering and for an extension of time to answer pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d). The defendant demonstrated both a reasonable excuse for its brief delay in serving an answer, and potentially meritorious defenses. Furthermore, there is a strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, and the default was not willful, nor was there a showing of prejudice to the plaintiffs (see Harcztark v Drive Variety, Inc., 21 AD3d 876 [2005]; Bunch v Dollar Budget, Inc., 12 AD3d 391 [2004]; Orwell Bldg. Corp. v Bessaha, 5 AD3d 573 [2004]; Sippin v Gallardo, 287 AD2d 703 [2001]).

The defendant’s motion to quash the information subpoena was properly granted (see CPLR 2304). Florio, J.P., Santucci, Mastro and Rivera, JJ., concur.