—[*1] Baxter Smith & Shapiro, P.C., West Seneca (Lauren E. Dillon of counsel), for petitioner-appellant.

Louden Law Firm, P.C., Malta (Michelle Murphy-Louden of counsel), for respondent-respondent Patricia Armitage.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Rose H. Sconiers, J.), entered February 10, 2010. The order denied the petition for a stay of arbitration.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioner appeals from an order denying its petition seeking a permanent stay of arbitration. Respondent sought arbitration following petitioner’s denial of her claim for no-fault insurance benefits. The propriety of the denial of benefits is a “dispute involving the insurer’s liability to pay first party benefits” (Insurance Law § 5106 [b]), and we therefore conclude that Supreme Court properly refused to grant a permanent stay of arbitration (see generally Ryder Truck Lines v Maiorano, 44 NY2d 364, 368-369 [1978]). Petitioner further contends that the issue whether the offset for workers’ compensation benefits exceeds the monthly limit of first party benefits is not a matter for arbitration. We reject that contention (see Insurance Law § 5102 [a] [2]; see generally § 5106 [b]; Matter of Johnson v Buffalo & Erie County Private Indus. Council, 84 NY2d 13, 18-19 [1994]; Matter of Cady [Aetna Life & Cas. Co.], 96 AD2d 967 [1983], affd 61 NY2d 594 [1984]). Finally, we reject petitioner’s contention that, by refusing to grant a permanent stay of arbitration, the court denied petitioner its right to seek a loss-transfer claim from additional proposed respondents (see generally Matter of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. [Hanover Ins. Co.], 307 AD2d 40, 42-43 [2003]). Present—Scudder, P.J., Fahey, Carni, Green and Gorski, JJ.

—[*1] Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP, Melville, N.Y. (Charles W. Benton of counsel), for appellant. Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault medical benefits under an insurance contract, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Martin, J.), entered October 28, 2009, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) to modify a judgment of the same court dated April 30, 2009, which, upon an order granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint, was in favor or the plaintiff and against it in the principal sum of $416,039.42.

Ordered that the order entered October 28, 2009, is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff hospital, as assignee of Bartolo Reyes, was awarded judgment against the defendant in the principal sum of $416,039.42, in this action to recover no-fault medical benefits under a contract of insurance entered into between the plaintiff’s assignee and the defendant. The defendant thereafter moved to modify the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a), belatedly asserting that the judgment exceeded the coverage limit of the subject policy due, in part, to payments previously made under the policy to other health care providers. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion to modify the judgment.

The defendant failed to specify on which of the five subdivisions of CPLR 5015 (a) its motion was based, much less establish its entitlement to relief on any of the enumerated grounds. To the extent that the defendant sought modification pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (2) based upon “newly-discovered evidence,” the defendant failed to demonstrate that the evidence offered in support of the motion, i.e., an affidavit of an employee setting forth the policy limits and the amount of benefits paid for alleged prior claims, “was not available at the time of the prejudgment proceedings” (Jonas v Jonas, 4 AD3d 336, 336 [2004]; see Sicurelli v Sicurelli, 73 AD3d 735 [2010]).

Moreover, although courts possess inherent discretionary power to grant relief from a judgment or order in the interest of justice, this “extraordinary relief” is not appropriate under the circumstances presented (Jakobleff v Jakobleff, 108 AD2d 725, 726-727 [1985]; see Selinger v Selinger, 250 AD2d 752 [1998]). The plaintiff previously moved for summary judgment on the complaint, seeking a certain amount of benefits, in accordance with the no-fault billing statement sent to the defendant, and [*2]this Court reversed the denial of that motion and granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2009]). Only after the plaintiff obtained, upon this Court’s order, a judgment from the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, representing, inter alia, the amount of benefits sought in the complaint, did the defendant raise the issue of exhaustion of the policy limits. Under these circumstances, modification of the judgment in the interest of justice is not warranted.

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

Motion by the respondent to dismiss an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Martin, J.), entered October 28, 2009, on the ground that the appeal is frivolous, and to impose a sanction upon the appellant and for an award of an attorney’s fee. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated March 19, 2010, the motion was held in abeyance and referred to the panel of Justices hearing the appeal for determination upon the argument or submission thereof.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion, the papers filed in opposition or relation thereto, and upon the argument of the appeal, it is

Ordered that the motion is denied. Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

—[*1] Israel, Israel & Purdy, LLP, Great Neck (William M. Purdy of counsel), for appellants.

Rubin, Fiorella & Friedman LLP, New York (Joseph R. Federici, Jr. of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane S. Solomon, J.), entered March 1, 2010, which denied defendants-appellants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment on the complaint, and declared that plaintiff does not owe coverage for the no-fault claims allegedly assigned to defendants, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The motion court properly determined that plaintiff insurer may retroactively deny claims on the basis of defendants’ assignors’ failure to appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs) requested by plaintiff, even though plaintiff initially denied the claims on the ground of lack of medical necessity (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 721-722 [2006]). The failure to appear for IMEs requested by the insurer “when, and as often as, [it] may reasonably require” (Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1) is a breach of a condition precedent to coverage under the no-fault policy, and therefore fits squarely within the exception to the preclusion doctrine, as set forth in Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. (90 NY2d 195 [1997]). Accordingly, when defendants’ assignors failed to appear for the requested IMEs, plaintiff had the right to deny all claims retroactively to the date of loss, regardless of whether the denials were timely issued (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [c]; Stephen Fogel Psychological, 35 AD3d at 721-722).

It is of no moment that the retroactive denials premised on failure to attend IMEs were embodied in blanket denial forms, or that they were issued based on failure to attend IMEs in a different medical speciality from that which underlies the claims at issue. A denial premised on breach of a condition precedent to coverage voids the policy ab initio and, in such case, the insurer cannot be precluded from asserting a defense premised on no coverage (see Chubb, 90 NY2d at 199).

There is likewise no merit to defendants’ contention that the IME request notices were [*2]invalid. Plaintiff satisfied its prima facie burden on summary judgment of establishing that it requested IMEs in accordance with the procedures and time frames set forth in the no-fault implementing regulations, and that defendants’ assignors did not appear. In opposition, defendants failed to raise an issue of fact that the requests were unreasonable (see generally Celtic Med. P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 13, 14-15 [2007]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 9 Misc 3d 19, 21 [2005]).

Defendants’ argument that plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the assignors’ failure to appear for the IMEs was willful is unpreserved and, in any event, without merit. The doctrine of willfulness, as addressed in Thrasher v United States Liab. Ins. Co. (19 NY2d 159 [1967]), applies in the context of liability policies, and has no application in the no-fault context, where the eligible injured party has full control over the requirements and conditions necessary to obtain coverage (cf. id. at 168).

Defendants’ argument that all IMEs must be conducted by physicians is unavailing. Although Insurance Department Regulations (11 NYCRR) § 65-1.1 (d) states that “[t]he eligible injured person shall submit to medical examination by physicians selected by, or acceptable to, the [insurer], when, and as often as, the [insurer] may reasonably require,” the regulations permit reimbursement for medically necessary treatment services that are rendered by nonphysicians, such as chiropractors and acupuncturists, as well (see Five Boro Psychological Servs., P.C. v AutoOne Ins. Co., 22 Misc 3d 978, 979-980 [2008]). We have considered defendants’ remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Friedman, Moskowitz and Richter, JJ. [Prior Case History: 2010 NY Slip Op 31936(U).]

—[*1] Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for appellant.

Litchfield Cavo LLP, New York, N.Y. (Mark A. Everett of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault medical payments, the plaintiff, St. Vincent’s Hospital & Medical Center, as assignee of Tula Huillca, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Phelan, J.), entered April 23, 2010, which denied its motion for summary judgment on the complaint and granted the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the claim was untimely.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint is granted, and the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

“A proper denial of [a] claim [for no-fault benefits] must include the information called for in the prescribed denial of claim form (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.4 [c] [11]) and must ‘promptly apprise the claimant with a high degree of specificity of the ground or grounds on which the disclaimer is predicated’ ” (Nyack Hosp. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 11 AD3d 664, 664 [2004], quoting General Acc. Ins. Group v Cirucci, 46 NY2d 862, 864 [1979]). However, a timely denial of a no-fault insurance medical claim alone does not avoid precluding an insurer from disclaiming or denying liability where the denial is factually insufficient, conclusory, vague, or otherwise involves a defense which has no merit as a matter of law (see Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 564, 565 [2005]).

The plaintiff, St. Vincent’s Hospital & Medical Center, as assignee of Tula Huillca, demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. While the defendant insurer timely issued two denials of claim within 30 days of its receipt of the completed hospital facility forms (NYS form N-F 5), those denials of claim, which incorrectly stated the amount of the bill and the amount in dispute, and incorrectly listed Tula Huillca as the applicant for benefits instead of the plaintiff, were fatally defective (see St. Barnabas Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 66 AD3d 996, 996-997 [2009]; Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d at 565). In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary [*2]judgment on the complaint, and denied the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Dillon, J.P., Dickerson, Hall and Roman, JJ., concur.

Motion by the respondent on an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered April 23, 2010, to strike Point I of the appellant’s reply brief on the ground, inter alia, that it improperly raises issues for the first time on appeal. Cross motion by the appellant to strike lines 11 through 19 of page 3 of the respondent’s brief on the ground that those lines refer to matter dehors the record. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated December 6, 2010, the motion and cross motion were held in abeyance and referred to the panel of Justices hearing the appeal for determination upon the argument or submission thereof.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and cross motion, the papers filed in opposition thereto, and upon the argument of the appeal, it is

Ordered that the motion is granted and Point I of the appellant’s reply brief is deemed stricken and has not been considered in the determination of the appeal; and it is further,

Ordered that the cross motion is denied. Dillon, J.P., Dickerson, Hall and Roman, JJ., concur.

—[*1] Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for appellants.

Jaffe & Koumourdas, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Jean H. Kang of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Murphy, J.), entered July 14, 2010, as denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs payable to the plaintiff New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens, and that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action is granted.

The plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the first cause of action by submitting, inter alia, the requisite billing forms, the affidavits from its third-party biller, the certified mail receipts, and the signed return-receipt card referencing the patient and the forms, which demonstrated that the plaintiff New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens (hereinafter the plaintiff) mailed the necessary billing documents to the defendant, that the defendant received them, and that the payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v GMAC Ins. Co. Online, Inc., 80 AD3d 603 [2011]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Countrywide Ins. Co., 45 AD3d 676 [2007]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Countrywide Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 729, 730 [2007]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 34 AD3d 532 [2006], affd 9 NY3d 312 [2007]).

In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). The defendant’s verification requests, dated April 22, 2008, and May 22, 2008, respectively, requested “Rev. 01/04 NF5 & Assignment of Benefit Forms signed (No Stamps).” The plaintiff responded by providing exactly what was requested of it. The defendant cannot now complain that the NF5 or the assignment of benefits forms provided by the plaintiff were “outdated,” as its verification requests only sought the January 2004 version of the NF5 form and its accompanying assignment. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, the affidavit of the defendant’s representative was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact, as the plaintiff’s documented responses demonstrate that it [*2]complied with the defendant’s verification requests.

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action. Dillon, J.P., Covello, Florio and Hall, JJ., concur.

—[*1] Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for appellant.

Lawrence N. Rogak, LLC, Oceanside, N.Y. (David A. Gierasch of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under an insurance contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Parga, J.), dated August 3, 2010, which denied its motion for summary judgment on the complaint and granted the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint is granted, and the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The plaintiff made a prima facie showing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its complaint to recover no-fault insurance medical payments by submitting evidence that the prescribed statutory billing form had been mailed and received by the defendant and that the defendant had failed to either pay or deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.5; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045, 1045-1046 [2009]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 51 AD3d 1014, 1017 [2008]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 43 AD3d 1019, 1020 [2007]).

In opposition to the plaintiff’s motion, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether it timely denied the plaintiff’s claim. The defendant’s denial of claim form NF-10 dated December 18, 2009, was fatally defective because it omitted several material items of information (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 564, 565 [2005]; Nyack Hosp. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 11 AD3d 664, 665 [2004]). The defendant also failed to submit sufficient evidence that it mailed the second denial of claim form NF-10 bearing the date December 31, 2009, to establish compliance with the 30-day period (see Nyack Hosp. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 564 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 284 AD2d 374, 375 [2001]). Thus, the defendant also failed to make a prima facie showing that it timely denied the claim in support of its cross motion for summary judgment [*2]dismissing the complaint.

Failure to establish timely denial of the claim results in preclusion of the defense that the intoxication of the insured was a contributing cause of the accident and subject to exclusion under the policy (see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 286 [1997]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint and should have denied the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Angiolillo, J.P., Belen, Chambers and Roman, JJ., concur.

—[*1] Law Offices of Teresa M. Spina, Woodbury (Peter J. Molesso of counsel), for appellant. Steven J. Neuwirth, Garden City, for respondent.

Order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, entered June 24, 2009, which affirmed an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Julia I. Rodriguez, J.), entered on or about February 15, 2007, finding the issue of which insurer is the primary insurer must be submitted to arbitration, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Insurance Law § 5105 (b) requires that mandatory arbitration be used to resolve all disputes between insurers as to their responsibility for the payment of first-party benefits. 11 NYCRR 65-3.12 (b) provides that “[i]f a dispute regarding priority of payment arises among insurers who otherwise are liable for the payment of first-party benefits, then the first insurer to whom notice of claim is given . . . shall be responsible for payment to such person. Any such dispute shall be resolved in accordance with the arbitration procedures established pursuant to section 5105 of the Insurance Law and section 65-4.11 of this Part.”

Defendant argues that its denial of benefits raised an issue of coverage, rather than of payment, because it was not “otherwise . . . liable” for the payment of first-party benefits. However, 11 NYCRR 65-4.11 (a) (6) provides that “any controversy between insurers involving the responsibility or the obligation to pay first-party benefits (i.e., priority [of] payment or sources of payment as provided in section 65-3.12 of this Part) is not considered a coverage question and must be submitted to mandatory arbitration under this section.” Thus, as “the first insurer to whom notice of claim [was] given” (11 NYCRR 65-3.12 [b]), defendant was responsible or obligated to pay the no-fault benefits for the health services provided by plaintiff, irrespective of any issues of priority or source of payment. By denying plaintiff’s claim on the stated ground that no-fault benefits were payable by another insurer (Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Co.), defendant raised an issue as to which insurer was obligated to pay first-party [*2]benefits, which “[c]learly . . . is an inter-company dispute subject to mandatory arbitration” (see Paramount Ins. Co. v Miccio, 169 AD2d 761, 763 [1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 851 [1991]; Matter of Pacific Ins. Co. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 150 AD2d 455, 456 [1989]). Concur—Saxe, J.P., Friedman, DeGrasse, Freedman and Abdus-Salaam, JJ. [Prior Case History: 24 Misc 3d 43.]

—[*1] Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for appellants. Jaffe & Koumourdas, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Jean H. Kang of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under two insurance contracts, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Galasso, J.), entered March 19, 2010, which granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 5019 (a) to modify the amount of a judgment entered January 14, 2010, which, upon an order of the same court entered December 28, 2009, among other things, granting that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action, awarded the plaintiff Mount Sinai Hospital, as assignee of Anthony Benjamin, the sum of $25,327.50.

Ordered that the order entered March 19, 2010, is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 5019 (a) to modify the judgment is denied.

The plaintiffs moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the first cause of action asserted by the plaintiff Mount Sinai Hospital, as assignee of Anthony Benjamin (hereinafter the hospital), to recover no-fault medical payments from the defendant Country Wide Insurance Company (hereinafter the insurer) under an insurance contract. The insurer cross-moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action. The Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action, denied that branch of the insurer’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action, and awarded judgment to the hospital against the insurer in the sum of $14,105.50, plus statutory interest and attorney’s fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65-4.6. The hospital then entered judgment against the insurer in satisfaction of that claim in the total sum of $25,327.50. The judgment consisted of benefits due the hospital for services rendered in the sum of $14,105.50, interest in the sum of $9,772, an attorney’s fee in the sum of $850, and costs and disbursements in the sum of $600.

Thereafter, the insurer moved pursuant to CPLR 5019 (a) to modify the amount of the judgment, belatedly asserting that the judgment exceeded the coverage limit of the subject policy due to payments previously made under the policy to other health care providers. The Supreme Court [*2]granted the insurer’s motion, and ordered a hearing to determine the amount remaining on the policy. The plaintiffs appeal.

CPLR 5019 (a) provides a court with the discretion to correct a technical defect or a ministerial error, and may not be employed as a vehicle to alter the substantive rights of a party (see Kiker v Nassau County, 85 NY2d 879, 880-881 [1995]; Herpe v Herpe, 225 NY 323, 327 [1919]; Rotunno v Gruhill Constr. Corp., 29 AD3d 772, 773 [2006]; Haggerty v Market Basket Enters., Inc., 8 AD3d 618, 618-619 [2004]; Novak v Novak, 299 AD2d 924, 925 [2002]; Tait v Lattingtown Harbor Dev. Co., 12 AD2d 966, 967 [1961]; see also Minnesota Laundry Serv., Inc. v Mellon, 263 App Div 889, 890 [1942], affd 289 NY 749 [1942]; Fleming v Sarva, 15 Misc 3d 892, 895 [2007]; Matter of Schlossberg v Schlossberg, 62 Misc 2d 699, 701 [1970]). Here, in seeking to modify the amount of the judgment on the ground that the policy limits were nearly exhausted, the insurer was not seeking to correct a mere clerical error. Rather, it sought to change the judgment with respect to a substantive matter. As such, CPLR 5019 (a) was not the proper procedural mechanism by which to seek such modification. Although the hospital raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we may review the issue because it presents a question of law which could not have been avoided if brought to the Supreme Court’s attention at the proper juncture (see Gutierrez v State of New York, 58 AD3d 805, 807 [2009]; Dugan v Crown Broadway, LLC, 33 AD3d 656, 656 [2006]; Buywise Holding, LLC v Harris, 31 AD3d 681, 682 [2006]).

In view of the foregoing, we need not reach the plaintiffs’ remaining contentions. Mastro, J.P., Dillon, Eng and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

—[*1] McDonnell & Adels, PLLC, Garden City, N.Y. (James J. Cleary, Jr., and Jannine Gordineer of counsel), for appellant.

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under certain contracts of insurance, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lally, J.), entered December 21, 2009, which denied its motion to vacate a judgment of the same court entered March 12, 2009, which, upon its failure to appear or answer the complaint, was in favor of the plaintiff and against it in the principal sum of $29,103.60, and to compel the plaintiff to accept a late answer pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d), and held in abeyance and referred for a hearing the plaintiff’s motion to hold it in contempt for failure to comply with an information subpoena dated March 30, 2009, and its cross motion to quash the information subpoena.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order entered December 21, 2009, as held in abeyance and referred for a hearing the plaintiff’s motion to hold the defendant in contempt for failure to comply with an information subpoena dated March 30, 2009, and the defendant’s cross motion to quash the information subpoena is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the order entered December 21, 2009, is reversed insofar as reviewed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment entered March 12, 2009, and to compel the plaintiff to accept a late answer pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) is granted, the judgment entered March 12, 2009, is vacated, and the answer annexed to the motion papers is deemed timely served upon the plaintiff; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.

The order entered December 21, 2009, did not decide the plaintiff’s motion to hold the defendant in contempt for failure to comply with an information subpoena dated March 30, 2009, or the defendant’s cross motion to quash the information subpoena, but instead, held that motion and cross motion in abeyance and referred them for a hearing. Accordingly, no appeal lies as of right from that portion of the order (see CPLR 5701 [a] [2] [v]; Evan S. v Joseph R., 70 AD3d 668 [2010]; Quigley v Coco’s Water CafÉ, Inc., 43 AD3d 1132 [2007]), and we decline to grant leave.

A defendant seeking to vacate a judgment entered on default must demonstrate a [*2]reasonable excuse for its delay in appearing or answering the complaint and a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; Taddeo-Amendola v 970 Assets, LLC, 72 AD3d 677 [2010]). The defendant established through an employee’s affidavit, which attested to a clerical oversight regarding the delay in forwarding the summons and complaint to its attorney, a reasonable excuse for the short period of time following service of the complaint in which it failed either to appear or answer the complaint (see Perez v Travco Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 738 [2007]; Sound Shore Med. Ctr. v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 31 AD3d 743 [2006]). Furthermore, the defendant demonstrated that it has a potentially meritorious defense to the action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to vacate its default and to compel acceptance of its answer in light of the strong public policy that actions be resolved on their merits, the brief delay involved, the defendant’s lack of willfulness, and the absence of prejudice to the plaintiff (see Perez v Travco Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 738 [2007]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v American Home Assur. Co., 28 AD3d 442 [2006]). Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur.

Motion by the respondent on an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered December 21, 2009, to dismiss so much of the appeal as held in abeyance and referred for a hearing the respondent’s motion to hold the appellant in contempt for failure to comply with an information subpoena dated March 30, 2009, and the appellant’s cross motion to quash the information subpoena, on the ground that said portion of the order is not appealable as of right. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated September 1, 2010, inter alia, the motion was referred to the panel of Justices hearing the appeal for determination upon the argument or submission thereof.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, and, upon the argument of the appeal, it is

Ordered that the motion is denied as academic in light of our determination on the appeal. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur.

—[*1] Freiberg & Peck, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Rachel N. Clark and Yilo K. Kang of counsel), for appellants.

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for respondent.

In an action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Palmieri, J.), entered October 15, 2009, which granted the motion of the plaintiff New York and Presbyterian Hospital for summary judgment on its second cause of action, and denied the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff New York and Presbyterian Hospital (hereinafter the plaintiff) established, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the second cause of action by demonstrating that the necessary billing documents were mailed to and received by the defendant and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 51 AD3d 1014, 1017 [2008]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Countrywide Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 729 [2007]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 40 AD3d 981, 981-982 [2007]).

In opposition to that prima facie showing, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether they timely denied the claim. The evidence submitted by the plaintiff showed that the no-fault billing claim form was received by the defendants on May 15, 2009. The defendants submitted, inter alia, copies of letters that they sent to their insured dated April 27, 2009, and May 28, 2009, respectively, as well as copies of letters that they sent to the plaintiff on May 14, 2009, and June 15, 2009, respectively, seeking additional verification. However, the April 27, 2009, and May 14, 2009, letters were sent prior to the defendants’ receipt of the no-fault billing form, and the remaining letters were sent more than 10 days after the defendants’ receipt of that form. Consequently, those letters failed to toll the period in which the defendants were required to pay or deny the claim (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5). In this regard, although the defendants stated, in their motion for summary judgment, that they first received the no-fault bill on May 7, 2009, or on May 9, 2009, the defendant did not establish that fact by submitting a copy of the bill [*2]received on one of those dates. Therefore, the defendants failed to submit evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether they timely denied the claim after issuing timely requests for additional verification (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 312, 317 [2007]).

Moreover, although the defendants contend that they submitted evidence showing that the plaintiff’s assignor misrepresented his state of residence in connection with the issuance of the subject insurance policy, the defendants are precluded from asserting that defense, as a result of their untimely denial of the claim (see Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d 556, 564 [2008]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d at 319; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045, 1046-1047 [2009]).

Although the defendants contend, on appeal, that North Carolina law should apply to this action, and that New York law does not preclude them from denying coverage, they did not raise that specific argument before the Supreme Court. Consequently, that contention is not properly before this Court (see Boudreau-Grillo v Ramirez, 74 AD3d 1265, 1268 [2010]; Matter of Panetta v Carroll, 62 AD3d 1010 [2009]). Dickerson, J.P., Hall, Austin and Cohen, JJ., concur.