No-Fault Case Law

The relevant facts considered in this case included an action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered to the plaintiff’s assignor. The plaintiff health care provider established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proving that it submitted a claim, the amount of the loss sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue. The main issue decided by the court was whether the defendant was precluded from raising most defenses due to its failure to pay or deny the claim within the prescribed period, and whether the alleged injuries were causally unrelated to the accident. The holding of the court was that the defendant was precluded from raising most defenses due to its failure to pay or deny the claim within the 30-day prescribed period, but was not precluded from asserting the defense that the alleged injuries were causally unrelated to the accident. As a result, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

In the case Ocean Diagnostic Imaging P.C. v New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, the court considered whether the plaintiff health care provider was entitled to first-party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered to its assignor. The main issue decided was whether the defendant insurance company was precluded from raising defenses due to not paying or denying the claim within the prescribed 30-day period. The court held that the defendant was not precluded from asserting the defense that the alleged injuries were causally unrelated to the accident, despite the untimely denial of the claim. The court also found that the defendant demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a lack of coverage, and therefore the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

The relevant facts the court considered were that A.B. Medical Services PLLC, D.A.V. Chiropractic P.C., and Lvov Acupuncture P.C. submitted claims for payment of no-fault benefits which were denied by GMAC Insurance. The main issue decided was whether the injuries claimed by the plaintiffs' assignor were causally related to the subject motor vehicle accident. The holding of the case was that the motion for summary judgment by A.B. Medical Services PLLC, D.A.V. Chiropractic P.C. and Lvov Acupuncture P.C. was granted, and the matter was remanded to the court below for a calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney's fees thereon. The claim by Square Synagogue Transportation Inc. was dismissed based on the revised insurance regulations that did not permit assignment of benefits for non-health-related services. The court also found that GMAC Insurance failed to raise any triable issue of fact in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and that their denial of the claims was not based upon a founded belief that the alleged injuries did not arise out of an insured incident. The dissenting opinion disagreed, finding that there was a sufficient basis to raise an issue of fact as to whether the defense of fraud was founded, and would have denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

The court considered the case of Progressive Northern Insurance Company v. John Rafferty and Robert Carman. The main issue was whether Progressive had a duty to defend or indemnify Rafferty in an underlying personal injury action, and whether Carman was eligible for no-fault insurance benefits after being injured by Rafferty. The court held that Progressive had no duty to defend or indemnify Rafferty, and that Carman was not eligible for no-fault insurance benefits, due to the intentional nature of Rafferty's actions. The court noted that the intentional act exclusion of Rafferty's policy applied, despite his claim of only intending to scare Carman, and that Carman's injuries were inherent in Rafferty's actions and, thus, were not caused by an "accident". Therefore, Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment in plaintiff's favor.

The main issue in this case was whether the plaintiff was able to demonstrate a justifiable excuse for failing to file a notice of trial within ninety days of the defendant's demand, and a meritorious cause of action. The plaintiff, a health care provider, sought to recover first party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered to its assignor. The defendant cross-moved to dismiss the action for want of prosecution, for failure to provide proof of the claim, and because the services were provided by independent contractors hired by the plaintiff, a professional corporation. The court held that the plaintiff did not demonstrate a justifiable excuse for failing to file a notice of trial, and therefore dismissed the plaintiff's action. The decision was made by Randy Sue Marber, District Court Judge on April 20, 2005.

The main issue in this case was whether the decision of the Master Arbitration to affirm the initial arbitrator's decision to deny the disputed billing of $3947.96 was arbitrary, capricious, or incorrect as a matter of law. The petitioner, a medical provider, argued that it only needed to prove that it provided services, mailed a claim, and that the claim was not paid or denied within thirty days. The Master Arbitrator disagreed and confirmed the arbitration award, stating that the medical provider had to establish the necessity of its medical treatments. The court considered previous cases and found that the law with respect to the burden of proof in first party no-fault claims was established by the Court. Therefore, the court held that the decision of the Master Arbitrator was not arbitrary nor capricious and affirmed the award.

The case involved Westchester Medical Center and two other hospitals appealing the denial of their motion for summary judgment in a lawsuit to recover no-fault medical payments under an insurance contract. The Supreme Court had denied their motion for summary judgment on the second cause of action arising from the treatment rendered by St. Vincent's Hospital & Medical Center to Brian Cardimone, and the third cause of action arising from the treatment rendered by New York and Presbyterian Hospital to Stanislaw Zarod. The Appellate Division reversed the order, granting the plaintiffs' motion and remitting the matter to the Supreme Court to calculate the amount owed for no-fault benefits, statutory interest, and an attorney's fee. The court found that the defendant had failed to pay or deny the claim within 30 days as required by law, and therefore could not raise defenses based on payment in accordance with the correct code or verification of claims.

The plaintiff was attempting to recover unpaid no-fault benefits from the defendant after being involved in an automobile accident. However, several years before the current action, the plaintiff had commenced an arbitration proceeding against the defendant to recover the same benefits. By electing to arbitrate, the plaintiff waived his right to commence an action to litigate subsequent disputes over no-fault benefits. The defendant did not move for summary judgment on this ground, but the court had the authority to search the record and award summary judgment to a nonmoving party with respect to a cause of action or issue that was the subject of the motion before the Supreme Court. Therefore, the court awarded summary judgment to the defendant and dismissed the complaint. The decision was also based on these circumstances and the plaintiff being precluded from maintaining the action. As a result, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed and the complaint was dismissed.

The main issue in this case is whether the Civil Court had personal jurisdiction over the respondent, Eveready Insurance Company, due to an improper service of the notice of petition and petition by the petitioner, Queens Community Medical Centers. The court considered the method of service required for a special proceeding and whether serving the notice and petition on an attorney not authorized to receive service on behalf of the respondent was sufficient. The court held that the service on the attorney, Maria Weissman, was insufficient to obtain jurisdiction over the respondent, as it did not comply with the requirements of CPLR § 403(c) for a special proceeding. The court also denied the petitioner's request to properly serve the respondent and have such service relate back to the original service in order to comply with the statute of limitation, stating that it had no discretion to override the statute of limitation. Therefore, the petition was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The relevant facts of the case are that S&M Supply Inc. filed a motion for summary judgment in an action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for medical supplies furnished to its assignors, Naum Bergman and Paul Showun. However, the affidavit submitted in support of the motion did not establish that the affiant had the requisite personal knowledge. As a result, the affidavit was considered to be of no probative value. The main issue decided by the court was whether the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff had the necessary personal knowledge to support the motion for summary judgment. The court held that the affidavit did not meet the requirements for personal knowledge and therefore, the court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.