August 19, 2022
Shafai Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2022 NY Slip Op 50907(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/shafai-acupuncture-p-c-v-state-farm-mut-auto-ins-co-2022-ny-slip-op50907u/
- Decided
- August 19, 2022
- Citation
- 2022 NY Slip Op 50907(U)
- Posture
- Motion to dismiss (CPLR 3211)
- Outcome
- Insurer prevailed
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Shafai Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2022 NY Slip Op 50907(U))
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
against
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Respondent.
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated August 6, 2021. The order (1) denied plaintiff’s motion to, in effect, deem its service of process on defendant on April 3, 2018 as having satisfied so much of an order of the Civil Court dated November 14, 2019 as directed plaintiff to serve defendant within 30 days, (2) sua sponte dismissed the complaint with prejudice based on a finding that plaintiff had not complied with that portion of the November 14, 2019 order, and (3) denied as moot defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint based on res judicata.
ORDERED that, on the court’s own motion, so much of the notice of appeal as is from so much of the order as, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint with prejudice is deemed an application for leave to appeal from that portion of the order, and leave to appeal is granted (see CCA 1702 [c]); and it is further,
ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, so much of the order as, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint with prejudice based on a finding that plaintiff had not complied with so much of an order of the Civil Court dated November 14, 2019 as directed plaintiff to serve defendant within 30 days is vacated, plaintiff’s motion to, in effect, deem its service of process upon defendant on April 3, 2018 as having satisfied that portion of the November 14, 2019 order is granted, and defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint based on res judicata is granted.
On March 24, 2017, plaintiff commenced this action (see CCA 400) to recover assigned [*2]first-party no-fault benefits. Plaintiff alleged that it served defendant with the summons and complaint on April 6, 2017. Defendant did not appear or answer, and, by order entered November 6, 2017, the Civil Court awarded plaintiff a default judgment. In January 2018, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment. By order dated November 14, 2019, the Civil Court granted defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment and directed plaintiff to “effectuate proper service” of the summons and complaint within 30 days of the order. Plaintiff then moved by order to show cause, signed on November 26, 2019, to, in effect, deem an alleged April 3, 2018 service of the summons and complaint upon defendant as having satisfied plaintiff’s obligation to “effectuate proper service” within 30 days of the November 14, 2019 order. The November 26, 2019 order to show cause stayed the action pending a final determination of the motion. Defendant opposed plaintiff’s motion, asserting that the April 3, 2018 service attempt was untimely, and cross-moved, in the event plaintiff’s motion was granted, to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a), on the ground that the action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel based on a declaratory judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered on May 20, 2019. The declaratory judgment, which was attached to defendant’s moving papers, declared that “Shafai Acupuncture [plaintiff herein] has no right to receive payment for [the bills at issue in the instant action, among others] because Shafai Acupuncture failed and/or refused to appear for Examinations Under Oath requested by STATE FARM, and thus breached a condition of coverage and violated its obligations under the New York No-Fault Laws.” By order dated August 6, 2021, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion, sua sponte dismissed the complaint with prejudice upon a finding that “Plaintiff failed to properly effectuate service within thirty days of Decision/Order dated November 14, 2019 as directed,” and denied defendant’s cross motion as moot.
While no appeal as of right lies from the sua sponte portion of the August 6, 2021 order (see CCA 1702 [a] [2]; Sholes v Meagher, 100 NY2d 333 [2003]), we deem the notice of appeal to be an application for leave to appeal from that portion of the order and grant plaintiff’s application (see CCA 1702 [c]). We agree with plaintiff’s argument on appeal that, at the time of the Civil Court’s August 6, 2021 order, the 30-day period that the Civil Court’s November 14, 2019 order gave plaintiff to effectuate service had not yet expired due to the stay contained in plaintiff’s November 26, 2019 order to show cause. Consequently, so much of the August 6, 2021 order as, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to effectuate service within the time frame set forth in the November 14, 2019 order is vacated.
With respect to plaintiff’s motion, it is undisputed that plaintiff commenced this action on March 24, 2017, and that the attempted service on April 3, 2018 occurred after the expiration of the 120-day time period allotted by CPLR 306-b (see CCA 403). However, by giving plaintiff 30 days to effectuate service in the November 14, 2019 order, the Civil Court implicitly found that an extension of time for service was warranted under CPLR 306-b. In our opinion, under the circumstances presented, the Civil Court should have deemed plaintiff’s April 3, 2018 service as satisfying the service that plaintiff had been directed to effectuate in the November 14, 2019 order.
In view of the foregoing, defendant’s cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel is no longer moot. In lieu of remitting the cross motion to the Civil Court for [*3]a new determination thereof, we review the cross motion in the interest of judicial economy (see S & J Serv. Ctr., Inc. v Commerce Commercial Group, Inc., 178 AD3d 977, 979 [2019]; Bonafede v Bonito, 145 AD3d 842, 843-844 [2016]).
In light of the May 20, 2019 declaratory judgment, defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted based on the doctrine of res judicata (see Wave Med. Servs., P.C. v Farmers New Century Ins. Co., 67 Misc 3d 137[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50555[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]; Healing Art Acupuncture, P.C. v 21st Century Ins. Co., 59 Misc 3d 139[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50583[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]; EBM Med. Health Care, P.C. v Republic W. Ins., 38 Misc 3d 1, 3 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]), as any judgment in favor of plaintiff in the present action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the judgment in the declaratory judgment action (see Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307 [1929]; Flushing Traditional Acupuncture, P.C. v Kemper Ins. Co., 42 Misc 3d 133[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50052[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]).
Accordingly, the order is reversed, so much of the order as, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint with prejudice based on a finding that plaintiff had not complied with so much of an order of the Civil Court dated November 14, 2019 as directed plaintiff to serve defendant within 30 days is vacated, plaintiff’s motion to, in effect, deem its service of process upon defendant on April 3, 2018 as having satisfied that portion of the November 14, 2019 order is granted, and defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint based on res judicata is granted.
ALIOTTA, P.J., WESTON and TOUSSAINT, JJ., concur.
ENTER:Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: August 19, 2022
Legal questions (2)
Questions of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Does an insurer’s no-coverage declaratory judgment, or pending declaratory action, bar or stay a no-fault claimant’s action?
This decision: The DJ is given preclusive effect and bars every claim in the action that the court considered
Held the cross motion to dismiss should be granted on res judicata because the declaratory judgment declared the provider had no right to payment of the bills at issue for failing to appear for examinations under oath.
Of the 164 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 101 (this one included) are in the same category.
Was the insurer validly served with process, and does the court have personal jurisdiction over it?
This decision: Insurer validly served and subject to the court's jurisdiction, or service defect cured/excused (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held that the plaintiff's late service on the insurer, made after the 120-day period of CPLR 306-b, should have been deemed to satisfy the order directing service, since that order implicitly extended the time to serve; the complaint was then dismissed on res judicata.
Of the 129 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 31 (this one included) are in the same category.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- Wave Med. Servs., P.C. v Farmers New Century Ins. Co. (2020 NY Slip Op 50555(U)) FollowedThe insurer obtained summary judgment based on a declaratory judgment establishing the provider's ineligibility for no-fault benefits.
- Healing Art Acupuncture, P.C. v 21st Century Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 50583(U)) FollowedA declaratory judgment barring coverage precluded the provider's no-fault recovery under res judicata and collateral estoppel.
- EBM Med. Health Care, P.C. v Republic W. Ins. (2012 NY Slip Op 22300) FollowedAn unvacated default declaratory judgment has res judicata effect in a provider's pending no-fault action.
- Flushing Traditional Acupuncture, P.C. v Kemper Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 50052(U)) FollowedThe provider's no-fault action was barred by res judicata because a default declaratory judgment denied its right to benefits.
Similar decisions
- Himalayans Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Cas. Co. (2022 NY Slip Op 50904(U))The insurer's detailed law-office-failure explanation and motion two days after entry of the default order supported vacatur.
- Charles Deng Acupuncture, P.C. v Omni Indem. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 51927(U))The insurer proved that the provider sued the wrong carrier because another insurer had issued the policy covering the accident.
- Comprehensive Med. Assist, P.C. v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (2022 NY Slip Op 51250(U))The insurer's summary judgment motion was untimely because its moving papers did not show good cause for exceeding the 120-day deadline.
- Ahmed Med. Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2025 NY Slip Op 50825(U))The provider's first seven causes of action were barred by a default declaratory judgment, but its eighth and ninth were restored.
- Ahava Med. Diagnostic, P.C. v Hertz Co. (2022 NY Slip Op 50298(U))A prior no-coverage declaratory judgment retains its binding effect even if notice of entry is served after a provider's default judgment.