April 2, 2009

Ocean Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2009 NY Slip Op 50565(U))

Headnote

The court considered the claim submitted by the plaintiff for payment of no-fault benefits under the Insurance Law, as a result of services provided due to an automobile accident. The defendant denied all the claims based on lack of coverage and allegations of fraud. The main issue decided was whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount claimed, and if the defendant's defense of lack of coverage due to fraud was valid. The court held that the plaintiff had established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, as it had submitted the claim and payment was overdue, and the defendant had failed to deny the claim within the required time frame. The defendant's allegations of fraud were found to be unsupported and unsubstantiated, and therefore the plaintiff was awarded judgment in the amount of $2,610.00, with interest and attorney's fees, while the cross motion by the defendant was denied.

Reported in New York Official Reports at Ocean Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2009 NY Slip Op 50565(U))

Ocean Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2009 NY Slip Op 50565(U)) [*1]
Ocean Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
2009 NY Slip Op 50565(U) [23 Misc 3d 1104(A)]
Decided on April 2, 2009
Civil Court, New York County
Mendez, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
Decided on April 2, 2009

Civil Court, New York County



Ocean Acupuncture, P.C. AS ASSIGNEE OF RAFAEL ESPINOSA, , Plaintiff(s)/, Petitioner(s),

against

State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Defendant(s)/, Respondent(s).

044447 CVN 2008

Attorneys for plaintiff:

Leon Kucherovsky

By: David Forman, Esq.

Attorneys for defendant:

Saretsky, Katz, Dranoff & Glass, LLP

By: Howard J. Newman, Esq.

Manuel J. Mendez, J.

Upon a reading of the foregoing cited papers on this motion and cross motion for summary judgment it is the decision of this court that the motion is granted, plaintiff is awarded judgment in the amount of $2,610.00 with interest at 2% per month from July 19, 2008, plus attorneys fees of 20% of judgment plus interest amount not to exceed $850.00, plus costs. The cross motion is denied.

This motion was returnable on November 13 2008. On the return date the court adjourned the motion to December 17, 2008 at which time defendant filed a cross motion and opposition to the motion. The court then adjourned the motion and cross motion to March 11, [*2]2009 for a reply. On March 11, 2009 there being no reply this court took the motion on submission and ordered plaintiff to submit its reply by March 25, 2009. Plaintiff has submitted its reply and this court now decides the motion.

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment to recover for services rendered its assignor under the No-fault provision of the Insurance Law. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of an automobile accident on July 19, 2002, it provided services to its assignor on August 15 to August 29, 2002 and on September 23, 2002 submitted a bill to the defendant for these services in the amount of $630.00. It provided services on September 3 to September 26, 2002 and on October 8, 2002 submitted a bill to the defendant for these services in the amount of $900.00. It provided services on October 1 to October 28, 2002 and on November 5, 2002 submitted a bill to the defendant for these services in the amount of $720.00. It provided services on November 1 to November 13, 2002 and on December 5, 2002 submitted a bill to the defendant for these services in the amount of $270.00. It provided services on December 20, 2002 and on January 7, 2003 submitted a bill to the defendant for these services in the amount of $90.00. The total for all the bills submitted by plaintiff to the defendant is $2,610.00.

In support of its motion plaintiff annexes the affidavit of Yevgeny Gorbatov, LAC, its owner who has personal knowledge that the claims were mailed because it is his responsibility to insure that the claims were mailed. He bases his affidavit on personal knowledge and a review of the file. He further states that the services were provided and bills mailed as indicated in this court’s factual recitation. Finally, he provides the office practice and procedure in place at the time these services were performed and bills generated to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed( See Moving papers Exh. A).

Plaintiff also annexes to its moving papers the denial of claims issued by the defendant. In these denials, all dated February 17, 2003, defendant acknowledges receipt of the claims and denies all of the claims submitted based on lack of coverage ( See moving papers Exh. E). There was no verification requested to toll the 30 day period within which defendant had to pay or deny the claim.

Defendant cross moves for summary judgment on the basis that the assignor is perpetrating a fraud and has failed to cooperate. Its denial of claim form gives as a reason for the denial of all claims the following: ” All New York no-fault benefits are denied to the above injured person based on the loss not being accidental; violation of the fraud provisions of the policy; failure to cooperate, we base our conclusion on your failure to cooperate on evidence of your giving false or misleading information throughout the presentation of the claim; the injuries did not arise our of the use or operation of the insured vehicle; and engaging in fraudulent conduct in connection with this loss.”

In support of its motion defendant annexes an attorney’s affirmation, the affidavit of Christopher Maresco, a claims representative, and the denial of claims forms (NF-10). Absent from defendant’s submission is an affidavit from an investigator from its special investigations [*3]unit and a copy of the assignor’s examination under oath.There was no request for verification of claim or additional verification tolling the time within which to pay or deny plaintiff’s claim. All the claims were denied on February 17, 2003 more than 30 days after the last bill for $90.00 had been submitted. Rosemarie Tulino, not Christopher Maresco, was the adjustor assigned to this claim.

Defendant claims the denial is due to a number of factors all of which taken together establish that there was fraud perpetrated by its insured, including the assignor. The affidavit of Chistopher Maresco states that his knowledge is based on a review of the file and on his personal knowledge. He states that “he has been assigned to oversee the handling of this claim which was referred to the special investigations unit to resolve questions of merit since this loss had multiple fraud indicators which support State Farms’s founded belief that the collision was fraudulent and not an accident.” The affidavit goes on to indicate that there are “Fraud Indicators” leading defendant to its conclusion of fraud. Mr. Maresco goes on to state that ” When all the information was carefully investigated and analyzed it formed State Farm’s founded belief that the purported accident was not a covered accident, but instead it was an intentional act which is not covered under State Farm’s policy of insurance.”

In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the proponent must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, through admissible evidence, eliminating all material issues of fact.(Klein V. City of New York, 89 NY2d 833; Ayotte V. Gervasio, 81 NY2d 1062, Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320). Once the moving party has satisfied these standards, the burden shifts to the opponent to rebut that prima facie showing, by producing contrary evidence, in admissible form, sufficient to require a trial of material factual issues(Kaufman V. Silver, 90 NY2d 204; Amatulli V. Delhi Constr. Corp.,77 NY2d 525; Iselin & Co. V. Mann Judd Landau, 71 NY2d 420). In determining the motion, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party(SSBS Realty Corp. V. Public Service Mut. Ins. Co., 253 AD2d 583; Martin V. Briggs, 235 [1992]).

In an Action to recover first-party no-fault benefits for health care services provided to an assignor, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof that it submitted a claim, setting forth the fact and amount of the loss sustained and that payment of no-fault benefits is overdue ( Insurance Law § 5106[a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. , v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742[2004]; Amaze Med. Supply v. Eagle Ins. Co., 2 Misc 3d 128 [A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51701[U][App. Term 2nd. & 11th Jud. Dists. 2003]). A no-fault benefits applicant may cure deficiencies in its proof of mailing by annexing to its motion papers an insurer’s denial of claim form wherein the insurer acknowledges the claims’ receipt ( Fair Price Med. Supply Corp., v. ELRAC Inc., 12 Misc 3d 119 [App. Term 2nd. & 11th, Jud. Dists. 2006]). Plaintiff has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment through the affidavit of Yevgeny Gorbatov and the exhibits annexed to its moving papers which show that a claim was submitted and payment is overdue. Any deficiencies in Mr. Gorbatov’s affidavit are cured by the defendant’s denial of claim forms which acknowledge receipt of plaintiff’s claims. [*4]

The burden now shifts to defendant to raise a material issue of fact. Defendant had 30 days to pay or deny the claim, counting from the date it receives the bills in question ( See 11 NYCRR§ 65-3.8(a)). Defendant did not pay or deny the claim within 30 days of receipt of the bill, and did not request verification of the bills within 15 days of its receipt ( See 11 NYCRR§ 3.5 (a)). However, this has no effect on its defense of lack of coverage.( See Presbyterian Hospital v. Maryland Casualty Co., 90 NY2d 274[1997]; Central General Hospital v. Chubb Group of Ins. Co.,90 NY2d 195, 659 N.Y.S. 2d 246 [1997]) which may be asserted after the time to pay or deny the claim has expired, premised on a “fact or founded belief” that the alleged injury does not arise out of an insured accident.

While the untimely denial does not preclude defendant from interposing the lack of coverage defense based on fraud, it remains defendant’s burden to demonstrate ” a fact or founded belief” that the injuries did not result from an insured event ( See Central General Hospital v. Chubb Group of Ins. Co., 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997] Supra). Thus, defendant’s proof has been found lacking when an “investigator’s report alleged only that the uncooperative insured, but not the assignor, had been involved in prior accidents alleged to be “suspicious” ( A.B. Medical Services PLLC v. Eagle Insurance Co., 3 Misc 3d 8, 776 N.Y.S. 2d 434 [App. Term 2nd. Dept. 2003]), the motion is supported by an affirmation of defendant’s counsel without personal knowledge of the facts and an affidavit of a claim representative likewise with no personal knowledge of defendant’s investigation into the incident ( Oleg Barshay, D.C., P.C., v. State Farm Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 74, 831 N.Y.S. 2d 821 [App. Term 2nd. Dept. 2006]; Comprehensive Mental v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 130(A), 836 N.Y.S. 2d 484[ App. Term 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2007]) when the statements in the affidavit of the investigator are conclusory (Great Wall Acupuncture v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 144 (A), 836 N.Y.S. 2d 499 [App. Term 2nd. & 11th Jud. Dists. 2007]).

“To interpose a defense of staged-accident fraud sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact, defendant must establish the fact or founded belief that the alleged injuries do not arise out of an insured incident. The discrepancies in the testimony given by two passengers during their examinations under oath are insufficient to establish a founded belief that the alleged injuries did not arise out of a covered accident. The affidavit of defendant’s claims representative and the attached exhibits failed to substantiate the conclusory allegations of the assignor’s participation in a ring that stages traffic incidents to defraud insurers” (Webster Diagnostic Medicine, P.C., v. State Farm Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 97, 838 N.Y.S. 2d. 343 [App. Term 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2007]).

The defendant must come forth with proof in admissible form which is more than just “unsubstantiated hypotheses and suppositions.” These are insufficient to raise a triable issue of the assignor’s fraud ( A.B. Medical Services, PLLC v. Eagle Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 8, 776, N.Y.S. 2d 434 [2003]; Oleg Barshay, D.C., P.C., v. State Farm Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 74, 831 N.Y.S. 2d 821 [2006];Comprehensive Mental v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 130(A), 836 N.Y.S. 2d 484 [2007];Great Wall Acupuncture v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 144 (A), 836 N.Y.S. 2d 499[ 2007] Supra). [*5]

Defendant has failed to come forth with more than mere unsubstantiated hypothese and suppositions in support of its motion. Its attorney’s affirmation is without probative value as he has no personal knowledge of the facts ( See Melbourne Med., P.C., v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 92 [App. Term 2nd. & 11th Jud. Dists. 2004]). The affidavit of Christopher Maresco is also without probative value as he has no personal knowledge of the investigation. He is not a member of the investigation Unit and was not the investigator assigned to investigate plaintiff’s assignor’s claims. In fact his affidavit does not state the name of the investigator investigating this claim. His affidavit, which is based on his review of the file is conclusory and provides no more than the hypothese and suppositions which the courts have previously rejected as insufficient to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment. Mr. Maresco alludes to discrepancies in the Examinations Under Oath of the various passengers in the vehicle at the time of the accident. However, the transcripts are not annexed to the cross moving papers for the court to review. The court is left to rely on the analysis of these transcripts by Mr. Maresco who reaches the conclusion that the accident was not a covered accident. His affidavit without more is insufficient to defeat plaintiff’s entitlement to summary judgment.

Accordingly, it is the decision and order of this court that the motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff is awarded a judgment in the amount of $ $2,610.00 with interest at 2% per month from July 19, 2008, plus attorneys fees of 20% of the judgment plus the interest amount not to exceed $850.00, plus costs. The cross motion is denied.

This constitutes the decision and order of this court.

Dated: April 2, 2009__________________________

Manuel J. Mendez

Judge Civil Court