March 29, 2004

Mount Sinai Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 02363)

Headnote

The court considered an appeal from an order denying a motion for leave to reargue summary judgment on a first cause of action to recover no-fault benefits. The plaintiffs, Mount Sinai Hospital and others, appealed from the order, claiming that the Supreme Court had overlooked controlling law and sought leave to reargue the motion. The court held that the appeal was actually one for leave to reargue, not for leave to renew, and that the denial of reargument was not appealable. The appellants did not provide new facts or a change in the law that would alter the prior determination, so the motion for leave to reargue was not granted. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the Supreme Court's order denying reargument was upheld.

Reported in New York Official Reports at Mount Sinai Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 02363)

Mount Sinai Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.

2004 NY Slip Op 02363 [5 AD3d 745]

March 29, 2004

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

As corrected through Wednesday, May 26, 2004

Mount Sinai Hospital, as Assignee of Adrienne Corn, et al., Appellants,
v
Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, Respondent.

—In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under certain insurance contracts, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Franco, J.), dated March 5, 2003, which denied their motion for leave to reargue that branch of their prior motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action to recover no-fault benefits for the treatment of Adrienne Corn, which was denied by prior order of the same court dated December 10, 2002.

Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, with costs.

We reject the appellant’s contention that the instant appeal was taken from an order denying a motion for leave to renew. The order appealed from decided a motion which the appellant itself denominated as one for leave to reargue that branch of its prior motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action. Further, the thrust of the appellant’s motion was that the Supreme Court purportedly overlooked controlling law in making its prior order. In addition, the appellant neither submitted new facts not offered on the prior motion, nor demonstrated a change in the law, that would change the prior determination (see CPLR 2221 [e] [2]). Accordingly, the motion was one for leave to reargue, the denial of which is not appealable (see Gutierrez v Rockefeller Group, 307 AD2d 335 [2003]; Lapadula v Sang Shing Kwok, 304 AD2d 798 [2003]; Kisswani v Manikis, 303 AD2d 643, 644 [2003]; Misirlakis v East Coast Entertainment Props., 303 AD2d 389 [2003]). Ritter, J.P., H. Miller, Crane and Cozier, JJ., concur.