April 28, 2010
Mandracchia v Allstate Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 50882(U))
https://www.beynensonlaw.com/case-law/mandracchia-v-allstate-ins-co-2010-ny-slip-op-50882u/
- Judge
- Levine, J.
- Decided
- April 28, 2010
- Citation
- 2010 NY Slip Op 50882(U) · 27 Misc 3d 1225(A)
- Posture
- Motion to dismiss (CPLR 3211)
- Outcome
- Insurer prevailed
- Issues
- Statute of limitations
- Legal questions
- No-fault statute of limitations (see the maps)
Posture, outcome, issues and treatment by other decisions are Beynenson Law’s classification. Treatment labels are assigned by a language model reading the citing decision; negative and appeal-history labels are checked by a second reader.
Summary
Editorial summary by Beynenson Law, not part of the court’s decision.
Reported in New York Official Reports at Mandracchia v Allstate Ins. Co. (2010 NY Slip Op 50882(U))
| Mandracchia v Allstate Ins. Co. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 50882(U) [27 Misc 3d 1225(A)] |
| Decided on April 28, 2010 |
| Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Richmond County |
| Levine, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County
Anthony Mandracchia,
D.C. A/A/O Dwayne Loftin, Plaintiff,
against Allstate Insurance Company, Defendant. |
08R014639
A P P E A R A N C E S:
Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Baker, Sanders, Barshay, Grossman, Fass, Muhlstock & Neuwirth
150 Herricks Road
Mineola, NY 11501
Attorneys for Defendant:
Peter C. Merani, P.C.
298 Fifth Avenue, 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10001
Katherine A. Levine, J.
Plaintiff Anthony Mandracchia, D.C. (“plaintiff”), a medical service provider, brings this action pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a) to recover $320.30 for services it provided to its assignor, Dwayne Loftin (“assignor”), for injuries he allegedly sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant Allstate Insurance Co. (“defendant”) moves to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211 or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212 on the grounds that the instant action is barred by the six (6) year Statute of Limitation. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106, a complete proof of claim is a prerequisite to receiving no-fault benefits. Under the old regulations applicable to insurance policies issued before April 5, 2002, the written proof of claim must be submitted to the insurance company “as soon as reasonably practicable, but in no event later than 180 days after the date services are rendered or 180 days after the date written notice was given to the insurer. 11 NYCRR 65.12. See Rockman v. Clarendon, 2008 NY Slip Op 52093 (U), 21 Misc 3d 1118(A) (Civil Ct., Richmond Co. 2008) citing Montefiore Medical Center v. Mary Immaculate Hospital, 9 AD3d 354 (2d Dept. 2004). Within 30 days of receiving the claim, an insurer shall either pay or deny the claim in whole or in part. See 11 NYCRR 65.15(g)(3). In the event an insurer fails to timely deny a claim or request verification from the provider, the insurer is precluded from asserting that the claim was untimely or incomplete. Presbyterian Hosp. In City of NY v. Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 282 (1997); Montefiore Medical Center v. NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 9 AD3d 354, 355 (2d Dept. 2004); NY Hosp. Med. Ctr. Of Queens v. Country-Wide Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 583 (2d Dept. 2002).
An action to recover first party benefits owed under an insurance policy is viewed as a breach of contract governed by the six year statute of limitations contained in CPLR 213(2). Alleviation Supplies, Inc. v Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 12 Misc 3d 787, 791 (Civil Ct., Richmond Co. 2006). See, Benson v. Boston Old Colony, 134 AD2d 214, 215 (1st Dept. 1987); Spring World Acupuncture, PC. V. NYC Transit Authority ., 24 Misc 3d 39 (2009). In contract cases, the cause of action accrues ,and the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the breach.Micha v. Merchants Mutual Ins. Co., 94 AD2d 835, 836 ( 2d Dept. 1983). [*2]
In no fault actions, a defendant insurer’s contractual obligation to pay the first party benefits arises after it receives the claim. As set forth above, pursuant to Insurance Law §5106, an insurer must either pay or deny the claim within 30 days of submission of proof or the bill becomes overdue. The cause of action thus accrues once the claim is overdue. In Line Chiropractic v. MVAIC, 2005 NY Slip Op 50275U, 6 Misc 3d 1032A (Civil Ct, Bronx Co. 2005), and the statute of limitations thus commences either upon the denial of the claim or, if the thirty days after the submission of plaintiff’s proof of claim. Mandarino v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 37 AD3d 775 (2nd Dept. 2007); Micha v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 94 AD2d 835, 836 (3d Dept. 1983), citing Insurance Law 675(1); Chester Medical Diagnostic v. Kemper Casualty Ins. Co., 2008 NY Slip Op. 52009(U), 21 Misc 3d 1108(A) (Civil Ct., Kings Co. 2008).
On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) on the ground that it is time-barred, the defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired. Cimino v. Dembeck,61 AD3d 802 (2d Dept. 2009). See, Swift v New York Med. Coll., 25 AD3d 686, 687 ( 2d Dept. 2006). “In order to make a prima facie showing, the defendant must establish, inter alia, when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued” (Swift v New York Med. Coll., 25 AD3d at 687). Furthermore, in deciding a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, “a court must take the allegations in the complaint as true and resolve all inferences ] in favor of the plaintiff” Cimino, supra, (Sabadie v Burke, 47 AD3d 913, 914,(2d Dept. 2008).
On a motion for summary judgment, a court may consider evidence contained in documents supplied by a party to the court. See Kwiecinski v. Chung Hwang, 2009 NY Slip Op 06630, 2009 NY App. Div. LEXIS 6503 (3d Dept. 2009); Sonnenfeldt v. Kyriakoudes, 226 AD2d 286 (1 Dept. 1996) citing Central Petroleum Corp. v. Kyriakoudes, 121 AD2d 165 (1st Dept. 1986). A court may utilize these admissions as evidence upon which it can make findings of fact. Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. BRI Coverage Corp., 38 F3d 627 (2d Cir. 1994); Freemantle v. U.S. Hoffman Machinery Corp., 2 AD2d 634 (3d Dept. 1956)(statements in answers to interrogatories or in proposed findings of fact are admissions against the party that made them); Bertha Building Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 248 F.2d 833, 836 (1957).
Plaintiff has annexed to its complaint a ledger providing the particulars of the assignor’s bill, including the date of accident and the date of service of August 25, 1998. The complaint avers that “the bill was received timely”; i.e. that plaintiff submitted the bill to Allstate within 180 days. The complaint also avers that more than 30 days have passed since the bill was submitted and that defendant failed to properly deny the bill within 30 days of receipt. Given these admissions, the court follows the rational of Pinnacle Open MRI, PC., v. Republic Western Insurance Co., 18 Misc 3d 626 (Dist. Ct., Nassau Co. 2008), in determining the latest date by which plaintiff could have commenced the lawsuit and be timely. In Pinnacle, the defendant insurer averred that it did not have the NF-3 claim form filed with it by the plaintiff, although it did not deny its receipt. The court therefore used the date of service, added the additional 180 days that plaintiff had to file the claim, and then added the maximum of 30 days in which the insurer had in which to pay or deny the claim to determine the day that plaintiff’s cause of action ripened.
Utilizing this formula, plaintiff would be barred by the six year statute of limitations from [*3]bringing this action. Adding the additional 180 days to the date of service – August 25, 1998- and then adding an additional 30 days in which the insurer had to pay or deny the claim – bring the date that the claim became overdue to March 23, 1999. Since plaintiff admits that the service of the summons and complaint upon defendant was completed on August 6, 2008 ( see proposed judgment and attorney’s affirmation of plaintiff’s counsel dated October 6, 2008 annexed to defendant’s motion as Exhibit “B”) it is clear that the instant action was commenced way beyond the six year statute of limitations. As such, the complaint is dismissed.
The foregoing constitutes the order and decision of the court.
Dated: April 28, 2010_____________________________
KATHERINE A. LEVINE
JUDGE, CIVIL COURT
ASN by_________on________
A P P E A R A N C E S:
Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Baker, Sanders, Barshay, Grossman, Fass, Muhlstock & Neuwirth
150 Herricks Road
Mineola, NY 11501
Attorneys for Defendant:
Peter C. Merani, P.C.
298 Fifth Avenue, 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10001
Legal questions
A question of no-fault law this decision rules on, from our Legal Questions pages. Bars count the decisions on the question by year and court, coloured by category; circles are this decision and the decisions on the question it cites or that cite it. Point at a bar or circle for details. The categories and summaries are Beynenson Law’s classification, made by a language model and checked by a second reading.
Which limitations period governs a first-party no-fault claim against an insurer, self-insurer or MVAIC: six or three years?
This decision: Claim against an insurer under a policy carries the six-year contract period (CPLR 213 [2]) (rules on the question, but another ground decided the case)
Held the action against the insurer barred by the six-year contract period of CPLR 213 (2), computing accrual from the service date plus 180 days for submission and 30 days to pay, which made the 2008 action untimely.
Of the 56 decisions on this question in the Second Department courts and the Court of Appeals, 21 (this one included) are in the same category. One decision in other departments that cites or is cited by this one is on the full map.
Cited in this decision
A label shows how this decision treated the case it cites.
- Rockman v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 52093(U))The provider failed to rebut the insurer's timely preserved defense that proof of claim was submitted beyond the 180-day deadline.
- Montefiore Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2004 NY Slip Op 05783)The insurer raised factual issues concerning denial of one hospital's late claim and timely verification requests for another's incomplete claim.
- Alleviation Supplies Inc. v Enterprise Rent-A-Car (2006 NY Slip Op 26177) FollowedA no-fault action against a self-insurer is governed by the three-year limitations period in CPLR 214 (2).
- Spring World Acupuncture, P.C. v NYC Tr. Auth. (2009 NY Slip Op 29229)An action to recover first-party no-fault benefits from a self-insurer is governed by the six-year limitation period in CPLR 213 (2).
- In Line Chiropractic, P.C. v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (2005 NY Slip Op 50275(U)) FollowedA no-fault claim against MVAIC accrues when payment becomes overdue absent verification tolling, or upon a timely denial.
- Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. (2007 NY Slip Op 01693) FollowedA provider's action to recover no-fault benefits under an insurance policy is governed by the six-year contractual limitations period.
Similar decisions
- Chiropractic Life, P.C. v Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. (2021 NY Slip Op 51221(U))The insurer failed to establish the claim's accrual date and could not obtain dismissal on limitations grounds.
- New York Med. Rehab., P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co. (2013 NY Slip Op 23218)The provider's action was time-barred because mailing the summons without a signed acknowledgment did not commence it.
- Dyckman Med. Diagnostic/Treatment, P.C. v Granite State Ins. Co. (2014 NY Slip Op 51026(U))The insurer failed to prove its limitations defense because its conclusory denial of receipt did not rebut the affidavit of service.
- Maple Med. Acupuncture, P.C. v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. (2007 NY Slip Op 50827(U))MVAIC failed to establish either noncompliance with accident-reporting requirements or expiration of the limitations period.
- Montgomery Med., P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co. (2006 NY Slip Op 51003(U))The insurer's evidence raised a triable issue of fraudulent incorporation but did not establish its entitlement to summary judgment.