July 30, 2008
Horton Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 51682(U))
Headnote
Reported in New York Official Reports at Horton Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2008 NY Slip Op 51682(U))
Horton Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. |
2008 NY Slip Op 51682(U) [20 Misc 3d 142(A)] |
Decided on July 30, 2008 |
Appellate Term, Second Department |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : WESTON PATTERSON, J.P., GOLIA and RIOS, JJ
2006-2063 Q C. NO. 2006-2063 Q C
against
New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered July 18, 2006, deemed from a judgment entered August 22, 2006 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the July 18, 2006 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $4,257.05.
Judgment reversed without costs, so much of the order entered July 18, 2006 as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment vacated and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment denied.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the complaint asserts seven causes of action based upon NF-3 claim forms and an eighth cause of action seeking attorney’s fees. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was supported by an affirmation from plaintiff’s counsel, an affirmation by plaintiff’s billing manager, and various documents annexed thereto. The affirmation executed by plaintiff’s billing manager stated in a conclusory manner that the documents attached to plaintiff’s motion papers were plaintiff’s business records. In opposition, defendant argued, inter alia, that the affirmation by plaintiff’s billing manager failed to lay a proper foundation for the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers and that, as a result, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. Defendant also sought summary judgment upon its cross motion on the ground that the action was premature because plaintiff failed to respond to timely verification requests. The court [*2]granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion. The instant appeal by defendant ensued.
On appeal, defendant reiterates its argument that plaintiff did not make a prima facie showing because plaintiff failed to establish the admissibility of the claim forms annexed to its moving papers. We agree. Inasmuch as the affirmation submitted by plaintiff’s billing manager was insufficient to establish that she possessed personal knowledge of plaintiff’s office practices and procedures so as to lay a foundation for the admission, as business records, of the documents annexed to plaintiff’s moving papers, plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment (see Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied.
Defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment is predicated upon defendant’s timely requests for verification. Inasmuch as the affidavit executed by defendant’s no-fault litigation examiner failed to establish that defendant timely mailed its verification requests based upon its standard office practice or procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 29 AD3d 547 [2006]; Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]; cf. Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), defendant is not entitled to summary judgment upon its cross motion with respect to the seven causes of action on NF-3 claim forms.
Since the issue is not raised, we do not pass on whether the eighth cause of action, seeking attorney’s fees, constitutes a separate cause of action for pleading purposes under the No-Fault Law or whether it is merely an element of the damages recoverable on the substantive causes of action (see generally Rocanova v Equitable Life Assur. Socy. of U.S., 83 NY2d 603, 616 [1994]). We note, however, that even were we to find that it is not a separate cause of action for pleading purposes, we would, upon dismissing said “cause of action,” deem the complaint amended to demand attorney’s fees as part of the damages sought in each of the remaining causes of action (see Bunker v Bunker, 73 AD2d 530 [1979]).
Weston Patterson, J.P., and Rios, J., concur.
Golia, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate memorandum.
Golia, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and votes to reverse the judgment, vacate the
entire order entered July 18, 2006 except the provisions thereof which denied defendant’s cross
motion for summary judgment with respect to its first and eighth causes of action, and, upon such
vacatur, deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grant defendant’s cross motion for
summary judgment to the extent of dismissing plaintiff’s second through seventh causes of
action, in the following memorandum:
I concur with the majority insofar as it denied summary judgment in favor of plaintiff for the reasons stated by the majority. I further concur with the majority insofar as it denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment with respect to the first and eighth causes of action, which portion of the cross motion I would deny based on defendant’s failure to provide adequate proof that the follow-up verification sought the same materials as the first verification request.
I dissent, however, as to the majority’s affirmance of the lower court’s denial of [*3]defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment with respect to the second through seventh causes of action. My disagreement with my colleagues turns, in large part, on the issue of what constitutes sufficient proof of mailing. I find that the affidavit of Ms. Annie Jordan, defendant’s no-fault litigation examiner, is more than sufficient to establish that the verification requests were mailed and that the follow-up requests were timely and properly sent in accordance with the protocols set forth in the regulations. Unlike the facts in Hospital for Joint Diseases v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (284 AD2d 374, 375 [2002]), in which the court found that the “employee had no personal knowledge that the . . . form had been mailed . . .,” in this case, Ms. Jordan specifically states that “I have personal knowledge that in compliance with that policy and business duty . . . the verification letters were dated and generated, copies of the verification letters were mailed to Horton Medical P.C., 40 Horton Ave., Lynbrook, N.Y. . . . .”
She further stated in her affidavit that:
“It is [defendant’s] office practice and [defendant’s] claims examiners are under a business duty to mail all verification letters to the address applicant lists on the bills on the same day the verification letters are dated and generated. I have personal knowledge that in compliance with that policy and business duty, on 08/24/05, 09/08/05, 09/14/05, 09/28/05, 09/29/05, 10/11/05. 10/14/05, 11/03/05, 11/16/05, 12/19/05, the dates the verification letters were mailed to [plaintiff at] the address listed on the bills. Copies were also mailed to Plaintiff’s assignor. I have personal knowledge that the postal service did not return the verification letters as being undeliverable.”
As stated by the Court of Appeals in Nassau Ins. Co. v Murray (46 NY2d 828, 830 [1978]), the real question is whether or not the party has established the following:
“office practice must be geared so as to ensure the likelihood that a notice . . . is always properly addressed and mailed.”
To the best of my understanding, the only reason that I can intuit as to why the majority finds this affidavit of mailing procedures to be insufficient is that it does not deconstruct the process itself. That is, it does not state that the office procedure entails affixing the proper postage, placing the envelopes in the care and custody of the U.S. Postal Service, etc.
I do not believe that such a strict catechism is necessary in order to trigger the legal presumption of mailing. Indeed, the plain meaning of the word “mailing” in and of itself denotes a process and not a concept. It is applicable only to the U.S. Postal Service. Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed 2004) defines “mail” as a noun meaning:
“one or more items that have been properly addressed, stamped with postage, and deposited for delivery in the postal system.”
“Mail” is also defined as a verb to mean:
“to ensure that a letter, package, etc. is properly addressed, stamped, and placed into a receptacle for mail pickup.”
It should not be the province of this Court to
require that a party to an action recite all the component parts encompassed by the act of this
unique word “mailing” in much the same way that “plebes” at a military academy are required to
recite all the component elements of the act of “walking” before taking a walk. For the military to
require such strict adherence can make sense. For the courts to do so is unreasonable.
[*4]
Decision Date: July 30, 2008