November 17, 2016

Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 26387)

Headnote

In Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., the court considered an action by a provider to recover first-party no-fault benefits on behalf of an assignee. The insurance company, defendant, cross-moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the insurance policy for the vehicle in question had been terminated prior to the accident in question. The main issues involved the sufficiency of the defendant's notice of termination to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and the plaintiff's demonstration of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The court held that defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was denied, as the notice of termination had not been properly filed with the DMV. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was properly denied, as the proof submitted in support of the motion failed to establish that the claims at issue had not been timely denied or that the denials issued by the defendant were conclusory, vague, or without merit as a matter of law.

Reported in New York Official Reports at Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 26387)

Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 26387)
Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co.
2016 NY Slip Op 26387 [54 Misc 3d 46]
Accepted for Miscellaneous Reports Publication
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th and 13th Judicial Districts
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, March 8, 2017

[*1]

Art of Healing Medicine, P.C., as Assignee of James Dorsainvil, Appellant,
v
Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th and 13th Judicial Districts, November 17, 2016

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

The Rybak Firm, PLLC, Brooklyn (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant.

Peter C. Merani, P.C., New York City (Eric M. Wahrburg of counsel), for respondent.

{**54 Misc 3d at 47} OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Ordered that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the insurance policy covering the vehicle allegedly involved in the March 26, 2010 motor vehicle accident had been terminated on March 16, 2010, prior to the accident. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and implicitly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted its senior field support representative’s affidavit accompanied by documents which, together, demonstrated that, on December 17, 2009, in compliance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313 (1), defendant had mailed a letter to the policyholder notifying it that, due to “missing information or no response to our underwriting inquiry,” the policy would terminate on March 16, 2010. However, although the affidavit referred to an annexed{**54 Misc 3d at 48} document purportedly showing a record of defendant’s March 17, 2010 notification to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) of defendant’s March 16, 2010 termination of the policy, these submissions did not conclusively establish, as a matter of law, that defendant’s notice of termination had been properly filed with the DMV (see e.g. Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Barthold, 194 AD2d 724 [1993]). As defendant failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that it had filed a copy of the notice of termination, upon which its defense is based, with the DMV within 30 days of the effective date of the policy’s termination, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313 (2) (a) (see Matter of Progressive Classic Ins. Co. v Kitchen, 46 AD3d 333 [2007]), defendant did not show that the cancellation was effective with respect to plaintiff’s assignor, who was not the named insured or a member of the insured’s household (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313 [3]). Consequently, defendant should not have been awarded summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

With respect to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of [*2]law, as the proof submitted in support of its motion failed to establish either that the claims at issue had not been timely denied (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]), or that defendant had issued timely denials that were conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). Thus, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied.

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Weston, J.P., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.