Gary Tsirelman, P.C. (Devon Riley Christian and David M. Gottlieb of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Peter C. Merani, P.C. (Edward M. Tobin and Adam Waknine of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Joy F. Campanelli, J.), dated August 30, 2017. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment of that court entered July 28, 2016 upon defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint, and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s answer.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branches of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the default judgment and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s answer are denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court as granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment of that court, entered July 28, 2016 upon defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint, and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s answer.

At the outset, we note that the process server’s affidavit constituted prima facie evidence of proper service of process upon defendant pursuant to CPLR 311 (a) (1), by serving a general agent of defendant who was authorized to accept service on its behalf (see Hayden v Southern Wine & Spirits of Upstate NY, Inc., 126 AD3d 673 [2015]; Teitelbaum v North Shore-Long Is. Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 123 AD3d 1006 [2014]; Indymac Fed. Bank FSB v Quattrochi, 99 AD3d 763 [2012]).

A defendant seeking to vacate a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the [*2]action (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., Inc., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v Excel Prods., Inc., 171 AD3d 812 [2019]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Allstate Ins. Co., 80 AD3d 695 [2011]). Here, we find that the Civil Court improvidently exercised its discretion in determining that defendant had provided a reasonable excuse for its default. Defendant submitted an affidavit by the employee allegedly served. However, the employee did not indicate whether he had in fact been served or even that he could not recall whether he had been served. Instead, he stated only that “[o]ne of my duties is to act as the receptionist” at defendant’s Brooklyn location and then purported to describe defendant’s business practices and procedures in recording receipt of summonses and complaints in its computer system. However, defendant’s employee did not indicate whether he had employed those practices and procedures at the time in question. An affidavit submitted by another of defendant’s employees, its claim representative, asserted conclusorily that defendant had not been served with the summons and complaint, since it did not have a record in its computer system of having received process. These affidavits are insufficient to warrant the relief requested (see Pierre J. Renelique Physician, P.C., as Assignee of Jose Mercado v Allstate Ins. Co., ___ Misc 3d ___, 2019 NY Slip Op 29225 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the branches of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the default judgment and to compel plaintiff to accept defendant’s answer are denied.

Decided on August 23, 2019

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

[*1]

Brown Chiari LLP, Buffalo (Timothy M. Hudson of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Rupp Baase Pfalzgraf Cunningham LLC, Buffalo (Matthew A. Lenhard of counsel), for defendant-respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Niagara County (Frank Caruso, J.), entered October 22, 2018. The judgment dismissed the complaint and awarded defendant costs and disbursements.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorist (SUM) benefits from defendant, her motor vehicle liability insurer, based on injuries that plaintiff allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The jury returned a verdict finding that the accident was not “a substantial factor in causing an injury to [plaintiff].” Thereafter, Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered after the jury’s verdict, and we affirm.

We reject plaintiff’s initial contention that the court erred in precluding her from calling as witnesses at trial any claims representatives employed by defendant or from entering into evidence any proof of insurance. It was undisputed at trial that plaintiff carried SUM coverage pursuant to a policy issued by defendant and that the SUM coverage was applicable to plaintiff’s motor vehicle accident, and thus there was no need for plaintiff to offer further evidence establishing the existence of the policy. Similarly, there is no indication in plaintiff’s pleadings or elsewhere in the record that she was alleging that defendant denied her claim for SUM benefits in bad faith (see e.g. Bi-Economy Mkt., Inc. v Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 10 NY3d 187, 191-192 [2008]), and thus evidence that defendant conducted an internal investigation regarding plaintiff’s claim was not relevant to the issues at trial. Indeed, it is understandable that defendant engaged in such an investigation inasmuch as, “[w]hen an insured injures someone in a motor vehicle accident, the injured party is subject to the serious injury requirement in the No-Fault Law and cannot sue for noneconomic loss unless the serious injury threshold is met (see Insurance Law § 5104 [a]). Since the purpose of supplementary coverage is to extend to the insured the same level of coverage provided to an injured third party under the policy, the insured must also meet the serious injury requirement before entitlement to supplementary benefits. If this were not the case, the insured would receive coverage more comprehensive than that available to a third party injured by the insured” (Raffellini v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 196, 205 [2007]). Here, we agree with defendant that its representatives were not witnesses to the accident, have no personal knowledge of the facts of the accident, and are not medical doctors qualified to testify regarding plaintiff’s alleged injuries. Thus, defendant’s internal investigation and evaluation of plaintiff’s claim is therefore irrelevant to the issue whether plaintiff sustained a serious injury, which, along with the issue whether any such injury was causally related to the accident, were the primary issues before the jury (see generally 40 Rector Holdings, LLC v Travelers Indem. Co., 40 AD3d 482, 483 [1st Dept 2007]). We also agree with defendant that plaintiff did not need a representative from defendant to explain the relationship between the parties. Plaintiff’s counsel could have requested a special instruction from the court or elicited detailed testimony from the plaintiff on that topic. Moreover, plaintiff’s counsel did explain to the jury in his opening and closing statements the relationship between the parties.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the court properly rejected her request to charge the jury pursuant to PJI 2:282 regarding the aggravation of a preexisting injury inasmuch as “ ’there was no factual basis for such a charge’ ” (Dennis v Massey, 134 AD3d 1532, 1533-1534 [4th Dept 2015]; cf. Mazurek v Home Depot U.S.A., 303 AD2d 960, 961 [4th Dept 2003]). We thus reject plaintiff’s contention that a “rational jury could have found that [plaintiff] had asymptomatic pre-existing arthritis that was activated and precipitated by the injury” and that a charge pursuant to PJI 2:282 was therefore warranted. We note, however, that plaintiff’s contention supports a charge under PJI 2:283 regarding increased susceptibility to injury, and that charge was given in this case (see Martin v Volvo Cars of N. Am., 241 AD2d 941, 943 [4th Dept 1997]).

We also reject plaintiff’s contention that the court erred in failing to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence. It is well established that “[a] verdict rendered in favor of a defendant may be successfully challenged as against the weight of the evidence only when the evidence so preponderated in favor of the plaintiff that it could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Sauter v Calabretta, 103 AD3d 1220, 1220 [4th Dept 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]). “That determination is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, but if the verdict is one that reasonable persons could have rendered after receiving conflicting evidence, the court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury” (Ruddock v Happell, 307 AD2d 719, 720 [4th Dept 2003]; see Todd v PLSIII, LLC-We Care, 87 AD3d 1376, 1377 [4th Dept 2011]). “Where a verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view” (Schreiber v University of Rochester Med. Ctr., 88 AD3d 1262, 1263 [4th Dept 2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, there was sharply conflicting expert testimony with respect to whether plaintiff sustained an injury as a result of the accident, and the jury was entitled to credit the testimony of defendant’s expert and reject the testimony of plaintiff’s experts (see McMillian v Burden, 136 AD3d 1342, 1344 [4th Dept 2016]).

While we conclude under the circumstances of this case that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence, we nonetheless note that the first question on the verdict sheet—i.e., “[w]as the accident . . . a substantial factor in causing an injury to [plaintiff]?”—invites the very problem we addressed in Brown v Ng (163 AD3d 1464, 1465 [4th Dept 2018]), where we noted that an interrogatory asking whether the plaintiff sustained an “injury” fails to address the appropriate legal issue, which is whether the plaintiff sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The first question on the verdict sheet was unnecessary here inasmuch as the second and third questions asked the jury to determine whether plaintiff sustained a serious injury under the relevant categories that was causally related to the accident.

Finally, we reject plaintiff’s contention that the court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant was not required to issue a disclaimer regarding the serious injury threshold (see generally Insurance Law § 3420 [f] [1], [2]; Raffellini, 9 NY3d at 205; Meegan v Progressive Ins. Co., 43 AD3d 182, 184-185 [4th Dept 2007]). Present—Peradotto, J.P., DeJoseph, NeMoyer and Curran, JJ.

[*1]

Hurwitz & Fine, P.C., Buffalo (Jerry Marti of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

The Morris Law Firm, P.C., Buffalo (Daniel K. Morris of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Catherine R. Nugent Panepinto, J.), entered November 1, 2017. The order denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is granted, and the amended complaint is dismissed.

Memorandum: Plaintiff, as the assignee of claims for no-fault benefits of individuals who had received health care services from plaintiff for injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents, commenced this action against defendant, the issuer of the assignors’ no-fault policies. In its amended complaint, plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that defendant violated the no-fault regulations by requesting verifications and examinations under oath and delaying the payment of claims for treatment rendered by plaintiff to the assignors. Although the no-fault claims were adjudicated and paid by defendant after arbitration, plaintiff sought further damages from defendant for the manner in which those claims were processed. Prior to serving its answer, defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint on, inter alia, the ground that it failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). Supreme Court denied the motion, and we reverse.

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, “[w]e accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Hall v McDonald’s Corp., 159 AD3d 1591, 1592 [4th Dept 2018]). “The allegations in a complaint, however, ‘cannot be vague and conclusory . . . , and [b]are legal conclusions will not suffice’ ” (Choromanskis v Chestnut Homeowners Assn., Inc., 147 AD3d 1477, 1478 [4th Dept 2017]; see Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d 46, 52 [2012]).

We agree with defendant that the court erred in denying the motion with respect to the breach of contract cause of action. The amended complaint alleged that defendant and plaintiff “were parties to the applicable insurance contracts by way of the [a]ssignments of [b]enefits” and that “[t]he underlying verification requests, examinations under oath, and subsequent non-payment of bills by . . . [d]efendant represent a breach of contract.” The amended complaint, however, failed to identify the specific insurance contracts that plaintiff had performed services under or the contract provisions that defendant allegedly breached. Inasmuch as bare legal conclusions without factual support are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, we conclude that the amended complaint fails to state a cause of action for breach of contract. Additionally, we note that plaintiff conceded in its respondent’s brief that “[d]efendant[ ] did not fail to perform their obligations under the contract[s]” and that “the contracts have specific remedies available to plaintiff . . . , and all such remedies have already been applied” (see generally Non-Instruction Adm’rs & Supervisors Retirees Assn. v School Dist. of City of Niagara Falls, 118 AD3d 1280, 1283 [4th Dept 2014]).

With respect to the cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention, the amended complaint alleged that defendant’s employees delayed the payment of plaintiff’s claims and sent plaintiff requests for verification and examinations under oath, that defendant was aware of its employees’ propensity to commit those acts, and that defendant nevertheless continued to employ them. Although “[a]n employer may be liable for a claim of negligent hiring or supervision if an employee commits an independent act of negligence outside the scope of employment and the employer was aware of, or reasonably should have foreseen, the employee’s propensity to commit such an act” (Lamb v Stephen M. Baker, O.D., P.C., 152 AD3d 1230, 1231 [4th Dept 2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]), the amended complaint failed to allege that the acts of defendant’s employees were committed independent of defendant’s instruction or outside the scope of employment (see id.). The amended complaint also failed to allege how the employees’ purported acts of sending requests for verification and examinations under oath constituted acts of negligence. We therefore conclude that the court erred in denying defendant’s motion with respect to the cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention.

We also agree with defendant that the amended complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for prima facie tort (see generally Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135, 142-143 [1985]). “There can be no recovery [for prima facie tort] unless a disinterested malevolence to injure [a] plaintiff constitutes the sole motivation for [the] defendant[‘s] otherwise lawful act” (Backus v Planned Parenthood of Finger Lakes, 161 AD2d 1116, 1117 [4th Dept 1990] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the amended complaint alleged that defendant acted in “bad faith” and intentionally caused harm to plaintiff by requesting verifications and examinations under oath. Those conclusory allegations, however, failed to state that defendant had “ ’a malicious [motive] unmixed with any other and exclusively directed to [the] injury and damage of [plaintiff]’ ” (Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner, 59 NY2d 314, 333 [1983]). Furthermore, it is “[a] critical element of [a prima facie tort] cause of action . . . that plaintiff suffered specific and measurable loss” (Freihofer, 65 NY2d at 143; see Lincoln First Bank of Rochester v Siegel, 60 AD2d 270, 279-280 [4th Dept 1977]). Here, the injuries alleged in the amended complaint, i.e., delayed payment of claims resulting in a “reduced cash flow,” are “couched in broad and conclusory terms” (Lincoln First Bank of Rochester, 60 AD2d at 280), and do not constitute “specific and measurable loss” (Freihofer, 65 NY2d at 143; cf. S. E. Nichols, Inc. v Grossman [appeal No. 1], 50 AD2d 1086, 1086 [4th Dept 1975]). Thus, the court erred in denying the motion with respect to the prima facie tort cause of action.

Finally, as conceded by plaintiff’s counsel at oral argument of this appeal before this Court, defendant is entitled to dismissal of the remaining causes of action asserted in the amended complaint. Present—Peradotto, J.P., Lindley, DeJoseph, Troutman and Winslow, JJ.

Goldberg Miller & Rubin (Ruth Nazarian and Harlan Schreiber of counsel), for appellant. Zara Javakov, P.C. (Zara Javakov and Victoria Tarasova of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Andrew Borrok, J.), entered September 19, 2017, deemed from a judgment of that court entered December 1, 2017 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the September 19, 2017 order denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granting plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,800.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, so much of the order as granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is vacated and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs), and plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. By order entered September 19, 2017, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion and granted plaintiff’s cross motion. A judgment was subsequently entered on December 1, 2017, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

The Civil Court properly found that defendant’s moving papers failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the first IME scheduling letter sent to plaintiff’s assignor had been timely, as the record indicates that it was mailed more than 30 days after defendant had received the claims at issue (see Neptune Med. Care, P.C. v Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins., 48 Misc 3d 139[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51220[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; O & M Med., P.C. v Travelers Indem. Co., 47 Misc 3d 134[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50476[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). Consequently, as defendant failed to demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment based upon plaintiff’s failure to comply with a condition [*2]precedent to coverage (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]), defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly denied.

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, as the proof submitted in support of its cross motion failed to establish either that the claims at issue had not been timely denied or that defendant had issued timely denial of claim forms that were conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, so much of the order as granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is vacated and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

PESCE, P.J., WESTON and ALIOTTA, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Karina Barska of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Karen L. Lawrence (Cheryl Scher of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin Kelly Sheares, J.), entered August 3, 2017. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action in the Civil Court on October 14, 2015 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for services provided to its assignor, who was allegedly injured in an accident on October 24, 2011. Prior to the commencement of this action, defendant had brought a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Court, Kings County, against plaintiff and its assignor herein, among other parties, pertaining to the October 24, 2011 accident. Thereafter, defendant moved in the Supreme Court for summary judgment, and, in an order entered April 28, 2014, the Supreme Court stated that defendant’s “motion for summary judgment for a declaration of a staged accident and that plaintiff is not liable in any respect for damages arising out of the accident is hereby granted in all respects on default” as to the present plaintiff and assignor, among other parties. Relying upon the Supreme Court’s order, defendant moved in the Civil Court for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Defendant annexed a copy of the Supreme Court’s order, pleadings and motion papers. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court entered August 3, 2017 which granted defendant’s motion.

We note that defendant failed to include res judicata as an affirmative defense in its answer, or to move to dismiss the complaint on that ground pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) prior to serving its answer. Defendant instead moved for summary judgment based on res judicata and also sought “such other and further relief as [the Civil Court] may deem just and proper.” As plaintiff, in opposition to defendant’s motion, failed to allege any prejudice (see Barrett v Kasco [*2]Constr. Co., 84 AD2d 555, 556 [1981], affd 56 NY2d 830 [1982]) or surprise (see CPLR 3018 [b]; Rogoff v San Juan Racing Assn., 54 NY2d 883, 885 [1981]; Renelique v State-Wide Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50096[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]) resulting from defendant’s seeking summary judgment based on that unpleaded affirmative defense, we deem defendant’s answer amended to include the affirmative defense of res judicata (see Barrett, 84 AD2d at 556; Metro Health Prods., Inc. v Nationwide Ins., 52 Misc 3d 138[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51122[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]).

“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final adjudication of a claim on the merits precludes relitigation of that claim and all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions by a party or those in privity with a party” (Ciraldo v JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 140 AD3d 912, 913-914 [2016]; see Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260 [2005]; Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307 [1929]). In light of the order in the declaratory judgment action, the present action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata (see Island Life Chiropractic, P.C. v Unitrin Auto & Home Ins. Co., 52 Misc 3d 137[U], 2016 NY Slip Op 51076[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]; EBM Med. Health Care, P.C. v Republic W. Ins., 38 Misc 3d 1, 3 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Ava Acupuncture, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 149[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50233[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; SZ Med., P.C. v Erie Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), as any judgment in favor of plaintiff in the instant action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the Supreme Court’s order (see Schuylkill Fuel Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307; SZ Med., P.C., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Goldberg Miller & Rubin (Joshua C. Shack of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Ilona Finkelshteyn, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered May 11, 2017, deemed from a judgment of that court entered September 1, 2017 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the May 11, 2017 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,595.38.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, so much of the May 11, 2017 order as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs). By order entered May 11, 2017, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion and denied defendant’s cross motion. A judgment awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $1,595.38 was entered on September 1, 2017. Defendant’s appeal from the May 11, 2017 order is deemed to be from the judgment entered pursuant thereto (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Defendant correctly argues that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied, as the proof submitted by plaintiff failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the claims had not been timely denied (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 25 NY3d 498 [2015]), or that defendant had issued timely denial of claim forms that were conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). However, [*2]since defendant failed to establish that its follow-up IME scheduling letter was timely (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.6 [b]), its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly denied. Defendant’s contention regarding the applicability of 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (p) is improperly raised for the first time on appeal (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]; Gulf Ins. Co. v Kanen, 13 AD3d 579 [2004]), and we decline to consider it.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, so much of the May 11, 2017 order as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is vacated, and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Jeffrey G. Lerman, P.C. (Jeffrey G. Lerman of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered April 19, 2017. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted defendant’s motion, in effect, to consolidate the above-entitled action with actions entitled EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Boakye, Oheneba v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (Civ Ct, Kings County, index No. 68017/15) and EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Kubi, George v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (Civ Ct, Kings County, index No. 68019/15) for the purposes of disposition of the motion and, upon consolidation, to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved to, among other things, in effect, consolidate the instant action with two related actions entitled EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Boakye, Oheneba v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (Civ Ct, Kings County, index No. 68017/15) and EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Kubi, George v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (Civ Ct, Kings County, index No. 68019/15)for the purposes of disposition of the motion, and, upon consolidation, to dismiss the complaints in all three actions, contending that the Civil Court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant. Plaintiff opposed the motion. Plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court [*2]entered April 19, 2017 as consolidated the actions for the purposes of disposition of the motion and dismissed the complaint.

For the reasons stated in EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Boakye, Oheneba v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (__ Misc 3d __, 2019 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2017-2137 K C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

ALIOTTA, J.P., PESCE and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Jeffrey G. Lerman, P.C. (Jeffrey G. Lerman of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered April 19, 2017. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted defendant’s motion, in effect, to consolidate the above-entitled action with actions entitled EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Boakye, Oheneba v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (Civ Ct, Kings County, index No. 68017/15) and EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Smith, Eugene v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (Civ Ct, Kings County, index No. 68018/15) for the purposes of disposition of the motion and, upon consolidation, to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved to, among other things, in effect, consolidate the instant action with two related actions entitled EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Boakye, Oheneba v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (Civ Ct, Kings County, index No. 68017/15) and EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Smith, Eugene v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (Civ Ct, Kings County, index No. 68018/15) for the purposes of disposition of the motion, and, upon consolidation, to dismiss the complaints in all three actions, contending that the Civil Court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant. Plaintiff opposed the motion. Plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court [*2]entered April 19, 2017 as consolidated the actions for the purposes of disposition of the motion and dismissed the complaint.

For the reasons stated in EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Boakye, Oheneba v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (__ Misc 3d __, 2019 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2017-2137 K C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

ALIOTTA, J.P., PESCE and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant. Jeffrey G. Lerman, P.C. (Jeffrey G. Lerman of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered April 19, 2017. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted defendant’s motion, in effect, to consolidate the above-entitled action with actions entitled EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Kubi, George v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (Civ Ct, Kings County, index No. 68019/15) and EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Smith, Eugene v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (Civ Ct, Kings County, index No. 68018/15) for the purposes of disposition of the motion and, upon consolidation, to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved to, among other things, in effect, consolidate the instant action with two related actions entitled EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Kubi, George v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (Civ Ct, Kings County, index No. 68019/15) and EMC Health Prods., Inc., as Assignee of Smith, Eugene v Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund (Civ Ct, Kings County, index No. 68018/15) for the purposes of disposition of the motion, and, upon consolidation, to dismiss the complaints in all three actions, contending that the Civil Court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant. In support of its motion, defendant alleged that it conducts no business in the State of New York, including that it does not issue insurance policies here, has no sales representative or agent within [*2]the state, and is not licensed to transact business within the State of New York. Plaintiff opposed the motion. Plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court entered April 19, 2017 as consolidated the actions for the purposes of disposition of the motion and dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the court erred in consolidating the three actions, arguing that consolidation is improper because defendant “failed to proffer any of the pleadings from any of the actions.” As this argument is raised for the first time on appeal, it is not considered (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]; Gulf Ins. Co. v Kanen, 13 AD3d 579 [2004]).

Upon defendant’s prima facie showing that the Civil Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it, on the ground that there was no jurisdictional basis for suit in the Civil Court of the City of New York (see CCA 404), the burden shifted to plaintiff to establish that it had acquired jurisdiction, as plaintiff “carries the ultimate burden of proof on that issue” (Opticare Acquisition Corp. v Castillo, 25 AD3d 238, 243 [2005]; see also Sanchez v Major, 289 AD2d 320 [2001]; Brandt v Toraby, 273 AD2d 429 [2000]; Cushley v Wealth Masters Intl., 29 Misc 3d 144[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52221[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). In determining whether a plaintiff has met its burden, a court must construe the pleadings, affidavits and other evidentiary materials in a light most favorable to plaintiff, and must resolve all doubts in favor of jurisdiction (see Brandt, 273 AD2d at 430). Here, plaintiff failed to meet its burden. Plaintiff’s opposition papers consisted only of the affirmation of its counsel, who had no personal knowledge of the underlying facts (see Carte v Parkoff, 152 AD2d 615 [1989]). Plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing a jurisdictional basis for the service (see CCA 404; Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v Johnson, 260 AD2d 638 [1999]; see also Matter of Hereford Ins. Co. v American Ind. Ins., 136 AD3d 551 [2016]).

In view of the foregoing, we do not consider plaintiff’s other arguments.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

ALIOTTA, J.P., PESCE and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.