Roman Kravchenko (Jason Tenenbaum of counsel), for appellant. Bruno, Gerbino. Soriano & Aitken, LLP (Vince Gerbino and Alfred Polidore of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Robert E. Pipia, J.), dated July 31, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the branch of petitioner’s motion seeking an award of attorney’s fees.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, the branch of petitioner’s motion seeking an award of attorney’s fees is granted and the matter is remitted to the District Court to determine the amount of attorney’s fees to which petitioner is entitled, in accordance with this decision and order.

After the provider’s claims for assigned first-party no-fault benefits were denied, the parties proceeded to arbitration and the no-fault arbitrator made an award in favor of the provider, which award was upheld by a master arbitrator. As the insurer did not timely satisfy the award (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [e] [4]), the provider commenced this proceeding to confirm the master arbitration award (see CPLR 7510). The provider moved to confirm the master arbitrator’s award and, insofar as is relevant here, for an award of attorney’s fees. Shortly thereafter, the insurer paid petitioner the amount of the master arbitration award. By order dated July 31, 2024, the District Court (Robert E. Pipia, J.) granted the branch of the motion seeking to confirm the master arbitration award but denied the branch of the motion seeking attorney’s fees, finding that, notwithstanding 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4), the provider was not entitled to an award of additional attorney’s fees because “the instant proceeding is a special proceeding that was commenced for the sole purpose of confirming a master arbitration award. It was not commenced to resolve a dispute de novo, nor was it brought to appeal the underlying master arbitration award.”

“The attorney’s fee for services rendered . . . in a court appeal from a master arbitration [*2]award and any further appeals, shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [j] [4]). “The term ‘court appeal’ applies to a proceeding taken pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award” (Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v TC Acupuncture P.C., 179 AD3d 414, 414 [2020]; see Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 705 [2017]). As the Court of Appeals has stated with regard to the No-Fault Law (see Insurance Law article 51), “[t]o implement [the] legislative aim of curtailing delay and reducing expense in the adjustment of motor vehicle accident claims, the regulations are written to encourage prompt payment of claims, to discourage investigation by insurers, and to penalize delays” (Dermatossian v New York City Tr. Auth., 67 NY2d 219, 225 [1986] [emphasis added] [citation omitted]). Consequently, where, as here, the insurer failed to timely (see 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 [e] [4]) pay the amounts set forth in the master arbitration award and the provider commenced a proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7510 to confirm the master arbitration award so that it could be reduced to a judgment, the provider is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees, fixed by the court, for the District Court proceeding as well as for fees incurred on this appeal (see 11 NYCRR § 65-4.10 [j] [4]; Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v TC Acupuncture P.C., 179 AD3d 414; Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 170 AD3d 1168, 1169 [2019]; Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703; Matter of Metro Pain Specialist, P.C., v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 66 Misc 3d 135[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50014[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2020]). In view of the foregoing, the matter is remitted to the District Court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to which the provider is entitled.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, the branch of petitioner’s motion seeking an award of attorney’s fees is granted and the matter is remitted to the District Court to determine the amount of attorney’s fees to which petitioner is entitled, in accordance with this decision and order

GARGUILO, P.J., DRISCOLL and GOLDBERG-VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

Gary Tsirelman, P.C. (Galina Feldsherova of counsel), for appellant. Law Office of Robyn M. Brilliant (Robyn M. Brilliant of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.), dated February 1, 2024. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that, on the court’s own motion, the notice of appeal from a “judgment” purportedly entered February 1, 2024 is deemed a notice of appeal from the order dated February 1, 2024 (see CPLR 5520 [c]); and it is further,

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Mary A. Kavanagh, J.) dated February 1, 2024 granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the vehicle insured by defendant (the insured vehicle), was not involved in the accident.

In support of its motion, defendant relied on the truth of statements made in a police report regarding the accident. While the police report was certified, the statements within the report attributed to the driver of an unrelated vehicle, a witness and plaintiff’s assignor were inadmissible hearsay, as no exception to the hearsay rule was established for the statements (see Yassin v Blackman, 188 AD3d 62, 66 [2020]; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 38 Misc 3d 128[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52388[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]). The statement in a purported transcript of a call with the owner of the insured vehicle, which defendant offered for its truth, was also inadmissible hearsay. In any event, defendant’s own papers demonstrated that there are conflicting accounts as to how the alleged accident occurred and whether the insured vehicle was involved. Thus, defendant’s motion failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that there are no material issues of fact to be determined.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

MUNDY, J.P., TOUSSAINT and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

Martyn, Smith, Murray & Yong (Thomas M. Martyn of counsel), for appellant. Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs. (Alan Queen of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Ira R. Greenberg, J.), dated April 12, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment of that court entered September 14, 2023.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action in 2000 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. The parties agreed to settle the matter, and plaintiff’s counsel tendered to defendant’s counsel a letter dated March 30, 2006, to which a general release and a stipulation of discontinuance were appended. After plaintiff applied to the clerk for the entry of a judgment pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e) in June 2023, predicated upon the alleged failure of defendant to make prompt payment (see CPLR 5003-a [a]), a judgment was entered against defendant on September 14, 2023.

In October 2023, defendant moved to, among other things, vacate the judgment. One of defendant’s arguments in support of its motion was that plaintiff failed to satisfy its CPLR 5003-a (a) obligations before entering judgment. Plaintiff opposed the motion, to which defendant replied. As limited by its brief, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Ira R. Greenberg, J.) dated April 12, 2024 as denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the judgment.

“The purpose of CPLR 5003-a is to encourage the prompt payment of damages in settled actions” (Pitt v New York City Hous. Auth., 106 AD3d 797, 797-798 [2013]). CPLR 5003-a (a) requires a settling defendant to “pay all sums due to any settling plaintiff within twenty-one days of tender, by the settling plaintiff to the settling defendant, of a duly executed release and a stipulation discontinuing action executed on behalf of the settling plaintiff” (see Orthotics & [*2]Professional Supply, Ltd. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 77 Misc 3d 130[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 51221[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). In the context of CPLR 5003-a (a), “tender . . . shall mean either to personally deliver or to mail, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested” (CPLR 5003-a [g]; see J.D.T. v Chaimowitz, 218 AD3d 821, 823 [2023]; DJS Med. Supplies, Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 143[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52456[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). “If the settling defendant fails to pay the sum due under the settlement agreement within 21 days of tender of [a duly executed release and a stipulation discontinuing action executed on behalf of the settling plaintiff], the statute authorizes the plaintiff to enter, without further notice, a judgment in the amount of the settlement, which is to include interest, costs, and disbursements” (Klee v Americas Best Bottling Co., Inc., 76 AD3d 544, 545 [2010]; see CPLR 5003-a [e]).

While defendant contends that the judgment was improperly entered because plaintiff failed prove on its application to the clerk for the entry of a judgment pursuant to CPLR 5003-a (e) that it tendered to defendant the executed release and stipulation of discontinuance by personal delivery or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested (see CPLR 5003-a [a], [g]), it was defendant’s burden on its motion to vacate the judgment to show plaintiff’s noncompliance with CPLR 5003-a (see Medtech Med. Supply, Inc. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 74 Misc 3d 137[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50304[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). However, defendant submitted no evidence to show that plaintiff failed to tender the requisite documents to defendant in accordance with CPLR 5003-a.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

MUNDY, J.P., BUGGS and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff and Cheryl F. Korman of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), entered July 16, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) entered July 16, 2024 as granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification. While plaintiff does not argue that its cross-motion should have been granted, on appeal, plaintiff argues that the order, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed and the matter remitted to the Civil Court for consideration of what plaintiff denominated as an amended cross-motion, which the court declined to consider, rejecting that submission as an improper surreply. In the alternative, plaintiff argues that defendant’s motion should have been denied.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, it was not improper for defendant to seek, during the claim verification stage, information—such as management agreements, W-2 forms, business-related bank records and lease agreements—for the purpose of determining whether plaintiff was ineligible to collect no-fault benefits due to a failure to meet licensing requirements (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.16 [a] [1]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313 [2005]; Burke Physical Therapy, P.C., v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 85 Misc 3d 130[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50196[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]).

Plaintiff also argues that the instant action cannot be maintained, as collateral estoppel effect should be given to an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, in a declaratory judgment action brought by defendant herein in that court, denying defendant’s motion for [*2]summary judgment (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Burke Physical Therapy, P.C., 2022 NY Slip Op 30580[U] [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2022]). However, this court has previously held that the denial of that motion by the Supreme Court “has no preclusive effect . . . as it was not a final determination on the merits” (Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 Misc 3d 41, 45 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]). Thus, we need not address plaintiff’s contention that the Civil Court erred in declining, on procedural grounds, to consider plaintiff’s subsequent submission of that Supreme Court decision and order in support of plaintiff’s “amended” cross-motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

MUNDY, J.P., BUGGS and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

Law Office of David Paul Horowitz, PLLC (David Paul Horowitz and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Buratti, Rothenberg & Burns (Kenneth F. Popper and Argyria Kehagias of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by permission from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Rupert V. Barry, J.), dated December 9, 2021. The order granted defendant’s oral motion to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is denied and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for all further proceedings.

After this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits commenced, the parties entered into a stipulation dated September 24, 2009 which provided that, if plaintiff did not receive payment as set forth in the stipulation within 30 days, plaintiff could enter judgment for the amount demanded in the complaint without further notice. In 2019, plaintiff moved to enter judgment pursuant to the stipulation. After the unopposed motion was granted (Lorna J. McAllister, J.), a judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff. Defendant moved to vacate the judgment, contending, among other things, that it had not received plaintiff’s motion to enter a judgment and that it had timely paid the amounts set forth in the stipulation. The Civil Court (Rupert V. Barry, J.) granted defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment, finding that defendant had not received plaintiff’s motion seeking entry of the judgment, and ordered a hearing to determine whether defendant had complied with the stipulation. When the parties appeared for the hearing, defendant orally moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claim on the ground that the claim to recover upon the stipulation was barred by the statute of limitations. By order dated December 9, 2021, the Civil Court (Rupert V. Barry, J.) granted defendant’s oral motion to dismiss the complaint, finding that, “as recited in CPLR § 213 (1), Plaintiff needed to have commenced its action ‘within six years’ . . . [but] Plaintiff commenced [this] action to enforce its settlement agreement outside the 6 years statute of limitations.” Plaintiff appeals, by permission [*2](Arguelles, M.D., P.C. v AIG Natl. Ins. Co., 2024 NY Slip Op 76031[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]), from the December 9, 2021 order.

“The parties’ [2009] stipulation expressly permitted [plaintiff] to apply to the court for a judgment based upon any future default without any time limits (see Marine Midland Bank v Worldwide Industrial Corp., 307 AD2d 221 [2003])” (Cook v Greenbaum, 18 AD3d 416, 417-418 [2005]). “Had respondents desired to impose a time limit on the enforcement of their obligations under the stipulation, they had only to incorporate the appropriate language into their agreement” (Marine Midland Bank, 307 AD2d at 222). To the extent defendant contends that the order should be affirmed pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c) because plaintiff did not seek entry of the judgment within one year of the alleged default, such a contention lacks merit as “[e]ntry of a default judgment for failure to comply with a stipulation of settlement is specifically provided for by CPLR 3215 (i) (1), which contains no time limit for entering such judgment” (id.).

Accordingly, the order is reversed, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is denied and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for all further proceedings.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

Petitioner, American Transit Insurance Company, moves under CPLR article 75 to vacate a no-fault arbitration award in favor of respondent, Brooklyn Medical Practice, P.C. Respondent cross-moves to confirm and for an award of fees. The motion is denied. The cross-motion granted in part and denied in part.

1. On its motion, American Transit argues that the arbitrator (and the reviewing master [*2]arbitrator) failed to follow settled law, rendering the award subject to vacatur. This argument is unpersuasive.

The arbitrator held (and the master arbitrator agreed) that American Transit’s basis for denying the claim was foreclosed on issue-preclusion grounds. (See NYSCEF No. 3 at 2; NYSCEF No. 4 at 2-3.) In challenging this determination, American Transit contends that the arbitrator erred as a matter of law in (implicitly) concluding that the “issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.” (NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶ 59.) In particular, American Transit says, the arbitral record does not reflect whether “the decision that the Arbitrator relied upon was confirmed in Court” or “converted into a judgment,” and, “therefore, necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.” (Id. [internal quotation marks omitted].) But an arbitral award may be entitled to issue-preclusive effect in a later proceeding whether or not it has been judicially confirmed or converted into a judgment.^[FN1] (See Allstate Ins. Co. v Toussaint, 163 AD2d 444, 445 [2d Dept 1990].)

American Transit also argues that there is “no evidence to show that the Petitioner did not file a de novo action, which would render the prior award a nullity.” (NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶ 61.) This court disagrees with American Transit’s position that affording issue-preclusive effect to the prior award was error in these circumstances.

The party seeking the benefit of issue preclusion must meet an initial burden to show “that the decisive issue was necessarily decided in the prior action against a party, or one in privity with a party.” (Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 304 [2001].) American Transit cites no authority for the proposition that the party seeking issue preclusion must then also provide evidence ruling out the possibility that the decision in the prior proceeding had been vacated. To the contrary, it makes much more sense to place the burden of showing that the prior determination was no longer in force on the party opposing preclusion—just as that party must “demonstrate[e] the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination.” (Id.; see American Transit Ins. Co. v U.S. Med Supply Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 50560[U], at *11-12 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023] [reaching the same conclusion].) That is particularly true in the no-fault context, where it is not difficult to ascertain whether a prior arbitral award has been vacated by a master arbitrator or upon a de novo action. Absent a showing that the prior arbitral determination had been vacated, the arbitrator did not err in affording that determination issue-preclusive effect.

American Transit’s motion to vacate is denied.

2. On respondent’s cross-motion, respondent seeks not only to confirm the arbitral decision, but also to obtain an additional award of attorney fees. For the reasons discussed above, the arbitral determination is confirmed. Respondent’s fee request is granted in part and denied in part.

In addition to the sums awarded by the arbitrator in principal, interest, and attorney fees, respondent also asks this court to award fees incurred in this proceeding, under 11 NYCRR 65-4.10 (j) (4). Under that provision, the amount to be awarded in fees to a party prevailing in a CPLR article 75 proceeding “shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter.” Respondent seeks to recover $850 in fees for 1.7 hours of attorney time billed at $500 an hour. (See NYSCEF No. 11 at ¶¶ 22-23.)

In opposition, American Transit contends that respondent’s attorney fee must be limited to the hourly rate (and maximum fee) permitted by 11 NYCRR 65-4.6 (d). (See NYSCEF No. 16 at ¶¶ 45-46.) This contention is without merit. Section 65-4.6 (d) governs only attorney fees incurred in the underlying arbitration, not also an ensuing CPLR article 75 proceeding to confirm (or vacate) an arbitral award. (See Country-Wide Ins. Co. v TC Acupuncture P.C., 172 AD3d 598, 598 [1st Dept 2019].) This court is also unpersuaded by American Transit’s alternative suggestion that § 65-4.6 (d)’s hourly-rate restrictions necessarily establish the normal billing rate for no-fault attorneys. (NYSCEF No. 16 at ¶ 47.) American Transit does not attempt to show that the capped rate corresponds to the typical no-fault billing rate (either as of the enactment of this regulation or today). And treating § 65-4.6 (d) as setting the maximum rate that a court may properly award under § 65-4.10 (j) (4) would significantly undermine the latter provision’s conferral on courts of discretion to fix a proper attorney fee for CPLR article 75 proceedings. (See Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Bay Needle Care Acupuncture, P.C., 220 AD3d 461, 462 [1st Dept 2023] [“[T]he amount of attorney’s fees awarded pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65—4.10(j)(4) is left to the court’s discretion.”].)

At the same time, respondent has not shown that it is entitled to $850 in fees. Respondent’s counsel’s fee affirmation states only that $500 an hour is his usual hourly billing rate; and that the total billable time spent on this proceeding was 1.7 hours. (See NYSCEF No. 12 at ¶¶ 4-5.) The affirmation does not offer any other information—such as the typical going rate for experienced no-fault attorneys, or what time was spent on which tasks. (Cf. Gamache v Steinhaus, 7 AD3d 525, 527 [2d Dept 2004] [describing criteria for determining hourly rates when awarding fees].) Additionally, some of the time billed is not compensable at all, because that time was spent on preparing respondent’s fee request itself. (See Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp., 148 AD3d 703, 706 [2d Dept 2017] [holding that “fees on fees” are not available under 11 NYCRR 65-4.6 [j] [4]].) This court concludes that respondent is entitled to $345 in fees, representing 1.15 hours of attorney time at $300 an hour, rather than the $850 claimed.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that American Transit Insurance Company’s petition to vacate the underlying arbitral award is denied, and the branch of Brooklyn Medical Practice, P.C.’s cross-petition to confirm the arbitral award is granted; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the branch of Brooklyn Medical Practice, P.C.’s cross-petition for an award of attorney fees incurred in this proceeding is granted in part and denied in part; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Brooklyn Medical Practice, P.C. is awarded a [*3]judgment against American Transit Insurance Company for (i) the principal amount owed in first-party benefits of $3,936, with interest on that sum running at the statutory rate of 2% monthly simple interest, from June 11, 2024; plus (ii) the $40 arbitral filing fee; plus (iii) $787.20 in attorney fees awarded in the underlying arbitral proceeding, with interest on that sum running at the statutory rate of 2% monthly simple interest, from June 11, 2024; plus (iv) additional attorney fees incurred in this proceeding of $345; plus (v) costs and disbursements as taxed by the Clerk upon the submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent serve a copy of this order with notice of its entry on petitioner and on the office of the County Clerk (using the NYSCEF filing event “Notice to the County Clerk – CPLR § 8019 (c)”), which shall enter judgment accordingly.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Oleg Rybak and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated September 8, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) dated September 8, 2023 as granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification.

For the reasons stated in Burke Physical Therapy, P.C., as Assignee of Brown, Wildex v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2023-1091 K C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

BUGGS, J.P. and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

OTTLEY, J., taking no part.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Oleg Rybak and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated September 8, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) dated September 8, 2023 as granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification.

For the reasons stated in Burke Physical Therapy, P.C., as Assignee of Brown, Wildex v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2023-1091 K C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

BUGGS, J.P. and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

OTTLEY, J., taking no part.