SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered July 17, 2009, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered August 18, 2009 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the July 17, 2009 order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had properly reimbursed plaintiff for services rendered by its licensed acupuncturist to plaintiff’s assignor. Plaintiff opposed the motion. The Civil Court granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint. This appeal by plaintiff ensued. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to be taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

It was proper for defendant to use the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors to determine the amount which plaintiff was entitled to receive for services rendered by a licensed acupuncturist (see AVA Acupuncture, P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 17 Misc 3d 41 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; Great Wall Acupuncture v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). As defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly granted, the judgment is affirmed.

Steinhardt, J.P., Pesce and Weston, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: January 26, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, Third District (Michael A. Ciaffa, J.), dated September 21, 2009. The order denied plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendant’s demand for a trial de novo.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by providers to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the parties stipulated, among other matters, to plaintiffs’ prima facie case and defendant’s timely denial of the claim. The parties participated in mandatory arbitration (see Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] part 28), which resulted in a ruling in plaintiffs’ favor, whereupon defendant served and filed a demand for a trial de novo (Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] § 28.12 [a]). Plaintiffs moved to strike the demand, arguing that defendant’s limited participation in the arbitration, which consisted of defendant’s attorney’s appearance and his offer of various documents which were excluded upon plaintiffs’ hearsay objection, amounted to a default, barring defendant from demanding a trial de novo. Defendant opposed, and the District Court denied the motion, finding that, on the facts, defendant had not defaulted. Plaintiffs appeal and we affirm.

The Rules of the Chief Judge provide that a demand for a trial de novo “may be made by any party not in default” (Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] § 28.12 [a]). A party’s failure to appear for an arbitration hearing constitutes a default (Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] § 28.7 [a]), as does a party’s appearance by counsel who otherwise “refus[es] to participate in the hearing” (Bitzko v Gamache, 168 AD2d 888 [1990]; see also Finamore v Huntington [*2]Rehabilitation Assn., 150 AD2d 426 [1989]). However, where, as here, a party’s attorney appears at the arbitration, participates in the hearing and submits evidence which, if admissible, would have tended to rebut the plaintiff’s case, there is no default within the contemplation of the Rules of the Chief Judge merely because the arbitrator ruled the proof inadmissible (see Tripp v Reitman Blacktop, 188 Misc 2d 317 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2001]; San-Dar Assoc. v Adams, 167 Misc 2d 727 [App Term, 1st Dept 1996]).

Accordingly, the District Court properly denied plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendant’s demand for a trial de novo.

Nicolai, P.J., Tanenbaum and LaCava, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: January 18, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, Third District (Michael A. Ciaffa, J.), dated September 8, 2009. The order denied plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendant’s demand for a trial de novo.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by providers to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the parties stipulated, among other matters, to plaintiffs’ prima facie case and defendant’s timely denial of the claim. The parties participated in mandatory arbitration (see Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] part 28), which resulted in a ruling in plaintiffs’ favor, whereupon defendant served and filed a demand for a trial de novo (Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] § 28.12 [a]). Plaintiffs moved to strike the demand, arguing that defendant’s limited participation in the arbitration, which consisted of defendant’s attorney’s appearance and the offer of peer review reports, to which the arbitrator sustained plaintiffs’ objection on hearsay grounds, amounted to a default, barring defendant from demanding a trial de novo. Defendant opposed, and the District Court denied the motion, finding that, on the facts, defendant had not defaulted. Plaintiffs appeal and we affirm.

The Rules of the Chief Judge provide that a demand for a trial de novo “may be made by any party not in default” (Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] § 28.12 [a]). A party’s failure to appear for an arbitration hearing constitutes a default (Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] § 28.7 [a]), as does a party’s appearance by counsel who otherwise “refus[es] to participate in the hearing” (Bitzko v Gamache, 168 AD2d 888 [1990]; see also Finamore v Huntington Rehabilitation Assn., 150 AD2d 426 [1989]). However, where, as here, a party’s attorney [*2]appears at the arbitration, participates in the hearing and submits evidence which, if admissible, would have tended to rebut the plaintiff’s case, there is no default within the contemplation of the Rules of the Chief Judge merely because the arbitrator ruled the proof inadmissible (see Tripp v Reitman Blacktop, 188 Misc 2d 317 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2001]; San-Dar Assoc. v Adams, 167 Misc 2d 727 [App Term, 1st Dept 1996]).

Accordingly, the District Court properly denied plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendant’s demand for a trial de novo.

Nicolai, P.J., Tanenbaum and LaCava, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: January 18, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, Third District (Fred J. Hirsh, J.), dated September 8, 2009. The order denied plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s demand for a trial de novo.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the parties stipulated, among other matters, to plaintiff’s prima facie case, defendant’s timely denial of the claim, the physician-peer reviewer’s medical qualifications, and the admissibility of the documents on which the reviewer relied. The parties participated in mandatory arbitration (see Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] part 28), which resulted in a ruling in plaintiff’s favor, whereupon defendant served and filed a demand for a trial de novo (Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] § 28.12 [a]). Plaintiff moved to strike the demand, arguing that defendant’s limited participation in the arbitration, which consisted of defendant’s attorney’s appearance and his offer of various documents, which were excluded upon plaintiff’s hearsay objection, amounted to a default, barring defendant from demanding a trial de novo. Defendant opposed, and the District Court denied the motion, finding that, on the facts, defendant had not defaulted. Plaintiff appeals and we affirm.

The Rules of the Chief Judge provide that a demand for a trial de novo “may be made by any party not in default” (Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] § 28.12 [a]). A party’s failure to appear for an arbitration hearing constitutes a default (Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] § 28.7 [a]), as does a party’s appearance by counsel who otherwise “refus[es] to participate in the hearing” (Bitzko v Gamache, 168 AD2d 888 [1990]; see also Finamore v Huntington [*2]Rehabilitation Assn., 150 AD2d 426 [1989]). However, where, as here, a party’s attorney appears at the arbitration, participates in the hearing and submits evidence which, if admissible, would have tended to rebut the plaintiff’s case, there is no default within the contemplation of the Rules of the Chief Judge merely because the arbitrator ruled the proof inadmissible (see Tripp v Reitman Blacktop, 188 Misc 2d 317 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2001]; San-Dar Assoc. v Adams, 167 Misc 2d 727 [App Term, 1st Dept 1996]).

Accordingly, the District Court properly denied plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s demand for a trial de novo.

Nicolai, P.J., Tanenbaum and LaCava, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: January 18, 2011

—[*1] McDonnell & Adels, PLLC, Garden City, N.Y. (James J. Cleary, Jr., and Jannine Gordineer of counsel), for appellant.

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under certain contracts of insurance, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lally, J.), entered December 21, 2009, which denied its motion to vacate a judgment of the same court entered March 12, 2009, which, upon its failure to appear or answer the complaint, was in favor of the plaintiff and against it in the principal sum of $29,103.60, and to compel the plaintiff to accept a late answer pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d), and held in abeyance and referred for a hearing the plaintiff’s motion to hold it in contempt for failure to comply with an information subpoena dated March 30, 2009, and its cross motion to quash the information subpoena.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order entered December 21, 2009, as held in abeyance and referred for a hearing the plaintiff’s motion to hold the defendant in contempt for failure to comply with an information subpoena dated March 30, 2009, and the defendant’s cross motion to quash the information subpoena is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the order entered December 21, 2009, is reversed insofar as reviewed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment entered March 12, 2009, and to compel the plaintiff to accept a late answer pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) is granted, the judgment entered March 12, 2009, is vacated, and the answer annexed to the motion papers is deemed timely served upon the plaintiff; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.

The order entered December 21, 2009, did not decide the plaintiff’s motion to hold the defendant in contempt for failure to comply with an information subpoena dated March 30, 2009, or the defendant’s cross motion to quash the information subpoena, but instead, held that motion and cross motion in abeyance and referred them for a hearing. Accordingly, no appeal lies as of right from that portion of the order (see CPLR 5701 [a] [2] [v]; Evan S. v Joseph R., 70 AD3d 668 [2010]; Quigley v Coco’s Water CafÉ, Inc., 43 AD3d 1132 [2007]), and we decline to grant leave.

A defendant seeking to vacate a judgment entered on default must demonstrate a [*2]reasonable excuse for its delay in appearing or answering the complaint and a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; Taddeo-Amendola v 970 Assets, LLC, 72 AD3d 677 [2010]). The defendant established through an employee’s affidavit, which attested to a clerical oversight regarding the delay in forwarding the summons and complaint to its attorney, a reasonable excuse for the short period of time following service of the complaint in which it failed either to appear or answer the complaint (see Perez v Travco Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 738 [2007]; Sound Shore Med. Ctr. v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 31 AD3d 743 [2006]). Furthermore, the defendant demonstrated that it has a potentially meritorious defense to the action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to vacate its default and to compel acceptance of its answer in light of the strong public policy that actions be resolved on their merits, the brief delay involved, the defendant’s lack of willfulness, and the absence of prejudice to the plaintiff (see Perez v Travco Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 738 [2007]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v American Home Assur. Co., 28 AD3d 442 [2006]). Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur.

Motion by the respondent on an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered December 21, 2009, to dismiss so much of the appeal as held in abeyance and referred for a hearing the respondent’s motion to hold the appellant in contempt for failure to comply with an information subpoena dated March 30, 2009, and the appellant’s cross motion to quash the information subpoena, on the ground that said portion of the order is not appealable as of right. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated September 1, 2010, inter alia, the motion was referred to the panel of Justices hearing the appeal for determination upon the argument or submission thereof.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, and, upon the argument of the appeal, it is

Ordered that the motion is denied as academic in light of our determination on the appeal. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur.

APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT

Defendant appeals from those portions of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Elizabeth A. Taylor, J.), dated April 6, 2010, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the claims of plaintiffs Spring Medical, P.C. and Right Aid Diagnostic Medicine, P.C. Per Curiam.

Order (Elizabeth A. Taylor, J.), dated April 6, 2010, insofar as appealed from, modified to grant defendant summary judgment dismissing the claims of plaintiff Spring Medical, P.C.; as modified, order affirmed, without costs.

Defendant made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing plaintiff Spring Medical, P.C.’s claims for assigned first-party no-fault benefits. Defendant established through the affidavit of its claims examiner and excerpts from the Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Schedule, which may be judicially noticed by this Court (see Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr. v Allstate Ins. Co., 61 AD3d 13, 21 [2009]), that the fees Spring charged for the medical services it rendered to the assignor exceeded the relevant rates set forth in the fee schedule. In opposition, Spring failed to raise a triable issue regarding [*2]defendant’s interpretation of the fee schedule or calculation of the applicable fees. Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Spring’s claims — which sought the difference between the amount Spring charged for the services and payments defendant made to Spring pursuant to the fee schedule — should have been granted (see Cornell Med., P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co., 24 Misc 3d 58 [2009]).

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim of plaintiff Right Aid Diagnostic Medicine, P.C. based on lack of medical necessity was properly denied, since defendant did not demonstrate as a matter of law that it timely denied the claim within the statutory 30-day period (see Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Zablozki, 257 AD2d 506 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 809 [1999]) or that the 30-day period was tolled by a proper verification request (see Nyack Hosp. v Encompass Ins. Co., 23 AD3d 535 [2005]). We note in this connection that the reply affirmation submitted by Right Aid could not be considered for the purpose of showing a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Batista v Santiago, 25 AD3d 326 [2006]).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
I concur
Decision Date: January 14, 2011

—[*1] Freiberg & Peck, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Rachel N. Clark and Yilo K. Kang of counsel), for appellants.

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for respondent.

In an action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for medical services rendered, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Palmieri, J.), entered October 15, 2009, which granted the motion of the plaintiff New York and Presbyterian Hospital for summary judgment on its second cause of action, and denied the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff New York and Presbyterian Hospital (hereinafter the plaintiff) established, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the second cause of action by demonstrating that the necessary billing documents were mailed to and received by the defendant and that payment of no-fault benefits was overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 51 AD3d 1014, 1017 [2008]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Countrywide Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 729 [2007]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 40 AD3d 981, 981-982 [2007]).

In opposition to that prima facie showing, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether they timely denied the claim. The evidence submitted by the plaintiff showed that the no-fault billing claim form was received by the defendants on May 15, 2009. The defendants submitted, inter alia, copies of letters that they sent to their insured dated April 27, 2009, and May 28, 2009, respectively, as well as copies of letters that they sent to the plaintiff on May 14, 2009, and June 15, 2009, respectively, seeking additional verification. However, the April 27, 2009, and May 14, 2009, letters were sent prior to the defendants’ receipt of the no-fault billing form, and the remaining letters were sent more than 10 days after the defendants’ receipt of that form. Consequently, those letters failed to toll the period in which the defendants were required to pay or deny the claim (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5). In this regard, although the defendants stated, in their motion for summary judgment, that they first received the no-fault bill on May 7, 2009, or on May 9, 2009, the defendant did not establish that fact by submitting a copy of the bill [*2]received on one of those dates. Therefore, the defendants failed to submit evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether they timely denied the claim after issuing timely requests for additional verification (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 312, 317 [2007]).

Moreover, although the defendants contend that they submitted evidence showing that the plaintiff’s assignor misrepresented his state of residence in connection with the issuance of the subject insurance policy, the defendants are precluded from asserting that defense, as a result of their untimely denial of the claim (see Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d 556, 564 [2008]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d at 319; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045, 1046-1047 [2009]).

Although the defendants contend, on appeal, that North Carolina law should apply to this action, and that New York law does not preclude them from denying coverage, they did not raise that specific argument before the Supreme Court. Consequently, that contention is not properly before this Court (see Boudreau-Grillo v Ramirez, 74 AD3d 1265, 1268 [2010]; Matter of Panetta v Carroll, 62 AD3d 1010 [2009]). Dickerson, J.P., Hall, Austin and Cohen, JJ., concur.

—[*1] Jaffe & Koumourdas, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Jean H. Kang of counsel), for appellant.

In an action to recover assigned first party no-fault medical payments under an insurance contract, the defendant appeals, by permission, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Appellate Term, Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts, dated May 8, 2009, as modified a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Lebedeff, J.), entered February 19, 2008, which, upon an order of the same court (Lebedeff, J.), dated January 23, 2008, inter alia, granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, is in favor of the plaintiff and against it in the principal sum of $2,856.45 only to the extent of reducing the award to the principal sum of $2,627.90.

Ordered that the order dated May 8, 2009, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, the judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County, entered February 19, 2008, is reversed, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted, without prejudice to the commencement of a new action, and the order dated January 23, 2008, is modified accordingly.

Contrary to the conclusion of the Appellate Term, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant insurer’s submission of follow-up verification requests to the plaintiff medical provider on the 30th day after the defendant sent its initial verification requests was not premature or “without effect” (Infinity Health Prods., Ltd. v Eveready Ins. Co., 67 AD3d 862, 864 [2009]). Furthermore, since the plaintiff did not fully comply with the defendant’s verification requests, the 30-day period within which the defendant was required to pay or deny the claim did not commence to run (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a] [1]; [b] [3]; Infinity Health Prods., Ltd. v Eveready Ins. Co., 67 AD3d at 865; Westchester County Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 553 [1999]). Thus, the action was commenced prematurely (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 903 [2007]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v ELRAC, Inc., 11 AD3d 432 [2004]).

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied, and the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted (see [*2]Westchester County Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 262 AD2d at 553; see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]), without prejudice to commencement of a new action. Prudenti, P.J., Angiolillo, Florio and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

—[*1] Jaffe & Koumourdas, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Jean H. Kang of counsel), for appellant.

In an action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits under an insurance contract, the defendant appeals, by permission, from an order of the Appellate Term, Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts, dated May 8, 2009, which affirmed an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Lebedeff, J.), dated August 1, 2007, denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order dated May 8, 2009, is reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, the order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County, dated August 1, 2007, is reversed, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted, without prejudice to the commencement by the plaintiff of a new action.

Contrary to the conclusion of the Appellate Term, under the circumstance of this case, the defendant insurer’s submission of follow-up verification requests to the plaintiff medical provider on the 30th day after the defendant sent its initial verification requests was not premature or “without effect” (see St. Vincent Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 80 AD3d 599 [2011] [decided herewith]).

Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted. Prudenti, P.J., Angiolillo, Florio and Sgroi, JJ., concur.