SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Pamela L. Fisher, J.), entered June 17, 2010. The judgment, entered pursuant to so much of an order of the same court entered February 23, 2010 as granted the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $7,716.62.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, so much of the order entered February 23, 2010 as granted the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment is vacated and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, pursuant to a so-ordered stipulation, defendant was required to serve responses to plaintiff’s interrogatories by a specified date or “be precluded from offering evidence in this action.”

It is undisputed that defendant failed to timely serve responses to plaintiff’s interrogatories. Subsequently, plaintiff moved for an order precluding defendant and for summary judgment. By order entered February 23, 2010, the Civil Court granted plaintiff’s motion, on the ground that since defendant was precluded from offering evidence, defendant could not rebut plaintiff’s entitlement to summary judgment. Defendant appeals from the judgment entered pursuant to the February 23, 2010 order.

The so-ordered stipulation functioned as a conditional order of preclusion, which became absolute upon defendant’s failure to sufficiently and timely comply (see e.g. Panagiotou v Samaritan Vil., Inc., 66 AD3d 979 [2009]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Hertz Corp., 43 AD3d 907 [2007]; Siltan v City of New York, 300 AD2d 298 [2002]). As a result, defendant is precluded from offering evidence in this action. However, plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment because its moving papers failed to establish a prima facie entitlement to such relief (see CPLR 4518; Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 15 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50602[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud [*2]Dists 2007]).

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, so much of the order entered February 23, 2010 as granted the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment is vacated and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Steinhardt, J.P., Pesce and Weston, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), entered May 27, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court found that plaintiff had established its prima facie case, that defendant had demonstrated that it had timely denied plaintiff’s claim and that the sole issue for trial was the medical necessity of the supplies provided to plaintiff’s assignor. Defendant appeals from so much of the order as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted, among other things, an affirmed peer review report which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the doctor’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the medical supplies at issue. Defendant’s showing that the supplies were not medically necessary was unrebutted by plaintiff.

As plaintiff has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. [*2]

Steinhardt, J.P., Pesce and Weston, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered March 23, 2010. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the calculation of statutory interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order denying its motion for summary judgment. The Civil Court found that plaintiff had established its prima facie case and that the only issue for trial was defendant’s defense that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs).

The affidavit submitted by defendant’s claims representative was insufficient to establish that the denial of claim form, which denied the claim based upon the assignor’s failure to appear for IMEs, had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). As a result, the defense that the assignor failed to appear for scheduled IMEs is precluded. As defendant has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that plaintiff is otherwise entitled to judgment, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2d Dept 2009]; but see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559 [1st Dept 2011]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the calculation of statutory
interest and an assessment of attorney’s fees pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and the regulations promulgated thereunder.

Steinhardt, J.P., Pesce and Weston, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Kenneth P. Sherman, J.), entered March 30, 2010. The order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted an affidavit of an employee of Crossland Medical Services, P.C. (Crossland), the entity which had scheduled the independent medical examinations (IMEs) involved herein on behalf of defendant. The affidavit established that the IME scheduling letters had been timely mailed in accordance with Crossland’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). In addition, an affidavit executed by defendant’s litigation examiner demonstrated that the denial of claim forms, which denied the claims based upon the failure of plaintiff’s assignor to appear for the IMEs, had been timely mailed pursuant to defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Defendant also submitted an affidavit from its examining chiropractor/acupuncturist, who stated that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the scheduled IMEs. As a result, defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Inasmuch as plaintiff submitted only an affirmation from its counsel, which affirmation failed to raise a triable issue of [*2]fact, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted. In light of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.

Accordingly, the order is reversed, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Steinhardt, J.P., Pesce and Weston, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Kenneth P. Sherman, J.), entered November 24, 2009. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order as denied its cross motion for summary judgment.

Although defendant denied the claims on the ground that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to attend scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs), the affidavits submitted by defendant were insufficient to establish the proper mailing of the IME scheduling letters (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). As a result, defendant was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Steinhardt, J.P., Pesce and Weston, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Kathryn E. Freed, J.), entered December 4, 2009. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as premature, based upon outstanding verification requests, and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

The affidavit of defendant’s litigation representative submitted in support of defendant’s motion for summary judgment was sufficient to establish that defendant had timely mailed requests and follow-up requests for verification in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Since plaintiff did not respond to the verification requests prior to the commencement of the action, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the action as premature was properly granted, as defendant’s time to pay or deny the claim had not elapsed (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]; Alur Med. Supply, Inc. v Eveready Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 135[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51492[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Steinhardt, J.P., Pesce and Weston, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 16, 2011