SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Wavny Toussaint, J.), entered March 2, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and, upon denying plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, found, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that plaintiff had “established its prima facie case.”

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and as, upon denying plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, found, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that plaintiff had “established its prima facie case.”

Defendant established that it had timely mailed the denial of claim form (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), which denied the claim on the ground of lack of medical necessity. In support of its motion, defendant submitted, among other things, a sworn peer review report, which set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the conclusion that there was a lack of medical necessity for the services at issue. Consequently, defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op [*2]52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), thereby shifting the burden to plaintiff to rebut defendant’s showing (see Alur Med. Supply, Inc. v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 132[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50700[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; sect f1 Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Defendant’s showing that the services were not medically necessary was unrebutted by plaintiff. Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. We reach no other issue.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 12, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Rudolph E. Greco, Jr., J.), entered April 16, 2010, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered April 29, 2010 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the April 16, 2010 order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint.

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order granting defendant’s unopposed motion for summary
judgment dismissing the complaint. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Although plaintiff asserts that it attempted to submit opposition to defendant’s motion, it acknowledges that the Civil Court rejected the papers as untimely. Thus, the order deciding the motion recites that the court considered only the moving papers (see CPLR 2219 [a]). In this posture, the judgment entered pursuant to the order must be considered as having been entered on default, and no appeal lies therefrom by the defaulting party (see CPLR 5511; Coneys v Johnson Controls, Inc., 11 AD3d 576 [2004]; Marino v Termini, 4 AD3d 342 [2004]; Millennium Med. Instruments v MVAIC, 27 Misc 3d 127[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50583[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; Infinity Chiropractic, P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 138 [A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50262[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 12, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Genine D. Edwards, J.), entered August 9, 2007. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its motion, defendant submitted an affidavit of an employee of its claims division which, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, sufficiently established that the claim denial forms had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). The affidavit further established that defendant had properly used the workers’ compensation fee schedule for acupuncture services performed by chiropractors to determine the amount which plaintiff was entitled to receive for the services rendered (see Great Wall Acupuncture, P.C. v Geico Ins. Co., 26 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). As it is undisputed that defendant, prior to the commencement of this action, paid plaintiff the full amount to which plaintiff was entitled, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted. Plaintiff’s remaining arguments [*2]are not properly before this court since they are raised for the first time on appeal.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 12, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered February 8, 2010, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered March 9, 2010 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the February 8, 2010 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,100.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, the order entered February 8, 2010 is vacated, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, based upon plaintiff’s assignor’s failure to appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs), and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, finding that the affidavit by the chiropractor who was to perform the IMEs failed to establish the assignor’s nonappearance. This appeal by defendant ensued. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

In support of its motion, defendant submitted an affidavit of the president of Media Referral, Inc., the independent medical review service retained by defendant to schedule IMEs, which affidavit sufficiently established that the IME requests had been timely mailed in accordance with Media Referral, Inc.’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). [*2]Defendant also submitted an affidavit from the chiropractor who was to perform the IMEs, which was sufficient to establish that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). In addition, an affidavit executed by an employee in defendant’s claims division demonstrated that the claim denial forms, based on plaintiff’s assignor’s nonappearance at the IMEs, had been timely mailed pursuant to defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Since an assignor’s appearance at an IME “is a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability on the policy” (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722; see also Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1), defendant properly denied plaintiff’s claim based upon the assignor’s failure to satisfy a condition precedent to coverage and, thus, was not precluded from raising such issue (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2d Dept 2009]; but see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559 [2011]). Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, the order entered February 8, 2010 is vacated, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ, concur.
Decision Date: October 12, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered February 8, 2010. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order denying its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its motion, defendant submitted an affidavit from the president of Media Referral, Inc., the entity that scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs) of plaintiff’s assignor on defendant’s behalf, which sufficiently established that the IME requests had been timely mailed in accordance with Media Referral, Inc.’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant also submitted sworn statements from the doctor and the chiropractor who were to perform the IMEs, which were sufficient to establish that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). In addition, an affidavit executed by defendant’s no-fault claims examiner demonstrated that the claim denial form, based on plaintiff’s assignor’s nonappearance at the IMEs, had been timely mailed pursuant to defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Since an assignor’s appearance at an IME “is a [*2]condition precedent to the insurer’s liability on the policy” (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722; see also Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1), defendant properly denied plaintiff’s claim based upon the assignor’s failure to satisfy a condition precedent to coverage and, thus, was not precluded from raising such issue (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2d Dept 2009]; but see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559 [1st Dept 2011]). Accordingly, the Civil Court should have granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 12, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered December 8, 2009, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered January 19, 2010 (see CPLR 5512 [a]; Neuman v Otto, 114 AD2d 791 [1985]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the December 8, 2009 order denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granting plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $878.67.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, the order is vacated, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the Civil Court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, finding that the affirmation of defendant’s independent medical examination (IME) doctor failed to establish the assignor’s nonappearance. We deem defendant’s appeal from the order to be from the judgment entered pursuant to the order (see CPLR 5512 [a]; Neuman v Otto, 114 AD2d 791 [1985]).

In support of its motion, defendant submitted an affidavit of the president of Media Referral, Inc., the independent medical review service retained by defendant to schedule IMEs, which affidavit sufficiently established that the IME requests had been timely mailed in accordance with Media Referral, Inc.’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). [*2]Defendant also submitted an affirmation of the doctor who was retained to perform the IMEs, which was sufficient to establish that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). In addition, an affidavit executed by defendant’s claims examiner demonstrated that the claim denial form, based on plaintiff’s assignor’s nonappearance at the IMEs, had been timely mailed pursuant to defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Since an assignor’s appearance at an IME “is a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability on the policy” (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722; see also Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1), defendant properly denied plaintiff’s claim based upon the assignor’s failure to satisfy a condition precedent to coverage and, thus, was not precluded from raising such issue (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2d Dept 2009]; but see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559 [1st Dept 2011]). The opposing affirmation submitted by plaintiff’s counsel was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, the order is vacated, defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 12, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Peter Paul Sweeney, J.), entered September 30, 2009. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order denying its unopposed motion for summary judgment.

“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was supported by an affidavit of the president of a third-party billing company, who did not demonstrate that he possessed personal knowledge of plaintiff’s business practices and procedures to establish that the documents annexed to plaintiff’s motion papers constituted evidence in admissible form pursuant to CPLR 4518. As a result, plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment” (PMR Physical Therapy v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 127[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51729[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; see Matter of Carothers v GEICO Indem. Co., 79 AD3d 864 [2010]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 21 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 12, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Dawn Jimenez Salta, J.), entered October 16, 2009. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted, among other things, affidavits of its no-fault litigation examiner/specialist and its office services manager, which were sufficient to establish that the denial of claim forms, which had denied the claims at issue on the ground of lack of medical necessity, were timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Defendant also submitted two affirmed peer review reports which provided a factual basis and medical rationale for the doctor’s determinations that there was a lack of medical necessity for the medical equipment provided to plaintiff’s assignors (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d [*2]128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the fact that the peer reviewer took into consideration medical records of other providers in formulating his opinion did not render the peer review reports inadmissible (see Urban Radiology, P.C. v Tri-State Consumer Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 140[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50987[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). Since defendant established, prima facie, a lack of medical necessity for the equipment in question, the burden shifted to plaintiff to rebut defendant’s prima facie showing (see Alur Med. Supply, Inc. v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 132[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50700[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). As plaintiff failed to do so, the Civil Court properly granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see A. Khodadadi Radiology, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 131[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51342[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 12, 2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Johnny Lee Baynes, J.), entered April 9, 2008. The order denied a petition to vacate a master arbitrator’s award.

ORDERED that the order is modified by adding thereto a provision confirming the master arbitrator’s award; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 75, petitioner seeks to vacate an award of a master arbitrator, which upheld the award of an arbitrator rendered pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (b), denying petitioner’s claim for assigned first-party no-fault benefits. The Civil Court denied the petition.

Upon a review of the record, we find that the determination of the master arbitrator had a rational basis and was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to settled law (see e.g. Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214 [1996]; Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207 [1981]; Matter of Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v New York State Ins. Fund, 47 AD3d 633 [2008]; Matter of Shand [Aetna Ins. Co.], 74 AD2d 442 [1980]; 101 Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 19 Misc 3d 145[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51118[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). Accordingly, the Civil Court properly denied the petition to vacate the master arbitrator’s award. However, upon denying the petition, the court was required, pursuant to CPLR 7511 (e), to confirm the award (see Matter of Exclusive Med. & Diagnostic v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 306 AD2d 476 [2003]).

We note that a special proceeding should terminate in a judgment, not an order (see CPLR 411). [*2]

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 12, 2011

[*1]

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, October 12, 2011

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

The Law Offices of Eva Gaspari, PLLC, New York City (Eva Gaspari of counsel), for appellant.

{**33 Misc 3d at 56} OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, without costs, so much of the order as granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is vacated, and defendant’s cross motion is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, claiming that it had timely denied reimbursement for the acupuncture services in question based on an independent medical examination by its neurologist, who had found a lack of medical necessity for further treatment. The Civil Court, finding that plaintiff had failed to raise a triable issue of fact, denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion. This appeal by plaintiff ensued. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Although plaintiff contends that defendant’s neurologist was not competent to give an opinion on the medical necessity of the acupuncture services rendered, we note that the Insurance Department has stated in an opinion letter, to which we must accord great deference (see LMK Psychological Servs., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 12 NY3d 217 [2009]; see also Allstate Social Work & Psychological Servs., PLLC v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 30 Misc 3d 90 [App [*2]Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]), that there is no requirement that a claim denial be based upon a medical examination conducted by a health provider of the same specialty area as the treating provider (see 2004 Ops Gen Counsel NY Ins Dept No. 04-03-10 [Mar. 2004]). As there was a factual basis and medical rationale for the doctor’s determination that there was a lack of medical necessity for the acupuncture services provided to plaintiff’s assignor (see Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Integon Natl. Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51502[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 18 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52455[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), the burden shifted to plaintiff{**33 Misc 3d at 57} to rebut defendant’s prima facie showing (see Alur Med. Supply, Inc. v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co., 27 Misc 3d 132[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50700[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]; Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Upon a review of the record, we find that the affidavit of plaintiff’s treating acupuncturist was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the acupuncture services rendered to plaintiff’s assignor were medically necessary (see Quality Psychological Servs., P.C. v Mercury Ins. Group, 27 Misc 3d 129[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50601[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Dists 2010]). Accordingly, the judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is reversed, so much of the order as granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is vacated, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Rios and Steinhardt, JJ., concur.