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Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th and 13th Judicial Districts, May 13, 2022

New Generation Wellness Chiropractic P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 66 Misc 3d 1207(A), 2020 NY Slip Op 50017(U), reversed.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Glinkenhouse Queen (Alan S. Queen of counsel) for appellant.

The Law Office of Thomas Torto (Jason Levine of counsel) for respondent.

Ordered that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking to recalculate, from a simple rate to a compound rate, an award of statutory no-fault interest in a judgment entered December 12, 2017, is granted, and defendant’s cross motion to vacate the judgment and dismiss the complaint is denied.

In or about July 2002, plaintiff commenced this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for services it rendered in August through October 2000 to its assignor who was injured in a motor vehicle accident on August 20, 2000. Defendant appeared and answered. On July 29, 2009, the State of New York dissolved plaintiff by proclamation. A settlement letter was drafted, which was signed by plaintiff’s attorney on August 12, 2009, which stated that the parties agreed that the action would be discontinued after defendant paid plaintiff{**75 Misc 3d at 56} $621, which sum was inclusive of attorney’s fees, costs and interest. The third paragraph of the letter referenced the provisions of CPLR 5003-a, while a sentence following that paragraph stated, “Please mail your settlement check promptly according to CPLR 5003 [sic, presumably CPLR 5003-a].” On August 13, 2009, defendant’s attorney signed the letter after modifying it by striking out its third paragraph and by adding handwritten language, to wit, “Payment to issue within 90 days with 14 days prior written notice to deft attorneys; judgment to issue in settled amount.” The sentence requesting prompt payment in accordance with the CPLR was not stricken. It is uncontroverted that defendant did not pay the amount set forth in the settlement. [*2]In May 2017, plaintiff sought to enter a judgment and submitted, among other things, a copy of the modified settlement letter and an ex parte proposed judgment to the clerk of the Civil Court. On December 12, 2017, a judgment was entered awarding plaintiff, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, $1,151.90 in interest accruing from August 12, 2009.

In January 2018, plaintiff moved to, among other things, recalculate the interest awarded in the judgment on the ground that it had erroneously been calculated at a simple rate instead of at a compound rate as allowed by Insurance Department Regulations (11 NYCRR) former § 65.15 (h). Defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved for “an Order . . . vacating the judgment . . . in favor of plaintiff and dismissing this action upon the grounds that the Secretary of State dissolved plaintiff and annulled its authority on July 29, 2009 and it has not been reinstated.” Plaintiff opposed the cross motion, to which defendant replied.

By order entered January 3, 2020, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion. The court vacated the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 and dismissed the complaint pursuant to CPLR 1017 and 1021 “due to the failure to substitute the Plaintiff as a party within a reasonable time after Plaintiff dissolved” (New Generation Wellness Chiropractic P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 66 Misc 3d 1207[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50017[U], *6 [2020]). The court noted that the “record lacks any indication that the seven-year gap [between the August 2009 settlement letter and when plaintiff sought to enter judgment in May 2017] constitutes a reasonable time for Plaintiff to wind up its affairs” (2020 NY Slip Op 50017[U], *9). The Civil Court also found that the settlement{**75 Misc 3d at 57} “included a notice requirement” and that the judgment was “also properly vacated pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4) because Plaintiff failed to provide notice prior to entry” (id. at *4, *5). Plaintiff’s motion was denied as moot.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the branch of its motion seeking to recalculate the statutory no-fault interest should have been granted and that defendant’s cross motion should have been denied, arguing, among other things, that the Civil Court improperly vacated the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015; that Business Corporation Law §§ 1005 and 1006 control in the case at bar, not CPLR 1017 and 1021; and that the Civil Court improperly determined that plaintiff was not in the process of winding up its business affairs.

Contrary to the determination of the Civil Court, substitution was not required here under CPLR 1017 and 1021. Pursuant to Business Corporation Law §§ 1005 and 1006, following its dissolution, plaintiff was allowed to enter judgment and make its motion as part of the winding up of its business affairs. To the extent that Business Corporation Law §§ 1005 and 1006 can be deemed to be inconsistent with CPLR 1017 and 1021, the Business Corporation Law provisions govern (see CPLR 101). Business Corporation Law § 1005 (a) (2) “defines ‘winding up’ as the performance of acts directed toward the liquidation of the corporation, including the collection and sale of corporate assets” (Matter of 172 E. 122 St. Tenants Assn. v Schwarz, 73 NY2d 340, 349 [1989]). Business Corporation Law § 1006 includes, as part of “winding up,” the right of a dissolved corporation to participate in actions and proceedings, whether judicial, administrative, arbitrative or otherwise, in its corporate name (Business Corporation Law § 1006 [a] [4]). Since Business Corporation Law § 1006 does not include any time limit for winding up the dissolved corporation’s affairs, it is proper for courts to imply a reasonable period of time (see e.g. Spiegelberg v Gomez, 44 NY2d 920, 921 [1978]).

As the party moving for vacatur of a judgment and dismissal of the complaint on the [*3]ground that plaintiff lacked the capacity to enter judgment or to move to recalculate interest, defendant had the burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that plaintiff was not still winding up its affairs (see e.g. Greater Bright Light Home Care Servs., Inc. v Jeffries-El, 151 AD3d 818 [2017]; Singer v Riskin, 137 AD3d 999, 1000 [2016]; Brooklyn Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v Jasne & Florio, LLP, 84 AD3d 997 [2011]; Brach v Levine, 36 Misc 3d 1213[A], 2012 NY Slip Op{**75 Misc 3d at 58}51312[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2012]). A review of defendant’s initial moving papers shows that it did not argue that plaintiff was not winding up its affairs. For the first time in reply, defendant argued that plaintiff had offered no explanation for its failure to move for entry of a judgment within a reasonable time following defendant’s failure to pay the settlement and that “upon information and belief,” plaintiff has not been engaged in active business operations since 2000. Since all the averments defendant made in support of its motion, both in its initial moving papers and in reply, were insufficient to show that plaintiff was not winding up its business affairs between the time of the August 2009 settlement letter and the time when plaintiff sought to enter judgment in May 2017, defendant failed to show that plaintiff lacked capacity. We note that numerous cases have held that a substantial number of years was not an unreasonable amount of time for a corporation to wind up its affairs (see Lamarche Food Prods. Corp. v 438 Union, LLC, 178 AD3d 910 [2019] [24 years between dissolution and action giving rise to lawsuit]; Greater Bright Light Home Care Servs., Inc. v Jeffries-El, 151 AD3d at 821 [11 years between dissolution and the motion to dismiss cross claims]; Moran Enters., Inc. v Hurst, 66 AD3d 972 [2009] [seven years between dissolution and the commencement of the lawsuit]; cf. Lance Intl., Inc. v First Natl. City Bank, 86 AD3d 479, 480 [2011]). Consequently, defendant did not demonstrate that its cross motion should be granted on the ground that plaintiff is not winding up its affairs.

As acknowledged by the Civil Court (see New Generation Wellness Chiropractic P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 2020 NY Slip Op 50017[U], *3), defendant did not argue in its cross motion that the settlement letter, as modified, required plaintiff to “provide notice prior to entry” of the judgment (id. at *4) or that the judgment should be vacated on the ground that plaintiff failed to provide such notice. Contrary to the Civil Court’s order, this was not, under the circumstances presented, a proper alternative basis upon which to grant defendant’s cross motion.

Plaintiff properly argues that the statutory no-fault interest awarded in the judgment from August 12, 2009, to the judgment date, December 12, 2017, should be recalculated from a simple rate to a compound rate (see Health Value Med., P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 66 Misc 3d 127[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 52036[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]). {**75 Misc 3d at 59}Defendant had the opportunity to pay the settlement amount without the accrual of additional interest (see CPLR 5003-a [a]). Its failure to do so (either within the statutory time frame or the 90 days enumerated by modified letter, a determination which we need not make) allowed plaintiff to enter a judgment for that amount “together with costs and lawful disbursements, and interest” (CPLR 5003-a [e]). Contrary to defendant’s argument in its respondent’s brief, nine percent pursuant to CPLR 5004 is not the correct rate of interest because “Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and former 11 NYCRR 65.15 (h), which were specific directives, supersede the interest provisions contained in CPLR 5004, the more general statute” (Matter of B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 197 AD3d 144, 156 [2021]). The calculation of interest on the claims at issue is governed by the former no-fault regulations providing for compound interest (see Health Value [*4]Med., P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 52036[U]; Belt Parkway Imaging, P.C. v State Wide Ins. Co., 30 Misc 3d 127[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52229[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking to recalculate, from a simple rate to a compound rate, an award of statutory no-fault interest in a judgment entered December 12, 2017, is granted and defendant’s cross motion to vacate the judgment and dismiss the complaint is denied.

Aliotta, P.J., Weston and Toussaint, JJ., concur.

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Thomas Torto, New York, for appellant.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC, Brooklyn (Maksim Leyvi of counsel), for respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Gerald Lebovits, J.), entered on or about February 4, 2021, which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as against defendants Healthway Medical Care P.C., Acupuncture Now P.C., SB Chiropractic, P.C., and Jules Francois Parisien MD, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

This appeal concerns plaintiff Country-Wide Insurance Company’s potential obligation to pay no-fault insurance benefits. Defendant Jeffrey Delacruz was the driver of a vehicle that was involved in a collision. The vehicle was covered by a no-fault insurance policy issued by Country-Wide. Delacruz assigned his right to collect no-fault benefits under that policy to his treating medical providers. Those providers applied for no-fault benefits from Country-Wide but were denied.

Country-Wide then brought this action for a declaratory judgment that it is not required to pay no-fault benefits to Delacruz or to the other defendants (all medical-provider assignees of Delacruz). Country-Wide moved for summary judgment on the ground that Delacruz’s failure to appear for scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs) defeats coverage under the no-fault policy, and thus forecloses the medical providers’ claim to benefits.

The court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]). Plaintiff failed to provide a specific objective justification for requesting the examination under oath (EUO). Plaintiff’s reason for the EUO is essential for defendants to oppose plaintiff’s summary judgment motion and this fact is exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant (11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [e]; see Kemper Independence Ins. Co. v AB Med. Supply, Inc., 187 AD3d 671, 671 [1st Dept 2020]; American Tr. Ins. Co. v Jaga Med. Servs., P.C., 128 AD3d 441, 441 [1st Dept 2015]; cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v Pierre, 123 AD3d 618 [1st Dept 2014]; Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596, 597 [2d Dept 2014]). Further, plaintiff concedes that it provided no response to defendants’ discovery demands for the “specific objective justification” for its request that the injured claimant submit to an EUO.

We have considered and reject all of plaintiff’s arguments that it is not required to provide claimants with the reason it requested the EUO. An insurer must affirmatively establish that it complied with the strict no-fault insurance claim procedures set forth in 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (see generally PV Holding Corp. v Hank Ross Med., P.C., 188 AD3d 429, 430 [1st Dept 2020]). In the absence of any justification for the EUO, plaintiff has failed to establish, as a matter of law, that it complied with the governing regulations (11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [e]; AB Med. Supply at 671; Jaga Med. Servs. at 441; see also American Tr. Ins. Co. v Curry, 45 Misc 3d 171, 174-175 [Sup Ct, NY County 2013]).

The court properly rejected plaintiff’s contention that defendants waived any claim as to the reasonableness of the EUO notices by failing to object upon receipt. [*2]In its EUO notices, plaintiff provided no justification for these defendants to object to. In any event, the regulation does not require defendants to lodge any objection to the justification within a specific timeframe. Westchester County Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (262 AD2d 553, 555 [2d Dept 1999]) is inapposite. Concur—Renwick, J.P., Mazzarelli, Gesmer, González, JJ. [Prior Case History: 71 Misc 3d 247.]

Hollander Legal Group, P.C. (Allan S. Hollander of counsel), for appellant. Zara Javakov, Esq., P.C. (Victoria Tarasova of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Matthew P. Blum, J.), entered February 18, 2020. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court denying defendant’s motion which had sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs), and granting plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

Contrary to defendant’s contention, defendant failed to establish that it had timely denied plaintiff’s claims after plaintiff failed to appear at two duly scheduled EUOs (see Island Life Chiropractic Pain Care, PLLC v 21st Century Ins. Co., 74 Misc 3d 17 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2021]; Quality Health Supply Corp. v Nationwide Ins., 69 Misc 3d 133[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51226[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]). As defendant did not demonstrate that it was not precluded from raising its proffered defense (see [*2]Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045 [2009]), defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly denied.

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, as the proof submitted in support of its cross motion failed to establish either that the claims at issue had not been timely denied or that defendant had issued timely denial of claim forms that were conclusory, vague, or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

ALIOTTA, P.J., WESTON and BUGGS, JJ., concur.

Decided on April 29, 2022

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on April 29, 2022

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Abrams, Cohen & Associates, P.C. (Frank Piccininni of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Robin S. Garson, J.), entered July 2, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first through fourth causes of action and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that so much of the appeal as is from the denial of plaintiff’s cross motion is dismissed as no appeal lies from an order entered upon the consent of the appealing party (see CPLR 5511); and it is further,

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from and reviewed, is reversed, with $30 costs, and the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first through fourth causes of action are denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action was premature due to plaintiff’s failure to provide requested verification. Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment. By order entered July 2, 2019, insofar as appealed from by plaintiff, the Civil Court granted the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first through fourth causes of action, and, on consent, accepted plaintiff’s untimely cross motion as opposition only, thereby implicitly denying it.

Defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that it had timely mailed initial and follow-up requests for verification (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]), that it had not received the requested verification, and that it had timely denied plaintiff’s claims on that ground (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [o]). However, the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in opposition to defendant’s motion was sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the requested verification had been mailed to, and received by, defendant (see Compas Med., P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 49 Misc 3d 152[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51776[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from and reviewed, is reversed and the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first through fourth causes of action are denied.

GOLIA, J.P., TOUSSAINT and BUGGS, JJ., concur.

Hollander Legal Group , P.C. (Allan S. Hollander and Brian Kaufman of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Gabriel & Moroff, P.C. (Jason Moroff and Koenig Pierre of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, Third District (C. Stephen Hackeling, J.), dated June 7, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). In an order dated June 7, 2021, the District Court denied the motion, but implicitly found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that defendant had established the timely and proper mailing of the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim form, as well as plaintiff’s failure to appear for the EUOs. The Civil Court further found that the only remaining issue for trial was the reasonableness of defendant’s EUO requests.

To establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing a complaint on [*2]the ground that a provider failed to appear for an EUO, an insurer must demonstrate, as a matter of law, that it twice duly demanded an EUO from the provider, that the provider twice failed to appear, and that the insurer issued a timely denial of the claims (see Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596, 597 [2014])—all elements that the Civil Court found to have been established pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g).

Plaintiff does not argue that defendant did not demonstrate its prima facie case. Rather, plaintiff argues that the grounds for defendant’s EUO requests were not based on objective reasons. However, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant was not required to set forth objective reasons for requesting EUOs in order to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon, 113 AD3d 596 [2d Dept 2014]; 21st Century Pharm., Inc. v Ameriprise Ins. Co., 65 Misc 3d 134[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 51629[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; Parisien v Metlife Auto & Home, 54 Misc 3d 143[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50208[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]; cf. Kemper Independence Ins. Co. v AB Med. Supply, Inc., 187 AD3d 671 [1st Dept 2020]; American Tr. Ins. Co. v Jaga Med. Servs., P.C., 128 AD3d 441 [1st Dept 2015]). As plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

DRISCOLL, J.P., VOUTSINAS and WARHIT, JJ., concur.

Gary Tsirelman, P.C. (Gary Tsirelman of counsel), for appellant. Barry, McTiernan & Moore, for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal, on the ground of inadequacy, from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Third District (Robert E. Pipia, J.), entered September 13, 2019. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $1,972.80 following an inquest, awarded plaintiff statutory no-fault interest accruing from the date the notice of trial was filed.

ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action in 2003 to recover $1,972.80 in assigned first-party no-fault benefits, alleging that a claim “was submitted to the defendant on or about 7/18/00.” In 2019, following an arbitration hearing, at which defendant failed to appear, plaintiff was awarded the principal sum of $638.82, plus statutory no-fault interest accruing from the date the notice of trial was filed in 2015. Thereafter, plaintiff demanded a trial de novo, at which defendant failed to appear. An inquest was subsequently held, at which defendant failed to appear, and plaintiff was awarded the principal sum of $1,972.80, plus interest accruing from the date the notice of trial was filed. On appeal, plaintiff contends that since defendant failed to deny its claim, the District Court should have awarded interest accruing from 30 days after the date the claim was submitted to defendant, and that the District Court improperly tolled the accrual of interest until the date the notice of trial was filed.

In Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v Insurance Co. of N. Am. (208 AD2d 501, 501 [1994]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that where a claim is not paid within 30 days, and is never actually denied, the claim is overdue within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5106 (a) and interest on the claim will commence “30 days after the claim was presented to the defendant for payment until the date the claim was or is paid” (see Corona Hgts. Med., P.C. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 8, 10 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

While plaintiff argues on appeal that the claim had not been timely denied, this assertion was made solely by plaintiff’s attorney at the inquest and contradicts what is stated in the written arbitrator’s award. Here, plaintiff failed to establish that interest should have started to accrue any earlier than the commencement of the action (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.9 [c]). In addition, a review of the record indicates that the District Court properly tolled the accrual of interest until the date of the notice of trial based upon its implicit finding that plaintiff unreasonably delayed the proceedings (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.9 [d]). Consequently, the District Court properly declined to award interest from the date of the submission of the claim.

Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

GARGUILO, P.J., DRISCOLL and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.

Glinkenhouse Queen, Esqs., Alan Queen of counsel, for appellant. Thomas Torto, for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Philip Hom, J.), entered March 16, 2018. The order denied, without prejudice to renewal upon proper papers, plaintiff’s motion to recalculate, from a simple rate to a compound rate, an award of statutory no-fault interest in a judgment of that court entered February 24, 2017.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and plaintiff’s motion to recalculate, from a simple rate to a compound rate, an award of statutory no-fault interest in a judgment entered February 24, 2017 is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for claims submitted to defendant in 2001, a judgment was entered pursuant to a settlement. The judgment, entered on February 24, 2017, awarded statutory no-fault interest at a simple rate, pursuant to the no-fault regulations in effect in 2017 (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.9 [a], effective April 5, 2002). Plaintiff moved, pursuant to CPLR 5019 (a), to have that interest recalculated pursuant to the pre-2002 regulations, which required no-fault interest to be calculated at a compound rate (see former 11 NYCRR 65.15 [h] [1]). By order entered March 16, 2018, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion without prejudice to renewal upon proper papers. The court found that it could not consider the motion because plaintiff had not included a copy of the stipulation of settlement in its motion papers.

We find that the Civil Court should not have denied the motion, without prejudice to renewal, on the ground that a copy of the stipulation of settlement had not been included among the motion papers, as defendant did not dispute that the action had settled or raise any issues as to the terms of the settlement agreement, and, under the circumstances presented, a copy of the stipulation of settlement was not necessary to demonstrate plaintiff’s entitlement to interest at a compound rate (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.9 [b]). The claim involved herein is governed by the former regulations providing for compound interest (see Matter of B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 197 AD3d 144 [2021]; Belt Parkway Imaging, P.C. v State Wide Ins. Co., 30 Misc 3d 127[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52229[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). Since defendant did not demonstrate that plaintiff prevented it from paying the settlement amount, the motion should have been granted (see Health Value Med., P.C. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 66 Misc 3d 127[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 52036[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; Seaside Rehabilitation v Allstate Ins. Co., 63 Misc 3d 162[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50918[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed and plaintiff’s motion to recalculate, from a simple rate to a compound rate, the award of statutory no-fault interest in the judgment entered February 24, 2017 is granted.

WESTON, J.P., TOUSSAINT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: April 22, 2022

Law Office of Damin J. Toell, P.C., Damin J. Toell of counsel, for appellant. Law Offices of Buratti, Rothenberg & Burns, Kenneth F. Popper of counsel, for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Nicholas W. Moyne, J.), entered April 5, 2021. The order granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment as moot.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a determination of the remaining branch of defendant’s motion and the merits of plaintiff’s cross motion.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for an order dismissing the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens (see CPLR 327), arguing that the action should have been commenced in Pennsylvania, where the assignor resides and the insurance policy was issued, or New Jersey, where the accident had allegedly occurred. In the alternative, defendant argued that the complaint should be dismissed as the statute of limitations had expired under the laws of both Pennsylvania and New Jersey, either of which should be applied in this case. Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion and cross-moved for summary judgment. By order entered April 5, 2021, the Civil Court granted the branch of [*2]defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 327, without prejudice to plaintiff commencing a new action in New Jersey. The court did not consider the remaining branch of defendant’s motion and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment as moot.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court may dismiss an action when, although it may have jurisdiction, it determines that, “in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum” (CPLR 327 [a]). The doctrine is flexible and requires the balancing of many factors, such as “the residency of the parties, the potential hardship to proposed witnesses including, especially, nonparty witnesses, the availability of an alternative forum, the situs of the underlying actionable events, the location of evidence, and the burden that retention of the case will impose upon the New York courts” (Turay v Beam Bros. Trucking, Inc., 61 AD3d 964, 966 [2009]; see Xiu Zhang Yin v Bennet, 78 AD3d 936 [2010]).

In the case at bar, defendant relied upon a New Jersey police crash investigation report to demonstrate that the underlying accident had occurred in New Jersey and, thus, that the action should be dismissed based upon forum non conveniens. The police report, offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein, constituted inadmissible hearsay, as the report was not certified as a business record (see CPLR 4518 [a]; Gezelter v Pecora, 129 AD3d 1021 [2015]; Hernandez v Tepan, 92 AD3d 721 [2012]; Monroe v Foremost Signature Ins. Co., 66 Misc 3d 128[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 52042[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; Longevity Med. Supply, Inc. v 21st Century Ins. Co., 66 Misc 3d 128[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 52041[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]). Moreover, defendant could not rely on the copy of the NF-2 no-fault application, which stated where the accident occurred, because it was first submitted in defendant’s reply papers (see GJF Constr. Corp. v Cosmopolitan Decorating Co., Inc., 35 AD3d 535 [2006]; New Millennium Med. Imaging, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 145[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50259[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). In any event, defendant failed to submit sufficient evidence to support a dismissal based on forum non conveniens (see CPLR 327 [a]). The evidence showed that plaintiff is a New York corporation and that defendant has offices in New York, and defendant failed to point to any hardship for possible witnesses or any burden on the New York courts (see Kefalas v Kontogiannis, 44 AD3d 624 [2007]). Upon the record presented, we find that the Civil Court erred in granting the branch of defendant’s motion seeking dismissal based on forum non conveniens.

Accordingly, the order is reversed, the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a determination of the remaining branch of defendant’s motion and the merits of plaintiff’s cross motion.

ALIOTTA, P.J., WESTON and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: April 22, 2022