The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Oleg Rybak and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP, (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated September 8, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) dated September 8, 2023 as granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification.

Plaintiff argues on appeal that the order, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed and the matter remitted to the Civil Court for consideration of what plaintiff denominated as amended opposition to defendant’s cross-motion, which the court declined to consider. The court rejected that submission as an improper sur-reply. In the alternative, plaintiff argues that defendant’s cross-motion should be denied.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, it was not improper for defendant to seek, during the claim verification stage, information—such as management agreements, W-2 forms, business-related bank records and lease agreements—for the purpose of determining whether plaintiff was ineligible to collect no-fault benefits due to a failure to meet licensing requirements (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.16 [a] [1]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313 [2005]; Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 85 Misc 3d 130[A], 2025 NY [*2]Slip Op 50196[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]).

Plaintiff also argues that the instant action cannot be maintained, as collateral estoppel effect should be given to an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action brought by defendant in that court. However, the denial of such a motion “has no preclusive effect on this case, as it was not a final determination on the merits” (Burke Physical Therapy, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 Misc 3d 41, 45 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]).

Furthermore, nothing in the record supports plaintiff’s contention that it was improper for the Civil Court to decline to consider plaintiff’s amended opposition to defendant’s cross motion, nor does plaintiff demonstrate that consideration of the amended opposition would warrant a different outcome.

Plaintiff’s remaining contentions lack merit.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

BUGGS, J.P. and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

OTTLEY, J., taking no part.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Oleg Rybak and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated September 8, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) dated September 8, 2023 as granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification.

For the reasons stated in Burke Physical Therapy, P.C., as Assignee of Brown, Wildex v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2023-1091 K C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

BUGGS, J.P. and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

OTTLEY, J., taking no part.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Oleg Rybak and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated September 8, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) dated September 8, 2023 as granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification.

For the reasons stated in Burke Physical Therapy, P.C., as Assignee of Brown, Wildex v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2023-1091 K C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

BUGGS, J.P. and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

OTTLEY, J., taking no part.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), dated September 8, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Civil Court (Sandra E. Roper, J.) dated September 8, 2023 as granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification.

For the reasons stated in Burke Physical Therapy, P.C., as Assignee of Brown, Wildex v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (— Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2023-1091 K C], decided herewith), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

BUGGS, J.P. and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

OTTLEY, J., taking no part.

Goldberg, Miller & Rubin, P.C. (Zachary Whiting of counsel), for appellant. The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Oleg Rybakof counsel), for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Keisha Alleyne, J.), dated February 27, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s cross-motion for, in effect, summary judgment dismissing the complaint and, upon denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that “[p]laintiff established their prima facie case by timely and properly submitting the bills to the [d]efendant” and limited the issue for trial to “whether the [declaratory judgment order in a Supreme Court action] precludes the instant matter.”

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by striking so much of the order as, upon denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that “[p]laintiff established their prima facie case by timely and properly submitting the bills to the [d]efendant” and limited the issue for trial to “whether the [declaratory judgment order in a Supreme Court action] precludes the instant matter”; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

Horizon P.T. Care, P. C. (Horizon) commenced this action against defendant Kemper Insurance Company to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for services rendered to its assignor, Anthony Ghee, for injuries allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident on December 31, 2014. In its answer, defendant identified itself as Unitrin Auto & Home Insurance Company (Unitrin). Before Horizon commenced this action, a declaratory judgment action had been commenced in Supreme Court, New York County, by Unitrin, as the sole [*2]plaintiff, against Horizon, other providers, and the assignor herein, Ghee, alleging that each of the providers including, insofar as is relevant here, Horizon, had breached the terms of the insurance policy in question by failing to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). Upon the failure of both Horizon and Ghee, among others, to appear in the declaratory judgment action, the Supreme Court, in an order entered December 1, 2016, granted an unopposed motion by Unitrin for leave to enter a default judgment against, insofar as is relevant here, Horizon and Ghee, relating to the motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 31, 2014 involving defendant Anthony Ghee.

Plaintiff moved in the Civil Court action for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g) deeming certain facts established for all purposes in this action. Defendant cross-moved for, in effect, summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the instant action is barred by res judicata by virtue of the order in the declaratory judgment action. By order dated February 27, 2023, the Civil Court (Keisha Alleyne, J.) denied defendant’s cross-motion and, upon denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, found, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that “[p]laintiff established their prima facie case by timely and properly submitting the bills to the [d]efendant” and limited the issue for trial to “whether the [declaratory judgment order in the Supreme Court action] precludes the instant matter.”

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is invoked when a party seeks to relitigate a disposition on the merits of claims, or causes of action, arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions which were raised or could have been raised in a prior proceeding between the same parties or those in privity (see Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005]; Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304 [1929]; Ciraldo v JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 140 AD3d 912 [2016]; see also Watts v Swiss Bank Corp., 27 NY2d 270 [1970]). In the case at bar, contrary to defendant’s contentions on appeal, it failed to proffer sufficient evidence upon its cross-motion to support its assertion that Unitrin is “the proper insurer” (see Quality Health Supply Corp. v Hertz Co., 68 Misc 3d 131[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50996[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]; cf. Healthwise Med. Assoc., P.C. v Nationwide Ins., 77 Misc 3d 133[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 51251[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]; Parisien v Kemper Ins. Co., 77 Misc 3d 132[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 51240[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). As a result, defendant failed to demonstrate at this juncture that the declaratory judgment action brought by Unitrin, not defendant herein, constitutes “a final adjudication of [the present claims] on the merits” between the same parties (Ciraldo, 140 AD3d at 913; see Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260; Schuylkill Fuel Corp., 250 NY 304). Consequently, defendant’s cross-motion for, in effect, summary judgment dismissing the complaint as barred by res judicata was properly denied.

However, defendant correctly argues that the record does not support finding as “incontrovertible” or “established for all purposes in the action” (CPLR 3212 [g]) that “[p]laintiff established their prima facie case by timely and properly submitting the bills to the [d]efendant” and or to limit the issues for trial to “whether the [declaratory judgment order in a Supreme Court action] precludes the instant matter.”

We do not consider defendant’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the subject action is barred by collateral estoppel (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]). We note, however, that, since Horizon defaulted in appearing in the declaratory [*3]judgment action, the EUO no-show issue was not actually litigated (see Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 456-457 [1985]; Parisien v Kemper Ins. Co., 76 Misc 3d 18 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by striking so much of the order as, upon denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, found, in effect pursuant to CPLR 3212 (g), that “[p]laintiff established their prima facie case by timely and properly submitting the bills to the [d]efendant” and limited the issue for trial to “whether the [declaratory judgment order in a Supreme Court action] precludes the instant matter.”

BUGGS, J.P., TOUSSAINT and MUNDY, JJ., concur.

The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Richard Rozhik of counsel), for appellant. Rivkin Radler, LLP (Stuart M. Bodoff and Anthony Hawkins of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Sandra E. Roper, J.), entered March 7, 2024. The order, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint as barred by the doctrine of res judicata and denied, as moot, plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and strike defendant’s affirmative defenses.

ORDERED that, on the court’s own motion, so much of the notice of appeal as is from the portion of the order as, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint is deemed an application for leave to appeal from that portion of the order, and leave to appeal is granted (see CCA 1702 [c]); and it is further,

ORDERED that the order is modified by vacating so much thereof as, sua sponte, dismissed the eighth and ninth causes of action, and denied, as moot, plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and strike defendant’s affirmative defenses; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a determination of plaintiff’s motion on the merits.

Plaintiff commenced this action on January 11, 2018 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for services provided to Wesley Isaacs, who was allegedly injured in a motor vehicle accident on April 2, 2016. Plaintiff asserted eight causes of action, based on eight bills, and a ninth cause of action seeking interest and attorney’s fees. Plaintiff moved to compel discovery and strike defendant’s affirmative defenses. The Civil Court took judicial notice of a [*2]judgment that had been entered on April 24, 2017 in the Supreme Court, Nassau County, declaring that plaintiff had no right to receive payments for certain bills submitted to defendant. These bills included seven of the eight claims in the instant action. By order entered March 7, 2024, the Civil Court, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint as barred by the doctrine of res judicata and denied, as moot, plaintiff’s motion.^[FN1]

While no appeal as of right lies from the sua sponte portion of the March 7, 2024 order (see CCA 1702 [a] [2]; Sholes v Meagher, 100 NY2d 333 [2003]), we deem the notice of appeal to be an application for leave to appeal from that portion of the order and grant plaintiff’s application (see CCA 1702 [c]).

By virtue of the Supreme Court declaratory judgment, of which the Civil Court properly took judicial notice (see Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr. v Allstate Ins. Co., 61 AD3d 13 [2009]; Matter of Khatibi v Weill, 8 AD3d 485 [2005]; Healing Art Acupuncture, P.C. v 21st Century Ins. Co., 59 Misc 3d 139[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50583[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]; Renelique v State-Wide Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 137[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50096[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]), there has been a conclusive determination of the merits of the first seven causes of action. Any judgment in favor of plaintiff in the present action as to the first seven causes of action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the judgment in the declaratory judgment action (see Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304 [1929]; Flushing Traditional Acupuncture, P.C. v Kemper Ins. Co., 42 Misc 3d 133[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50052[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]). Consequently, the Civil Court properly dismissed the first through seventh causes of action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata, even though the declaratory judgment was entered on default (see Lazides v P & G Enters., 58 AD3d 607 [2009]). The eighth cause of action, however, involves a claim not included in the declaratory judgment action, and the ninth cause of action sought interest and attorney’s fees. Thus, the Civil Court should not have dismissed those causes of action.

Accordingly, the order is modified by vacating so much thereof as, sua sponte, dismissed the eighth and ninth causes of action, and denied, as moot, plaintiff’s motion. The matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a determination of plaintiff’s motion on the merits.

BUGGS, J.P., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

Roman Kravchenko and Jason Tenenbaum of counsel, for appellant. Short & Billy, P.C. (Seok Ho [Richard] Kang of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Ignatius L. Muscarella, J.), dated October 12, 2023. The order denied a petition in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitrator’s award dated March 27, 2023.

ORDERED that the order is modified by adding thereto a provision confirming the master arbitrator’s award; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitrator’s award dated March 27, 2023, which upheld the award of an arbitrator, rendered pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106 (b), denying petitioner’s claims to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits. The District Court (Ignatius L. Muscarella, J.) denied the petition.

In the decision, the arbitrator stated that, based on a stipulation, the only issue to be resolved was whether petitioner’s assignor had appeared for scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs). The arbitrator found that, as the assignor had not appeared, the assignor had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage under the insurance policy. The provider appealed the award to the master arbitrator who, by an award dated March 27, 2023, upheld the arbitrator’s award. However, on appeal, petitioner contends that the arbitrator’s award was contrary to settled law because the IME scheduling letters were not timely, the IMEs themselves were not timely, and because respondent’s proffered defense was precluded as the denial of claim forms were untimely.

“A court reviewing the award of a master arbitrator is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR article 75, which include, in this compulsory arbitration, the question of whether the determination had evidentiary support, was rational, or had a plausible basis (see Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207, 212 [1981])” (Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 176 AD3d 800, 802 [2019]). Applying this standard, we find a rational basis for the determination of the master arbitrator upholding the arbitrator’s award, as the award was predicated upon a stipulation between the parties and the arbitrator determined that, as a result of the stipulation, the only issue to be determined by the arbitrator was whether the assignor had appeared for the IMEs (see Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214 [1996]; Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.], 54 NY2d 207). Consequently, the District Court properly denied the petition to vacate the master arbitrator’s award (see Matter of Empire Mut. Ins. Co. v Jones, 151 AD2d 754 [1989]) but, in doing so, should have confirmed the award (see CPLR 7511 [e]).

We note that a special proceeding should terminate in a judgment, not an order (see CPLR 411).

Accordingly, the order is modified by adding thereto a provision confirming the master arbitrator’s award.

GARGUILO, P.J., GOLDBERG-VELAZQUEZ and CONWAY, JJ., concur.

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Mikhail Kopelevich of counsel), for appellant. Hardin, Kundla, McKeon & Poletto, P.A. (Ari Reiser of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Heela D. Capell, J.), dated July 12, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment entered on September 12, 2019 upon defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint and extended defendant’s time to serve its answer.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for medical supplies furnished to its assignor for injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on May 9, 2018. Plaintiff served the summons and complaint on the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) on April 18, 2019, pursuant to Insurance Law § 1212, and filed its affidavit of service on May 3, 2019. Defendant received the summons and complaint from the DFS on June 3, 2019 via regular mail. It is undisputed that defendant’s claims representative contacted plaintiff’s counsel’s office between June 12, 2019 and June 14, 2019, and defendant’s counsel contacted plaintiff’s counsel between June 27, 2019 and August 12, 2019, stating that plaintiff’s assignor was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the automobile accident and requesting that the lawsuit be voluntarily discontinued on the ground that the injuries were covered by workers’ compensation insurance. In an email sent on June 28, 2019, plaintiff’s counsel stated that she needed proof of these assertions, which defendant’s counsel provided via email on July 10, 2019. Defense counsel served an answer on [*2]July 1, 2019 and filed it on July 2, 2019. A default judgment was entered against defendant on September 12, 2019.

By notice of motion dated January 30, 2020, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment and, upon such vacatur, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Insofar as is relevant on appeal, defendant argued that the default judgment should be vacated, pursuant to CPLR 5015, as a timely answer had been served, and, in any event, defendant had a reasonable excuse for its delay in answering as well as a meritorious defense to the action. In support of its motion, defendant submitted the affidavits of its employees who averred that the summons and complaint was not received until June 3, 2019 and so the answer was timely. Any alleged delay in answering was due to the attempts of defendant’s employee and defendant’s counsel to obtain a voluntary discontinuance of the action. Defendant also submitted an affidavit by plaintiff’s assignor’s employment supervisor, in which the supervisor asserted that plaintiff’s assignor was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the automobile accident in which the assignor was injured. In opposition, plaintiff argued that defendant had not filed a timely answer and had otherwise failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for its delay in answering, and noted that plaintiff’s assignor, in his no-fault benefits application, had denied that the accident occurred within the scope of his employment. By order dated July 12, 2023, the Civil Court (Heela D. Capell, J.) granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the default judgment, finding that defendant had proffered a reasonable excuse for its delay in answering as well as a potentially meritorious defense, extended defendant’s time to serve its answer, and implicitly denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff appeals from so much of the order as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the default judgment and extended defendant’s time to serve an answer.

Defendant established its entitlement to vacate the default judgment under CPLR 317. Although defendant specifically moved pursuant to CPLR 5015, under the circumstances presented, its motion to vacate the default judgment was also governed by CPLR 317 (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 142-143 [1986]; Kircher v William Penn Life Ins. Co. of NY, 165 AD3d 1241 [2018]). A defaulting defendant who was “served with a summons other than by personal delivery” may be permitted to defend the action upon a finding by the court that the defendant did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a potentially meritorious defense (CPLR 317; see Booso v Tausik Bros., LLC, 148 AD3d 1108, 1108 [2017]). “There is no necessity for a defendant moving pursuant to CPLR 317 to show a reasonable excuse for its delay” (Kircher, 165 AD3d at 1243; Booso, 148 AD3d at 1108). Here, defendant established that it did not receive actual notice of the action until it received the summons and complaint from the DFS on June 3, 2019, and, thus, it did not have enough time to defend within the 30-day period set forth in CCA 402 (b).

Defendant also demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the action, as the affidavits of defendant’s employee and plaintiff’s assignor’s employment supervisor stated that plaintiff’s assignor was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the automobile accident in which he was injured, which would entitle him to workers’ compensation benefits (see Mani Med., P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 28 Misc 3d 127[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51185[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). Consequently, we find that the Civil Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the branch of defendant’s [*3]motion seeking to vacate the default judgment.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

Hollander Legal Group, P.C. (Allan S. Hollander of counsel), for appellant. Law Offices of Jonathan B. Seplowe, P.C. (Alan M. Elis of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Karen Lin, J.), dated December 28, 2023. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court (Karen Lin, J.) denying defendant’s motion which had sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the policy limits had been exhausted.

To obtain summary judgment on its asserted defense of policy exhaustion, defendant had to prove that it had paid the limits of the policy in accordance with 11 NYCRR 65-3.15 (see Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294 [2007]; Alleviation Med. Servs., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 55 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017], affd 191 AD3d 934 [2021]). Here, defendant failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the policy limits were exhausted before completed claims from plaintiff were received (see Alleviation Med. Servs., P.C., 55 Misc 3d 44, affd 191 AD3d 934; S.O.V. Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 69 Misc 3d 142[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51365[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]). Consequently, defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. We reach no other [*2]issue.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

BUGGS, J.P., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.

Kopelevich & Feldsherova, P.C. (Mikhail Kopelevich of counsel), for appellant. Hardin, Kundla, McKeon & Poletto, P.A. (Ari Reiser of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Heela D. Capell, J.), dated July 12, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate a judgment entered on September 12, 2019 upon defendant’s failure to appear or answer the complaint and extended defendant’s time to serve its answer.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for medical supplies furnished to its assignor for injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on May 9, 2018. Plaintiff served the summons and complaint on the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) on April 18, 2019, pursuant to Insurance Law § 1212, and filed its affidavit of service on May 3, 2019. Defendant received the summons and complaint from the DFS on June 3, 2019 via regular mail. It is undisputed that defendant’s claims representative contacted plaintiff’s counsel’s office between June 12, 2019 and June 14, 2019, and defendant’s counsel contacted plaintiff’s counsel between June 27, 2019 and August 12, 2019, stating that plaintiff’s assignor was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the automobile accident and requesting that the lawsuit be voluntarily discontinued on the ground that the injuries were covered by workers’ compensation insurance. In an email sent on June 28, 2019, plaintiff’s counsel stated that she needed proof of these assertions, which defendant’s counsel provided via email on July 10, 2019. Defense counsel served an answer on [*2]July 1, 2019 and filed it on July 2, 2019. A default judgment was entered against defendant on September 12, 2019.

By notice of motion dated January 30, 2020, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment and, upon such vacatur, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Insofar as is relevant on appeal, defendant argued that the default judgment should be vacated, pursuant to CPLR 5015, as a timely answer had been served, and, in any event, defendant had a reasonable excuse for its delay in answering as well as a meritorious defense to the action. In support of its motion, defendant submitted the affidavits of its employees who averred that the summons and complaint was not received until June 3, 2019 and so the answer was timely. Any alleged delay in answering was due to the attempts of defendant’s employee and defendant’s counsel to obtain a voluntary discontinuance of the action. Defendant also submitted an affidavit by plaintiff’s assignor’s employment supervisor, in which the supervisor asserted that plaintiff’s assignor was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the automobile accident in which the assignor was injured. In opposition, plaintiff argued that defendant had not filed a timely answer and had otherwise failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for its delay in answering, and noted that plaintiff’s assignor, in his no-fault benefits application, had denied that the accident occurred within the scope of his employment. By order dated July 12, 2023, the Civil Court (Heela D. Capell, J.) granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the default judgment, finding that defendant had proffered a reasonable excuse for its delay in answering as well as a potentially meritorious defense, extended defendant’s time to serve its answer, and implicitly denied the branch of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff appeals from so much of the order as granted the branch of defendant’s motion seeking to vacate the default judgment and extended defendant’s time to serve an answer.

Defendant established its entitlement to vacate the default judgment under CPLR 317. Although defendant specifically moved pursuant to CPLR 5015, under the circumstances presented, its motion to vacate the default judgment was also governed by CPLR 317 (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 142-143 [1986]; Kircher v William Penn Life Ins. Co. of NY, 165 AD3d 1241 [2018]). A defaulting defendant who was “served with a summons other than by personal delivery” may be permitted to defend the action upon a finding by the court that the defendant did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a potentially meritorious defense (CPLR 317; see Booso v Tausik Bros., LLC, 148 AD3d 1108, 1108 [2017]). “There is no necessity for a defendant moving pursuant to CPLR 317 to show a reasonable excuse for its delay” (Kircher, 165 AD3d at 1243; Booso, 148 AD3d at 1108). Here, defendant established that it did not receive actual notice of the action until it received the summons and complaint from the DFS on June 3, 2019, and, thus, it did not have enough time to defend within the 30-day period set forth in CCA 402 (b).

Defendant also demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the action, as the affidavits of defendant’s employee and plaintiff’s assignor’s employment supervisor stated that plaintiff’s assignor was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the automobile accident in which he was injured, which would entitle him to workers’ compensation benefits (see Mani Med., P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 28 Misc 3d 127[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51185[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). Consequently, we find that the Civil Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the branch of defendant’s [*3]motion seeking to vacate the default judgment.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and QUIÑONES, JJ., concur.