Decided on March 23, 2015

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Margaret A. Chan, J.), entered December 17, 2012, which granted defendant’s motion to consolidate four related actions and to limit any potential recovery of attorneys’ fees in the consolidated action to $850.

Per Curiam.

Order (Margaret A. Chan, J.), entered December 17, 2012, insofar as appealable, affirmed, with $10 costs.

We sustain so much of the order under review as limited the amount of any recovery of attorneys’ fees to the sum of $850, the maximum allowable pursuant to Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-4.6(e). Since this provision provides that attorneys’ fees in a no-fault action are to be calculated based on the “aggregate of all bills for each insured” disputed in any action, up to a maximum of $850 (LMK Psychological Servs., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 12 NY3d 217 [2009]), the $850 limit was properly applied to the claims at issue in this consolidated action, all of which involve the same parties and assignor, and arise from the same accident.

Plaintiff’s appeal from that portion of the order granting consolidation must be dismissed, inasmuch as plaintiff expressly “agree[d] to consolidation.” No appeal lies from an order entered on consent of the appealing party (see CPLR 5511; Shteierman v Shteierman, 29 AD3d 810 [2006]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Decided on March 17, 2015

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered April 17, 2013. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Because plaintiff failed to establish either that defendant had failed to pay or deny the claim within the requisite 30-day period (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]), or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]), plaintiff failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment. Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Decided on March 17, 2015

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Wavny Toussaint, J.), entered August 23, 2012. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court found that defendant had timely and properly denied the claims at issue on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage, in that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant failed to prove that it had mailed its EUO scheduling letters and denial of claim forms or that plaintiff had failed to appear for the EUOs; that defendant lacked justification for its EUO requests; and that defendant’s motion should have been denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), as plaintiff had not received discovery regarding the reasonableness of defendant’s EUO requests.

Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, the affidavits submitted by defendant established that the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), and the affirmation submitted by defendant’s attorney, who was present in his office to conduct plaintiff’s EUO on the scheduled dates, was sufficient to establish that plaintiff had failed to appear. Furthermore, since plaintiff does not claim to have responded in any way to the EUO requests, its objections regarding the EUO requests will not now be heard (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 35 Misc 3d 127[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50579[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Crescent Radiology, PLLC v American Tr. Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 134[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50622[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2011]). Consequently, discovery relevant to the reasonableness of the EUO requests was not necessary for plaintiff to oppose defendant’s motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Decided on March 17, 2015

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered July 6, 2012. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court found that defendant had timely and properly denied the claims at issue on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage in that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant failed to prove that it had mailed its EUO scheduling letters and denial of claim forms; that defendant lacked justification for its EUO requests; and that defendant’s motion should have been denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), as plaintiff had not received requested discovery regarding the reasonableness of defendant’s EUO requests.

Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the affidavits submitted by defendant established that the EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Furthermore, since plaintiff does not claim to have responded in any way to the EUO requests, its objections regarding the EUO requests will not now be heard (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 35 Misc 3d 127[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50579[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Crescent Radiology, PLLC v American Tr. Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 134[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50622[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2011]). Consequently, discovery relevant to the reasonableness of the EUO requests was not necessary for plaintiff to oppose defendant’s motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Barry A. Schwartz, J.), entered August 17, 2012. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon plaintiff’s first cause of action is granted and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendant’s cross motion.

The affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s owner was sufficient to establish plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to summary judgment upon its first cause of action (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33, 35 [2013]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). “[D]efendant’s mere denial of receipt of [the claim at issue] was insufficient to rebut the presumption of receipt established by plaintiff’s proof of mailing” (see Compas Med., P.C. v Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co., 38 Misc 3d 142[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50254[U], *2 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). Thus, defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to plaintiff’s first cause of action.

In support of the branch of defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s second cause of action, defendant submitted an affidavit by its claims examiner which established that defendant had timely mailed its verification requests and follow-up verification requests (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant demonstrated prima facie that it had not received the requested verification and thus that plaintiff’s second cause of action is premature (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]). However, in opposition to the cross motion, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from one of plaintiff’s employees, which affidavit was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the requested verification had been mailed to and received by defendant (Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]). In light of the foregoing, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether this cause of action is premature (see Healing Health Prods., Inc. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 Misc 3d 59 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment upon plaintiff’s first cause of action is granted and defendant’s cross [*2]motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (William A. Viscovich, J.), entered May 30, 2012, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered June 25, 2012 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the May 30, 2012 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $3,358.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, the order entered May 30, 2012 is vacated, and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

A no-fault provider establishes its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence, in admissible form, that the claim forms were mailed to and received by the defendant insurer, which failed to pay or deny the claims within the prescribed 30-day period (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33, 35 [2013]), or which issued timely denial of claim forms that were conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]).

While the supporting affidavit by plaintiff’s owner established that plaintiff had mailed the claim forms in question to defendant, and that defendant had failed to pay those claims within the requisite 30-day period, the affidavit failed to demonstrate either that defendant had failed to deny the claims within the requisite 30-day period or that defendant had issued timely denial of claim forms which were conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law. As plaintiff failed to meet its initial burden of establishing its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33). In any event, the affidavit by defendant’s litigation examiner and the attached complete copies of the denial of claim submitted in opposition to plaintiff’s motion were sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, the order entered May 30, 2012 is vacated, and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.