Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered January 3, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order as denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

While defendant sought summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for independent medical examinations and that plaintiff was seeking to recover for treatment which the assignor swore he never received, defendant failed to establish that such defenses are not precluded.^[FN1] As result, contrary to defendant’s contention on appeal, the record does not demonstrate that defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint on either of these grounds (see Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d 556 [2008]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 60 AD3d 1045, 1046 [2d Dept 2009]; cf. Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]). To the extent that defendant also sought summary judgment on the ground of lack of medical necessity, we find, upon a review of the record, that defendant is also not entitled to summary judgment on that ground.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Decision Date: July 28, 2014

Footnotes

Footnote 1: We note that if the treatment at issue had been rendered after April 1, 2013, pursuant to the revised Insurance Department Regulations, the defense that the services were not provided would not be subject to preclusion (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [g] [eff Apr. 1, 2013]).

Decided on July 28, 2014

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Decided on July 24, 2014

[*1]

The Rybak Firm, PLLC, Brooklyn (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellants.

Burke, Gordon & Conway, White Plains (Philip J. Dillon of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol R. Edmead, J.), entered on or about March 22, 2013, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted so much of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as sought a declaration that plaintiff properly disclaimed coverage of its insured, defendant Gregory Huff (defendants Alleviation Medical Services, P.C. and Great Health Care Chiropractic P.C.’s assignor), based, inter alia, on Huff’s breach of a condition precedent to coverage under the policy, and a permanent stay of any arbitration or court hearing for no-fault benefits arising from the underlying alleged accident involving Huff, and declared, among other things, that the disclaimer is proper, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The instant action arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on or about April 28, 2011, involving a vehicle insured by plaintiff. The vehicle’s owner and driver, defendant Gregory Huff, assigned his no-fault insurance benefits to defendant medical providers. Plaintiff commenced this action, in effect, seeking a declaration that it is not obligated to pay these no-fault benefits to defendants because, among other reasons, Huff failed to complete an examination under oath (EUO), as required by the subject insurance policy. Thus, plaintiff asserts that Huff breached a condition precedent to coverage under the policy, and defendant medical providers are not entitled to recover Huff’s no-fault benefits.

We find that Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor. In support of its motion, plaintiff relied primarily upon Huff’s EUO, which was corroborated by the affidavit of plaintiff’s investigator who was present at the examination. The EUO established that Huff appeared for his EUO, but departed before questions regarding the accident and his injuries had been asked. The aborted EUO of Huff, the named insured, established a prima facie case that Huff had breached a condition precedent to coverage under the policy.

In opposition, defendants do not dispute what occurred at the EUO. Instead, defendants argue that the transcript of the EUO was inadmissible. We find, however, that the EUO [*2]transcript of Huff was admissible evidence on the motion for summary judgment as it was certified by the court reporter and is considered a party admission (see Zalot v Zieba, 81 AD3d 935, 936 [2d Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 703 [2011]). Even if this were not the case, the affidavit of plaintiff’s investigator confirms that Huff did not seek another EUO, a fact the insured does not dispute. Insofar as defendants complain that plaintiff did not seek another EUO, the record demonstrates that Huff, represented by counsel, was advised of the ramifications of his refusal to continue the EUO, and confirmed that he understood.

An assignee “stands in the shoes” of an assignor and thus acquires no greater rights than its assignor (see Arena Constr. Co. v Sackaris & Sons, 282 AD2d 489 [2d Dept 2001]; see also Dilon Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 927, 930 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2005]). Since the defense of the breach of a condition precedent to coverage under the policy may indisputably be raised by plaintiff against Huff, it is available as against defendants, who accepted assignments of no-fault benefits (see Hammelburger v Foursome Inn Corp., 54 NY2d 580, 586 [1981]; Losner v Cashline, L.P., 303 AD2d 647, 648 [2d Dept 2003]). Concur—Sweeny, J.P., Renwick, Andrias, Richter and Kapnick, JJ.

Decided on July 16, 2014

Defendant, as limited by its brief, appeals from so much of an amended order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Joseph E. Capella, J.), dated July 3, 2013, as denied, in part, its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Per Curiam.

Amended order (Joseph E. Capella, J.), dated July 3, 2013, insofar as appealed from, reversed, without costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted in its entirety. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

The defendant-insurer made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the action for first-party no-fault benefits by establishing that it timely and properly mailed the notices for independent medical examinations (IMEs) to plaintiff’s assignor and his counsel, and that the assignor failed to appear (see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas, 111 AD3d 423 [2013]; American Tr. Ins. Co. v Solorzano, 108 AD3d 449 [2013]). With respect to the appearance issue, defendant presented competent evidence of the assignor’s nonappearance in the form of the sworn affidavits of the scheduled examining physician and an employee of the defendant’s third-party biller attesting to the affiants’ “personal knowledge of the office procedures when a[n] [assignor] failed to appear for a medical exam” (American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas, 111 AD3d at 424).

In opposition, plaintiff did not specifically deny the assignor’s nonappearance or otherwise raise a triable issue with respect thereto, or as to the mailing or reasonableness of the underlying notices (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]). Plaintiff’s remaining arguments, to the extent properly considered, are lacking in merit.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

[*1]

Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, N.Y., for appellant.

Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP, Melville, N.Y. (Mitchell L. Kaufman of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover no-fault medical payments under an insurance contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mahon, J.), entered October 2, 2013, which denied its motion for summary judgment on the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the complaint, in which the plaintiff sought to recover no-fault medical payments from the defendant, by tendering proof that the claim was neither paid nor denied within 30 days of the defendant’s receipt of the prescribed claim forms (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 51 AD3d 1014, 1017 [2008]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 750, 752 [2007]). However, in opposition, the defendant raised a triable issue of fact as to whether it timely and properly denied the claim based on the alleged intoxication of the plaintiff’s assignor at the time of the accident by the issuance of a denial within 30 days of the receipt of additional verification it requested concerning the claim (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Clarendon Natl. Ins. Co., 57 AD3d 659, 660 [2008]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 51 AD3d at 1017). Although, as the defendant acknowledges, some of the evidence it submitted was not in admissible form, it proffered an “acceptable excuse for [its] failure to meet the strict requirement of tender in admissible form” (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]; see Merriman v Integrated Bldg. Controls, Inc., 84 AD3d 897, 899 [2011]; cf. Oddo v Edo Mar. Air, 34 AD3d 774, 775 [2006]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint. Mastro, J.P., Chambers, Lott and Roman, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Fred J. Hirsh, J.), dated December 3, 2012. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first, fourth and fifth causes of action of the complaint are granted; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on the failure of plaintiff’s assignor to appear for scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). The District Court denied defendant’s motion on the ground that defendant had not offered a reason why it had requested an EUO. This appeal by defendant ensued.

With respect to the fourth cause of action, seeking to recover upon a claim for $879.73, and the fifth cause of action, seeking attorney’s fees with respect thereto, defendant established that the time to pay or deny this claim had been tolled by the timely issuance of EUO scheduling letters (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]); that plaintiff had failed to appear for either of the properly scheduled EUOs; and that the claim had been timely denied (see id.) on that ground. Contrary to the determination of the District Court, no “provision of No-Fault Regulations 68 requires an insurer’s notice of scheduling an EUO to specify the reason(s) why the insurer is requiring the EUOs” (2006 Ops Ins Dept No. 06-12-16 [http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/ogco2006/rg061216.htm]). Moreover, the Insurance Department’s interpretation of the Regulations “is entitled to deference unless irrational or unreasonable” (Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720, 722 [2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]). An assignor’s appearance at an EUO “is a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability on the policy” (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722). The opposing affirmation submitted by plaintiff’s counsel did not raise a triable issue of fact with respect to these causes of action. As plaintiff does not allege, let alone establish, that it or its assignor responded in any way to defendant’s EUO requests, plaintiff’s remaining objections regarding the EUO requests will not now be heard (see Crescent Radiology, PLLC v American Tr. Ins. Co., 31 Misc 3d 134[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50622[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2011]). Consequently, the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the fourth and fifth causes of action should have been granted.

With respect to the second cause of action, seeking to recover upon a claim for $878.66, and the third cause of action, seeking attorney’s fees with respect thereto, defendant’s claim representative stated that defendant had received plaintiff’s claim for the sum of $878.66 on July 8, 2010 and that it had denied the claim on October 4, 2010. She also stated that defendant had [*2]sent delay letters, dated July 30, 2010 and September 9, 2010 to plaintiff after the receipt of the claim. The letters informed plaintiff that payment of the claim would be delayed pending an EUO of the injured party. However, an insurer’s delay letters, which request no verification, are insufficient to toll the 30-day statutory time period within which a claim must be paid or denied (see Nyack Hosp. v Encompass Ins. Co., 23 AD3d 535 [2005]). Since defendant did not establish that it had otherwise tolled its time to pay or deny the claims, defendant failed to demonstrate that the claim underlying these causes of action had been timely denied. Thus, the branches of defendant’s motion seeking dismissal of the second and third causes of action were properly denied.

As the first cause of action does not allege a separate cause of action, it should also have been dismissed.

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first, fourth and fifth causes of action of the complaint are granted.

Iannacci, J.P., Marano and Garguilo, JJ., concur.

Decided on July 7, 2014

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

[*1]

District Court of Nassau County, First District, July 7, 2014

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Israel, Israel & Purdy for plaintiff.

Printz & Goldstein for defendant.

Background

This matter was submitted to the court for decision on the following stipulated facts.{**44 Misc 3d at 651}

Kenroy Palmer was injured in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on August 16, 2010. On August 31, 2010 and September 2, 2010, Meridian Psychological Service, P.C. provided psychological services to Palmer for injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident.

Meridian took an assignment of benefits and submitted the claim to Government Employees Insurance Co. (Geico) for payment.

Meridian mailed its claim for services, provided to Palmer on the aforementioned dates, to Geico on September 28, 2010. The documents sent to Geico included an NF-3, Verification of Treatment by Attending Physician or Other Provider of Health Services, signed by Walter Spear, Ph.D. on behalf of Meridian and an NF-AOB, New York Motor Vehicle No-Fault Insurance Law Assignment of Benefits Form signed by Palmer and Spear.

By letter dated October 17, 2010, Geico acknowledged receipt of Meridian’s claim and advised Meridian it would process the claim upon receipt of “A completed and signed no-fault application.”

By letter dated August 24, 2011, Meridian’s attorneys mailed a copy of a completed NF-2, “Application for Motor Vehicle No-Fault Benefits” that had not been [*2]signed by Palmer to Geico.

Geico did not respond to Meridian’s submission of the unsigned NF-2 or pay or deny the claim.

Meridian then commenced this action seeking to recover the unpaid no-fault benefits for the psychological services provided to Palmer.

Discussion

A carrier must pay or deny a claim for no-fault benefits within 30 days of receipt of a claim. (11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a].)

A carrier’s time to pay or deny a no-fault claim is tolled or extended until it receives all timely and properly requested verification. (Hospital for Joint Diseases v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 903 [2d Dept 2007]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [c]; 65-3.8 [a] [1].) An insurer does not have to pay or deny a claim until it receives all timely requested verification. (St. Barnabas Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 57 AD3d 517 [2d Dept 2008]; Mount Sinai Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 43 AD3d 889 [2d Dept 2007]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 568 [2d Dept 2004]; 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [c].){**44 Misc 3d at 652}

Geico could not continue to delay payment of Meridian’s claim after Geico received the completed but unsigned copy of the application for no-fault benefits from Meridian’s attorneys. (Nyack Hosp. v Encompass Ins. Co., 23 AD3d 535 [2d Dept 2005]; Nyack Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 13 Misc 3d 139[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 52233[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2006].) Upon receipt of the unsigned NF-2, Geico was required to either pay or deny the claim or requested additional verification. (Nyack Hosp. v Encompass Ins. Co.) Geico did neither.

Even if the court were to consider Geico’s October 17, 2010 letter a timely request for additional verification (11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [b]), Geico would not have a defense to this action because Geico did not comply with the follow-up verification requirements of the no-fault regulations. If a carrier requests additional verification and the additional verification is not received after 30 calendar days from the original request, the carrier must follow up with the party from whom additional verification was requested either by telephone or mail. (11 NYCRR 65-3.6 [b].) If the carrier fails to follow up on its request for additional verification, its time to pay or deny the claim is not extended. (Westchester Med. Ctr. v Allstate Ins. Co., 112 AD3d 916 [2d Dept 2013]; Sound Shore Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 AD3d 157 [2d Dept 2013].)

Since the parties stipulated to the timely submission of the claim, the psychological services provided by Meridian to Palmer are presumed to be necessary. (All County Open MRI & Diagn. Radiology P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co., 11 Misc 3d 131[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50318[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2006].) Geico did not timely pay or deny the claim and/or did not properly or timely follow up on its request for additional verification. Therefore, Geico does not have a defense to this action.

The court finds for the plaintiff.

Decided on July 1, 2014

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Genine D. Edwards, J.), entered July 17, 2012. The order granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant answered the complaint and served demands for discovery on March 8, 2010, including a notice to take the deposition of plaintiff’s owner and its treating doctor. On November 17, 2010, plaintiff served a notice of trial and certificate of readiness. Thereafter, defendant moved, pursuant to Uniform Rules for New York City Civil Court (22 NYCRR) § 208.17 (c) and CPLR 3126, to vacate plaintiff’s notice of trial and certificate of readiness, to strike the case from the trial calendar and, pursuant to CPLR 3124, to compel discovery. Defendant argued that it sought the testimony of plaintiff’s owner and documentary discovery in connection with its defense that plaintiff was ineligible for reimbursement of no-fault benefits because it had failed to comply with applicable state or local licensing laws. In support of its motion, defendant set forth detailed and specific reasons for its belief that plaintiff is a professional service corporation which fails to comply with applicable state or local licensing laws and, thus, is ineligible to recover no-fault benefits (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313 [2005]). Plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting, among other things, that defendant had failed to demonstrate its entitlement to discovery. By order entered July 6, 2011, the Civil Court conditionally granted defendant’s motion and ordered plaintiff to produce its “purported” owner and its “purported” employee for an examination before trial within 60 days of the order.

Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3126, on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with the July 6, 2011 order of the Civil Court since plaintiff had failed to produce its owner and its employee for duly scheduled examinations before trial. Plaintiff opposed the motion and submitted written responses to defendant’s discovery demands. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court entered July 17, 2012 which granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

” The determination whether to strike a pleading for failure to comply with court-ordered disclosure lies within the sound discretion of the trial court’ ” (Orgel v Stewart Tit. Ins. Co., 91 AD3d 922, 923 [2012], quoting Giano v Ioannou, 78 AD3d 768, 770 [2010], quoting Fishbane v Chelsea Hall, LLC, 65 AD3d 1079, 1081 [2009]; see Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 123 [1999]). Although dismissing a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a drastic remedy, it is warranted where a party’s conduct is shown to be willful, contumacious or in bad faith (see Rock City Sound, Inc. v Bashian & Farber, LLP, 83 AD3d 685 [2011]). In the present case, plaintiff’s willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from its refusal to adequately comply with [*2]discovery requests, even after being directed to do so by court order, as well as the absence of a reasonable excuse for its failure to comply (see Tos v Jackson Hgts. Care Ctr., LLC, 91 AD3d 943 [2012]; Rowell v Joyce, 10 AD3d 601 [2004]).

Plaintiff’s remaining contention is not properly before this court as it is raised for the first time on appeal.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Pesce and Aliotta, JJ., concur.