Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Wavny Toussaint, J.), entered May 17, 2012. The order denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover on claims for $837.63 and $1,193.50 are granted; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, defendant established, with respect to claims for $837.63 and $1,193.50, that the denial of claim forms had been timely mailed (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a]; see also St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) and that the claims had been denied on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs). Defendant also submitted an affidavit by an employee of the company which had been retained by defendant to schedule IMEs, which affidavit established that the scheduling letters had been timely mailed in accordance with that office’s standard mailing practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). Defendant further submitted an affidavit by the healthcare professional who was to perform the IMEs, which affidavit established that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Since defendant demonstrated that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage, the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover upon these claims should have been granted.

To the extent defendant’s motion sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint with respect to claims for $515 and $199.35, defendant failed to establish, as a matter of law, that these claims had been timely denied (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [l]).

Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that the branches of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover on claims for $837.63 and $1,193.50 are granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Pamela L. Fisher, J.), entered May 24, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed from and as limited by the brief, denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, the Civil Court denied defendant’s cross motion and held that the sole issue for trial was defendant’s defense that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for independent medical examinations (IMEs).

In support of its cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint, defendant submitted an affidavit by the president of Media Referral, Inc., which had been retained by defendant to schedule IMEs, which affidavit sufficiently established that the IME requests had been timely mailed (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant also submitted, among other things, affirmations from the doctors who were to perform the IMEs, which affirmations were sufficient to establish that plaintiff’s assignor had failed to appear for those duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]).

In view of the foregoing, and as plaintiff has not challenged the Civil Court’s finding, in effect, that defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted (see id.).

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered May 7, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In support of its motion, defendant submitted an affidavit by an employee of the company which had been retained by defendant to schedule independent medical examinations (IMEs), which affidavit established that the IME scheduling letters had been timely mailed in accordance with that office’s standard mailing practices and procedures (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant also submitted affidavits by the healthcare professionals who were to perform the IMEs, which affidavits established that plaintiff’s assignors had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). In addition, the affidavit executed by defendant’s litigation examiner sufficiently described the standard mailing practices and procedures to establish the timely mailing of the denial of claim forms (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond, 50 AD3d 1123; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 17 Misc 3d 16). An assignor’s appearance at an IME is a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability on the policy (see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Pamela L. Fisher, J.), entered May 1, 2012. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied its motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant’s cross motion should have been denied, and plaintiff’s motion should have been granted, because defendant submitted an affidavit to the court that had been executed in Pennsylvania and which was not accompanied by a proper certificate of conformity, and because defendant had not tolled its time to pay or deny the claims at issue as its delay letters, attached as exhibit “D” to its cross motion, “failed to conform to the requirements of a proper EUO [examination under oath] request letter.”

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the affidavit submitted by defendant was accompanied by a proper certificate of conformity (see CPLR 2309 [c]). In any event, the absence of a certificate of conformity for an out-of-state affidavit is not a fatal defect (see Fredette v Town of Southampton, 95 AD3d 940 [2012]; Active Chiropractic, P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 43 Misc 3d 134[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50634[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]).

Furthermore, while plaintiff correctly argues that the letters attached to defendant’s cross motion as exhibit “D” “failed to conform to the requirements of a proper EUO request letter,” and that these letters failed to toll defendant’s time to pay or deny the claims at issue, plaintiff has not demonstrated on appeal that the Civil Court improperly held that defendant had timely denied the claims at issue. Indeed, the record reflects that defendant submitted EUO scheduling letters attached to its cross motion as exhibit “F,” which appear to contain the information plaintiff found to be lacking in the letters attached as exhibit “D,” and plaintiff has raised no issue with respect to the sufficiency of those letters.

In view of the foregoing, plaintiff has provided no basis upon which to reverse the order of the Civil Court. Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), entered May 3, 2012, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered May 18, 2012 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the May 3, 2012 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $1,438.92.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

Defendant’s contention that plaintiff did not establish that it has standing to receive reimbursement of the first-party no-fault benefits to which its assignor is entitled because plaintiff failed to annex a copy of the assignment of benefits form executed by its assignor is not properly before this court, as this argument is being raised for the first time on appeal (see Joe v Upper Room Ministries, Inc., 88 AD3d 963 [2011]). In any event, since the claim forms received by defendant stated that plaintiff’s assignor had executed an assignment and, as in Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. (9 NY3d 312, 319-320 [2007]), defendant was advised that the signature on the assignment was “on file,” defendant’s contention is devoid of merit (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 312, 319-320 [2007]).

Defendant’s remaining argument is likewise not properly before this court, as this argument is also being raised for the first time on appeal (see Joe, 88 AD3d 963) and, in any event, this argument lacks merit (cf. Radiology Today, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 145[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50148[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), entered April 26, 2012. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

A no-fault provider establishes its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence, in admissible form, that claim forms were mailed to the defendant insurer, and that the insurer failed to pay or deny those claims within the prescribed 30-day period or issued timely denial of claim forms that were conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 [2013]; Ave T MPC Corp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 128[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51292[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; see also Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 [2010]).

While the supporting affidavit by plaintiff’s employee established that plaintiff had mailed the claim forms in question to defendant, and that defendant had failed to pay those claims within the requisite 30-day period, the affidavit failed to demonstrate that defendant had either failed to deny the claims within the requisite 30-day period or that defendant had issued timely denial of claim forms which were conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law. As plaintiff failed to meet its initial burden of establishing its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered March 14, 2012. The order denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the supplies at issue were not medically necessary.

Defendant’s papers established that it had timely denied the claims at issue (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]) based on a lack of medical necessity. However, upon a review of the record, we find that there is a triable issue of fact regarding the medical necessity of the services at issue. Accordingly, the order is modified by providing that defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Wavny Toussaint, J.), entered March 22, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed from, made, in effect, CPLR 3212 (g) findings in plaintiff’s favor, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and limited the issue for trial to medical necessity.

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $25 costs.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had timely and properly denied the claims at issue based on a lack of medical necessity. The Civil Court denied defendant’s motion and limited the issue for trial to medical necessity.

We find that defendant has failed to articulate a sufficient basis to strike the Civil Court’s implicit CPLR 3212 (g) findings in plaintiff’s favor (see EMC Health Prods., Inc. v Geico Ins. Co., 43 Misc 3d 139[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50786[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]). Moreover, upon a review of the record, we find that there is a triable issue of fact regarding the medical necessity of the services at issue (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Carol Ruth Feinman, J.), entered December 16, 2011, deemed from a judgment of the same court entered February 17, 2012 (see CPLR 5501 [c]). The judgment, entered pursuant to the December 16, 2011 order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $3,087.90.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, with $30 costs, the order entered December 16, 2011 is vacated, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. A judgment was subsequently entered, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).

The affidavit of defendant’s no-fault claims examiner established that defendant had timely mailed its verification request and follow-up verification requests (see St. Vincent’s Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Defendant demonstrated that it had not received all of the verification requested, and, in opposition to defendant’s cross motion, plaintiff did not show that such verification had been provided to defendant prior to the commencement of this action. Consequently, the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay or deny the claims at issue did not begin to run (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [a]; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]; D & R Med. Supply v American Tr. Ins. Co., 32 Misc 3d 144[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51727[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]), and, thus, plaintiff’s action is premature.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, the order entered December 16, 2011 is vacated, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.